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Abstract 
 North Korea and the ruling Kim regime continues to present a unique security dilemma to 
both East Asia and the international community.  The Kim regime's actions, which often include 
hostile military and diplomatic foreign policy actions, often seem inconsistent with parallel 
efforts to peacefully engage the international community.   
 This research examines the following question: what has been the historic relationship 
between North Korea’s domestic conditions and its propensity to engage in “hostile” diplomatic 
and military activities?  I also consider whether the concept of diversionary theory, the idea that 
leaders pursue external conflict when faced with domestic problems, is an explanation for these 
actions.  The study initially proposes there is a relationship between North Korea’s domestic 
challenges and its willingness to engage in conflict activities aimed primarily at South Korea and 
the United States.  To test these ideas, I conduct a quantitative analysis of North Korean event 
data collected from both US and Korean sources from 1960-2011 and a qualitative analysis of 
three case studies.   
My findings provide only limited support to the idea that internal conditions faced by the 
Kim regime influence its conflict behavior.  More influential are a select number of external 
conditions, especially those involving South Korea, which often prompt North Korean responses 
and heightened conflict levels.  This research also finds that the ruling Kim regime has often 
turned to diversion-type actions as a means to achieve domestic goals, yet diversionary theory 
itself is insufficient to explain these activities.  North Korea represents an ongoing security 
dilemma for both East Asia and the international community and in this study, I demonstrate 
how historical and political science methods can be used to examine and explain the actions of 
this reclusive state.  
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Preface 
Almost thirty years before my first trip to South Korea, my own father directly supported 
ROK ground troops deployed to Vietnam.  As a US Army helicopter pilot, he provided air-
mobile support to ROK combat units in South Vietnam during Operation Kil Tong Hong in 1967.  
Between 1969 and 1971, I lived with my family in the Philippines near Clark Air Force Base, 
while my father coordinated logistical support for US troops in Vietnam.  At the same time, two-
thousand miles away in Korea, ROK and US troops were also fighting together against the North 
Koreans along the DMZ.  Forty years later, the tension between the Koreas remained as 
dangerous as it was in the 1960s and the stakes are much higher.  My own experiences in Korea 
began in 1995 and included late nights in operation centers, “no-notice” emergency meetings and 
briefings, and military training events that ranged from the tactical to strategic level.  These 
events and experiences were influenced by not only North Korea, but also by other key actors 
within the region (the US-ROK alliance, China, Japan, and Russia).  These countries, and the 
international community, are concerned with North Korea’s development and acquisition of 
sophisticated conventional weapons and nuclear technology.  While the probability of a 
catastrophic event or war remains low, the possibility remains.   
Over the years, the DPRK regime has shown a surprisingly consistent foreign policy, 
focused on national sovereignty and ensuring that the Kim family remains in power.  It also 
continues to oppress its own people as a means to this end.  Yet Western policies towards North 
Korea are often based on the “crisis of the moment” rather than a long-term consideration of 
DPRK activities.  A better understanding of the nature and incidence of political and military 
conflict on the Korean peninsula might spur better international responses or confirm the 
usefulness of current ones.  My research is a unique effort to examine this closed state using 
systematic and analytical methods to scrutinize the Kim regime’s choices to use hostile acts to 
achieve foreign policy goals.   
  
1 
 
Chapter 1 - Introduction 
North Korea defines its military actions as part of a historical continuum and…will continue to use force as the 
single most important policy tool in the foreseeable future. 
                                                                                                     Narushige Michishita (2009) 
 
 
North Korea uses both diplomatic threats and armed force to advance its own political, 
socio-economic, and military agendas.  These include assassination attempts against South 
Korean political leaders, terrorist-style bombings, kidnapping of civilians, border clashes with 
ROK and US troops, missile tests, and most recently, the development of nuclear weapons.  
Unfortunately, the opaque nature of North Korea’s government and society makes efforts to 
understand and explain these activities difficult.  The DPRK is a rare exception among modern 
states where the government permeates throughout society, maintaining significant control over 
its population.  While North Korean-produced information is often either unreliable or 
impossible to obtain, data and methods do exist that have the potential to explain why the 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (the DPRK or North Korea) chooses foreign policy 
actions ranging from cooperation to the use of military force.  This dissertation seeks to explain 
North Korea’s foreign policy behavior, focusing on its use of force in relation to the domestic 
and international conditions it faces.  
In this dissertation, I examine the following question:  What has been the historic 
relationship between the domestic conditions faced by North Korean leaders and their propensity 
to engage in “hostile” diplomatic and military activities?  Additionally, I examine whether or not 
the concept of diversionary theory is an explanation for these actions.  The study initially 
proposes there is a negative relationship between domestic conditions and external conflict 
activities.  Specifically, I proposed that as domestic conditions in North Korea deteriorate, the 
incidence of DPRK-initiated conflict actions increase.  To test these ideas, I conduct a 
quantitative analysis of North Korean event data collected from both US and Korean sources 
from 1960-2011 and a qualitative analysis of three case studies.   
I initially argue that North Korea uses diplomatic pronouncements, political 
maneuvering, and military force to achieve its policy objectives and these events are dependent 
on internal conditions faced by the Kim regime.  I propose that diversionary theory (the idea that 
leaders seek to distract the public from domestic conditions) is a possible explanation for why 
  
2 
the Kim regime has historically chosen to engage in these types of hostile actions.  Most 
international relations scholars readily admit that domestic factors influence foreign policy, yet 
the linkages between local conditions and international actions by authoritarian states are often 
difficult to identify.  North Korea’s foreign policy activity might also be susceptible to domestic 
influence, similar to Western democracies, or Pyongyang might be “exempt” from these types of 
influences due to its seemingly total control of North Korean society.  The international 
community seeks stability and prosperity for East Asia and thus a better understanding of the 
determinants of North Korea’s foreign policy activity can be a valuable contribution to this end.   
 1.a. Problem Statement 
This study seeks to identify and analyze links between the conditions faced by North 
Korea and its foreign policy actions.  North Korea poses a security concern for not only East 
Asia, but also the entire international community with its demonstrated nuclear, conventional, 
and asymmetric military capabilities and willingness to leverage these to attain foreign policy 
goals.  Although conceived as a socialist state, North Korea has developed into a military 
dictatorship with an established “cult of personality” society with a large standing army and a 
wide array of military capabilities.  As Cho (2009, 1) observes, “North Korea presents a dual 
challenge as a newly-nuclear global rogue state and, at the same time, a traditional regional 
security problem.”  The tense relationship between North Korea and its neighbors has resulted in 
continuous efforts by South Korea (and its main ally, the US) to attain the military capacity to 
deter the North from hostile military activity.  Despite the hope of change in the DPRK after the 
death of Kim Jong-il in 2011, the “new Kim regime” led by his son (Kim Jong-un) has shown 
surprising continuity with North Korea’s historic trends of conflict and suppression.  
North Korea routinely initiates both localized and international “provocations,” often 
considered both inexplicable and unprovoked by the outside world, with regional and global 
implications.  Pyongyang’s efforts to maintain control over its population, aggressive defense 
posture, military buildup and repositioning of forces, routine clashes along its borders, nuclear 
proliferation and provocative statements all cause concern for its neighbors and the international 
community.  As Kongdan Oh (2000, 185) notes,   
The basic problem is that the principles that the Kim regime pursues…are 
incompatible with the principles of the dominant Western states.  Threatened by 
this incompatibility, the Kim regime resorts to harsh totalitarian measures…while 
pursuing a policy of military strength and state-sponsored crime to carve out a 
  
3 
place in a post-cold war environment that is becoming increasing hostile to 
oppressive regimes.   
 
This “incompatibility” results in an environment of consistent tension within East Asia 
and an ongoing security dilemma for regional actors (including the United States).  These tense 
international conditions, North Korea’s domestic challenges, and the DPRK’s hostile foreign 
policy activity all form the basis for this research effort. 
 1.b. Study Significance 
The closed nature of North Korea regime makes the ruling Kim regime extremely 
difficult to study.  One of the primary goals of this research is to provide an example of how 
scholars and policymakers can use available information to examine the characteristics of North 
Korean conflict behavior.  In this research, I examine quantitative and qualitative data to test the 
idea that either internal or external influences form the basis of DPRK conflict.  While this type 
of analysis is common in international relations scholarship, few studies attempt this with North 
Korea.  Instead, current scholarship on the DPRK focuses solely on the current threat posed by 
the DPRK and outputs often include short term, time-sensitive policy recommendations, or 
historical views of North Korean activities.  Notable past research efforts includes assessments 
by academic and government sources, which often provide important analyses of North Korean 
society, politics, and provocative actions,
2
 but there are few systematic empirical analyses of the 
motives or conditions related to the Kim regime and its activities.  Additionally, only a handful 
of cross-national research efforts attempt to analyze North Korean political and military activity 
using modern social science methods.
3
   
 Additionally, there have been a number of useful studies on theoretical approaches to the 
causes of interstate conflict and state interactions (Waltz 1954 and 1979; Wendt 1992; Bueno de 
Mesquita and Lalman 1992; Putnam 1988; Morgan and Bickers 1992).
4
  Other studies exist that 
                                                 
2
 For example, scholars such as Cha (2012), Hassig and Oh (2009), Martin (2006), and Cumings (2005) all 
provide excellent qualitative accounts of North Korea from a political, societal and historical perspective. 
3
 There have been some generalized studies on authoritarian conflict behavior that have included North 
Korea (Lai and Slater 2006; Kisangani and Pickering 2007).  Additionally, Davies (2005; 2006; 2007) analyzed the 
effect of US policy on North Korea.  Yet, the only systematic study of North Korean-initiated conflict is 
qualitatively-focused (Michishita 2009).   
4
 The “traditional theorist” view of interstate activity (Waltz 1954 and 1979; Wendt 1992) focuses on 
external causes of conflict (international system or a state’s perception of the international environment), but 
overlook influence of domestic conditions.  Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman (1992) downgrade of the importance of 
  
4 
focus on the domestic determinants of conflict behavior to include Peceny and Beer (2003), Lai 
and Slater (2006), Sobek (2007), Bell (2009), Li, James, and Drury (2009), Pickering and 
Kisangani (2005, 2007, 2009, 2010), and Bak and Palmer (2011).  Unfortunately, those research 
efforts often prove inadequate when applied to the inter-Korean security dilemma because they 
omit analysis of the unique security characteristics that exist in East Asia.  My research on North 
Korea seeks to enhance and build upon previous projects that examine the relationships between 
internal conditions and external uses of force.
5
  
One study that is comparable to this project is Narushige Michishita’s 2003 dissertation 
and his expanded case studies and longitudinal research (2009) on North Korea’s diplomatic 
history and use of military force.  Michishita (2009, 2-3) proposes that North Korea’s conflict 
activity focused was not based on reactions to domestic conditions or a “hostile international 
environment.”6  He notes that diversionary theory is most likely not a factor for North Korea’s 
activities, but in correspondence, he comments that examining the question was important 
(Michishita 2011).  While Michishita’s research provides an excellent basis for this project, he 
uses only qualitative methods to analyze North Korean conflict behavior.  The use of a mixed-
method approach (using quantitative and qualitative analysis) might have provided more support 
for his conclusions.   
Additionally, while Michishita dismisses the effect of domestic influences on external 
conflict activity, he does identify instances of this behavior in his text.  In several passages, he 
mentions the linkage between North Korea’s initiation of conflict activities and domestic 
                                                                                                                                                             
realist theories (and focus on the importance of domestic factors) and provide useful support to the idea that 
domestic factors influence international activity, but do not directly address these concepts in relation to the Korean 
regimes.  Putnam (1988) uses a “two-level approach” to diplomacy assumes that national leaders are subject to the 
whims of their constituents (which is not always the case in inter-Korean dilemmas).  Morgan and Bickers (1992) 
focused exclusively on democratic governments in their study and provided useful information, but this is of limited 
value when considering the characteristics and actions of communist North Korea. 
5
 Prior scholarship on diversionary theory provides a wide-ranging and diverse theoretical basis for this 
study.  For example, Peceny and Beer (2003) argue that autocracies do not follow the same rules as other polities 
because reelection and public opinion are less influential in these societies.  Lai and Slater (2006) observe that 
legitimacy is an indicator of conflict propensity for authoritarian regimes: the more legitimate, the less likely the 
regime will initiate conflict.  Sobek (2007) identified the benefits of diversionary force and the incentives leaders 
have to engage in “violent adventures.”  Bell (2009) examines the relationship between diversionary activities and 
transparency and contends that increased transparency results in decreased diversionary force.  Li, James, and Drury 
(2009) provide one of the only quantitative studies of diversionary activity in East Asia in their research on Taiwan 
and mainland China. Pickering and Kisangani (2005; 2007; 2009; 2010) have done extensive work on diversionary 
force use by autocracies under conditions of internal unrest or economic difficulties.  Finally, Bak and Palmer 
(2011) argued that for authoritarian leaders, domestic factors constrain their tendency to engage in diversionary 
activities. 
6
 Michishita (2009) examines eight case studies spanning 40 years. 
  
5 
concerns of the Kim regime.  For example, he acknowledges that the 1966-1968 DMZ and the 
USS Pueblo incidents were possibly intended to strengthen Kim Il-sung’s status both at home 
and abroad (Michishita 2009, 31, 50).  Michishita (2009, 92) also notes that North Korea’s 1976 
Axe Murder Incident helped bolster the position of Kim Jong-il as the future leader of the 
regime.  He additionally identifies partial associations between North Korea’s nuclear threats in 
1994, missile testing and proliferation activities, West [Yellow] Sea naval clashes and efforts by 
the Kim regime to maintain power (Michishita 2009, 114, 135, 160).  Finally, Michishita (2009, 
186) comments that North Korea’s nuclear test in 2006 was “extensively used for domestic 
propaganda purposes.  After the nuclear test, words of celebration appeared in every corner of 
the nation.”  This analysis, along with observations by other scholars and policy practitioners 
(including my own research), provides the background for new research (such as this project) to 
examine the relationships between North Korea’s domestic conditions and external conflict 
behavior.   
 The only other influential study found during this research is Jung’s (2012) analysis of 
North and South Korean conflict behaviors.  Jung (2012) examines the relationship between 
internal conditions and external conflict using a mixed-methods approach to analyze the 
applicability of diversionary theory and other explanations of conflict.  Jung’s (2012) study 
includes two case studies, one on South Korea’s deployment of troops in support of American 
forces in Vietnam during the 1960s and the North Korean nuclear crisis in the 1990s.  
Additionally, Jung (2012, 168-169) adds a quantitative cross-national analysis to the case studies 
and concludes that there is a complicated relationship between domestic unrest and interstate 
conflict.
7
  In his analysis of the two Koreas, Jung (2012, 169) states, “political leaders are 
motivated by domestic unrest to initiate military aggression but also constrained by foreign 
conditions.”   
 These two studies provide an important, although limited, foundation for the examination 
of internal conditions and ongoing conflict between the Koreas.  Although there have been a 
limited number of other studies that include data on conflict involving the Koreas,
8
 none have 
                                                 
7
 Jung (2012, 168-169) notes that the quantitative analysis showed that the presence of a “rising power, the 
territory target, and the hegemony target” all contribute to a relationship between interstate conflict and domestic 
unrest.   
8
 These include Clark, Fordham and Nordstrom (2011); Kim (2010); Kisangani and Pickering (2007); 
Davies (2005, 2006, 2007); Fordham (2005); Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2004); Peceny and Butler (2004); and 
Peceny, Beer, and Sanchez-Terry (2002).   
  
6 
used a mixed-method approach focused solely on the relationship between North Korean hostile 
actions and internal conditions.  In this study, I use social science analytical methods and a 
middle range international relations concept (diversionary theory) to examine and attempt to 
explain DPRK-initiated conflict activities.  These same methods have been used extensively to 
study Western nations and, at the very least, will provide an example of an approach to the 
analysis of opaque nations, demonstrating the importance of using social science methods to 
analyze similar regimes.
9
     
This single-country longitudinal study provides an in-depth analysis of DPRK-initiated 
hostile foreign policy on the Korean peninsula from 1960 to 2011.  Although there are merits to 
comparing the Korean situation with other authoritarian states (as in cross-sectional studies), the 
focus of this research seeks to conduct a thorough analysis of DPRK-initiated diplomatic or 
armed conflict and to identify and explain relationships in Korean-specific cases.  While the 
findings may offer limited generalizability, the methods have broad applications in the analysis 
of other “limited-information” states.  This study provides an example of how to gather and 
analyze data on an authoritarian state with limited outside access: the North Korean regime 
remains arguably the most closed garrison state that exists today.  This research is both relevant 
to the “real world” and makes a “specific contribution” to existing literature:  conditions that 
King, Keohane, and Verba (1996, 15) identified for useful academic scholarship.   
This research effort also strives to apply methods that include the “best practices” from 
both historians and political scientists as both fields have much to offer to the study of conflict.  
While historical narratives often lack comparability and breadth, political science research is 
often too focused on methodologies, theoretical discussions, and quantitative analysis techniques 
that overlook the advantages of in-depth studies of particular events.  This research uses both 
detailed examinations of specific cases and comparisons across time of the relationships between 
North Korea’s conflict events and external factors.  As Levy (1997, 33) notes, “The worst abuse 
of each discipline is to ignore the other.  History is too important to leave to the historians, and 
theory is too important to leave to the theorists.”   This research blends two academic approaches 
in an effort to address a significant gap in current scholarship on DPRK conflict behavior. 
                                                 
9
 See Toft (2010) and Li (2008) for mixed-method study examples.  
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 1.c. Theoretical Concepts  
North Korea’s foreign policy activities, as with most other nations, range from conflictual 
to cooperative relationships with external states.  For example, economic cooperation with other 
nations does occur, and North Korea has gone to considerable effort to establish and maintain 
special economic zones with both China and South Korea (Lankov 2011).  Yet the international 
community is most concerned with Pyongyang’s provocative foreign policy actions, which (at 
least on the surface) seem to demonstrate the Kim regime’s willingness to risk war to achieve its 
foreign policy goals.  These “hostile foreign policy actions” (or HFP) include activities such as 
diplomatic threats, clandestine infiltrations into South Korea, naval clashes, and nuclear weapons 
testing.   
1.c.1.  Expanding the Scope of Foreign Policy Actions  
Defining the concept of foreign policy can be problematic, and many studies of 
international relations and foreign policy activities omit definitions entirely.
10
  For international 
relations scholars studying state interactions, the term foreign generally denotes actions and 
entities that are focused or exist outside the state and the term policy represents a wide range of 
activities including “specific decisions (to sign a weapons treaty, for example) and general 
guidelines (to support human rights, for example)” (Kaarbo et al. 2002, 4).  These actions can 
range from military activities to diplomatic communication between nations (in a cooperative or 
threatening manner).  Foreign policy also constitutes an underlying philosophy of action used by 
a state to pursue its own best interests.  Rochester (2008, 21) defines foreign policy as 
 
…a set of priorities and guides for action that underlies a country’s behavior 
toward other states and includes both the basic goals a national government 
seeks to pursue in the world and the instruments used to achieve those goals. 
 
Domestic concerns and foreign policy are inextricably linked and national efforts to 
maintain internal and external security.  Foreign policy is also a tool used by states to maintain 
conditions that are supportive of the regime in power and is exercised through political, 
diplomatic, and military power (Sarkesian et al. 2008, 4).  Foreign policy activities (policies) 
                                                 
10
 Rochester (2008, 21) notes, “Trying to define foreign policy is reminiscent of the judge in the obscenity 
case who said, ‘I can’t define it, but I know it when I see it.’ We all sort of know what is meant by the term.” 
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encompass a continuum of state actions ranging from cooperation to conflict and these 
descriptions help clarify these concepts.  
Miroslav Nincic (1975, 624) defines hostile foreign policy as “emanating from bearers of 
official authority in each nation and directed toward other nations in the international 
system…[and]…a set of behaviors characterized by negative affect and/or the desire to impose 
deprivations.”  Additionally, given this discussion and the unique characteristics of North Korea, 
the term hostile foreign policy consists of interactions or “events” involving two states.  Events 
are defined as “Any overt input and/or output of the type ‘who does what to and/or with whom 
and when,’…[with] ramifications for the behavior of an international actor or actors and [is 
publicly] recorded” (Azar et al. 1982, 374).   
1.c.2.  Defining Hostile Foreign Policy Activity (the Dependent Variable) 
Based on the discussion above on the scope of foreign policy actions, I define hostile 
foreign policy (HFP) activity as  
 
Domestic or international actions by governments or government-sanctioned 
entities intended to negatively influence or detrimentally affect a target state 
through diplomatic, social, economic, or military activities ranging from 
provocative statements to hostile acts in support of national or regime goals. 
 
This statement focuses on both domestic and international measures and the effects of 
these activities on target states.  These actions are undertaken by governments or entities that are 
supported by the governments (either overtly or covertly) including foreign policy actions 
(events) by diplomats, economic organizations (domestic or international), and military actions 
that have either internal or external characteristics.
11
  This study focuses on foreign policy 
activities that intended to have negative or detrimental effects on the target state.
12
  These 
activities can include actions that are conducted directly against a target state (such as military 
conflict) or lesser actions that are intended to influence other states, including propaganda 
statements or an unwillingness to cooperate.  Additionally, these activities span the full range of 
national power and include diplomatic actions by the government or its diplomats, economic 
measures with local or international effects, and military activities including exercises or actual 
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  These types of actions include events such as localized land-based military exercises or show of force 
operations in international waters. 
12
  Although concurrent study of the conditions of both conflict and cooperation is an important research 
topic, this dissertation focuses solely on the study of North Korean-generated conflict.   
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hostilities.  Finally, these actions are linked to national leadership and efforts to retain both 
sovereignty and power:  these are deliberate activities in support of national or regime 
objectives.   
 In the case of North Korea, this definition provides for the inclusion of a wide range of 
policy actions.  Aside from military events, HFP activities also include North Korea’s routine use 
of propaganda statements and aggressive policy announcements, which often spur international 
concern.  North Korea’s threat in 1994 to turn Seoul into a “sea of fire” was a warning of DPRK 
intentions to use nuclear weapons against the ROK and was conveyed by a Pyongyang diplomat 
(Financial Times 1994).  Other provocative statements from the Kim leadership on the security 
situation, such as North Korea’s annual “New Year’s Statement,”13 often include threats from the 
civilian leaders of the DPRK against both the US and South Korea.   
 Economic activity that fits the category of “hostile foreign policy” often is directed 
against joint (North-South) economic ventures, such as the Kaesong Industrial Complex near the 
western border of North and South Korea and the Mount Kumgang Tourist Area on the east 
coast of the DPRK.  For example, in August 2011, North Korea seized all South Korean assets at 
the Mount Kumgang and ended its joint venture with the ROK at that location (Chosun Ilbo 
2011a; 2011b).
14
  Finally, North Korea’s military activities are the most visible of its hostile 
foreign policy actions and range from DMZ incidents and West Sea fishing vessel clashes to 
ballistic missile firings and nuclear tests.  Yet there are limits to North Korea’s hostile actions, as 
the Kim regime does not intend to start a second Korean war.
15
  Rather the DPRK’s leaders are 
most likely focused on shaping the overall security environment to sustain North Korea’s 
national sovereignty and to ensure the Kim regime maintains control over the North’s 
government and society.   
                                                 
13
 This annual message, broadcast in North Korea and internationally via national television and print 
media, is somewhat similar to the United States’ yearly “State of the Union” address.  It is intended for both 
domestic and international audiences and outlines key areas of progress and concern.  For example, the 2011 
message “warned the South’s [ROK] government to stop what it called ‘north-targeted moves’ and a ‘smear 
campaign’ against it [DPRK]” (Ramstad 2011). 
14
 This incident demonstrates the complexities of North-South relations.  In 2008, North Korean guards 
killed a South Korean tourist for “trespassing in a military-controlled area” and the Kim regime has linked the 
seizure of assets to that incident (Chosun Ilbo 2011a).  In 2011, North Korea began soliciting businesses in other 
nations (including China, Japan, and the US) to provide assistance in restarting tours to the area (Chosun Ilbo 
2011b).  While North Korea’s actions are partially inspired by its own economic objectives, the killing of the South 
Korean tourist became an international incident that triggered the closure of this resort and both negative actions and 
denouncements by North Korea.  
15
 War on the Korean peninsula would result in catastrophic effects, and most scholars agree that the Kim 
regime would not survive a large-scale conflict with South Korea and the US.   
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1.c.3.  Domestic Conditions (the Independent Variable)   
This research proposes that while many factors influence North Korea’s foreign policy, 
internal conditions are potentially the most significant influencers of hostile actions.  The internal 
characteristics of North Korean society, while intensely controlled by the Kim regime, remain 
linked to political, social, or economic conditions.  If these internal conditions become unstable 
or deteriorate, the resultant effects will have a detrimental influence on North Korean society as a 
whole.  Several authors conceptualize this in terms of domestic challenges faced by the ruling 
regime.  Dassel and Reinhardt (1999, 57) use the term “domestic strife,” defined as “the 
contestation of political institutions, or conflict over the basic rules governing political 
competition” while discussing diversionary activity and links this concept to external conflict 
behavior.  Davies (2002, 682) uses several variables to measure “domestic strife” including riots, 
armed attacks, protests, and political strikes.  Fordham (2005, 141) refers to “domestic economic 
and political conditions” as influential in the actions of US rivals to avoid conflict.  Fordham 
(2005, 143) examines domestic political difficulties to include US economic conditions 
(unemployment, inflation, GDP growth) and rival states’ economic performance, using energy 
consumption as a proxy for economic growth.   
This research considers both positive and negative domestic conditions and tests whether 
diversionary theory (which predicts an inverse relationship between domestic conditions and 
conflict) explains North Korean activities.  The concept of domestic conditions for this study is 
generally represented as the conditions within a state (i.e. North Korea) that have effects on 
society from a political, economic, or social aspect.   
For North Korea, political conditions that fall into this category (of domestic conditions) 
include regime stability and control DPRK society.  Ake (1975, 273) defines political stability as 
“the extent that members of society restrict themselves to the behavior patterns that fall within 
the limits imposed by political roles expectations.  Any act that deviates from these limits is an 
instance of political instability.”  Gates et al. (2006, 907) add that it requires “institutional 
consistency” and that both autocracies and democracies have inherent characteristics that “self-
enforce” political stability.   
Economic conditions are often used to determine the internal stability of states.  For 
North Korea, these are potentially indicated by proxy measures including the rise and fall of the 
DPRK’s gross domestic product (GDP) and the trade with foreign countries (how much the 
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DPRK imports and exports).  These two indicators help determine the health of North Korea’s 
economy and relative dependence on external nations to support its domestic material needs. 
Finally, the influencers of social unrest include the level of satisfaction that both the 
elites (privileged members) of society as well as the masses (ordinary citizens) feel towards the 
ruling government.  Kisangani and Pickering (2007, 285) discuss elite unrest in terms of 
“government crises and purges” and mass unrest as characterized by “general strikes, riots, and 
anti-government demonstrations” in their analysis of the effects of diversionary military 
activities.  Social unrest is also influenced by food, medical and energy shortages, health care 
capabilities and the number of North Korean citizens who flee the country (defectors).  These 
factors are potential indicators of the ability of the DPRK to provide the basic necessities for its 
citizens.  The three categories (i.e., political, economic, and social) of domestic “difficulties” 
form the basis for this study’s concept of the conditions which possibly cause diversionary 
behavior.  For this study, I define domestic conditions as: 
 
The actual or perceived political, economic, or social conditions that affect North 
Korean society including conditions that interfere with or enable the Kim 
regime’s ability to govern and maintain control over the DPRK population. 
 
This definition assumes that conditions which threaten North Korea’s sovereignty or the Kim 
regime’s ability to govern could potentially spur diversionary behavior and conditions that 
support domestic stability result in decreased levels of external conflict. 
1.c.4.  The Concept of Diversionary Behavior 
The concept of diversion focuses on domestic influences and may help clarify why North 
Korea chooses to use diplomatic threats and military force in some instances and not in others.
16
  
I use diversionary theory to test the proposition that internal conditions can help explain North 
Korea’s hostile foreign policy activities.  As a “middle-range” theory of international relations, 
diversionary theory contends that leaders, in times of crisis will commit their nations to external 
uses of force to alleviate the national focus from domestic to international issues.  In other 
words, domestic leaders identify an external threat (or actor) and engage in heighten levels of 
hostile action in order to shift the nation's attention away from internal troubles.  As a result, this 
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 This concept has a number of names such as the diversionary theory of war, the diversionary hypothesis, 
diversionary force, or diversionary foreign policy (Levy 1989; Mitchell and Thyne 2010, 461-462; Kisangani and 
Pickering 2007, 278; Oakes 2006, 433-434).   
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external threat helps to alleviate focus on the domestic strife and ensure the leader's position in 
power.   
Diversionary foreign policies provide advantages for leaders including the potential shift 
of public attention towards international issues and demonstration of the domestic “leader’s 
capacity for strong leadership” (Hagan 1986, 293).  Other benefits of diversionary activities 
include increased domestic support, justification of a “crackdown” (such as martial law), 
diversion of public attention from issues that cause domestic dissatisfaction, and increased 
support to the regime due to “an in-group/out-group effect” (Sobek 2007, 31).  Thus, leaders may 
have tangible incentives to attempt to divert public attention from domestic problems.   
By analyzing North Korea’s hostile foreign policy activities and the Kim regime’s 
domestic conditions, this study seeks to identify the causal relationships between these two 
variables and to test the relevance of diversionary theory as an explanation.  North Korea 
remains susceptible to the domestic pressures that potentially cause attempts to divert popular 
attention through aggressive foreign policies.  By using a structured empirical (qualitative and 
quantitative) analytical approach, this research examines linkages between specific conditions 
and North Korean-initiated conflict actions.  In the next chapter, I review the extant literature on 
the concept of diversion and diversionary theory to lay the groundwork for this research effort.  
The following two chapters include a quantitative analysis of DPRK conflict from 1960-2011 
and the qualitative portion of the dissertation, in which I analyze three case studies of conflict on 
the Korean peninsula.  Finally, I conclude with a comparison of the quantitative and qualitative 
research and provide my findings, policy implications, and recommendations for further 
research. 
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Chapter 2 - Diversionary Concepts and Historical Background 
North Korea has used force to achieve its policy objectives, however idiosyncratic they might be,  
within the structural conditions it faces. 
 Michishita (2009) 
 
In this study, I use both a mixed social science methods (quantitative and qualitative 
analysis) and multidisciplinary approach (political science and history) to analyze North Korean 
conflict.  Historians and political scientists approach the study of war often through distinctly 
different approaches.  The historian generally uses an inductive approach by analyzing events 
and facts, which helps to determine the root causes of the conflict, the interconnectedness of key 
actors, and the overall impacts of these actions.  Historians are less inclined to attempt to predict 
and more likely to provide evidence to academics and policymakers means to prepare for the 
future (Gaddis 1997, 84).  Political scientists approach the study of war using deductive 
techniques.  They formulate and test theories on the relationships between events or conditions 
and attempt to provide simple (“parsimonious”) and generalizable explanations as to why 
conflict occurs (Kellstedt and Whitten 2009, 4).  Although historians and political scientists 
approach the study of conflict from different methodological perspectives, both fields generally 
agree that tension between nations remains an enduring characteristic of interstate activity and a 
crucial focus for academia.  The seemingly unpredictable nature of “rogue states” such as North 
Korea makes the analysis and prediction of hostile foreign policy activities events a critical task.  
While grand international relations theories may provide a perspective on the external 
determinants of state behavior,
17
 more recent scholarship on internal factors related to hostile 
foreign policy activities are more applicable in efforts to explain DPRK actions.  A number of 
authors (Fearon 1994; Morgan and Bickers 1992; Putnam 1988; Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman 
1992; Bueno de Mesquita et al 2003) emphasize domestic interests as an important mechanism 
for external uses of force.  Middle range theories that link domestic and international politics 
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 From an international relations perspective, there is a tendency to categorize North Korean activity in 
terms of grand theory, especially structural realism (Bluth 2011, 14).  The DPRK has limited allies, focuses on state 
survival, and often engages in activities to preserve its sovereignty and international status.  “Middle range” 
behavioral theories (rather than traditional “grand” concepts), such as the diversionary hypothesis, offer possible 
explanations for the Kim regime’s foreign policy choices.  International relations theorists now place less emphasis 
on grand theories and tend to favor “non-paradigmatic” theories (Maliniak et al. 2011, 439) and diversionary theory 
fits neatly in this category of non-traditional concepts. 
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(Rosenau 1969; Li 2008), such as diversionary theory, are much more applicable to the analysis 
of armed and political conflict on the Korean peninsula.  The following paragraphs will discuss 
the extant research on diversionary theory, including a summary of the argument, criticisms, and 
recent developments in this field.    
 2.a.  Literature Review 
 Historical anecdotes surrounding the use of diversion by national leaders to solve 
domestic tensions are abundant.  Notable figures such as Machiavelli, Shakespeare, and Jean 
Bodin have commented on the unifying potential of diversionary foreign policy activity.
18
  
Additionally, one of the most famous interstate conflicts, the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905), 
began purportedly because Russia needed a “short victorious war to stem the tide of revolution” 
(Walder 1974, 56).  A number of more recent conflicts have been associated with the 
diversionary use of force including the 1982 Falklands War, US invasions of Iraq in 1991 and 
2003, US 1998 missile attacks against terrorist targets in Afghanistan and Sudan, and the conflict 
between Russia and Georgia in 2008 (Oakes 2006, 442; Kisangani and Pickering 2009, 485; 
Oreskes 1990, A21; Milbank 2002, A1; Purdum 1998, A1; Filippov 2009, 1844).
19
 
2.a.1.  Diversionary Theory as an Explanation for Conflict 
The roots of diversion concepts are generally attributed to sociologist Georg Simmel who 
proposes that individuals and groups threatened by external forces would coalesce and cooperate, 
regardless of their differences.
20
  Simmel (1955 [1898], 91-92) observes,  
 
…the group as a whole may enter in antagonistic relations with a power outside of 
it, and it is because of this that the tightening of the relations among its members 
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 Machiavelli (1882 [1513], 73) was referring to diversionary behavior when he observes “…the present 
king of Spain…attacked Granada…[and] kept the nobles of the Castile occupied with this enterprise, and, their 
minds being thus engaged by war, they gave no attention to the innovations introduced by the king, who thereby 
acquired a reputation and an influence over the nobles without their being aware of it.” In his play King Henry IV, 
Shakespeare (1823 [1600], 295) comments, “Be it thy course to busy giddy minds with foreign quarrels; that action, 
hence borne out, may waste the memory of former days.”  Additionally, Bodin (1955 [1606], 168) stated, “The best 
way of preserving a state, and guaranteeing it against sedition, rebellion and civil war is to keep the subjects in amity 
one with another, and to this end, to find an enemy against whom they can make common cause.”   
19
 This is not an inclusive list as many other conflicts have been associated with diversionary war such as 
the Franco-Prussian Wars, World War I, the United States’ war with Vietnam, and the 1996 conflict in Rwanda 
(Mayer 1969, 299; Lenin 1930, 76; Fordham 1998, 568; Pickering and Kisangani 2005, 23). 
20
 A number of scholars have reviewed the literature on domestic and external conflict linkages and the 
validity of diversionary theory including Mack (1965), Wilkenfeld (1973), Hazlewood (1975), Stein (1976), Stohl 
(1980), Vincent (1981), James (1987), Levy (1989), Meernick and Waterman (1996), Levy (1998) and Fravel 
(2010).  
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and the intensification of its unity, in consciousness and in action, occur…each 
element in a plurality may have its own opponent, but because this opponent is 
the same for all elements, they all unite – and in this case, they may, prior to that, 
not have had anything to do with each other… 
 
Durkheim’s (1951 [1897]) studies on suicide and other research on the concept of the “in-
group” versus the “out-group” (Sumner 1906) lent support to Simmel’s views.21  Others contest 
this idea and propose that internal disturbances and war were independent, concluding that 
external war was not required for initiating or ending domestic instability (Sorokin 1957).  
Alternatively, political scientist Quincy Wright (1971[1942], 140f) observes “Foreign war [was] 
a remedy for internal tension, revolution or insurrection has been an acceptable principal of 
government” and suggested that the wars associated with the Crusades (1095-1291), World War 
I (1914-1918), and the beginnings of the Second Sino-Japanese War in 1931 were all examples 
of “remedies” for domestic unrest.22  Additionally, Wright (1971[1942], 253-254) concludes,   
 
War has also had a role in maintaining the established status of nations and the 
established international order…This function of war has been more important in 
some states than in others, but there is none in which war or war preparations 
have not to some degree at some time been used as an instrument of national 
stability and order. 
 
Sociologist Lewis Coser (1956) attempts to systemize and refine Simmel’s original 
concept of group cohesion and external threats.  Coser (1956, 93) notes that external tensions 
could unify individuals into a group, but also could result in the fragmentation and disintegration, 
if it lacked previous cohesion or if not all of the members of the group are equally threatened 
(Stein 1976, 144).  Nevertheless, these behavioral explanations and the linkage between internal 
and external conflict appealed to political scientists as an alternative to the prevailing neorealist 
and systems-level theories of international relations (Richards et al. 1993, 505).       
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 Sumner (1906, 12) lent support to this concept and used the terms “we-group, or in-group” to describe 
those who would band together when threatened by “other-groups, outgroups.”  Other sociological research at the 
time concurred with this view such as  mile Durkheim’s 1897 study on the phenomenon of suicide.  Durkheim 
(1951 [1897], 208) notes that national crises tend to “rouse collective sentiments, stimulate partisan spirit and 
patriotism, political and national faith alike, and concentrating activity toward a single end, at least temporarily 
cause a stronger integration of society.”  Arthur Stein (1976, 146) also discussed the importance of this research on 
the decline of suicides during national crises and notes that Durkheim “infers that that the decrease is due to the 
increased group integration during crises.” 
22
 Wright (1971[1942], 266) also proposed that for authoritarian governments, “war has continued to be 
useful for both internal and for external policy.” 
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Empirical tests to determine the extent of these relationships between internal conditions 
and external use of force
23
 were characterized by mixed results and disputes over methodology.  
These included Rummel (1963, 100) and his Dimensions of Nations Project
24
 which focuses on 
how to quantify domestic conflict.  Rummel (1963, 100) concludes, “Foreign conflict behavior is 
not a necessary and sufficient condition for domestic peace.”  Tanter (1966, 60) replicates 
Rummel’s 1963 research and finds that there might be “no ‘simple’ relationship between 
domestic and foreign conflict behavior, but there may be a causal relationship which is being 
obscured by other phenomena.”  Other studies confirm Rummel’s previous conclusions that 
there was either a limited or a nonexistent relationship between domestic conflict and foreign 
(external) uses of force (Tanter 1969, 556; Burrowes and Spector 1971, 316).  In response to 
these mixed results, Rosenau (1969, 2) argues that this field of “linkage politics” was still in 
development and that “it has long been recognized that national political systems…respond to a 
larger environment” and had never been studied using “systematic, sustained, and comparative 
inquiry.”  
Wilkenfeld, Lussier, and Tahtinen (1973, 297) conduct research on external military use 
of force involving Middle Eastern states
25
 and find that domestic conditions did influence foreign 
conflict, but with significant variations based on type of regime.  In a more comprehensive study, 
Wilkenfeld (1972, 281) explores the relevance of regime type and diversion by dividing states 
into three categories for analysis: personalist (dictatorships with less bureaucracy including 
South Korea prior to 1987), centrist (authoritarian nations with more bureaucracy, including 
states such as North Korea), and polyarchic (democratic states such as the US) for analysis.
26
  
Wilkenfeld (1972, 298) also notes that diversionary behavior might be constrained by fears that 
the use of force might not achieve leaders’ goals and observes, 
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 The most relevant studies involved the “use of force” rather than the expansion of the concept to hostile 
foreign policy.  For this dissertation, the external “use of force” by states is considered a subset of foreign policy 
activities. 
24
 North and South Korea were included in Rummel’s study (1963, 105) 
25
 These included Israel, Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon (Wilkenfeld et.al 1972, 150). 
26
 Banks and Textor (1963) base these groupings on a systematic analysis and categorization of states.  
Wilkenfeld (1972, 298) also found that polyarchic and centrist states demonstrated “an overriding tendency to 
pursue a policy of foreign conflict behavior that matched the state’s previous foreign conflict level, i.e. to perpetuate 
the existing level of foreign conflict.”  Personalist states acted independently of prior conflict levels, but did 
demonstrate “influences of domestic conflict levels on the level of foreign conflict” Wilkenfeld (1972, 298).    
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Thus, for the personalist ruler, relatively free to make foreign policy decisions and 
alter them, the prospect of diverting attention from his deteriorating domestic 
situation by engaging in a mild form of foreign conflict is a tempting policy 
alternative and one not difficult to pursue.  However, the discovery of significant 
relationships between prior and subsequent levels of belligerency indicates that 
this particular course of action may be more difficult to terminate than to initiate.  
Having focused public attention upon a hostile opponent, the personal ruler may 
be constrained by the very public attitudes he had sought to generate. 
 
A number of scholars offered harsh critiques of the foundations and methodology used 
for early diversionary propositions.  These criticisms generally focus on misinterpretation and 
omissions related to Coser’s work, which is usually identified as the historic basis for modern 
diversionary theories.  Coser (1956, 93-94) qualifies his findings by emphasizing that a given 
group will perceive the external actor as less threatening if the group has potential for cohesion 
and is also convinced that the collective action will reduce the external threat.  Levy (1989, 161) 
comments that Coser’s qualifying conditions were often omitted in social science research and 
by the 1980s many scholars adhered to Dahrendorf’s (1973, 297) view that “It appears to be a 
general law that human groups react to external pressure by increased internal coherence.”   
Mack (1965, 389) adds that Coser’s findings are “cited by everyone and heeded by no 
one.”  Stein (1976, 145) echoes these sentiments and faulted social science research for the 
“casual acceptance of the [internal-external conflict] hypothesis without any of the caveats” and 
the “paucity of empirical conflict literature in sociology.”  Levy (1989, 262) agrees and notes 
logic concerns with the social science efforts to generalize Coser’s research on conflict from the 
individual to national level of analysis.  In another critique of the discussion over the theoretical 
relationship between internal and external conflict, Mack (1975, 613) notes  
 
The total lack of theoretical input has been one of the main criticisms leveled 
against the early work of the DON [Dimensions of Nations] Project, with which 
the Rummel and Tanter studies are associated.  The same criticism also applies to 
the other studies.  In general, no strong relationships have been discovered 
between external and internal conflict behavior.  Given the methods used, this 
proves absolutely nothing. 
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While Mack’s assessments27 are both boorish and entertaining, he does identify many of 
the enduring criticisms of both diversionary theory to include problems with theoretical 
foundations, data collection, and quantitative testing methods (Mack 1975).  Other authors 
criticize these early works for their vague definitions of conflict (Stein 1976, 145), 
methodological problems with timeframes (Bronson 1997, 11; Levy 1989, 265-266) and the lack 
of “theoretical foundations” and the influence of reciprocity (Levy 1989, 266).   
Levy (1989, 263) concludes that this method of diversion research has “failed to produce 
any cumulative results.  We have a set of findings that are scattered and inconsistent, and these 
inconsistencies have yet to be resolved or explained.”  Levy proposes to extend the length of 
studies to account for long-term changes potentially linked to diversion and an emphasis on 
methods, such as the inclusion of “structured, focused comparison” of a limited number of 
historical cases (Levy 1989, 284).
28
  Despite the problems mentioned above, this “first wave”29 
of research provides the foundations for subsequent theoretical and empirical work on domestic 
conditions and external use of force at the state and international levels. 
2.a.2.  More Recent Developments in Diversionary Literature 
Over the past 20 years, diversionary theory has expanded into an important research 
program, but one that lacks a common approach to distinguishing diversionary cases from other 
instances of use of force activity.  As Fravel (2010, 307) notes,  
 
The diversionary hypothesis offers a seductive explanation for why states initiate 
crises or go to war.  The notion that a desperate leader might provoke conflict 
with another state to deflect attention from problems at home is intuitively 
compelling and seems to reflect commonsense. 
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 Mack (1975, 616-618) also comments that the studies give the impression that “they were performed by 
intelligent Martians whose only knowledge of the world was based on the data banks culled from such sources as the 
New York Times Index, and whose theoretical ideas were wholly constrained by a knowledge of little more than 
electronic techniques for data manipulation and correlation testing” and “the most useful contribution to political 
science which can be claimed for the papers criticized in this article is that they have demonstrated beyond all 
reasonable doubt that a research effort which many thought a waste of time at the outset is, in fact, a waste of time.” 
28
 Levy was referring to the case study methods in Alexander George’s (1982) “Case Studies and Theory 
Development” presentation.    
29
 James (1987, 25) refers to these initial empirical and theoretical efforts as the “first wave” of research on 
diversionary relationships.  In this research, I use both a structured, focused comparison of cases and another case 
study method (process tracing) to examine the qualitative data.  More details on my application of these methods are 
included in Chapter 4. 
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Recent scholarship has included a shift towards emphasizing the components of 
diversionary relationships, such as regime type, levels of conflict, economic factors, and 
constraints on domestic leader activities.  Rather than comprehensive surveys of the correlations 
between internal and external uses of force, much of the current scholarship focuses on the 
relationships between democratic states and diversion, and other types of diversionary activities, 
rather than simply on conflict or war.
30
  Additionally, much of the research during the late 1980s 
and 1990s focused solely on the United States’ diversionary actions. 
Diversionary Activities by Western Democracies.  Ostrom and Job (1986), James and 
Oneal (1991), Morgan and Bickers (1992) and DeRouen (1995) examine United States 
presidential decisions to use force based on domestic conditions.  Morgan and Bickers (1992, 49-
50) expand the view of diversionary theory including “cooperative foreign policy [and] domestic 
political actions” and other events short of war, concluding that democratic leaders may commit 
to diversionary activity when faced with domestic strife.  Alastair Smith (1996, 133) analyzes 
reelection incentives for US presidents and find that when leaders are unsure of their ability to 
retain office or if their foreign policy decisions could increase popular support, they will often 
engage in “violent, adventurous foreign policy.”  James and Rioux (1998, 800-801) note that a 
small increase in popularity occurs “when U.S. presidents respond with vigor in an international 
conflict” but if actual military force is used, this “rallying effect” is cancelled or even becomes 
negative depending on the level of force applied.  
Yet many scholars still questioned the scope, methodology, and analytical procedures 
associated with diversionary theory.  Historian Geoffrey Blainey (1988, 291) discounts the 
“scapegoat theory” and disagreed with the proposal that leaders initiate wars to “promote peace 
at home” citing other factors for the onset of war.31  Additionally, Meernick and Waterman 
(1996, 587) note that when a US president chooses to engage in the external use of force, the 
decision is most likely based on “…national security concerns, U.S. responsibilities as a 
hegemon, and the peculiarities of the crisis he is facing when making such momentous 
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 This supports the expansion of the definition of “use of force” to hostile foreign policy when studying 
potential diversion events. 
31
 Blainey (1988, 293) identifies seven factors that have influenced leadership decisions for war throughout 
history: “(1) military strength and the ability to apply that strength efficiently in the likely theater of war; (2) 
predictions of how outside nations will behave if war should occur; (3) perceptions of whether there is internal unity 
or discord in their land and in the land of the enemy; (4) knowledge or forgetfulness of the realities and sufferings of 
war; (5) nationalism and ideology; (6) the state of the economy and also its ability to sustain the kind of war 
envisaged; [and] (7) the personality and experience of those who shared in the decision.” 
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decisions” rather than domestic concerns.  Gelpi (1997, 256) criticizes the field’s narrow focus 
on conflict and omission of other less violent options for leaders to respond to domestic 
challenges.  He notes that leaders have three options when mass unrest occurs: “(1) grant the 
demands of the dissatisfied groups, (2) repress the dissatisfied groups by force, and (3) divert the 
public's attention by using force externally” (Gelpi 1997, 256).   
Regime type is also considered a determining factor.  Democratic leaders will tend to use 
diversionary force while authoritarians will “repress the unrest directly, and these acts of 
repression will make them less likely to use force internationally” (Gelpi 1997, 256).  Gowa 
(1998, 307,320) contends that political activity “…does stop at the water’s edge…[emphasis in 
original]” in an analysis of US conflict behavior and that “Neither political-military cycles nor 
partisan politics have had any observable effect on U.S. recourse to use of force abroad between 
1870 and 1992.”  Additionally, conceptual issues also have been criticized including the nature 
of diversion and its status as a theory (Williams 2000 and Bronson 1997). 
Cross-Sectional Studies of Diversionary Activities.  While much of the diversion 
literature in the 1980s and 1990s focused on the United States, some of the most important (and 
most recent) research has involved cross-sectional studies with extended timeframes and other 
methods, which address many of the criticisms raised by James (1987) and Levy (1989).  As 
Hayashi (2004, 14) observes, current diversionary research has  
 
…shifted from a simple question of whether domestic unrest provides leaders 
with an incentive to engage in diversionary conflict abroad to that of whether this 
“willingness” to divert attention externally is constrained by “opportunity” to do 
so.  Increasingly, researchers have attempted to develop hypotheses explaining 
how the environment is conducive to diversionary behavior, and construct 
research designs to induce more rigorous testing. 
 
 Enterline and Gleditsch (2000) and DeRouen (2000) review the relationship 
between use of force abroad and use of repression domestically and find some support for 
the link between domestic conditions and international conflict.  Additionally, Chiozza 
and Goemans (2003, 461) analyze the reciprocal nature of conflict (on both the sender 
and receiver) and conclude that along with incentives to divert, leaders also fear losing 
office because of the same activity.  This “endogeneity mechanism” is an important part 
of the diversion hypothesis and must be considered when examining cases attributed to 
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domestic conflict (Chiozza and Goemans 2003, 462).  Mitchell and Prins (2004, 958) 
explore other conditions that affect the likelihood of diversion and find that the presence 
of economic difficulties (inflation) and non-democracies’ lack of transparency made 
diversionary activity more likely.  Chapman and Reiter (2004,  906) examine the “rally 
round the flag” effect in the US in relation to instances of militarized disputes and find 
that UN Security Council support boosted presidential approval ratings by “as much as 8 
or 9 points.”  Additionally, Mitchell and Thyne (2010, 463) argue that “issue claims” 
(such as border disputes) provide opportunities for diversionary activity and militarized 
disputes and Tir (2010, 422) also concurs that territorial disputes provide opportunities 
for diversion.  These research efforts are typical of more recent studies, which have 
moved past the basic inquiries towards more sophisticated questions.  As Bronson (1997, 
2) observes, the real question in examining diversionary theory is “when…and under 
what conditions does it work rather than simply does it work? [emphasis in original].”   
Meernik (2001, 902) criticizes diversionary theorists for their “fixation” on domestic 
factors and the use of force and failing to appreciate the importance of international influences.  
Clark (2003, 1013) notes that the same domestic conditions, which might cause democratic 
leaders to pursue external military actions, also provide their targets “incentives to maintain low 
profiles.”  Mitchell and Prins (2004, 938) argue that transparency was the explanation for the 
reduction in opportunities to use force by democratic states.  Thus potential targets of democratic 
nations are often well aware of the possibility of pending conflict and adjust their behavior 
accordingly.  Alternatively, Mitchell and Prins (2004, 938) contend that non-democratic states 
face fewer constraints based on transparency and that “Paradoxically, then, the initiation of 
diversionary force by nondemocratic regimes fits the pattern that we have expected traditionally 
from democratic states.” 
Kisangani and Pickering (2007) provide a more nuanced examination the diversionary 
hypothesis with their research on the use of force from both a “benevolent” and “belligerent” 
perspective.
32
  By controlling for regime types (democracies, mixed regimes, and autocracies), 
Kisangani and Pickering (2007) identify differences in the responses of these types of 
governments to diversionary conditions.  Kisangani and Pickering (2007, 296) find that 
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 Kisangani and Pickering (2007, 277) distinguished between the use of diversionary force for 
“benevolent” means such as humanitarian operations (low politics issues or “socioeconomic interventions”) and for 
more aggressive purposes (high politics issues or “politico-strategic interventions”).   
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democratic and mixed regimes prefer “low-risk, low-profile” socio-economic interventions while 
autocracies, when faced with domestic challenges, do not use any form of “external armed force” 
to remedy their situation.  They conclude that both democratic and mixed governments engage in 
diversionary activity, although not the “high profile, confrontational military force we typically 
envision” (Kisangani and Pickering 2007, 297).   
 2.b.  Diversion and the North Korean Case 
No diversionary theory research exists that is singularly focused on North Korea’s hostile 
foreign policy activities.  However, a number of related case studies on diversionary activity 
provide examples of the advantages of single or limited country studies.  Levy (1998, 152-153) 
notes that empirical research which dismisses the relationship between domestic unrest and 
external conflict “contrasts sharply with evidence of external scapegoating from historical and 
journalistic accounts and from a growing body of case-study evidence.”     
2.b.1.  Case Studies on Diversion 
A number of authors have used case studies to examine specific historical events and 
their relationship to diversionary theory.  These include Fravel (2010, 338) and his examination 
of Turkey’s 1974 invasion of Cyprus and Argentina’s 1982 seizure of the Falkland Islands (both 
incidents are often cited as historic examples of diversionary activity).  However, Fravel (2010, 
338) concludes that the evidence supports neither case as being spurred by diversionary 
behavior.  Others examine the Falklands War with mixed results (Kisangani and Pickering 2009; 
Oakes 2006).  Davies (2008, 209) reviewed Iran’s behavior toward the US from 1990-2004 and 
concludes that although Tehran might have had incentives to divert, the Iranians tend to take 
measures to “avoid confrontation with the United States.”  Yet, in a review of Middle East 
politics, Tures (2004, 617, 624) notes that both Syria and Lebanon have a history of diversionary 
activity.  In examining more recent uses of force, Filippov (2009, 1844) argues that Russia’s 
conflict with Georgia in 2008 was influenced by both security concerns and “domestic 
diversionary goals.”  These types of case studies provide important details on individual 
instances that are often omitted during empirical analysis studies of the use of diplomatic or 
armed force.   
2.b.2.  Regime Type and Diversion 
Other authors focus on regime type when analyzing diversionary behavior and the 
characteristics of non-democratic governments that engage in these activities.  Miller (1995) 
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concludes that autocratic regimes with lower resource levels had a higher propensity to divert.
33
  
Peceny and Beer (2003, 340) comment that the rules for autocracies are different: autocrats are 
not concerned with reelection or public confidence data and they can crack down on internal 
unrest and disband legislatures as needed.  Additionally, Debs and Goemans (2010, 430) contend 
that nondemocratic regimes are less likely to divert due to difference in “post-exit” fates: 
democratic leaders risk the loss of reelection while autocrats who are deposed risk “more 
punitive” results (jail or loss of life).  Bak and Palmer (2011, 23) also studied the relationship 
between domestic conditions and diversion and identify a number of constraining factors 
(including domestic and elite unrest) that limit authoritarian leaders’ decisions to engage in 
international diversionary activities.     
Mitchell and Prins (2004, 937) observe that diversionary activities are related to the 
“strategic and historical relationships among states” and that non-democratic states are more 
prone to diversion in the traditional sense.  In fact, they note that among enduring rivalries,
34
 
states can better justify diversionary uses of force when domestic unrest is at heightened levels 
(Mitchell and Prins 2004, 938).  They also explore other conditions that affect the likelihood of 
diversion and determined that the presence of economic difficulties (inflation) and non-
democracies’ lack of transparency made diversionary activity more likely (Mitchell and Prins 
2004, 958).  Reilly (2004, 7) notes that states like North Korea, the former Yugoslavia and the 
Russian Federation have engaged in diversionary activity and “exemplify how weak states 
externalize their own domestic crises, employ violence to reduce threats, and respond 
aggressively to international pressures.” 
Pickering and Kisangani (2005, 39) conclude that mature autocracies are less likely to 
divert compared to consolidating ones and that seasoned dictators tend not to engage in external 
uses of force because of either mass or elite unrest.  In other research, Kisangani and Pickering 
(2007, 295) contend that autocracies do not generally appear to engage in external actions based 
on internal unrest, but that “socio-economic interventions” are possible during times of economic 
distress.  In more recent work, Pickering and Kisangani (2010, 490) also argue that personalist 
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 Miller (1995, 779) stated, “…the lower the ability of society to remove a leader from power, the more 
likely the leader will be to abuse that power for personal gain; and the fewer the resources available to leaders to 
influence their domestic environment, the more likely they are to use foreign policy to pursue their political 
ambition.” 
34
 The conflict between North and South Korea fits this concept of “enduring rivalries.” 
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regimes are prone to international uses of force as the level of elite unrest increases.
35
  They also 
concluded that all types of regimes are prone to external military diversion under conditions of 
elite unrest, but that the reciprocal domestic effects from these actions are often negative and 
include mass unrest and economic distress (Pickering and Kisangani 2010, 490).  Bell (2009, 
176) also studied the conditions that affect a leader’s propensity to divert domestic attention and 
concluded that transparency remains the key to limiting diversionary behavior.  As with other 
research on diversionary theory, the analysis of regime type and other factors provides a more 
refined approach, but continues to demonstrate the complexities of examining the impetus for 
state-level foreign policy actions. 
2.b.3.  East Asia Studies on Diversionary Behavior 
While most of the scholarship on diversionary theory has focused on cross-sectional 
studies or solely on western democracies, few studies specifically examine East Asia.  Yet, as Li 
(2008, 224) notes, “the study of diversionary theory should not be limited to Western major 
powers…The case of China-Taiwan has shown that leaders of non-Western [states] can indeed 
initiate diversionary behaviors.”  Other authors examine the application of diversionary concepts 
to historical cases from Japan (Nicholls 2010; Hayashi 2004) and China (Johnston 1998).  Shirk 
(2008, 62,144) comments that “Any Chinese government that looks weak in the face of foreign 
pressure is likely to be overthrown” and that the PRC often uses its relationship with Japan to 
divert attention from “difficult domestic problems.”  However, Downs and Saunders (1998-1999, 
121) note that China remains wary of the pitfalls of the rallying effect and that “Excessive 
nationalism can stir up demands for assertive international policies that Chinese leaders cannot 
presently satisfy.”  Yet Woods and Dickson (2012, 30) observe that the majority of Chinese are 
inclined towards nationalistic attitudes and tend to view actions by foreign governments as 
“hostile to Chinese interests.”  Finally, studies of Chinese nationalism find that China’s 
intellectuals continue to focus on “patriotism and economic growth” rather than more 
progressive issues such as political reform and individual rights (Nam 2006, 163).   
Bennett (2010, vii) notes that North Korea does engage in diversionary activity and 
contends that in the future, choices to engage in diversion could be prompted by mass or elite 
unrest.  He also comments that North Korea’s attack against South Korean diplomats in Rangoon 
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 Pickering and Kisangani (2010, 478) emphasized the importance of distinguishing between types of 
autocracies and rely on Geddes’ (1999) typology that identifies regimes as single party, military, or personalist (for 
example, North Korea is considered a “personalist” regime).   
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in 1983 and Pyongyang’s 2006 nuclear weapons test were “diversion” and “coercion” activities 
(Bennett 2010, 8).
36
  Lai and Slater (2006, 13) examine the decisions to engage in external uses 
of force by authoritarian regimes and note that the more legitimate a regime is, the less likely it 
will be to initiate conflict.  They also conclude that the stability and legitimacy of a regime was 
just as important as regime type and that in the case of North Korea, the Kim regime’s 
characteristics would actually make it less likely to initiate conflict than a more “collective” 
leadership such as Iran (Lai and Slater 2006, 135).  Kim and Choy (2012, 61) argue that during 
three of North Korea’s nuclear-missile crises (in 1993, 1998, and 2002) there was no association 
between domestic conditions and external foreign policy and there was little evidence that the 
Kim regime attempted to divert public attention with external conflict during these periods.
37
    
Jung’s (2012) study on the relationship between domestic instability and external conflict 
is an important addition to the literature.
38
  Jung’s examination of conflict dyads between 1920 
and 2001 complements previous studies of international conflict behavior and demonstrates the 
importance of using both quantitative and qualitative analysis methodologies.  Jung’s (2012, 
139-140) analysis also examines some of the same historical events included in my case studies, 
including the ROK decision to send troops to Vietnam and the North Korean nuclear crisis in 
1994.  Yet Jung’s (2012) study also demonstrates the difficulty of conducting quantitative 
research on North Korea.  His database for measuring domestic unrest (Arthur Banks’ Cross 
National Time Series) only includes sparse data on North Korea and is primarily limited to New 
York Times media reports (Jung 2012).
39
  However, Jung’s (2012) use of both quantitative 
methods and examination of two case studies of domestic unrest on the Korean peninsula 
provides an important example of the advantages of a mixed-methods approach.   
Lastly, Michishita’s (2009) study of North Korean “military-diplomatic campaigns” 
stands apart from other scholarship with its analysis of the DPRK’s foreign policy actions and 
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 While these observations help support the propositions for my research, Bennett (2010) provides no 
evidence to support his contentions. 
37
 This study is a more recent effort to use quantitative analysis to examine North Korean behavior and the 
authors used “word count technology” to scan North Korean media information during these periods for words that 
indicated domestic instability (Kim and Choy 2012).  
38
 This dissertation was made publicly available in 2013 and its overarching impact on the study of 
diversion and external conflict is to be determined. 
39
 Jung  (2012, 175) notes the limitations of the CNTS database and calls for a more systematic way for 
political scientists to measure the initiation of interstate conflict. 
  
26 
examination of the influence of both internal and external conditions.
40
  While not focused 
specifically on diversionary theory, Michishita’s research provides an important foundation for 
the study of North Korean conflict.  Michishita (2009) examines eight cases of key conflict 
events on the Korean peninsula from 1966-2008 which included a wide range of activities from 
armed conflict to nuclear testing.
41
  He uses a structured qualitative method to compare these 
cases
42
 and concludes that North Korea’s diplomatic-military activities are rational, based on 
political objectives, and focused on deterrence (Michishita 2009, 1-3).  Michishita (2009, 3) also 
examines the influence of external and internal conditions on North Korean activity and notes 
that “none of North Korea’s major military-diplomatic actions have been primarily caused by 
domestic factors…the contention that North Korea tends to undertake military actions when it 
faces a hostile international environment is not true.”  While these statements imply that internal 
and external factors are not primarily influential in North Korea’s decisions to use force, 
Michishita does admit that on several occasions, diversionary considerations were influential in 
Kim regime decisions to use force for the establishment and consolidation of power.   
 2.c.  The Conceptual Propositions 
As Foster and Keller (2010, 219) note, “The diversionary hypothesis is perhaps as old as 
the study of international conflict itself, and its basic tenets hold prominence in the work of such 
luminaries as Niccolò Machiavelli and Jean Bodin.”  Yet many of the criticisms identified by 
Levy in his 1989 review are still valid in relation to the study of diversion and East Asia: limited 
data, untested methods, and mixed conclusions all make these research efforts difficult.  
Diversionary theory remains logically sound and, as Jasinski (2010, 21) observes, “it is difficult 
to think of an international relations theory that has a more widespread support base.”  Yet more 
recent criticisms, such as those raised by the strategic conflict avoidance (SCA) argument,
43
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 Young-June Park (Korea National Defense University) and Victor Cha (Korea Chair at CSIS) 
recommended Michishita’s study for this project. 
41
 Michishita’s case studies included: (1) conflict along the DMZ from 1966-1968; (2) the seizure of the 
USS Pueblo; (3) West (Yellow) Sea naval incidents from 1973-1976; (4) the 1976 Panmunjom Axe Murder 
incident; (5) Nuclear threats and diplomacy from 1993-1994; (6) Missile firings; (7) DMZ incidents and other 
Armistice violations (1993-2002); and (8) nuclear testing (2002-2008). 
42
 Michishita (2009, 4) uses the term "controlled comparative analysis" to describe his case study method, 
which uses a common outline for his case studies.  For each case, he provides a historical background and 
description, motivating factors (that caused the conflict), characteristics, analysis, and outcomes (Michishita 2009, 
4). 
43
 Strategic Conflict Avoidance (SCA) contends that states often avoid conflict with other states by 
changing their behavior (often to a more conciliatory stance) towards external threats (Fordham 2005).  This concept   
  
27 
demonstrate the need for a much more sophisticated approach to the study of diversionary 
concepts.
44
  
Supporters of diversionary theory provide the basis for the first proposition, which is 
focused on the traditional view that internal conditions and hostile foreign policy activities are 
related.  As noted above, a number of authors, beginning with Simmel (1955[1898]) contend that 
diversion occurs
45
 while others question the “one-way” link between domestic strife and 
leadership choices to engage in “violent adventures.”46  In the North Korean case, Simmel’s 
assertion would argue that domestic factors are related to the Kim regime’s proclivity to engage 
in hostile foreign policies.  An alternate explanation would contend that the international 
community is the primary influence on North Korea’s foreign policy choices.  These overarching 
ideas can be expressed as two propositions.
47
  The first proposition (P1) identifies relationships 
as suggested by diversionary theory:  domestic conditions in North Korea are related to the 
incidence of conflict on the Korean peninsula.  The second proposition (P2) states that external 
conditions are more influential in the levels of conflict between North Korea and its neighbors.
48
  
The two propositions are expressed as follows: 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
(SCA) is important because it questions many of the basic assumptions and empirical findings of diversionary 
concepts, yet SCA rests upon concepts and studies that are similarly controversial (Fordham 2005, 132).  States 
react differently to “impending military confrontation” and some nations seek, rather than avoid conflict (Fordham 
2005).  Additionally, Fordham (2005, 137) provides a more structured approach to modeling SCA behavior and 
emphasized the importance of identifying behavior that was “short of militarized conflict.”  He concludes that not all 
states will avoid conflict and only those that are the targets of more powerful states bent on using diversionary force 
will engage in SCA (Fordham 2005, 149).  Yet when targeted, states will engage in SCA under some circumstances 
and their actions may include avoiding international disputes with “third states” which might allow for intervention 
by the diversionary state (Fordham 2005, 149).   
44
 As previously noted, a number of authors criticize the underlying assumptions of diversionary theory, 
including Levy (1989) and Bronson (1997), calling for a more nuanced approach to the study of this concept. 
45
 Supporters include Durkheim (1951[1897]), Wright (1971[1942]), Coser (1956), Rosenau (1969), 
Wilkenfeld (1972), Ostrom and Job (1986), Morgan and Bickers (1992), DeRouen (1995), Miller (1995), Smith 
(1996), Mitchell and Prins (2004), Chapman and Reiter (2004), Pickering and Kisangani (2005), Mitchell and Thyne 
(2010) and Tir (2010). 
46
 Those who contend that internal and external conflict exist independently include Sorokin (1957), Cattell 
(1949), Rummel (1963), Mack (1965), Tanter (1969), Burrowes and Spector (1971), Mack (1975), Stein (1976), 
James (1987), Blainey (1988), Levy (1989), Meernick and Waterman (1996), Gelpi (1997), and Gowa (1998). 
47
 Kellstedt and Whitten (2009, 4) use the term “causal theory” to describe the concepts preceding and 
underlying the development these types of concepts.  This research uses the term “proposition” to identify the 
overarching relationships between North Korea’s conflict activities and both internal and external influencers.     
48
 Waltz (1954; 1979) and Wendt (1992) provide the theoretical basis for P2 with their concepts of 
“international system” causes for state-level conflict.   
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P1:  The deterioration of domestic conditions in North Korea is associated with an 
increase in North Korean-initiated hostile foreign policy.   
 
P2:  Increased international tensions are associated with increases in North Korean-
initiated hostile foreign policy.     
 
This study examines North Korea’s use of hostile foreign policy using both quantitative 
analysis of event data involving threats or use of military force (in Chapter 3) and a qualitative 
examination of three case studies in Chapter 4.
49
  I also test whether or not diversionary theory 
explains the characteristics, relationships, and possible motivations for DPRK-initiated interstate 
diplomatic or military actions.  Although the singular focus on North Korea might raise 
methodological concerns, this technique finds support from King, Keohane, and Verba (1994, 
221) who contend that the examination of hypotheses over time within a single subject is a valid 
technique.  North Korea’s unique characteristics warrant this sole focus during this study.  This 
limited, single-country study allows a more thorough analysis to uncover key details that 
generalized studies may overlook.   
Finally, one important caveat must be added for research associated with analyzing North 
Korea:  most research on the DPRK must rely on “proxy” sources.  Field or archival research 
inside North Korea is virtually impossible, and if scholars do happen to travel to the DPRK, they 
face severe restrictions on their activities.
50
  Thus, researchers are left to observe North Korea 
through its historic relations and interaction with other nations, literature generated by the DPRK 
government itself, defector testimony, and other derivative and proxy sources.  Additionally, 
other external sources on North Korea, such as the United Nations, World Bank and International 
Monetary Fund, and trade data from other nations are readily available.  The use of data from 
proxy sources outside North Korea remains a “necessary evil” for almost all scholars examining 
the DPRK and is an unavoidable constraint on this research.   
Additionally, while there is proxy data available on North Korean activities, the concept 
of “intent” of the regime to divert the public’s attention is difficult to quantify.  Without 
examining the personal notes of North Korean leaders, conducting in-country interviews, or 
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 For more details on the advantages of combining both quantitative and qualitative research methods, see 
Mahoney and Goertz (2006) and Levy (1997).    
50
 Members of the US military (such as myself) are generally prohibited from traveling to North Korea.  
Exceptions include US-sponsored missions to recover the remains of military members who died during the Korean 
War.  These missions are focused solely on remains recovery (Starr 2011). 
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other first-hand evidence, determining regime intent is difficult.  Thus the application of 
diversionary theory for this dissertation rests on methods used by previous scholars such as 
Ostrom and Job (1986), Morgan and Bickers (1992) and Pickering and Kisangani (2005), and 
related techniques to identify the linkage between international domestic conditions and the 
propensity to engage in external “adventures” by the Kim regime.  Because of these 
complicating factors, scholars rarely analyze DPRK conflict using social science methods.  The 
next section begins this effort to examine the Kim regime’s conflict activities by first examining 
the history of North Korean conflict from the DPRK’s establishment in 1948 to the beginning of 
the study period in 1960. 
 2.d.  History of North Korea’s Hostile Foreign Policy (1948-1960) 
The following section provides background for the case studies through an overview of 
North Korea’s hostile foreign policy activities from 1948 (and the founding of North Korea) 
through 1960, which saw Kim Il-sung firmly in control of the DPRK.  The modern history of 
North Korea includes the peninsula’s opening to the west in the late 1800s, Japanese colonial 
rule colonization (1910-1945), the formation of two Korean states (1948), the Korean War 
(1950-1953) and war recovery and political consolidation by DPRK leader Kim Il-sung (through 
1960).  Ample literature is available on the “Hermit Kingdom” and from its early relationship 
with the West in the 1800s through the formation of two Korean states in 1948.
51
  While an 
understanding of the modern background of the Koreas is essential for any analysis of the 
peninsula, the following summary focuses on the formation of North Korea as a separate and 
distinct state and the hostile acts (both diplomatic and military) by North Korean leaders after the 
formation of the DPRK through 1960.  This section provides the background for both the 
quantitative analysis and three case studies of North Korea’s conflict activities presented later in 
the text. 
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 Relevant literature on the modern history of the Koreas includes Eckert (1990), Cumings (2005), 
Robinson (2007) and Salvada (1994) and Worden (2008).  These scholars provide an important perspective on 
Korea’s initial relations with other nations and opening to the West in the 1800s, the domination and occupation by 
the Japanese and the arrival of the Cold War and influence of the Soviet Union and United States.  Additionally, 
there are number of important works that discuss the rise of the Korean communist party (Suh 1967; Nam 1974; 
Kim I. 1975; Van Ree 1989), Kim Il-sung’s background and ascension (Suh 1988, Lankov 2002; Szalontai 2005), 
and the early formation of the North Korean state (Cumings 1981; Cumings 1990; Armstrong 2003; Millett 2005).   
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2.d.1.  The Early Years 
North Korea declared itself an independent socialist state on September 9, 1948 and the 
“only legitimate government on the peninsula” (Eckert 1990, 343).  Prior to the 1940s, Korea 
had existed as a generally unified state for over a thousand years since Korea’s Silla era (dating 
back to the year 668)
52
 and had remained intact during its opening to the West in the 1800s and 
through over 40 years of Japanese occupation in the 1900s.  However, post-World War II 
occupation by the US and USSR
53
 resulted in competition between communist and Western 
democratic concepts on the peninsula: both the Americans and Soviets guided the two Koreas 
based differing ideological views of state governance.  
After the war, Soviet objectives in the region focused on ensuring that the USSR had 
influence “at least equal to the United States” (CIA 1946, 1).  Additionally, from the US 
viewpoint, Soviet actions in Korea beginning in 1945 demonstrated the intent to secure “all of 
Korea as a satellite” (CIA 1947a, 1).54  From Stalin’s perspective, his objectives in Korea 
included a focus on regional security, as well as global influence.  The Soviets were determined 
that any future Korea would not be “turned into a staging ground for future aggression against 
the USSR” and that Russia must participate in any trusteeship of the peninsula (Weathersby 1993, 
quoting Russian archival sources, 11-12).   
By the end of 1945, both the United States and Soviet Union had designated leaders for 
each of the Korean zones.  Syngman Rhee, a 72-year old US-educated Korean, was the 
American choice to govern, while the Soviets chose “General” Kim Il-sung, a 33-year old anti-
Japanese war hero to eventually (with Stalin’s assistance) assume control of the DPRK.55  Within 
a few months of their arrival, both Rhee and Kim were “the dominant political figures in the two 
zones” (Cumings 2005, 195).  Between 1946 and 1948, Kim and his former soldiers established 
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 Salvada (1994, 9-11) provides a concise review of this period in Korea’s history. 
53
 At the end of World War II, Japanese occupation troops left Korea and the US and Soviet Union jointly controlled 
the peninsula.  The Russians took control of the northern half and the Americans occupied the south.   
54
 In 1947, the CIA analysis commented that the Soviets had, since Japan’s surrender, conducted subversion 
operations against the South, consolidated power and assumed control of North Korea (CIA 1947b, 1).  The CIA 
identified a number of actions by the Soviets including the construction of a “military-political machine under 
Soviet auspices…strengthening of the South Korean Communist Party…[by] infiltrating its members into key 
positions in the administrative and policy organization of South Korea (CIA 1947b, 2).   
55
 Although Rhee was officially elected by the South’s National Assembly in July 1948 (Finley 1984, 50), 
he was supported by the US occupation administration.  In October 1945, Rhee (along with another conservative, 
Kim Ku) were brought back to Seoul by the US and introduced by General Hodge (the US forces commander) to the 
southern Koreans.  Finley (1984, 49) also notes that the Soviets installed Kim as the communist party leader in 
October 1945.  The early history of Kim and his guerilla activities against the Japanese are available in Martin 
(2006, 29-46) and Suh (1988, 30-54).   
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the Korean People’s Army and control over the civilian administration body, the People’s 
Provisional Committee (Suh 1988, 68-69).
56
  The early years of Kim’s rule in North Korea were 
turbulent and filled with “factious rivalry inside the North Korean leadership” (Lankov 2002b, 
60) and it was not until the late 1950s that he established firm control over the entire government 
(Vreland and Shinn 1976, 35).  To those in the North, Kim represented the promise of progress 
and recovery after decades of Japanese rule, which bled the peninsula of both resources and its 
heritage through attempts to assimilate the Koreans into Japanese culture.
57
  
Decades of rule by an external power (Japan) had left the Koreans with little experience 
with self-governance, resulting in the US and Soviet Union advocating that Korea be governed 
under “trustee status” until it could rule itself (FRUS 1943, 869).  Thus, the government and 
foreign policy of Korea (and subsequently North Korea in 1948) was not initially determined by 
the Korean people, but under the aegis of foreign occupiers (now the Soviets and Americans).  
North Korea’s government and subsequent foreign policy actions were rooted in the tutelage of 
the Soviets and their pressure to form a socialist state that would ally itself with the communist 
world.  This appealed to the ruling faction in North Korea (led by Kim Il-sung) who hoped this 
new government would help the DPRK embark on a 
 
path of modernity modeled on the Soviet Union, in the postcolonial context of a 
newly independent country: a specifically noncapitalist, anticolonial modernity 
that would propel Korea from the status of a backward subjugated nation into the 
forefront of social, cultural and technical progress (Armstrong 2003, 2-3). 
 
With Soviet help, North Korea hoped to become a model socialist state, an active part of 
a communist alliance with the USSR and both a political and economic power.  From the Soviet 
perspective, Korea was important to the USSR’s regional security objectives, although Stalin had 
concerns that were at a much higher priority, such as the recovery from the devastating effects of 
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 Kim was aided by a core group of supporters who had fought with him as partisans against the Japanese 
in Manchuria (Suh 1988, 68-69) 
57
 Prior to and during the annexation period (1905-1945) Japan viewed Korea as a resource to fuel its 
growing need for raw materials and as a colony that could serve as a reservoir of cheap labor and industrial goods.  
Although the Meiji government is credited with improving Korea’s infrastructure through the building of ports, 
roads and schools, this came at a high price as Japanese officials also established “a ‘legalized’ system of racial 
discrimination against Koreans, making them second-class citizens in their own country” (Cumings 2005, 148).  For 
example, during the 1930s, Japan enacted a number of measures in Korea including mandatory worshiping at Shinto 
shrines, use of Japanese language in all public places, pressure to adopt Japanese family names and cessation of 
Korean language newspapers (Choe 1997, 315).   
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World War II.
58
  Additionally, while the Soviets were influential in the formation of a socialist 
government in the North, Stalin did not directly support communist activities and subversion in 
the South until early 1950 (Weathersby 1993, 24).
59
  At the same time, between 1946 and 1950, 
the Soviets provided an estimated $546 million in total aid to North Korea (Kim 1970, 241).  In 
fact, the Soviets provided the “necessary protection, a womb within which a socialist state could 
incubate until it was strong enough to stand alone” (Cumings 1990, 436-437).   
Ideologically, Kim Il-sung and his followers were also linked to Mao Zedong’s Chinese 
Communist Party and many within Kim’s inner circle had been active in China’s revolution 
(Armstrong 2003, 2).  While China would soon become more influential in the Korean situation, 
Mao’s priorities (in the late 1940s) were focused on defeating the Chinese Nationalists and 
establishing the People’s Republic of China.60  Nevertheless, support from communist allies 
strengthened the DPRK in its efforts to become a viable state, and this supported the Kim 
regime’s pursuit of reunification through the destabilization of the South.61  The overarching 
political situation on the peninsula was tenuous and hostile foreign policy actions became the 
vehicle for eventual reunification.      
Both North and South Korea considered the division of the peninsula by external powers 
an unnatural state of affairs and reunification was always a foreign policy priority for both states.  
For example, Kim Il-sung (2001, 127) expressed his ongoing support for reunification in 1948 by 
stating, “Our Party’s stand on the establishment of a unified democratic government remains the 
same as ever.  Our Party holds that a supreme legislative body for all Korea should be elected by 
secret ballot on the principle of universal, equal, and direct suffrage.”  In the South, Syngman 
Rhee’s administration also pursued this goal throughout his administration from 1948-1960 
(Lankov 2008).  Additionally, during the late 1940s, the DPRK initiated a number of hostile 
foreign policy actions with the intent to set the stage for reunification.  These included North 
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 The USSR did not achieve its pre-war production levels until 1948 and its subsequent support to North 
Korea weighed heavily on the Soviet economy (Carter 1972, 9). 
59
 There was a significant level of tension and the domestic Korean communists (in both the North and the 
South) instigated agitation that occurred in the South in the late 1940s in hopes of eventual reunification 
(Weathersby 1993, 23-24). 
60
 The People’s Republic of China was formally established on October 1, 1949 and Mao’s first visit to the 
Soviet Union and Stalin occurred in December 1949 (Spence 1990 512, 524).    
61
 During this period, South Korea was ripe for turmoil and instability.  A large number of refugees 
returned to South Korea in the weeks that followed the Japanese defeat, including 400,000 from the North and over 
1 million from Japan (Millett 2005, 59).  Additionally, between 1945 and 1947, there were thousands of guerilla 
fighters operating in the South in a bloody “rural peasant protest” against historic landlord-tenant disparities 
(Cumings 2005, 243-245). 
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Korean military operations in the Ongjin peninsula (June and August 1949), protests to the UN 
over its presence in Korea (Oct 1949), border skirmishes (throughout 1949), and the DPRK 
shelling of the border town of Kaesong (May 1950) (Finley 1984, 53).  By mid-1949, while the 
majority of foreign troops had been withdrawn from their post-war occupation,
62
 the peninsula 
was far from stable.  In the South (including the southern island of Cheju), there were several 
groups of pro-North Korean insurgents numbering between 500 and 1000 individuals who were 
conducting unconventional military operations (Millett 2005, 180-181).   
In fact, a February 1949 US intelligence assessment predicted an invasion of South Korea 
by communist forces sometime after the withdrawal of US forces causing a “collapse of the US-
supported South Korea” (CIA 1949, 1).  Additionally in 1949, both Kim and Rhee sought 
support from the Soviets and the Americans for “a major assault on the other side”: Kim received 
approval and support from both Mao and Stalin while Rhee was promised US assistance “only if 
South Korea were attacked without provocation” (Cumings 2005, 253-254).  By 1950, the entire 
peninsula was on the verge of war.   
2.d.2.  War Between the Koreas  
For the two Koreas, the war from 1950 to 1953 was the most devastating conflict event 
these states have ever experienced.  There is extensive literature on the background of the 
conflict and scholarship the war is not without controversy, such as an ongoing disagreement 
among historians (and between the governments of North and South Korea) on who instigated 
combat operations.
63
   
The North Koreans consistently blame the war on the United States (KCNA 2012b) while 
the South Korean government’s official stance is that the attack was an “unprovoked full-scale 
invasion of the South” (ROK 2012).  These views contrast with archival evidence, which 
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 The Soviets withdrew their forces in December 1948 and the Americans removed their troops in June 
1949 (Suh 1988, 62; Cumings 1990, 163). 
63
 Traditional accounts of the war include Appleman (1961), Fehrenbach (1963), Ridgeway (1967), Blair 
(1987) MacDonald (1987), Yup (1999) who view the war as an unprovoked North Korean attack.  More balanced 
(sometimes referred to as “revisionist”) views include Cumings (1990; 2005) Stueck (2002) and Chen (2011).  
These scholars base their assessments on an extensive variety of sources, including Russian and Chinese archival 
materials and note that both North and South Korea were involved in the onset of hostilities.  Additionally, the 
American military’s official account of the war (in condensed form) can be found in U.S. Army (2009, 221-254).   
The more recent and “revisionist” sources portray the war in the context of both the inter-Korean and international 
dynamics.  Additionally, scholarship that focuses on the prelude period (1945-1950) to the war including Cumings 
(1981; 1990), Armstrong (2003), and Millett (2005) and a trove of original source documentation available through 
the Wilson Center’s Cold War International History Project (2012), North Korea International Documentation 
Project (2012), and the CIA’s FOIA portal (2012).  
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supports the view that Kim Il-sung initiated combat operations after gaining approval from both 
Mao and Stalin to reunite the peninsula by force (Zubok 2007, 79-80, CWIHP 1949, Stueck 2002, 
75-76 and Cumings 2005, 253).  At this time, the Rhee government also wanted to reunify Korea 
(by force if necessary) although North Korea was better prepared for war (Armstrong 2003, 236). 
The first engagements (generally thought to be on the South Korean-held Ongjin 
peninsula) might actually have been in response to ROK artillery fire (Cumings 1990, 575-577).  
However, the North Koreans had spent months preparing for war and by the middle of 1950, the 
Kim regime was prepared to invade.
64
  The Truman administration received a number of 
conflicting warnings from its intelligence apparatus predicting either DPRK aggression (CIA 
1949) or a reliance on propaganda and guerilla actions to foment instability in the south (CIA 
1950).  In any case, the ROK and US military forces were caught unawares by the beginning of 
the war on June 25, 1950.
65
  Within four days of the initial attack, Kim’s soldiers had taken 
Seoul and within six weeks had pushed ROK forces (and recently arrived UN troops composed 
primarily of US soldiers) to a small perimeter around the southeastern port of Pusan (Appleman 
1961, 35; Ridgeway 1967, 29-30).  The United States’ deployment of US forces to support the 
South was not anticipated by communist leaders
66
 and Mao had commented that “there is no 
need to be afraid…The Americans will not enter a third world war for such a small territory” 
(Shtykov, 1950).  However, Truman considered the conflict as part of a larger attempt by 
communists to expand their sphere of influence (NYT 1950) and based his decision on efforts to 
contain perceived Soviet expansionism (Truman 1950).
67
  By the end of summer, the two Koreas 
were in heavy combat and both the US and USSR suddenly found themselves in a “hot” Cold 
War.   
The UN’s amphibious counterattack (led by US General George MacArthur) included 
landings on the west coast port of Inchon and subsequent recapture of Seoul in September 1950.  
These actions turned the war in favor of the ROK and UN (Fehrenbach 1963, 240-253).  
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 A telegram from Soviet diplomat Grigory Tunkin to the USSR foreign ministry sent in September 1949 
described Kim’s plans to invade South Korea including initial combat operations on the Ongjin peninsula (CWIHP 
1949).  
65
 Cumings (1990, 568-621) devotes an entire chapter to the question of who started the Korean War and 
concludes, “Who caused the Korean war?  No one and everyone, [it was caused by] all who where party to the 
tapestry of events since 1945.”     
66
 In December 1950, Kim Il-sung admitted, “the American intervention was an unexpected turn of events” 
in a speech before the DPRK’s Central Committee (Suh 1988, 122). 
67
 Although Truman did not publically refer to Soviet involvement at the onset of the war, the 
administration (including Truman) believed that Stalin was supporting the North Koreans (Truman 1950).  
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Throughout September and early October, UN forces pushed Kim’s troops northward to their 
border with China and to the brink of total capitulation.  Around the same time, China publicly 
warned the Americans that if they crossed the 38th parallel, China would intervene in the war 
(Stueck 2002, 89) although the Americans dismissed this as a “bluff” (MacDonald 1987, 52-
56).
68
  As the US and ROK forces approached the Sino-Korean border, they began to encounter 
small units of Chinese soldiers and by the end of October they realized that Mao had sent over 
180,000 Chinese “volunteers” over the border to save the North Koreans (Cohen 1988, 54).  By 
mid-November 1950, over 300,000 Chinese forces were engaging the UN troops (Appleman 
1961, 767).
69
  A full-scale UN retreat followed and by early January 1951, United Nations forces 
were pushed out of Seoul to defensive positions 40 miles to the south (US Army 2009, 239-240).  
Although the UN recaptured Seoul in March 1951, fighting from that point on through the end of 
the war stagnated (Eckert 1990, 345). 
The war dragged on until peace was negotiated in 1953 after a two-year stalemate in 
roughly the same area that had been the previous partition line:  the 38th parallel.
70
  The overall 
cost of the war was horrendous, and three years of war destroyed most of the Korean national 
infrastructure, further solidified the division on the peninsula, and resulted in horrific causalities 
(mostly borne by the Koreans).  UN and ROK losses included 776,000 total casualties (killed 
and wounded) with South Koreans accounting for 80 percent of the total (ROK Government 
2012a).
71
  Additionally, an estimated 600,000 North Koreans and 700,000-900,000 Chinese were 
killed or wounded (Spence 1990, 530).  Approximately ten percent of the civilian population 
(roughly three million people) of both the North and South Korea were casualties and five 
million became refugees because of this conflict (Oberdorfer 1997, 9-10).  As Eckert (1990, 345-
346) notes, 
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 As late as October 12, 1950, the US intelligence community, while acknowledging that Chinese 
intervention was a possibility notes, “there are no convincing indications of an actual Chinese Communist intention 
to resort to full-scale intervention in Korea” (Smith 1950, 1). 
69
 Had it not been for the intervention of Chinese communist forces in mid-October, Kim’s forces would 
have been pushed out of North Korea and most likely defeated.   
70
 Admittedly, this overlooks both the combat actions and complex negotiations that occurred between 
1951 and 1953.  For a detailed account of the activities during that period, see Ridgeway (1967, 185-225), 
MacDonald (1986, 116-198), and Stueck (2002, 143-181). 
71
 The South Korean government (2012a) lists ROK losses as 137,000 killed and 621,000 injured as well as 
over 39,000 US dead and 137,000 injured.   
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Those who experienced the war know that such numbers [as shown above] do not 
even begin to convey a sense of what it was like…the terror of alien armies and 
incendiary bombing; the separation of families, often to be permanent; the frantic 
flight to refugee camps up and down the peninsula…[leaving] scars on an entire 
generation of survivors, a legacy of fear and insecurity that continues even now to 
affect the two Koreas… 
 
To the North Koreans, the war was a necessary vehicle to eliminate the division of their 
ancient land and culture and the Kim regime considered it the most efficient solution to the 
division of the peninsula.  War with the South was considered “inevitable” in light of the 
Syngman Rhee’s  stated intention “to march North” to unite the Koreas (Suh 1988, 112).  To the 
rest of the world, Korea was a test of Truman’s doctrine of containment and the first instance of 
armed conflict directly between the major Cold War foes (the US, China, and the Soviet 
Union).
72
  By 1953, war had wrecked both sides of the 38
th
 Parallel and solidified Korea as 
politically divided peninsula.   
2.d.3.  Recovery and Foreign Assistance 
The war itself had left North Korea’s infrastructure and industrial capacity in tatters.73  
An eyewitness account notes that there was “complete devastation between the Yalu River and 
the capital [Pyongyang]…[there were] no more cities in North Korea” (Cumings 2005, 297-
298).
74
 In the aftermath of the war, North Korea sought economic assistance from the Soviet 
Union, China, and other states for recovery efforts.  Immediately after the signing of the Korean 
Armistice, the DPRK gained Soviet pledges of support (FBIS 1953).  By 1954, Kim had 
garnered pledges of aid including $250 million from the Soviets (intended for both heavy 
industry and defense projects), $350 million from China (providing transportation and 
agricultural equipment and raw materials), and $250 million from other communist states for 
reconstruction projects (CIA 1954).  Other aid from the Soviets and Chinese included providing 
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 In May 1947, Truman declared “I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free 
peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressure” in an appeal to the US 
Congress to support aid to Greece and Turkey in their own efforts in engaging destabilizing forces (Truman 1947a, 
4).  Truman’s policy was tested throughout the Cold War period including during the Korean conflict.  The 
stalemate at the end of the Korean War was an ominous foreshadow of the Cold War itself: a continual struggle 
between the communists and the West, often ending with maintenance of the status quo.     
73
 The majority of the heavy industry was located in the northern half of the peninsula (CIA 1947a, 4 and 
Salvada 1993, 31). 
74
 Cumings (2005, 297-298) was quoting a Thames Television transcript for “Korea: The Unknown War” 
(Thames, Nov. 1986). 
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necessities (such as fuel) at “artificially low prices” or in exchange for North Korean goods that 
“would otherwise have been unsaleable on the international market” (Lankov 2002b, 63).   
Additionally, technical assistance was essential for North Korea’s rebuilding and 
included help from not only the Soviet Union, but also from other Eastern Bloc nations.  For 
example, Poland and Romania provided assistance with transportation and construction power; 
Czechoslovakia assisted with tool production; engineering support came from East Germany; 
and help with forestry came from Bulgaria (CIA 1957, 18).  Finally, thousands of Chinese 
soldiers (Chinese People’s Volunteers) remained in North Korea after the end of the Korean War 
and provided essential labor rebuilding the damaged infrastructure.
75
  The labor provided by 
300,000 Chinese troops “saved the North Korean regime from total collapse” and reportedly 
reconstructed railways, repaired 1,300 bridges, constructed over 200,000 square meters of 
buildings (in Pyongyang alone), and 313,000 miles of embankments for flood control (Kim R. 
1968a, 715).
76
  North Korea’s recovery relied on these types of assistance and by the mid-1950s, 
the DPRK showed signs of stability and even prosperity.
77
 
2.d.4.  Kim Consolidates Power 
Although the war in Korea was devastating for the DPRK, it did serve to unify competing 
North Korean communist factions against a common enemy (Nam 1974, 138).  Prior to the 
Korean War, there were four primary communist factions in Korea.  These included the 
Domestic (underground rebels in Korea during the Japanese occupation); the Yanan
78
 
(communists who left Korea for China in the 1920s and returned); Soviet Koreans (who were 
born and grew up in Russia and arrived with the occupation forces); and the Guerilla faction 
(who had fought the Japanese in Manchuria and had fled to the Soviet Union in the late 1930s, 
eventually returning to Korea in 1945) (Lankov 2002b, 78-80).  Although Kim was from the 
Guerilla faction, the other members of this group did not enjoy the same influence as Kim and 
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 The Chinese maintained troops in North Korea until 1958, both to support recovery and to deter 
perceived external threats from the US (Martin 2006, 92). 
76
 Kim (1968a, 715) obtained these figures from both Kim Il Sung and Nodong Shinmun (North Korea’s 
leading newspaper).   
77
 More details on the evolution of foreign aid to North Korea are available in the case study chapter on the 
North Korean famine. 
78
 This is also spelled “Yan’an” or  “Yenan.” 
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were generally marginalized in the late 1940s (Lankov 2002b, 84-85).
79
  In any case, after the 
Japanese surrender, these four groups united themselves into a single organization, the North 
Korean Communist Party (Lankov 2002b, 80-81), which was solidified during the Korean War 
period. 
Kim Il-sung’s goals in the aftermath of the Korean War were focused on national 
recovery and efforts to strengthen his position as leader of the DPRK (Suh 1988, 139).  Kim was 
able to garner significant international assistance throughout the 1950s and successfully rebuilt 
the North’s industrial base.  Yet his political status was far from secure and without an external 
enemy to unite them, dissension among the competing Korean communist factions emerged once 
again. 
Kim’s faction strengthened its hold on power immediately following the end of the 
Korean War through a series of purges.  These began with the trial and conviction of twelve 
members of the South Korean Workers Party, and along with a series of other purges in the mid-
1950s, effectively eliminated the influence of the “domestic communists” from the south (Nam 
1974, 92-93; Szalontai 2005, 85-86).
80
  The Soviet Koreans diminished in influence during the 
1950s and while many simply returned to the USSR, others were purged by Kim’s group (Suh 
1988, 156; Nam 1974, 139).  Additionally, criticism by high ranking party members associated 
with the Yanan (Chinese Korean) faction during the plenum meeting in August 1956
81
 resulted 
in another series of purges and members of the Yanan party were “demoted and castigated” 
(Lankov 2002a, 90; Paige 1963, 19-23; Nam 1974, 139).   
 During this same time, Kim and his faction were reacting to the wave of “de-
Stalinization” that was sweeping through the communist world (Kim I. 1962a, 37). Kim’s post-
war efforts to collectivize North Korea’s agriculture, the focus on rapid industrialization in 
accordance with the Stalinist model and the DPRK’s continued “wartime mobilizations” were in 
conflict with Moscow’s evolving and more open approach to foreign policy (Shimotomai 2011, 
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 However, the relationship between Kim and this faction eventually allowed them to rise to prominence in 
the Korean communist leadership and eventually assume control (led by Kim) of the North Korean government 
(Lankov 2002, 86-87).   
80
 Lankov (2002a, 90) notes that “The faction’s leaders were put on show trial as ‘U.S. spies’ and then shot, 
while most of their fellow activists were purged from the Party.”  
81
 Kim “was accused of being an adherent of outdated Stalinist methods and personally responsible for 
numerous ‘distortions of the socialist legality’ and a headlong rush toward heavy industrialization.  These 
accusations were in tune with the general mood of the time” Lankov (2002a, 90). 
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124).
82
    Domestic criticism of Kim and his policies also occurred, especially in 1956, as party 
leaders faulted Kim for “lack of party democracy, the cult of personality…and flawed economic 
policies” (Person 2006, 29).  Khrushchev’s February 1956 speech attacking the “legend” of 
Stalin was seen as a political attack against North Korea’s leader by Pyongyang (Kiyosaki 1976, 
52).  Kim’s “cult” status also worried Moscow and caused the Soviet ambassador to pressure the 
North Korean leader to separate his political duties as Chairman of the Korean Workers Party 
and head of the government (Shimotomai 2011, 125).
83
  Khrushchev's (1959) “Peaceful 
Coexistence” approach to dealings with the West was a significant change for communist foreign 
policy efforts.  Yet both Mao and Kim had misgivings toward Khrushchev’s more liberal 
approach towards the West and the Chinese reaction was to increase both economic and 
ideological self-sufficiency, thus decreasing dependence on Moscow for support (Kiyosaki 1976, 
52). 
North Korea’s response was similar and included the idea of self-sufficiency as a societal 
goal as part of North Korea’s national ideology of juche.84  Although the North Korean concept 
of juche has evolved over the years, it generally refers to the supremacy of Koreans as the 
masters of their own destiny and the importance of independence and national self-reliance.
85
 In 
a December 1955 speech, Kim (1955a) introduced this concept by emphasizing the importance 
of an independent ideological and economic path for North Korea: 
 
It is important in our work to grasp revolutionary truth, Marxist-Leninist truth, 
and apply it correctly to the actual conditions of our country.  There can be no set 
principle that we must follow the Soviet pattern.  Some advocate the Soviet way 
and others the Chinese, but it is not high time to work out our own?  
 
The North did not go as far as severing diplomatic ties with either China or the Soviet 
Union (and other parts of this 1955 speech praised both nations), but this nationalist ideal was a 
guiding principle for both domestic and international foreign policy actions.  Interestingly, the 
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 Shimotomai (2011, 125) contends that Kim was “simply copying” failed Stalinist policies.  
83
 While Kim complied with the request from Moscow (Shimotomai 2011, 125), this is indicative of the 
North Korea’s efforts to maintain its relationship with both Moscow and Beijing, neither of which Kim could afford 
to ignore. 
84
 During the late 1950s, North Korea began to place an “emphasis on all things Korean over all things 
foreign” (Lankov 2002b, 67). 
85
 Ironically, self-reliance as a concept was something that the Japanese also focused on during its 
expansionist period through the end of World War II.  See Barnhart (1987) for details on Japanese efforts to achieve 
autarky.  
  
40 
juche “campaign” announced in 1955 and another four years later coincided with national food 
shortages and that Kim was attempting to divert public focus to negative influences of the USSR 
and China (Shimotomai 2011, 131).
86
  Additionally, Kim’s consolidation of power and ascension 
to ruler of North Korea from 1945 to 1960 was strikingly similar to Stalin’s rise from 1924 to 
1936 (Lankov 2002b, 78).  Nam (1974, 140-141) also comments on Kim’s rise and stated,  
 
In the road leading to his final victory, Kim showed himself a thoroughgoing 
Machiavellian.  He displayed remarkable skill in balancing the contending forces 
by mergers, making timely alliances with individuals or groups and changing such 
alliances when their usefulness was at an end. 
 
In any case, Kim had effectively consolidated power and then sought to expand his 
influence beyond the borders of the DPRK.  At the end of the 1950s and North Korea’s recovery 
from the war, the Kim regime began to pursue significant hostile foreign policy activities aimed 
at its two key foes: South Korea and the United States. 
2.d.5.  Early Hostile Foreign Policy Actions 
The North’s initial approach to foreign diplomacy was cautious and often characterized 
by secrecy and suspicion, even in dealings with its own communist allies (Szarvas 1955).
87
  Yet 
from the very beginning, the Kim regime did establish diplomatic relations with other communist 
states including the Soviet Union, most of its satellites, and the People’s Republic of China (Koh 
1984, 11).  These relations were instrumental in the post-war period and helped North Korea 
work towards achieving its policy goals, which included a “national cohesiveness centered on 
Kim Il-sung,” rebuilding of the industrial base, and balanced diplomatic relations with both 
Beijing and Moscow (Kiyosaki 1976, 48).  Another foreign policy goal was security from 
external attack, and the presence of thousands of Chinese troops (who did not leave the peninsula 
until 1958) helped mitigate threats from the US and South Korea (Martin 2006, 114).   
North Korea’s foreign policy interactions during the mid-1950s often focused on the 
aftermath of the Korean War and were characterized by diplomatic interactions between the 
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 Unfortunately, Shimotomai (2011, 131) provides no details or evidence of the relationship between 
diversion and these juche campaigns.  These types of assertions about diversion are often made by both scholars and 
policymakers, but require evidence to substantiate.   
87
 The Hungarian attaché in Pyongyang noted that in the North Korean government “there is a certain 
incomprehensible secret-mongering aimed at covering up mistakes and difficulties, not just toward the diplomatic 
corps but toward the Korean people too. Of course, this manifests itself much more sharply toward the diplomatic 
corps” (Szarvas 1955).    
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DPRK and the United Nations.  There were few, if any, instances of significant military 
confrontations until around 1958.  Up until that time, North Korea routinely criticized the United 
States and the “puppet regime” of Syngman Rhee (KINU 2011), but engaged in few militarized 
actions.  Subsequent events, initiated by both South Korea and the United States, triggered a 
resurgence in military hostilities on the peninsula. 
During this same period, the Eisenhower administration had embraced the use of nuclear 
weapons as an option in dealing not only with the Soviet Union, but also in localized conflicts in 
which American interests were threatened (Gaddis 2005, 146-148).  Eisenhower’s “New Look” 
strategy was intended to establish dominance (lost under Truman) in the Cold War without 
endangering the US economy (Dockrill 1996, 2).
88
  Eisenhower sought to reduce the size of the 
US military (in hopes of strengthening the economy) while relying heavily upon the capabilities 
provided by lower cost military options, such as nuclear weapons, to counterbalance threats 
posed by the Soviets and other communist states.  Although the US and South Korea had signed 
a mutual defense treaty
89
 following the Korean War, Eisenhower’s foreign policy was focused on 
maintaining security commitments on the peninsula with fewer conventional forces (Stueck 2009, 
584).
90
  
United States’ troop levels in South Korea had been decreasing since the end of the 
Korean War.  At the signing of the Armistice (July 1953), the US had 326,000 troops deployed 
to Korea, this was reduced to 225,000 in 1954, and by 1957 there were only 71,000 US troops 
remaining (DoD 2012a).  Concurrently, the North continued to rebuild and strengthen its forces 
with help from both the Soviets (providing weapons and equipment) and the Chinese (supplying 
manpower).  In February 1958, the North Korean army (without the Chinese forces) was 
estimated to contain between 300,000 and 400,000 troops, 1,000 tanks, and 500-1,000 Russian-
built aircraft compared to 600,000 ROK troops in the South (Trumbull 1958a).
91
  The North 
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 The text of Eisenhower’s policy is detailed in NSC 162/2 (FRUS 1953). 
89
 In this treaty, the US pledged to assist South Korea in case of an “armed attack” and currently remains in 
effect (USFK 2012b).  
90
 This was part of Eisenhower’s “New Look” strategy to reduce overall conventional troop levels. 
Eisenhower’s long term strategy was to reduce “army divisions from 21 to 14, navy ships from 1,200 to 1,030, and 
air force wings from 143 to 137” through troop withdrawals in Korea and cuts to military support units in the US 
and Europe (Stueck 2009, 584). 
91
 Trumbull (1953a) estimates that were 350,000 Chinese troops in North Korea although he also notes that 
China had announced that these troops would soon be moved back across the Yalu into Manchuria.  Regardless of 
the status of these units, Mao still had the ability to rapidly move troops into North Korea to assist with military 
operations based on China’s close proximity and shared border with the DPRK. 
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Koreans were also accused of increasing their military capabilities, including obtaining advanced 
jet aircraft, despite the Armistice Agreement, and there were rumors of deployed nuclear-capable 
rockets and artillery systems in the DPRK (Hailey 1956).  At the end of the Korean War, the US 
agreed to support a South Korean army with up to 720,000 soldiers (20 divisions), but the US 
“did not agree to provide the Korean forces with the latest US equipment” which would violate 
the Armistice Agreement (Callow 1995, 12-13).  
However, the increased military capabilities spurred concerns in the US over the South’s 
ability to defend itself against a North Korean attack (Hailey 1956).  Eisenhower responded in 
June 1957, by announcing that the US would deploy nuclear capable bomber aircraft to South 
Korea to bolster defense capabilities in response to perceived violations of the Armistice 
Agreement by the DPRK (Raymond 1957).
92
  North Korea’s immediate response was that these 
deployments also violated the Armistice Agreement and called for a withdrawal of all foreign 
troops from Korean soil (NYT 1957a).  Additionally, the seeming disparity between ROK 
military capabilities and North Korea’s modernized forces resulted in South Korea’s President 
Rhee appealing to Eisenhower for additional military assistance.   
Rhee agreed to reduce South Korean troop levels in exchange for additional military 
modernization assistance, stating it was necessary to “counterbalance the unfair buildup of 
Communist military strength in the northern part of our country which has been taking place 
since the day the Armistice Agreement was signed” (Rhee 1957).93  Eisenhower agreed to 
modernize the South Korean forces and in August 1957 authorized the deployment of nuclear-
capable surface-to-surface missiles (“Honest Johns”) and artillery systems (280mm howitzers) to 
South Korea (NSC 1957).
94
  These tactical nuclear-capable systems arrived in South Korea in 
January 1958 and were controlled and manned by the US Army (Finley 1984, 108).  This was 
followed in December 1959 by the US deployment of nuclear-capable Matador cruise missiles 
that could range all of North Korea (Jackson 2005, 65; Stars and Stripes 1958).   
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 US-financed modernization came after a “reinterpretation” of the Armistice Agreement by the US 
Department of Defense and State Department based on violations by the DPRK and fears that the ROK would be 
outmatched by the DPRK in a conventional military conflict (Raymond 1957 and Callow 1995, 13-14). 
93
 Rhee agreed to reduce South Korean troop levels by 60,000 to address Washington’s economic concerns 
on sustaining the ROK’s large army financed by US aid (Raymond 1958). 
94
 In July 1955, the US announced it had sent Honest John systems to Okinawa with the intent to deter 
aggression in the region (NYT 1955a).   
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Immediately after nuclear weapons were deployed to South Korea, North Korea’s hostile 
military actions began to increase significantly.  The first notable incident occurred just two 
weeks after the public announcement of the Honest John deployments.  North Korean agents 
hijacked a South Korean airliner and forced it to land in Pyongyang (Finley 1984, 108).
95
  
During this same time, although the Chinese declared that all of their troops had returned to 
Manchuria (and that there were no foreign troops in North Korea), the US announced that it 
would continue to maintain two ground divisions in the South (Trumbull 1953a).  Both of these 
incidents increased tensions on the peninsula significantly.   
Other hostile military incidents in 1958 and 1959 include North Korea’s shooting down 
of a US Sabre jet which had flown over the DMZ; five DPRK armed infiltration attempts 
(resulting in the deaths of at least two North Koreans); MiG jet fighter attacks against a US Navy 
reconnaissance plane; and increased fortifications along the DMZ on the North Korean side 
(Finley 1984, 108-109).
96
  During this same time, North Korea also denounced both the United 
Nations and the ROK-US alliance through diplomatic pronouncements.  These included charges 
that the US violated the Armistice Agreement, appeals for the removal of foreign troops, and 
claims that the UN activities in South Korea and within the international community were 
inappropriate and unlawful (KINU 2011, 20-21; NYT 1957a).   
There was a marked decrease in hostile foreign policy military activities in 1960 and 
1961, possibly influenced by the political turbulence within South Korea.  During this time, 
Syngman Rhee was removed from power in April 1960 due to civil unrest and opposition to his 
government.  Additionally, a South Korean coup d’état by ROK General Park Chung-hee on 
May 16, 1961 most likely influenced the North’s efforts to maintain stability on the peninsula, 
lest a major war break out at a time when the DPRK had made no preparation to “exploit” the 
unrest in the South (CIA 1961c, 5).
97
  Also during this time, the DPRK signed mutual defense 
treaties with the Soviet Union (on July 6, 1961) and China (July 11, 1961) (Nam 1974, 130).  
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 North Korea released the passengers and crew in March 1958, minus six DPRK agents that had been on 
board, and kept the DC-3 aircraft in Pyongyang (Finley 1984, 108). 
96
 North Korean military activities during this time (from a South Korean and US perspective) are well-
documented, but South Korean military actions against the DPRK, which may have preceded or even instigated 
these events, are rarely mentioned in available sources.  This is an inherent weakness of analyses of activities on the 
Korean peninsula at this time: North Korean military actions are often reported at length, but through the lens of the 
US and its allies, while ROK and US military activities involving the DPRK often are overlooked in media and 
other reporting.   
97
 The Kim regime denounced the coup as orchestrated and controlled by the US (DPRK 1961).   
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The negotiations for these agreements may have dampened Kim Il-sung’s proclivity to raise 
tensions on the peninsula to assure Khrushchev and Mao that conflict between the Koreas was 
not imminent.
98
  These events helped solidify Kim Il-sung’s grip on power in North Korea by 
demonstrating that the DPRK could actively engage its political and military foes (South Korea 
and the United States).  Alternatively, these incidents also demonstrated that North Korea was an 
influential and potentially destabilizing factor in the security regime of northeast Asia.   
2.d.6.  Evidence of Diversion? 
Linkages between hostile foreign policy activities and diversionary intentions were not 
apparent, at least on the surface.  During the late 1950s, although North Korea was recovering 
from the devastation of the Korean War, it had made significant progress as a society to establish 
stability and basic services.  In fact, many in the South noted that the North Koreans enjoyed a 
higher quality of life due to both foreign aid and Kim’s success at recovery (Nam 1974, 130).99  
Diversion might have been a consideration for Kim in his diplomatic rhetoric, but the incidence 
and timing of DPRK hostile military actions often seemed to be related to external events, such 
as the atomic weapons deployments by the United States in 1958 and the coup d’état in South 
Korea led by a former ROK general in 1961.
100
 
However, diversion may have played a limited  role in other policy behaviors by the Kim 
regime, such as the initiation of his concept of juche and its focus on independence and self-
sufficiency (Shimotomai 2011, 131).  Yet diversionary activity was a logical policy option for 
the Kim regime.  Kim’s efforts to chart an independent course for Korea despite his country’s 
reliance on an immense amount of aid from both China and the Soviet Union most likely 
appealed to nationalist attitudes in the North.  Additionally, the maintenance of a “wartime 
stance” against the US and South Korea probably united the North Koreans either through fear or 
patriotism against a common foe.  The atmosphere in North Korea during the reconstruction 
period was ripe for diversionary activities as Kim Il-sung sought to unify popular attitudes 
against the US, enhance his ability to eliminate rivals, and crack down on public dissent.
 101
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 This was an example of Kim’s unique ability to balance between his two allies/benefactors who were 
essential in his efforts to maintain a sovereign North Korean regime. 
99
 Kuark (1963, 63) conducted a detailed study of North Korea’s economy during the 1950s and concluded 
that even if “one makes allowance for Communist propaganda and window-dressing…it appears indisputable…that 
North Korea has made greater economic strides during the post-war period as a whole than has South Korea.” 
100
 Hostilities initiated by the DPRK increased after the deployments of new weapons to the South (1958-
1959) and decreased during the time in which the ROK transitioned power from Rhee to Park (1960-1961). 
101
 As Sobek (2007, 31) notes, diversion provides these types of capabilities to leaders.  
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Additionally, during this period, North Korea did experience food shortages beginning in 1954 
(Lee 2003, 8) and considerable economic turmoil associated with recovery from the devastation 
of the Korean War.  Yet the most significant hostile foreign policy activities came at the end of 
the reconstruction period (in 1958), and coincided with tensions associated with external threats.  
Thus, during this period, diversion might have been a factor, but other influences, such as the 
rising external threat, and the regime’s desire to remain in power, played a larger role in the 
DPRK’s reactions to security concerns.     
The preceding pages have outlined the historical background of the Kim regime and the 
relationship between internal factors and external conflict activity.  In the next two chapters, I 
analyze North Koreas hostile foreign policy actions from 1960-2011 and the relationship 
between those actions and both domestic and international factors.  
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Chapter 3 - Hostile Foreign Policy Event Analysis 
In the era of the information revolution, the DPRK’s release of official statistics is entirely  
episodic and absolutely minimal, and had been so for over four decades. 
          Eberstadt (2007) 
 
This chapter includes my analysis of North Korean conflict behavior using quantitative 
methods.  My research reveals the complicated nature of analyzing a closed state but also yields 
important and empirically-supported findings.  I find evidence of statistical relationships in 
support of Proposition 1 (P1) and the diversionary hypothesis, lending support to the idea that 
domestic conditions (political and social instability) does influence North Korea’s external 
conflict behavior.  Additionally, I also find limited support for P2 and the argument that some 
external factors (such as ROK election periods and government type) are related to the Kim 
regime’s actions.  Another key finding was indications there were correlations between the 
absence of the Cold War and heightened levels of HFP activities.  Finally, the relationships not 
found between other internal and external conditions (such as the DPRK’s domestic economy, 
UN resolutions and ROK-US military exercises) and DPRK hostile foreign policy activities were 
also significant outputs.  The following sections provide an overview of the quantitative research 
design and methodology used for this project, analysis of the collected event data, and a 
summary of the key findings on North Korean hostile foreign policy activities. 
3.a.  Research Design and Methods 
 I use a mixed-methods approach to test both propositions and this chapter includes the 
quantitative analysis portion of this study.
102
  Mixed methods offer several advantages over 
single methodologies, such as social science (deductive) techniques or historical (inductive) 
methods, to analyze closed states (Levy 1997; Mahoney and Goertz 2006).  Specifically, Levy 
(1989, 284) notes that using both historical and international relations methods to examine the 
concept of diversionary theory allows for a more comprehensive analysis.  Quantitative methods 
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 The first proposition (P1) notes that North Korea’s domestic conditions are related to the incidence of 
conflict on the Korean peninsula.  The second proposition (P2) states that external conditions are more influential in 
the levels of conflict between North Korea and its neighbors.  Chapter 2 provides additional information on these 
propositions.  Additionally, more details on hypotheses supporting these are included later in the chapter.  
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complement the qualitative (case study) analysis in Chapter 4 of this study and provide a more 
holistic analysis of DPRK hostile foreign policy activities.  Although a multi-disciplined 
methodological approach (such as the one used in this research) provides significant advantages 
in analyzing North Korean activities, few scholars use this method.
103
  Additionally, this study 
uses time-series event data analysis to examine the relationships between DPRK hostile foreign 
policy incidents and the ongoing domestic and international conditions faced by the Kim regime.  
Time-series event data analysis is the examination of event data (or “event history data”) over 
time (Allison 1984, 9).  I use this technique to conduct a longitudinal event analysis of North 
Korean hostile foreign policy between 1960 and 2011.
104
   
I chose to begin this study with events that occurred starting in 1960.  Tensions were still 
high between North and South Korea in 1960, but the South was distracted with domestic 
political chaos.  Although this was a time of prosperity and relative stability for North Korea, in 
the South, the political climate was vastly different.  In 1960, South Korea’s first regime (led by 
US-supported Syngman Rhee) came to an abrupt end after massive protests occurred in reaction 
to rigged national elections.  The Kennedy administration’s regional foreign policies focused on 
the instability in South Korea, rather than the threat posed by the DPRK.
105
  Thus at this time, 
although it still maintained over 50,000 troops stationed in South Korea (Kane 2006), US interest 
in North Korea was waning.  For North Korea, 1960 signaled the end of post-war recovery 
efforts, a growing economy
106
 and Kim Il-sung firmly in control of the North Korean regime 
(Lankov 2002, 63-65; Martin 2006, 109).  Using 1960 as a start point for analysis limits the 
effects of the Korean War on both the North and South (as both had mostly recovered at this 
time) and begins the research timeframe at the start of prosperity for the first “Kim Regime.”  
Just a few years later, North Korea would embark on a series of high-profile attacks along the 
DMZ against South Korean and US forces as part of Kim Il-sung’s “undeclared war” against 
South Korea and the US (Bolger 1991).   
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 Most of the analytic work involving North Korea is part of larger research projects focused on cross-
national time-series studies.  Jung’s (2012) mixed-method analysis of diversionary theory and the Koreas remains an 
exception and this project has benefitted greatly from his research. 
104
 The US military often uses the term “spot reports” to refer to many of the hostile foreign policy events 
included in this study.  Both the military and diplomatic hostile events include information including the date, 
intensity (based on Azar’s 1993 scale, which is discussed later), and a description of the event. 
105
 The Kennedy administration was focused on the upheavals in Korea in 1961 and felt that with current 
US forces and South Korean military units, a North Korean attack (as long as China did not participate) could be 
repelled (Presidential Task Force on Korea 1961). 
106
 North Korea’s economy outpaced South Korea’s well into the 1970s (Oh and Hassig 2000, 8). 
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The end date of 2011 allows for some of the most intense North Korean uses of force and 
hostile foreign policy actions to be included in the analysis and signifies the end of the second 
Kim regime (Kim Jong-il).
107
  The 2000s
108
 were characterized by a series of hostile DPRK 
foreign policy actions, dominated by militarized activities.  These have included long range 
missile firings (in 2006) and nuclear tests (in 2006 and 2009), the sinking of a South Korean 
naval vessel (the Cheonan) and the artillery shelling of a South Korean island (the first such 
attack since the Korean War) in 2010 (Hom and Thompson 2010; Klinger 2010).  This 52-year 
analysis of Korean hostile foreign policy activities covers two North Korean regimes (Kim Il-
sung and Kim Jong-il) and the beginnings of a third “dynasty” (Kim Jong-un).109   
Scholars often use event analysis in conflict research to determine possible correlations of 
events, trends over time, and other information that might not be apparent in other types of 
analysis, such as cross-sectional or case study research (Mahoney and Goertz 2006; Levy 1989).  
I apply multivariate linear regression to test possible statistical relationships between events and 
North Korean hostile foreign policy activities.   
 Hostile foreign policy events (i.e., event data) constitute the dependent variable for the 
quantitative portion of this research, while domestic conditions and international influences are 
the independent variables.
110
  I also include one control variable to address an explanation for 
the levels of hostile foreign policy not accounted for in my theory: the influence of the Cold War.  
I examine these variables in relation to the following two propositions: 
 
P1:  The deterioration of domestic conditions in North Korea is associated with increases 
in North Korean-initiated hostile foreign policy.   
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 Kim Jong-il, the son of North Korea’s first leader (Kim Il-sung) died of a heart attack on December 17, 
2011 after ruling the DPRK for 17 years.  North Korea’s government quickly affirmed that Kim Jong-il’s son, Kim 
Jong-un was its next leader. 
108
 Throughout this text, the term “2000s” generally refers to the period from 2000 to 2010.  Thus, a 
statement referring to the “mid-2000s” would be referencing the 2004 to 2006 timeframe. 
109
 Additionally, using an expanded timeframe addresses methodological criticisms of short-term studies 
(Bronson 1997, 11; Levy 1989, 265-266).    
110
 Kellstadt and Whitten (2009, 7) note that political theories are often conceived in terms of causal 
relationships between variables, which must be observable and include “any entity that can take on different values” 
(Trochim 2005).  These variables are related to the research question and are the “building blocks” of hypotheses 
and theories.  A theory describes the link between the individual variables and is a “reasoned and precise speculation 
about the answer to a research question, including a statement about why the proposed answer is correct” (King, 
Keohane and Verba 1994, 19).  I categorize variables according to their function:  the dependent variable is the 
output of a particular event is caused or influenced by a single or a number of independent variables.  Additionally, 
control variables provide alternate explanations for events not associated with the independent variables.
 
 Finally, a 
hypothesis attempts to describe the relationship between these variables and to predict future activities.   
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P2:  Increased international tensions are associated with increases in North Korean-
initiated hostile foreign policy.     
 
Based on the two propositions above (P1 and P2), I derive eight hypotheses for testing.  
Three hypotheses (H1, H2, and H3) focus on internal conditions and problems with DPRK 
stability as the impetus for foreign policy threats or militarized actions.  I develop the first three 
hypotheses based on the overarching concept of diversionary theory, which essentially states that 
when leaders experience domestic difficulties, they will engage in external conflict, or “violent 
adventures,” to divert public attention from the ruling regime (Sobek 2007).  For North Korea, 
diversionary behavior may occur when these domestic conditions (in H1, H2, and H3) 
deteriorate to a level that may cause the Kim regime to increase its hostile foreign policy 
activities.  The first three hypotheses, based on internal conditions, follow: 
 
Proposition 1 Hypotheses (internally influenced relationships): 
H1:  The deterioration of political conditions in North Korea correlates with increases in 
DPRK-initiated hostile foreign policy activities. 
 
H2:  The deterioration of economic conditions in North Korea correlates with increases 
in DPRK-initiated hostile foreign policy activities. 
 
H3:  The deterioration of social conditions in the DPRK correlates with increased DPRK-    
initiated hostile foreign policy activities. 
 
The other five hypotheses (H4, H5, H6, H7, and H8) examine the alternative explanation 
for North Korea’s relations with the international community:  that external factors, such as UN 
resolutions, military exercises, election cycles, and type of ROK government, influence the 
levels of provocative events.  I constructed the second set of hypotheses to represent a more 
conventional view of DPRK conflict and based these on arguments proposed by the Kim regime 
itself:  the level of conflict on the Korean peninsula is exclusively due to external pressure 
(KCNA 2010a; KCNA 2010f; KCNA 2010g).  The “external conditions” (P2) argument finds 
theoretical support in the “traditional theorist” view of interstate relations.  This viewpoint 
contends that the international system is the primary cause of international conflict (Waltz 1954; 
1979).  The second set of hypotheses follows: 
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Proposition 2 Hypotheses (externally influenced relationships): 
H4:  UN resolutions enacted involving the DPRK are correlated with increased DPRK-
initiated hostile foreign policy activities. 
 
H5:  Leadership changes in the Republic of Korea (ROK) are correlated with increased 
DPRK-initiated hostile foreign policy activities. 
 
H6:  Leadership changes in the United States (US) are correlated with increased DPRK-
initiated hostile foreign policy activities. 
 
H7:  Strategic-level military exercises by the ROK and US are correlated with increased 
DPRK-initiated hostile foreign policy activities. 
 
H8:  The presence of ROK conservative governments are correlated with increased 
DPRK-initiated hostile foreign policy activities. 
 
 I test these hypotheses empirically using social science quantitative analysis methods and 
build upon previous work and concepts from Pickering and Kisangani (2005; 2009; 2010), Li 
(2008), Levy (1989; 2010), and Bueno de Mesquita (2005).  To conduct these tests, I use linear 
regression analysis
111
 to examine the relationship between the independent variables (internal or 
external conditions faced by the Kim regime) and the dependent variable (hostile foreign policy 
activities).  This technique complements the qualitative case studies in this dissertation and the 
outputs support inferences and generalized observations about North Korean conflict behavior.
112
  
The following sections define and operationalize the variables included in this study.    
3.a.1.  The Dependent Variable: Hostile Foreign Policy Event Data 
 Scholars draw upon a variety of methods to measure hostile foreign policy activities and 
often simply use categories from event data or conflict data research.  These efforts have 
included analysis of the onset of state-level disputes from a simple “conflict/no-conflict” 
standpoint (rather than scaling individual events) and additional analysis that measures the 
intensity of the disputes between states.  For example Leeds and Davis (1997) and Crescenzi, 
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 Regression analysis is the study of relationships between variables.  Gujarati and Porter (2009, 15) 
observes that regression can be used to examine “the dependence of one variable, the dependent variable, or one or 
more other variables, the explanatory [independent] variables, with a view to estimating and/or predicting the 
(population) mean or average value of the former in terms of the known or fixed (in repeated sampling) values of the 
later” [emphasis in original].  In this study, I used a linear regression model, AR(1), to conduct the analysis.  More 
details on this model are available later in this chapter and in Guajarati (2009, 634-639). 
112
 This is the goal of all social science research:  to make conclusions that “go beyond the particular 
observations collected” (King, Keohane, and Verba1999, 8). 
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Enterline, and Long (2008) use militarized interstate dispute (MIDs) data
113
 to analyze dyadic 
(two-state) conflict and the onset of hostilities.  Clark and Reed (2005, 615) advocate an 
expansion of interstate conflict research beyond the “conflict/no-conflict” typology and examine 
the propensity of US leaders to use either economic sanctions or force (based on MIDs data) to 
study hostile foreign policy activities.  Other techniques to analyze interstate conflict behavior 
focus on the examination and scaling of event data.  For example, McClelland’s (1999) World 
Event/Interaction Survey (WEIS) database includes over 98,000 interstate events from 1966 to 
1978 and 63 descriptive categories ranging from cooperation to conflict.  Goldstein (1992) 
aggregated this data (WEIS) and scales each category of events for comparison and analysis.   
In this research, I rely on similar methods to examine North Korea’s event data and use 
Azar’s (1993) Conflict and Peace Databank (COPDAB) as a technique to measure conflict.  The 
COPDAB, includes state-level interactions from 1945-1973, ranked using a 15-point scale 
(Table 3.1 below).  On this scale, cooperative actions rate between one and seven, neutral actions 
are designated as eight, and conflict is annotated from nine to 15 (Azar et al. 1982, 36; Azar 
1993).  Azar classifies conflict events into seven categories and weights each category.  Azar’s 
(1993, 37-38) scale provides a method to record the intensity of North Korean hostile foreign 
policy events.  Table 3.1 shows Azar’s (1993) entire scale, but I only used the conflict categories 
for this research on the DPRK:    
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 Leeds and Davis (1997) and Crescenzi, Enterline, and Long (2008) rely on the Correlates of War 
Militarized Interstate Dispute Project (COW MID 2012) for their data. 
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Table 3.1  Azar’s Conflict and Cooperation Scale 
 Scale Category Description114 
15 Extensive war acts causing deaths, dislocation, high strategic costs 
14 Limited war acts                                                        
13 Small scale military acts 
12 Political-military hostile actions 
11 Diplomatic-economic hostile actions                                     
10 Strong verbal expressions displaying hostility in interaction   
  9 Mild verbal expressions displaying discord in 
interaction                                                                    
Scale Category   Weighted Value 
------------------------------------- 
 15 102 
 14   65 
 13   50 
 12   44 Conflict End  Used for this research  
 11   29         
 10     9 
   9     6 
 ------------------------------------ 
   8     1 Neutral Point 
 ------------------------------------ 
   7     6 
   6   10 
   5   14 
   4   27 Cooperative End 
   3   31 
   2   47 
   1   92  
  ------------------------------------ 
 
 Azar (1993, 37-38) 
 
 International relations scholars use the aforementioned databases and scaling techniques 
to examine and analyze other types of event data.  For example, Sprecher and DeRouen (2005, 
127) examine foreign policy behavior of enduring Middle Eastern rivalries using an area-specific 
event database (the KEDS or Kansas Events Data System)
115
 and both Azar’s COPDAB and the 
KEDS coding designations to analyze their dependent variable.
116
  For this research on DPRK 
activity, Azar’s COPDAB scaling (but not its database) was the most efficient and the best fit for 
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 Detailed descriptions of each category and event examples are available in Appendix A.  
115
 The KEDS database (Kansas Events Data System 2012) is now in the Penn State Events Data Project 
(2012) and is focused primarily on areas such as the Balkans, West Africa, and the Middle East (but not East Asia). 
116
 Sprecher and DeRouen (2005, 127) note that “Hostile actions in COPDAB are those events coded nine 
and above. In KEDS, events coded 110 and above are considered hostile actions.”  The KEDS coding is more 
specific than the COPDAB method and uses over 60 categories (Sprecher and DeRouen 2005, 137-138).  For this 
research on DPRK activity, Azar’s COPDAB scaling was more efficient and a better fit for the analysis of Korea 
events. 
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the analysis of Korea events.
117
  An accurate analysis of North Korean conflict activities requires 
an original database and unique techniques to accommodate the varied data sources.  Appendix 
B includes details on the database construction and use of Azar’s (1993) scale and Appendix C 
includes the entire database. 
 Although data collection techniques (McClelland 1999; Goldstein 1992; Azar 1993; King 
and Lowe 2003a) discussed above may not be appropriate for North Korea, these scholars’ 
analytical methods provide the basis for analyzing North Korea’s hostile foreign policy events.  
Similarly, for this study I operationalize variables using Azar’s COPDAB definitions and scaling 
to account for differences in events.
118
  I chose this method because using expanded views of 
state interaction beyond conflict provides a more holistic analysis of the influencers of state 
actions, especially for totalitarian regimes such as North Korea.  For example, a firefight along 
the DMZ is not same as the sinking of an ROK navy ship or the threat of nuclear warfare.  Thus, 
I chose to code the “intensity” of events to weigh each incident appropriately for analysis 
following techniques established by Azar (1993).   
Figure 3.1 depicts the intensity scores for the 2100 total hostile foreign policy events that 
occur between 1960 and 2011.  These measures allow for consideration of the proportionality of 
events.  Applying this method to all the events in the database allows for a cursory analysis of 
the comparative levels of DPRK hostile foreign policy activities during the research period. 
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 Vincent (1983) notes systemic problems with both COPDAB and WEIS event data and comments that 
these included significant levels of “reegional bias” and an inability to predict changes in conflict that occurred. 
118
 This method is based on Nincic (1975, 624), Azar (1982, 36), McClelland (1999, 1); and Goldstein 
(1992, 376-377).  See text above for an explanation of the scaling in the COPDAB and WEIS data. 
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   Figure 3.1  DPRK Hostile Foreign Policy Activities 1960-2011 
 
Source:  Korean Conflict Database (Appendix C) 
 
Figure 3.1 shows the scores for each year based on the recorded hostile foreign policy 
events (2100 total events from 1960-2011).  This research seeks to explain the relationship 
between the levels of hostile events (as shown above) and internal conditions faced by the Kim 
regime. 
3.a.2.  The Independent Variables:  Domestic Conditions and External Influences 
The independent variables I use in this analysis are domestic conditions and external 
influences as both of these factors are influential in North Korean aggressive foreign policy 
choices (KNDU 2011).  Additionally, I incorporate methods and measures previously used in 
studies of authoritarian governments and chose the variables based on the characteristics of the 
DPRK and data availability.
119
  Finally, the paucity of data on North Korea makes any statistical 
analysis of DPRK internal activity a challenge, thus I often rely on proxy information sources to 
analyze internal conditions.  
Domestic Conditions 
The first set of independent variables focus on domestic conditions faced by the Kim 
regime.  This includes indicators of domestic stability (political, economic, and social) and their 
relationships to hostile foreign policy actions.  I measure each type of domestic stability 
temporally by quarter.  The following sections include additional details on each of the variables. 
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 This includes research by Weeks (2011), Pickering and Kisangani (2010), Lai and Slater (2006) and 
Peceny and Butler (2004). 
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Political Stability.  Political stability is the relationship between individual actors and 
societal norms: acts that violate those norms constitute potential evidence of instability (Ake 
1975, 273).  Political stability also requires “institutional consistency” and that both autocracies 
and democracies have inherent characteristics that “self-enforce” political stability (Gates et al. 
2006, 907).  For this study, I measure political instability using two indicators: government 
stability and national capacity. 
The most relevant proxy available for government stability in North Korea is the variable 
measuring political stability included in Kaufmann’s (2009, 2) World Governance Indicators 
(WGI) project.
120
  Kaufmann (2009, 6) combines political stability and the level of violence 
(designated as “PV”) in a state in his index and defines PV as “perceptions of the likelihood that 
the government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, 
including politically-motivated violence and terrorism.”  This variable provides a measure of the 
North Korean government, which has a reported history of political violence and (to a lesser 
extent) political instability (Hawk 2003; Kang 2002; Oh and Hassig 2009).  The PV score is an 
aggregated indicator based on a variety of sources such as rankings and surveys from both 
government and non-government organizations.  For North Korea, the score ranges from -0.53 
(lower stability) to 0.53 (higher stability) (Kaufmann 2011).
121
  The limitation of WGI data is 
that it is only available from 1996 to 2011, which covers only a portion of the overall time period 
under consideration (1960 through 2011).  However, approximately 1000 out of the 2100 total 
events in the database occur during this period, and this subset is representative of a significant 
portion of the total event data.   
An additional measure of political stability is North Korea’s national capacity based on 
the Composite Indicator of National Capabilities (CINC) index from the Correlates of War 
(COW) Project.  The CINC database uses a number of measures to determine overall capabilities 
including military personnel, defense expenditures, population levels, iron, steel, and energy 
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 The World Governance Index (WGI) attempts to measure the level of “good” governance using “six 
dimensions of governance: Voice and Accountability, Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism, 
Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, and Control of Corruption.”  This report includes data 
beginning in 1996 through 2008 for 212 territories and countries.  Although the timeframe of the WGI data limits its 
explanatory capability, this index has the advantage of being one of the only structured measures of political 
stability applied to North Korea.      
121
 The overall WGI index averages from -2.5 (less chance of instability) to 2.5 (likelihood of higher 
instability) with as score of zero as the mean (Kaufmann et al 2010, 9).  The scores rely on data from sources such as 
the Economist Intelligence Unit Democracy Index, Freedom House, Heritage Foundation Index of Economic 
Freedom, and a variety of other data surveys (Kaufmann et al 2010, 29). 
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consumption from 1960-2008 (CINC 2011).  This measure has not been used previously to 
measure North Korean stability,
122
 yet the authors note that the components of this measure 
(demography, industrial capacity, and military characteristics) “reflect the breadth and depth of 
the resources that a nation could bring to bear in instances of militarized disputes” (NMC 2005, 
3).  These same “resources” (or state capacity) allows the DPRK regime to maintain stability, 
social order, and domestic control over its population.  In other words, increased North Korean 
state capacity results in enhanced control over DPRK society and more stability.  These same 
capabilities allow the Kim regime to remain in power and limit the potential for political dissent, 
thus increased CINC scores for North Korea equates to enhanced power for the regime and less 
possibility of political instability.
123
  Thus for North Korea, rather than simply a measure of 
“national capacity,” CINC scores also provide a useful way to gauge the DPRK’s political 
stability.
124
 
Economic Stability.  A number of authors use economic stability and related measures to 
examine the inclination of leaders to pursue diversionary policies (DeRouen 1995; Chapman and 
Reiter 2004; Pickering and Kisangani 2005; and Li, James and Drury 2009).  While almost all 
scholars agree that North Korea’s economic system has struggled throughout the years, there is 
much debate on the magnitude and extent of Pyongyang’s ability to manage its domestic 
economy.  North Korea declined to publish official statistics for over 30 years (North Korea 
Country Profile, 2005; Eberstadt 2007, 18) and the opaque nature of the DPRK makes economic 
data gathering more of an “art” than a “science.”  Statistics on North Korea’s trade also remain 
difficult to obtain, as the DPRK is not a member of the World Trade Organization or 
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 While this measure is not generally used to measure political stability, it does provide, at least in North 
Korea’s case, a measure of the Kim regime’s ability to remain stable and in power. 
123
 For this measure, North Korea’s score ranges from 0.0048 to 0.0135 (with a higher score indicating 
more capability) (CINC 2011).  In comparison, the average CINC scores for South Korea between 1960 and 2007 
are twice as high as North Korea and US scores are an average of 18 times higher than the DPRK (CINC 2011).   
124
 I considered other options for measuring political instability, such as mass and elite unrest, but after 
careful examination and consultation with other scholars, data for these and other measures of political stability were 
not found.  A number of authors use mass and elite unrest in a particular society as additional measures of political 
instability.  This technique proposes that the influencers of social unrest include the level of dissatisfaction that both 
the elites (privileged members) of society as well as the masses (ordinary citizen) feel towards the ruling 
government.  Kisangani and Pickering (2009, 500) defined elite unrest in terms of “government crises and purges” 
and mass unrest as characterized by “general strikes, riots, and anti-government demonstrations” in their analysis of 
the effects of diversionary military activities.  Arthur Banks’ (2004) Cross-National Time-Series (CNTS) Data 
Archive has reporting on internal instability (including purges, strikes and riots) for many nations and has been used 
by a number of scholars (Pickering and Kisangani 2005; Bell 2009; Tir 2010).  Unfortunately, the CNTS has limited 
information on DPRK instability and is an inadequate measure for this research.   
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International Monetary Fund and they are reluctant to allow access to useful economic data.
125
  
Economic analysis organizations, such as the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), attempt to 
analyze North Korea’s economy, but are subject to the same limitations of data availability as 
other research efforts.  For example, EIU’s Country Report: North Korea (2011) provides the 
following description of a Supreme People’s Assembly (SPA) annual meeting: 
  
As usual, the main formal business at the annual meeting of the SPA was to hear 
economic and budget reports for 2010, and to approve the budget for 2011.  This 
was as opaque as ever, with a complete absence of hard numbers.  All that was 
given were a few percentages, which even if true cannot be interpreted without a 
baseline. 
 
The best option for studying North Korea’s economic activity is to gather and analyze 
information on nations who trade with the DPRK.  This concept of “outside-in” (proxy) analysis 
has its limitations, including the reliance on reporting from other nations and lack of inclusion of 
illicit trade.  Nevertheless, this method is the most objective technique available to measure 
North Korea’s economy and trade.   
For this study, I use two economic indicators: GDP and total trade per capita.  Gross 
domestic product (GDP) refers to the overall domestic output of a nation (goods and services) 
and is reported on an annual basis.  Economists often refer to comparisons between nations of 
total GDP or GDP per capita in comparisons of wealth and standard of living.  This study uses 
GDP per capita as relatively simple measure of the relative wealth of the DPRK.  Increases or 
decreases to GDP per person indicate whether North Korea’s national economy is growing or 
shrinking over time.  Data sources for GDP information included Maddison’s (2008) historic 
GDP database supplemented by CIA (2009; 2010; 2011) data.
126
  
The level of imports and exports per person is another indicator of the performance of the 
North Korean economy.  Davies (2002) and Eberstadt (1996 and 1998a) use this measure as an 
indicator of the strength of the DPRK’s economy.  For example, Eberstadt (1998a, 176-179) 
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 This study uses proxy sources for trade data from the Correlates of War Database (COW 2012) and CIA 
(2010; 2011).  
126
 Other GDP sources considered for this research included the World Bank (World dataBank 2012), 
United Nations (UNdata 2012), Penn World Tables (Heston and Summers 2012) and Maddison (2008).  None of 
these sources adequately cover the study period and provided consistent data, except for Maddison (2008) and the 
CIA (2013).  
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analyzes the DPRK import and export of capital goods
127
 from 1970 to 1995 using “mirrored 
statistics” from the United Nations and North Korean trade with other nations.  He begins by 
examining the United Nations International Commodity Trade Database and supplements that 
information with data from countries that engage in the most trade with North Korea (the 
USSR/Russia, China, and South Korea) (Eberstadt 2007, 68).  Additionally, Eberstadt (2007, 72-
90) compares his data on North Korean trade with another survey, an unpublished dissertation by 
Soo-Young Choi (1992), and determines that both analyses report similar findings. 
128
 Here, I 
use a related approach and rely on the Correlates of War database information on trade (COW 
Trade 2012).  I compute total trade per capita by dividing the sum of total exports and imports by 
the estimated DPRK population.
129
  I supplement the COW trade information with CIA data for 
the years 2010 and 2011 (CIA 2010; CIA 2011). 
Social Stability.  Public dissatisfaction with DPRK society also indicates domestic 
difficulties and instability.  Measuring these indicators is difficult, but the most significant sign 
that citizens are dissatisfied with the level of support they receive from the government is the 
willingness of individuals to flee North Korea.  A satisfied population that is confident with its 
government’s ability to provide for social needs will have fewer incentives to leave.  This 
measure can provide valid insight into the social stability of the DPRK.  Choosing to leave North 
Korea for China or the ROK is a “drastic act” since the “defector would know all too well that 
his family members remaining behind quite likely would be sent off to political prison camps, 
perhaps for the rest of their lives…”(Martin 2006, 268).130  Since the 1990s, the number of North 
Korean refugees that fled to the ROK has been meticulously documented by South Korea’s 
Ministry of Unification (1996; 2001; 2010).  Unfortunately, estimates of North Korean refugees 
in other countries (i.e., China) is only available through anecdotal information and disorganized 
sources (Oh 2009; Haggard and Noland 2006; Margesson 2007; ICG 2006; US Government 
2005).  Thus, numbers of North Koreans who flee to the ROK (rather than other states) per year 
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 Capital goods are finished items that governments use for the production of other items.  For North 
Korea, these include items such as metal, machinery, and other manufactured items (Eberstadt 1998, 180).   
128
 US government researchers also used this approach to analyze North Korea’s economy (Nanto and 
Chanlett-Avery, 2010).   
129
 North Korea population figures are from the US Census (2012) international population data. 
130
 Those who choose to leave the DPRK risk not only own lives, but also put their family members who 
remain in North Korea in danger of imprisonment by the Kim regime.  Fleeing North Korea violates the DPRK’s 
criminal code 52 (Betrayal of the Fatherland) which states “Any citizen of the Republic who flees to a foreign 
country or to the side of an enemy, including the seeking of asylum in a foreign embassy…shall be subject to the 
death penalty’” (Demick 2010, 176).   
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is the only reliable measure available, and I chose to use it in this study.  I adjust refugee 
numbers to account for reporting issues as much of this data was reported in total (rather than 
yearly) through 1989
131
 (ROK MOU 2012a).  Consequently, I only use refugee data during the 
post-Cold War period and calculate the rate per 1,000 citizens (both military and civilians) based 
on US Census estimates (2012). 
North Korea’s ability to provide for the health of its citizens is another measure of social 
stability.  Social stability measures include infant mortality rates (IMR) and food availability per 
person.  Fortunately, data for both of these measures is available throughout the course of this 
study period.  Infant mortality rates, provides a proxy indication of the overall health of North 
Korean society.  For example, Abouharb and Kimball (2007, 743) note that IMR can be used to 
“measure development and indicate the extent to which governments provide for the economic 
and social welfare of their citizens, both of which are correlates of conflict.”  North Korea 
experienced declining rates of infant deaths between the 1960s and late 1980s, but after the end 
of the Cold War and during its famine period in the 1990s, the rates began to fluctuate (World 
dataBank 2012; WDI 2012; UN Population 2010).
132
  Numerous research studies use IMR to 
measure characteristics of society including the level of income equality (Kawachi et al 1997), 
the effects of governance (Ross 2006), and the relationship between democracy and the 
availability of healthcare (Lake and Baum, 2001).   
For this study, I use IMR as an indication of the Kim regime’s ability to provide for the 
welfare of its citizens.  Organizations such as the UN, World Bank, and US Census and 
individual researchers (Abouharb and Kimball 2007) provide several measures of these rates, 
which indicate the death rates for infants to age one, expressed in deaths per thousand births (UN 
World Population Estimates 2012).  After analyzing several measures, I chose to use the UN 
World Population Estimates (2012) and World Bank World Development Indicators (World 
databank 2012) to measure IMR in North Korea.
133
   
The final measure of social stability is the ability of North Korea to provide food for its 
people.  If North Korea can provide for its own citizens, then I assume that the population is 
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 Detailed data on pre-1994 refugees held by the ROK government is not publically releasable (ROK 
MOU 2012b). 
132
 More information on the causes of the increase in infant mortality during the 1990s is available in case 
studies on North Korea’s famine (Natsios 2000; Haggard and Noland 2007).   
133
 The UN data was used from 1960 to 1991 and the World Bank information was used from 1992 to 2011 
in order to provide complete reporting throughout the dates for the study. 
  
60 
content with the DPRK leaders and their government.  This became an acute issue during the 
1990s, when North Korea experienced a severe famine during which up to a million deaths 
occurred as a result of food shortages (Haggard and Noland 2007, 1; Hassig and Oh 2009, 116).  
International aid to North Korea became an important part of the DPRK economy starting in the 
1990s.  In fact, during this period the US provided a significant amount of the aid to the DPRK, 
mostly in the form of energy and food aid.  Since 1995, the US provided over $1.2 billion in aid 
(60% food and 40% heavy fuel oil) (Manyin, 2010).  Other key donors of food and include 
China, South Korea, and Japan.
134
  North Korea’s ability to provide food is a stabilizing factor in 
DPRK society and I use the availability of food in metric tons per thousand North Korean 
citizens as a proxy measure for social stability.
135
   
External Conditions 
The second category of independent variables involves the pressure exerted on North 
Korea by the international community in attempts to change the Kim regime’s behavior.  
Indicators of these external conditions include international conditions that might occur in 
conjunction with changes in DPRK conflict activity levels such as United Nations resolutions, 
ROK and US election cycles, the incidence of ROK-US alliance military exercises, and type of 
South Korean government.  These conditions often result in political rhetoric and occasional 
military responses from the DPRK. 
 UN Security Council Resolutions.  North Korea’s actions often result in international 
responses, the most significant of which is the UN reaction to the North Korean invasion of 
South Korea in 1950.  Since the Korean War, the majority of the international responses (with 
the exception of actions by the ROK-US alliance) were overwhelmingly diplomatic.  These 
responses are often international admonishments in an effort to change the Kim regime’s 
behavior.
136
  Chapman and Reiter (2004, 897) use UN Resolutions enacted by the Security 
Council as an indicator for external conditions to measure international involvement in crises.  
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 From 1995-2008, the UN’s World Food Program (and other public and private sources) provided a 
significant amount of food aid to North Korea.  During that time, China provided 26.9% of food aid, South Korea 
provided 26.5%, and the US, Japan, and other nations contributed 17.5%, 10.7%, and 18.4% respectively (Manyin 
2010,  13; UN World Food Program Food Aid Information System 2011).  
135
 This data is available from the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAOSTAT 
2012).    
136
 I also considered economic sanctions for inclusion as an independent variable, but most of the current 
sanctions against North Korea (especially those enacted by the US) have been in place since the Korean War (and 
thus do not provide any variation).  Rennack (2011) provides a useful discussion of the background and the status of 
sanctions on North Korea while Noland (2008) contends that they are overwhelmingly ineffective. 
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These types of international responses and the enactment of Security Council Resolutions 
potentially influence North Korea’s decisions to engage in aggressive foreign policy and military 
activity.  Here, I code UN Security Council resolutions as binary (dummy) variables: quarters 
that include the enactment of a new resolution are coded as “one,” and all others as “zero.”137   
Leadership Changes.  I use two other indicators, US and ROK leadership changes, to 
investigate a possible correlation between events in the ROK and the US and North Korean 
hostile foreign policies.  While there are several studies on the effects of national elections and 
leadership decisions to use force, prior research primarily focuses on the US (and presidential 
decisions to use force in relation to a US election cycle) (Ostrom and Job 1986; James and Oneal 
1991; Meernick 1994).  In one of the only available studies of its kind, Davies (2006, 148-149) 
contends that US elections influenced North Korea’s actions during the 1990s resulting in 
strategic conflict avoidance (SCA),
138
 while ROK election cycles had little effect on DPRK 
actions.  Other researchers use election cycles to analyze diversion activity (Pickering and 
Kisangani 2005 and 2007; Li, James and Drury 2009) lending support to the inclusion of this 
variable.  The DPRK reportedly elevates its propaganda activity during each election cycle in 
South Korea and has historically been accused of engaging in provocative actions in an effort to 
influence US and ROK election outcomes (Chosun Ilbo 2010b).  Additionally, scholars observe 
that North Korea possibly takes “into account such events as presidential elections here [ROK] 
and in the U.S. next year to make the North Korea issue a major variable” (Korea Joongang 
Daily 2011).  Nevertheless, these observations are anecdotal and require empirical evidence to 
determine if statistically significant relationships exist (Enterline 2010, 411-412).   
South Korean presidential elections occur every four to seven years, while the US holds 
elections every four years.
139
  I code ROK and US leadership changes as “one” for the quarter in 
which they occur (based on the election date, rather than the assumption of office) while I code 
periods that include no change as “zero.”  Exceptions to this coding are cases of assassination, 
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 This concept proposes that the increased international attention given to North Korea because of a new 
resolution might spur DPRK choices to use diversionary force.  United Nations General Assembly actions and 
resolutions, and economic sanctions do not have similar impacts on the Kim regime. 
138
 This concept involves state-level efforts to avoid conflict with other states through “conciliatory” actions 
or attitudes (Fordham 2005). 
139
 ROK elections or regime changes have occurred in 1948, 1952, 1956, 1960, 1963, 1967, 1971, 1978, 
1981, 1987 and every five years thereafter (for this study, 2007 was the most recent).  US elections generally occur 
every 4 years (2008 was the most recent). 
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coup, or other types of non-election leadership change.  For those situations, I code the quarter of 
the leadership change as “one.” 
Military Exercises.  I measure the impact of ROK-US strategic-level military exercises 
on DPRK activities.  The US and the ROK conduct joint military exercises aimed at maintaining 
South Korea’s defense capabilities every spring and fall.  These include annual events, which 
range from units in the field to computer-simulated command-post scenarios, including exercises 
such as KEY RESOLVE, FOAL EAGLE, RSOI (Reception, Staging and Onward Integration), 
ULCHI FOCUS LENS, ULCHI FREEDOM GUARDIAN, and TEAM SPIRIT. All of these 
exercises use North Korea as the adversary pitted against the ROK-US alliance (D’Orazio 2012, 
277-279).  In fact, one of the negotiating terms for the resolution of the 1993 North Korean 
nuclear crisis was the cancellation of the TEAM SPIRIT training exercises by US and ROK 
military forces (Sigal 1998, 44-51).  These types of exercises often cause intense reactions from 
North Korea.  For example, the DPRK made the following statement in reaction to joint ROK-
US exercises in August 2011:  “The Korean peninsula is faced with the worst crisis ever.  An all-
out war can be triggered by any accidents” (Telegraph 2011).  Published research is limited on 
the effects of ROK/US military exercises on North Korean behavior
140
 and no studies of 
diversionary theory incorporate this factor.  I include strategic military exercises jointly 
conducted by the ROK and US by coding exercise periods in a given quarter as “one” (and non-
exercise periods as “zero”).141 
ROK Administration Type.  The final independent variable measures the influence of the 
political characteristics of the ruling party in South Korea and the internal political parties within 
South Korea as influential in HFP activities.
142
  This variable examines the contention that 
DPRK conflict was more prevalent during conservative ROK administrations, because during 
these times South Korea engaged less and acted with more hostility towards the Kim regime.  A 
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 D’Orazio (2012, 276) remains an exception and he found that joint military exercises “do not trigger a 
systematic escalation in conflictual rhetoric or behavior” by North Korea in his study of events between 1998 and 
2010. 
141
 Military exercises at the strategic level are those which employ “instruments of national power in a 
synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater, national, and/or multinational objectives” and operational 
exercises are those which link the “tactical [combat] employment of forces to national and military strategic 
objectives” (US Department of Defense 2011, xi).  Military war games such as the now defunct “TEAM SPIRIT” 
and the ongoing ULCHI FREEDOM GUARDIAN exercise fit this category of strategic events.  
142
 This variable is specifically focused on the internal workings of the ROK government.  Davies (2006, 
144) notes that DPRK actions were sometimes influenced by the domestic political conditions in the United States 
and this variable attempts to account for the influence of ROK internal political conditions on DPRK conflict 
behavior.   
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conservative ruling party typically takes a more “hardline” approach towards the DPRK 
(resulting in increased hostile behavior), while a liberal South Korean party is typically more 
open to engagement with the North (and less conflict).  North Korea reacting to perceived threats 
from the ROK might have caused conflict with the DPRK during these administrations.  For 
example, although North Korea conducted dozens of military operations against ROK and US 
forces during the mid-late 1960s, these operations were often done in retaliation for previous 
activities (often military raids) by ROK forces (Michishita 2010, 20-21 quoting Vance 1968).  A 
more recent example is the November 2010 artillery attack by North Korea against the South 
Korean island of Yeonpyeong.  North Korea blamed this attack, which left four South Koreans 
dead, on previous military activities by South Korea in the Yellow Sea (Yonhap 2010a, BBC 
2010).  During both of these events, a conservative administration ruled South Korea.  In fact, 
while studies of DPRK-initiated conflict are rare, research on South Korean-instigated events is 
also absent.  Thus using a variable to represent DPRK hostilities as reactions to South Korean 
administrations potentially provides an important way to explain these conflict events.  For this 
study, I code periods that included conservative South Korean administrations as “one” and 
liberal administrations as “zero.”143   
3.a.3.  The Cold War as the Control Variable 
 A potential rival explanation of the incidence of DPRK conflict during the study period 
might propose that the end of the Cold War had a significant impact on North Korea’s HFP 
activity levels.  During the Cold War, both "threats and incentives" from both the US and Soviet 
Union potentially "kept the behavior of satellites in check" (Calaway 2001, 106-107).  Some 
argue that in the post-Cold War period, the absence of the "stabilizing" impact of the 
superpowers may have caused increased repression and conflict actions by these same states 
(Calaway 2001, 107; Milner 1998).  In the North Korean case, the political, military, and 
economic security provided by both the PRC and Soviet Union may also have worked to dampen 
DPRK efforts to pursue HFP actions.
 144
  The cessation of support from the Soviets and changes 
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 South Korean administrations that are coded as “liberal” include Yun Bo-seon (1960-1962), Kim Dae-
jung (1998-2003) and Roh Myoo-hung (2003-2008).  Yun Bo-seon, along with his Prime Minister Chang Myon, 
took power after Syngman Rhee’s resignation in 1960 and was the leader of “South Korea’s first democratic 
regime” (Cumings 2005, 350-351; see also  Eckert 1990, 355-357).  The more recent administrations of Kim and 
Roh more centrist and liberal compared to other ROK presidencies. 
144
 The Cold War included external influences (as proposed by P2), but also had such wide-ranging effects, 
such as ideological support to maintain the regime, Kim Il-sung’s confidence that the PRC and USSR would 
potentially support his military “adventures” against the ROK and US.  The Cold War provided an overarching 
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demanded by the Chinese also might have affected the DPRK's willingness to pursue HFP 
actions, not only in the 1990s, but also in the 2000s, after the worst effects of the famine period 
ceased.  The presence (or absence) of the Cold War provides an alternative explanation for Kim 
regime conflict activities that have not been properly accounted for in either diversionary theory 
or the propositions.  To account for these factors, I include the Cold War as a control in my 
multivariate regression models.     
 The DPRK’s propensity for external conflict might be influenced by the presence of the 
Cold War and the associated political environment regardless of North Korea’s internal 
conditions (P1) or the associated external influences mentioned in P2.  United States’ and Soviet 
posturing during the Cold War routinely amplified regional tensions, as both states viewed the 
Korean peninsula as a strategic-level concern.  Additionally, North Korea’s reliance upon the 
support of both China and the Soviet Union during the Cold War was a key component of its 
economic health and national security.  For North Korea, the end of the Cold War included the 
evaporation of Soviet support, significant decreases in Chinese assistance, and the beginning of a 
period of economic crisis and widespread famine (Eberstadt, Rubin, and Tretyakova 1995; 
Noland 2000; Natsios 2001; Wallace 2007).  In addition, China’s rapprochement with South 
Korea (beginning in the late 1980s) had detrimental effects on North Korea’s perceived ability to 
maintain its regional security posture (Scobell 2004).  Thus, to account for this rival hypothesis, I 
control for the pre- and post- Cold War activities of North Korea by using the Cold War as a 
control variable.  Years prior to 1992 are coded “one” to measure the Cold war period, with 
years 1992-2011 coded as “zero.”145   
3.a.4.  Time Series Linear Regression Models 
 I constructed four models using time series analysis of quarterly observations between 
1960 and 2011 of the dependent, independent and control variables described above.  Model 1 
includes all of the variables noted above that included reliable reporting and variance during and 
                                                                                                                                                             
political-military atmosphere in which the DPRK felt emboldened to pursue Kim’s domestic and international 
policies to include hostile foreign policy activities.  While the Cold War is often used as an independent variable, 
scholars have also used it as a control variable when analyzing conflict behavior (Doyle and Sambanis 2000, 786; 
Cooney 2013).     
145
 This project uses December 31, 1991 as the date of the official dissolution of the Soviet Union and end 
of the Cold War. 
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after the Cold War between 1960 and 2011.
146
  Models 2, 3, and 4 are variations of the first 
model and include WGI, UN Resolutions, and refugee rates respectively.   
 The models test P1 and P2 by examining the relationship between the independent 
variables (described above) and the level of hostile foreign policy.  Changes in these independent 
variables (IVAR) or conditions are related to changes in the dependent variable (Hostile Foreign 
Policy).  Conceptually, this relationship is as follows:  
 
Hostile Foreign Policyt = β0 + β1DPRK CINCt-1 + β2WGIt-1 + β3GDPt-1 +  
β4Tradet-1 + β5Refugeest-1 + β6Infant Mortt-1 + β7Foodt-1 + β8UN Resolutionst-1 +  
β9Mil Exercisest-1 + β10US Leadershipt-1 + β11ROK Leadershipt-1 +  
β12ROK Admint-1 + β13Cold Wart-1 + µt    
 
 
Hostile Foreign Policyt represents the dependent variable (DVAR) during a given quarter 
(t), β signifies the coefficients, and µt is the error term.  To ensure that I analyze data in the 
correct temporal order (IVAR followed by DVAR), I lag the independent variables by one 
quarter (denoted by “t-1”).  I include only the lagged data in the regressions.  Additionally, the 
four models were constructed to test these relationships based on differences in data, such as the 
span of observations.  In the first model (Model 1, the “Base Model”), I omit the independent 
variables WGI, Refugees, and UN Resolutions, to allow for consistent reporting throughout the 
study period.  This allows for an analysis of the DVAR over the entire study period (1960-2011) 
with most of the independent variables.  The other three models introduce the omitted variables 
and only include observations during the post-Cold War period.
147
  The second model adds WGI 
to Model 1 as an independent, external condition variable and examines the relationship between 
conditions faced by North Korea and its HFP activities from 1996 to 2011.  Model 3 adds UN 
Resolutions to Model 1 and examines the relationship between these conditions and DPRK 
conflict levels during the post-Cold War period (1992-2011).  The final model (Model 4) 
examines Model 1 with the addition of refugee data.  Additionally, Model 4 only includes data 
from the post-Cold War period (due to lack of reliable reporting on refugees prior to 1992).    
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 In the first model, WGI was omitted due to limited reporting (1996-2011), UN resolutions were omitted 
because they did not vary during the Cold War (none were passed), and refugee rates prior to 1992 were not reliably 
reported by the ROK government. 
147
 I omit the Cold War variable from the other three models because it does not vary during the periods 
examined by those models.  Additionally, UN resolutions were not included in Models 1, 2, and 3 because of lack of 
variance prior to 1992.   
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Model and Independent Variable Data Transformations 
 After examining the independent variable data, I adjust the models to ensure the use of 
valid social science and regression analysis techniques.  I also adjust the data to account for 
differences in characteristics of the dependent variable (conflict) data and the independent 
variables.  Specifically, the DVAR is reported as events (with a specific date associated) while  
the IVARs and control variables are only available in yearly increments.  Thus, I collapsed the 
data into a uniform time period and tested each model using monthly, quarterly and yearly 
aggregation to see which provide the best statistical fit.  Monthly data, although available for 
dependent variable, requires over-manipulation of the other variables while models using yearly 
data offer too few observations (52 total).
148
   
Because of these tests, I find that using quarterly data (rather than monthly or yearly) 
provides a suitable “middle solution” that affords an acceptable number of observations without 
causing significant analytical problems.  This provides enough occurrences to allow for 
regression analysis and consistency for analysis with other data (such as military exercises and 
leadership changes).
149
  More details and examples of specific data calculations are available in 
Appendix B.  
 Additionally, I analyze the models using statistical (regression) analysis to determine 
their predictive value.
150
  I conduct a series of diagnostic tests on each model to ensure 
conformity with multivariate assumptions.  Detailed results are included in Appendix D.  
Multivariate regression assumes that the dependent variable (conflict) is continuous, that 
relationships between the IVARs and DVAR are linear, that the error term is not correlated with 
each IVAR, and that each independent variable exhibits an additive effect on the dependent 
variable (Berry and Sanders 2000, 38).   
Linear regression analysis also assumes that the model is “correctly specified,” meaning 
that it includes variables that are necessary and excludes those that are not.  Tests for 
specification bias indicated that there might be specification bias in the models, but I could not 
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 King, Keohane and Verba (1994, 221) discuss problems with research involving small numbers of 
observations.   
149
 Monthly and yearly aggregation of events were both considered and tested.  Quarterly aggregation 
provided the most consistent event data calculations for analysis and provided enough fidelity to identify long-term 
trends without over-generalizing the data. 
150
 For more detailed explanations on the types of adjustments required for this type of analysis, see 
Gujarati and Porter (2009, 34-54), Ostrom (1990, 7-16) and Downing and Clark (1996, 107-128).  
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implement typical solutions (such as finding additional variables) due to the lack of information 
on North Korea.  Thus, I accept potential specification bias as an assumed risk in this analysis.  
To account for potential heteroscedasticity, I use robust standard errors.
151
  Additionally, the data 
shows correlation between successive time variables (i.e., autocorrelation), which is a common 
problem with time-series data.  I correct for this by using Cochrane-Orcutt AR(1) regressions.
152
  
Finally, I test for correlations (“multicollinearity”) and find high levels of correlation did exist 
between some of the variables.
153
  After attempting a number of standardized remedies to 
problems associated with multicollinearity (i.e., transforming variables),
154
 none was effective.  
Thus, multicollinearity is also an assumed risk in this analysis.
155
  
 3.b.  Quantitative Analysis 
 In the statistical analysis portion of this research, I examine time-series event data 
surrounding the Kim regime’s hostile foreign policy events between 1960 and 2011.156  In this 
analysis, I find support for Proposition 1 and a correlation between heightened levels of conflict 
and both political and social instability.  I also find some support for Proposition 2, although the 
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 Heteroscedasticity is a condition where the error terms are constant and not related to the DVAR and 
robust standard errors is a commonly used statistical procedure to correct for these types of errors. 
152
 I initially use ordinary least squares (OLS) regression, but detected autocorrelation. To correct for this, I 
use “autoregressive process of order 1” or AR(1) regression (Cochrane-Orcutt) for the analysis and found it to be a 
better fit for the data.  The advantage of using the Cochrane–Orcutt AR(1) regression technique is that it initially 
provides an estimate of the autocorrelation error, then includes that error while estimating new regression 
coefficients, and finally provides a regression output that confirms that the “fitted residuals are independent” 
(Maggin et al. 2011, 308).  See Cochrane and Orcutt (1949), Gujarati and Porter (2009, 55-85), Gujarati (2011), and 
DSS 2012 for a detailed discussion of this method of regression analysis and AR(1), OLS, and associated tests for 
validity.  
153
 Mean variable inflation factor (VIF) scores for each of the models (1 to 4) are at 10 or below, but 
individual variable scores were often higher.  After conducting diagnostic tests of joint significance or the “joint f 
test” (Blackwell 2008), I find that Model 1 contains variables that are influential in relation to the dependent 
variable, regardless of their correlation.  Similar tests run on Models 2, 3 and 4 indicate that removing variables had 
little effect on the DVAR, indicating significant correlation between variables in those models.  See Appendix D for 
the statistical outputs of these tests.   
154
 I conducted a number of tests and transformations on the data (i.e., log, square or cube), but this resulted 
in either insignificant changes to the overall model outputs or significant skewing of the data.  Thus, I simply use the 
original quarterly data without additional statistical transformations.   
155
 Gujarati and Porter (2009, 342) note that one method to deal with multicollinearity is to “do nothing” 
and given the characteristics of this data, this is the best option for this research. 
156
 This analysis uses longitudinal research, which involves the consistent and methodological collection 
and analysis of data across time (Menard 1991, 4).  I obtained the data through repeated observation of DPRK-
related activities (designated as the dependent and independent variables) during a given historical context (52 years, 
divided into 206 quarters).  This method of focusing solely on the long-term activity of North Korea allows for a 
more structured and detailed examination of the DPRK and its conflict activities.  Statistical analysis, with the help 
of the computer program Stata, is used to examine the data and help support conclusions on relationships between 
the variables.  Stata is a commercially available statistical software package often used by social scientists to analyze 
the relationships between measurable characteristics (variables) of a specific phenomenon (Stata 2012).     
  
68 
external conditions associated with increased HFP are primarily based on the South Korean 
government and its activities.  Additionally, relationships between the levels of conflict and the 
presence of the Cold War suggest that North Korean HFP activities are more prevalent during 
the post-Cold War period.  The following pages summarize the data and the statistical outputs.  
Table 3.2 characterizes and summarizes the data by showing the number of data points, mean, 
standard deviation, and minimum and maximum (range) of observations. 
 
Table 3.2  Descriptive Statistics for all Variables (1960-2011) 
Variable Variable 
Description 
N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Hostile 
Foreign 
Policy 
Activities  
Dependent 208 183.8269 184.0945 0 982 
DPRK CINC 
Independent 
(Political) 
208 0.008994 0.002955 0.004855 0.013581 
WGI 
Independent 
(Political) 
64 -0.0803125 0.3116647 -0.53 0.53 
GDP 
Independent 
(Economic) 
208 1987.762 746.0711 1104.994 2841.079 
Trade 
Independent 
(Economic) 
208 .1148044 .0738334 .030464 .368898 
Refugees 
Independent 
(Social) 
80 0.0449841 .0446442 .0007884 .1209954 
Infant Mort 
Independent 
(Social) 
208 38.65601 13.13068 24 67 
Food 
Independent 
(Social) 
208 0.154359 0.009751 0.13531 0.175528 
UN 
Resolutions 
Independent 
(External) 
80 0.1 0.3018928 0 1 
Mil Exercises 
Independent 
(External) 
208 0.091346 0.288796 0 1 
ROK 
Leadership 
Independent 
(External) 
208 0.913462 0.2887958 0 1 
US 
Leadership 
Independent 
(External) 
208 0.072115 0.259303 0 1 
ROK Admin 
Independent 
(External) 
208 0.7788462 0.2887958 0 1 
Cold War Control 208 0.6153846 0.4160251 0 1 
 
As shown in Table 3.2, the dependent variable (Hostile Foreign Policy Activities) 
includes 206 quarterly observations with an intensity level ranging from 0 to 982, a mean 
(average) of 183.82 and standard deviation of 184.09.  The political stability variables follow, 
with the DPRK national capabilities (CINC) measurements ranging from 0.0048 to 0.0135, a 
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mean of 0.0089, and standard deviation score of 0.0029.  The other political variable, WGI score, 
has a range of -0.53 to 0.53, with a mean of -0.080 and standard deviation of 0.311.  The 
economic stability variables include GDP per person (in US dollars) per quarter, ranging from 
1104.99 to 2841.07 with a mean of 1987.76 and standard deviation of 746.07.  I measure the 
economic variable, total trade per person, in millions of US dollars and it ranged from .0304639 
to .3688978 with a mean of .1148 and a standard deviation of .0738.  The first social stability 
variable, refugees, range from .0007884 to .1209954 per person, with an average of .0449 and 
standard deviation of .0446.  Infant mortality rate per 1000 had quarterly averages ranging from 
24 to 67 with a mean score of 38.65 and standard deviation of 13.13.  The final social variable, 
food availability per person (in metric tons) ranges from 0.135 to 0.175 with an average of 0.154 
and standard deviation of 0.097.  I record the other independent (external condition) variables 
and the control variable as binary and designated these as either “one” or “zero” denoting the 
presence or absence of the variable.
157
  For example, I code periods that included the binary 
variables, such as UN Resolutions or the Cold War, as “one” and all other times as “zero.”  
Table 3.3 shows the results of regression analysis on each of the four models.  I use 
Cochrane-Orcutt AR(1) regression for each model.  Appendix D includes the diagnostic tests and 
full analysis output tables from Stata.   
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 The external condition independent variables include UN Resolutions, Military Exercises, ROK 
Leadership Change, US Leadership Change, and ROK Admin.  The control variable was Cold War. 
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Table 3.3  Statistical Analysis Results:  All Models 
Variable 
Model 1 (1960-2011) 
(Base Model)
158
 
Model 2 (1996-2011) 
(Base + WGI) 
Model 3 (1992-2011) 
(Base + UN Resolutions) 
Model 4 (1992-2011) 
(Base + Refugees) 
DPRK CINC(t-1) -55154.67 (17969.03)*** 77237.74 (80520.1) 3736.401 (41331.83) -3189.311 (37417.85) 
WGI(t-1) - 161.1741 (277.9712) - - 
GDP(t-1) -0.0917953 (0.0705419) 0.1348404 (0.3197684) -0.0527 (0.0612981) 0.0102596 (0.0714668) 
Trade(t-1) -43.57502 (494.4618) -502.8026 (1056.531) 116.7253 (703.9506) -828.2668 (847.7516) 
Refugees(t-1) - - - 2868.563 (1633.79)* 
Infant Mortality(t-1) -7.236242 (5.246148) 7.708937 (11.94308) -2.374974 (5.832422) 2.756085 (6.745713) 
Food(t-1) -3634.759 (2140.799)* -11065.66 (12884.88) -3537.73 (5751.358) -2949.348 (5301.901) 
UN Resolutions(t-1) - - -16.00958 (29.87347) - 
Military Exercises(t-1) -18.91945 (16.17652) 23.24864 (21.95039) 10.60475 (20.5928) 11.43339 (20.29014) 
ROK Leadership 
Change(t-1) 
93.37184 (48.12031)* 98.92562 (70.27786) 107.4748 (61.30165)* 100.9797 (65.67377) 
US Leadership Change(t-1) -29.74627 (23.42722) -5.589573 (58.80727) 3.086805 (50.64341) 16.76734 (53.91637) 
ROK Admin(t-1) 110.6997 (49.11612)** -14.34915 (118.7285) 46.22309 (81.23314) 52.4943 (77.06109) 
Cold War(t-1) -179.9121 (58.40437)*** - - - 
     
R2 0.1221 .2025 .1789 0. 2235 
Number 206 62 78 78 
     
*p< 0.10,  **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01 
 
Note:  Coefficients are listed first followed by standard errors in parentheses.  I use robust standard errors for all models.
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 In this first model, I omit WGI, UN Resolutions, and Refugees and test each of these in the other models.  See next section for a detailed explanation 
for the characteristics and outputs of each model. 
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Model 1 tests the overall relationships between the DVAR (hostility score) and the 
independent variables that were reliably reported throughout the study period (1960-2011).  In 
this model, I omit WGI due to limited reporting (1996-2011) and do not include both UN 
Resolutions and Refugees due to lack of variance or unreliable reporting during the Cold War 
period.  This first model includes a number of statistically significant and negative relationships 
between hostility levels and the independent variables such as DPRK CINC and food availability.  
Thus, between 1960 and 2011, I find that decreases in North Korea’s national capacity and food 
supplies are related to increases in hostile foreign policy behaviors.  Additionally, ROK 
leadership changes and ROK administration type are associated with increased North Korean 
conflict.  Finally, the control variable (Cold War) is also statistically significant, and 
demonstrates a negative relationship to the level of HFP.  In other words, the presence of the 
Cold War is related to decreased levels of HFP, while the absence of the Cold War has the 
opposite effect.
159
 
Model 2 adds the World Governance Indicators (WGI) to Model 1, but limits the 
temporal scope of the analysis to 1996-2011.  While this model uses the WGI political stability 
measures to test for correlations between conflict and the independent variables, I find no 
relationships and that the model itself is not statistically significant.  Model 3 includes the 
variables in the first model and UN resolutions, limiting the scope of the analysis to only the 
post-Cold War period.  Aside from the resolutions in the 1950s, the UN did not enact any 
resolutions until 1993, during the first DPRK nuclear crisis.  In this model, the only significant 
variable is a ROK leadership change (which provides additional support to P2) although the 
model is also not statistically significant.  Finally, Model 4 examines the relationship between 
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 Many scholars support the idea that the DPRK felt less secure after the loss of USSR and PRC support 
(Mceachern 2010, 68-70; Park 2012, 324; Cha and Kang 2003, 19; and Oh 2000, 185) and the quantitative analysis 
seems to support that viewpoint.  As stated previously, one of the reasons for using the Cold War as a control is to 
address that alternate hypothesis.  Yet, as the qualitative portion of this research will show, the end of the Cold War 
was less related to DPRK conflict than it might seem.  In many respects, support to North Korea from its communist 
benefactor (China) never really stopped at the end of the Cold War.  While the support from the Soviets evaporated 
(Radchenko 2011, 309), the Chinese continued to provide aid (either direct or in the form of subsidized goods) 
throughout the 1990s (Noland 2000, 187) and the PRC continues to do this today (Jayshree and Xu 2013).  In fact, 
when Kim Jong-il died, there were reports of substantial PRC aid to North Korea to ensure stability (Yonhap 2012).  
China’s policy towards Northeast Asia remains stability and the status quo and an intact North Korea is a key part of 
that policy (Choi 2012, 54-55).  Despite the end of the Cold War, North Korea still received a significant amount of 
aid (often in the form of trade) from China and that support helped ensure the DPRK remained solvent and 
sovereign.   
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refugee levels and hostile foreign policy activities during the post-Cold War period.  This 
statistically significant model finds a relationship between increased levels of refugees and 
heightened DPRK conflict during this period (in support of P1).  This lends support to the 
contention that increased levels of North Korean hostile foreign policy occur in conjunction with 
higher refugee numbers. 
The R
2
 values for all of the models are relatively low, although Gujarati and Porter (2009 
206-207) note that a low score is not “necessarily bad.”160  Based on the R2 value, Model 1 
explains 12% of the variance in the level of conflict (DVAR) while Model 4 accounts for 22% of 
the change in the dependent variable.  These two statistically significant models (Model 1 and 
Model 4) do provide support for Proposition 1 (internal conditions) and limited support for 
external or international community-based conditions (Proposition 2).  Model 1 also shows that 
other factors are influential, such as ROK election periods, conservative administrations, and the 
control variable (presence of the Cold War).  Additionally, Model 4 is the most robust (with the 
highest explanatory power) and does provide limited support for the contention that after the 
Cold War, domestic distress (based on the numbers of refugees) experienced by the DPRK is 
related to the propensity for increased hostile foreign policy behavior.  Models 2 and 3 add little 
to these arguments and show (with the exception of ROK leadership changes in Model 3) no 
significant relationships between the variables.   
Interpreting the slope coefficients also provides valuable information about the direction 
and intensity of the relationships between the variables.  In multivariate regression, these 
coefficients measure the “responsiveness” of the DVAR to a change in a particular IVAR when 
the other independent variables are held constant (Berry and Sanders 2000, 31).  Thus, the 
regression coefficients provide a prediction of the effects of each independent variable on the 
DPRK’s hostile foreign policy activities.  In Table 3.4, I show the substantive effects of a change 
in each of the significant independent variables from one standard deviation below the mean to 
one standard deviation above the mean.   
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 R
2
 is a measure of proportional reduction in error and helps determine the ability of the independent 
variables to explain or predict the dependent variable (DPRK hostilities) (Pollock 2005, 163-164).  Alternatively, 
Gujarati and Porter (2009, 206-207) warn that overemphasizing R
2 is a common problem and that scholars “should 
be more concerned about the logical or theoretical relevance of the explanatory variables to the dependent variable 
and their statistical relevance.”  
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Table 3.4  Substantive Effects (Significant Variables)
161
 
 HFP Unit Change 
Model 1 (Base)  
DPRK CINC(t-1) -992 
Food(t-1) -1122 
ROK Leadership Change(t-1) 170 
ROK Conservative Administration(t-1) 172 
Cold War(t-1) -221 
  
Model 3 (Base +UN)
162
  
ROK Leadership Change(t-1) 196 
  
Model 4 (Base + Refugees)  
Refugees(t-1) 258 
 
Table 3.4 above shows the intensity of the effects of changes in the IVARs on the DVAR 
(hostile foreign policy).  Model 1 demonstrates the most amplified effects of changes in internal 
conditions (CINC and Food availability) and conflict levels.  For example, a one unit increase in 
DPRK national capabilities result in a significant (992 unit) decrease in the level of hostile 
foreign policy activities and a similar change in food availability results in a 1,122 unit decrease 
in HFP scores.  Refugee levels affected the hostile foreign policy scores as predicted, as a similar 
increase in refugees resulted in a 258 unit increase in HFP levels.  Additionally, the presence of 
the Cold War resulted in a decrease in the level of HFP by 221 units.  Two external conditions 
were associated with increased levels of HFP.  The first was the presence of a ROK Leadership 
Change, which increased the hostile foreign policy scores by 170 and 196 in Models 1 and 3 
respectively.  Additionally, ROK conservative governments were associated with heightened 
HFP and increased the level of conflict by 172 points.   
Some of the interpretations above are unrealistic because of the characteristics of the data.  
For example, CINC scores are extremely small (with a mean of 0.008994) and are also 
negatively correlated with hostility levels, which range from 0 to 982.  Thus, based on the 
information from the Descriptive Statistics (Table 3.2), a one unit change in CINC would seem 
to cause hostility levels to increase by over 55,000!  This is because of the measurement 
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 Only the statistically significant variables are included in this table.  The substantive effects for all of the 
variables, are provided in Appendix E (Figure E.5).  I calculate the substantive effects by multiplying the standard 
deviation times two (to represent a change in the DVAR of one standard deviation below the mean to one standard 
deviation above the mean), multiplied by the slope coefficient (2σ * coefficient).  This demonstrates the influence of 
the independent variables on the change in the hostile foreign policy scores. 
162
 There were no statistically significant variables in Model 2. 
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technique used for CINC, which calculates a proportion of global capability (zero indicates no 
capability, while one indicates all of the world’s capability).  This is also reflected in the 
substantive results above and these calculations offer varying levels of utility in showing the 
responsiveness of the DVAR to changes in the IVAR.    
More appropriate methods exist to examine these relationships.  One method is to analyze 
the changes in HFP activities in temporal relation to the significant IVARs.  This provides a 
more accurate insight into the complicated relationships that I find in this research.  Figure 3.2 
shows the relationship between HFP, CINC, food availability, and refugee levels.  CINC and 
food availability were scaled to account to allow for comparison. 
 
Figure 3.2  Significant Variables Comparison
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Examining CINC scores reveals near constant increases throughout much of the study 
period.  Yet at the end of the Cold War (and just prior to the famine period), there was an 
increase in CINC scores (42 percent between 1988 and 1992) that accompanied a relatively low 
level of HFP activity.  This increase in capabilities, along with the continued support of both the 
USSR and China, might have allowed North Korea to rely less upon HFP activities to achieve its 
national goals.  The end of the Cold War and loss of support saw a gradual increase in JFP 
activities and the accompanying economic and social disasters that occurred during the famine 
period in the 1990s.   
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 Only the statistically significant variables that are continuous (CINC, Food Availability, and Refugees) 
are included in this figure.   
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   Additionally, examining food availability shows that between 1966 and 1967, HFP scores 
increased dramatically (almost 800 percent) and during the same period, there was a 12 percent 
decrease in food availability per person.  Additionally, the increase of hostilities in 2009 (84 
percent higher than in 2008) was preceded by was a nine percent decrease in food availability per 
person between 2006 and 2008.  These observations provide support to the idea that as the Kim 
regime encounters difficulties in feeding its people, it potentially turns to HFP activities and 
diversion in efforts to gain concessions and distract the public’s attention from food shortages.   
Finally, examining the refugee levels shows a correlation between HFP levels and both 
increases in refugee levels during two periods (2000-2003 and 2007-2009) and decreases in 
refugees between 2004 and 2005.  Between 2000 and 2003, refugee levels increased over 300 
percent and during the same time, conflict levels increased over 500 percent; between 2007 and 
2009, increases in HFP activities (170 percent) accompanied increases in refugee levels (15 
percent) during the same period.  Decreases in refugee levels occurred either just after or in the 
same year as decreases in HFP levels in both 2005 and 2010.  This lends support to the idea that 
decreases in hostilities are potentially related refugee levels, especially after the famine period.  
In other words, as diversionary incentives (such as domestic distress, indicated by refugee levels) 
disappear, the levels of North Korea’s HFP activities also decrease.       
 3.c.  Summary and Conclusions 
This analysis of North Korean activity demonstrates the complicated nature of dealing 
with unruly sources of data on a closed state.  It also shows statistically significant relationships 
between conflict and the conditions the Kim regime has faced over the past 52 years.  The data 
provides support to P1and diversionary theory as a possible explanation for DPRK conflict 
activities.  Decreases in political stability (measured by DPRK CINC) and social stability (Food 
and Refugees) were correlated with increases in HFP activities indicating support to H1 and H3.  
The analysis also provides some support to P2, but only with the variables focused on the 
characteristics of the ROK government.  I find that two of the hypotheses (H5 and H8) 
associated with external influences are positively correlated with conflict levels and indicate that 
the actions of South Korea are associated with increases in conflict activity.  Finally, the control 
variable (Cold War) is significant, but associated with decreased hostile foreign policy activities.  
This indicates that prior to 1992, North Korea demonstrates a lower propensity to conduct 
external conflict activities compared to the post-Cold War period.  The lower overall incidence 
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of conflict during the entire Cold War (despite the spike in activity in the late 1960s) may have 
been due to a combination of the overall economic difficulties experienced beginning in the 
1970s and the overarching security “umbrella” as a result of economic support and the defense 
alliances with the USSR and PRC.  After the Cold War ended (and subsequent loss of support), 
the Kim regime might have been more inclined to engage in conflict to increase its security 
posture within the region and in an attempt to ensure domestic stability.   
Finally, some of the most important results of this examination come from the 
relationships not present between the DVAR and variables such as UN Resolutions, ROK-US 
military exercises and internal DPRK economic conditions.  For example, throughout all of the 
models, I find that economic conditions and infant mortality levels have no relationship with 
hostility levels.  Similarly, military exercises and US leadership changes are not associated with 
variances in North Korean conflict levels.  Perhaps most striking is the lack of relationship 
between UN resolutions and DPRK actions, which I find to be uncorrelated in Model 2.  Thus, 
the lack of relationships potentially leads to questions about which external conditions and 
actions by the international community actually affect North Korea’s conflict behaviors.   
Based on the empirical evidence presented, this chapter shows there is a relationship 
between North Korea’s internal conditions and its external activities. Yet this fails to tell the 
complete story.  Determining if particular events were actual cases of diversion, or related to 
other motivations, remains problematic and a much more thorough analysis of individual events 
is required.  Unfortunately, the quantitative analysis I present above only provides evidence of 
statistical linkages between hostile events and conditions and is insufficient to explain the 
relationships between conditions faced by the regime and external conflict.  These findings 
potentially support the contention that diversionary behavior might be present (i.e., increased 
external conflict because of internal instability).  Additionally, while the analysis above uses 
some of the best proxy data available on North Korean activities, the concept of “intent” of the 
regime to divert the public’s attention is difficult to quantify.  Thus, although the quantitative 
analysis provides insight into the conditions faced by North Korea and its level of external 
conflict, this is an incomplete characterization.  The addition of case studies to examine 
individual periods of internal distress and conflict provides for a more comprehensive 
examination to determine if diversion was a factor.  More evidence is needed to test both 
propositions and to identify stronger historical linkages between domestic distress and hostile 
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foreign policy activities.  The next chapter provides an analysis of three case studies on DPRK 
conflict behavior during times of both internal and external stress to complement this 
quantitative research. 
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Chapter 4 - Case Study Analysis of North Korean Conflict 
Kim is neither crazy nor strange; he is just doing his job. 
Hassig and Oh (2009) 
 
 This quantitative analysis uses a systematic approach to compare three case studies and 
provide a more holistic examination of North Korean conflict actions.  Case study analysis, or 
the qualitative analysis of a single event to “shed light on larger class of cases” (Gerring 2007, 
20), has received greater attention from political scientists in recent years.  As Levy (2007, 197) 
notes, “We see a growing recognition in the discipline that case studies can in principle play a 
useful role, not only in historical description but also in the development, refinement, and 
perhaps testing of theories.”   
 In this chapter, my findings do not provide substantial support to the idea that domestic 
conditions are the primary influencers of conflict behavior by the DPRK.  In fact, the case 
studies provide less support than the quantitative analysis to the first proposition and that while 
domestic conditions were sometimes influential in HFP levels, they were only to a limited extent.  
Additionally, while diversionary-type activities did occur, the conflict levels during the first two 
case studies did not conform to diversionary theory predictions.  I find that external influences 
were much more influential in DPRK conflict actions than internal conditions.  
 This section begins with a discussion of the research methods, case selection concept, and 
each case’s relevance to the research.  Next, I discuss the comparison methods used and 
conclude with an explanation of how structured methods help to identify influential events in the 
individual cases.  This section provides the basis for the case studies and comparisons that follow 
later in this chapter. 
4.a.  Research Design and Methods 
 Case study selection for this research follows techniques described by a number of 
methods theorists including George (1979), King, Keohane, and Verba (1994), and Seawright 
and Gerring (2008).  For valid analysis, cases should be chosen to avoid selection bias 
concerns
164
 and vary on the dependent variable (hostile foreign policy) (King, Keohane, and 
                                                 
164
 Collier and Mahoney (1996, 59) define selection bias as “occurring when some form of selection 
process in either the design of the study or the real-world phenomena under investigation results in inferences that 
suffer from systematic error.” 
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Verba 1994).  Additionally, case study selection should have “useful variation on the dimensions 
of theoretical interest” and should include a sample that represents the larger population 
(Seawright and Gerring 2008, 296).  This study limits its cases to similar historic situations in 
North Korea and strives to achieve unit homogeneity
165
 to the extent possible.  The advantage of 
homogenous cases is that when the theoretical “experiment” is run, the outputs should be similar 
(King, Keohane, and Verba 1994, 91).   
Goertz and Diehl (1995, 31) note that in order for a significant change in the pattern of 
international conflict, a “large shock” might have to occur.  They describe this condition as a 
“political shock” and define it as “a dramatic change in the international system or its subsystems 
that fundamentally alter the processes, relationships, and expectations that drive nation-state 
interactions” (Goertz and Diehl 1995, 31).  While Goertz and Diehl (1995) examine this concept 
in relation to enduring rivalries, this same method can apply to the analysis of states such as 
North Korea.  In this research, I use the concept of “political shocks” to identify North Korean 
cases that have significantly affected the political and security status quo within East Asia.
166
  
My case selection strategy identified two cases (famine in the 1990s and the succession efforts in 
the 2000s) in North Korea’s history based on “shocks” to the domestic and international political 
environment associated with the Kim regime.  Additionally, I include a third case (North Korea’s 
rise to power) which includes a period relative political stability for North Korea that provides 
depth to the discussion.  The final case demonstrates the difference between the independent and 
dependent variables in periods of domestic stability and instability for the DPRK and conforms 
to the case selection concept of “useful variation” (Seawright and Gerring 2008, 296).  The cases 
are listed chronologically below and a synopsis of each follows:  
Case 1 – North Korea Becomes a Regional Power (1963-1969).  This period saw North 
Korea’s rise as a stable communist state with political and economic links to both the Soviets and 
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 King, Keohane, and Verba (1994, 91) define unit homogeneity as the condition when “the expected 
values of dependent variables from each unit are the same when our explanatory variable takes on a particular 
value.”     
166
 In his qualitative analysis of Korean “military-diplomatic campaigns” Michishita (2009, 4) based his 
selection of Korean cases on two criteria: sustained use of force or threat for at least a year and a major crisis in 
which the US-ROK authorities significantly increased their defense condition level (DEFCON).  Although these 
criteria yielded important cases of North Korean conflict, Michishita’s research omitted significant crises associated 
with “shocks” (such as famine) to North Korea, which had significant impacts on the DPRK’s domestic institutions 
and forever changed the Kim regime’s relationship with the international system.  Additionally, events such as 
North Korea’s famine also resulted in a redistribution of power within the international system and constituted a 
political shock as described by Goertz and Diehl (1995, 36). 
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Chinese.  Additionally, the Kim regime did not hesitate to use force as a means for diplomacy, 
which changed the regional balance of power and increased both international tensions and 
reactions (both military and diplomatic) from the US and ROK.  Although this was a time of 
relative prosperity for the DPRK, it did experience the beginnings of economic difficulties that 
would become amplified in the decades that followed.  This case also adds considerable depth to 
the research by expanding the overall temporal framework of the study.  Additionally, the 
inclusion of the Kim regime’s actions and relative stability during the 1960s allows for useful 
comparison and contrast with the other two cases of “political shocks” to the DPRK regime.      
Case 2 – The Great Famine (1993-1999).  This “political shock” resulted in the deaths of 
five to ten percent of the population and caused North Korea’s first-ever appeal for substantial 
humanitarian assistance.  During this time, North Korea weathered the death of its founder (Kim 
Il-sung), the leadership succession to Kim’s son, and a nuclear standoff with the United States 
and South Korea.  This period fit the criteria of a “political shock” as North Korea assumed a 
new role in the region:  as an aid recipient that concurrently posed a conventional security threat 
to the international community.    
Case 3 – Regime Succession (2008-2011).  This period included efforts to secure the Kim 
regime's succession and was accompanied by a range of active foreign policy behaviors.  The 
“political shock” was significant as the DPRK again experienced challenges associated with Kim 
Jong-il’s declining health and preparations for its second father-to-son dynastic power transfer.  
During this same period, North Korea established itself in yet another role as a proven nuclear-
armed state that was chronically dependent on external sources of economic assistance from the 
international community.   
 To ensure case comparability, the concept of “unit homogeneity, equivalence, and cross-
case validity” (Gerring 2005, 183) also influenced the selection process.  Based on these 
criteria,
167
 selected cases include periods of international hostilities
168
 (all cases), external aid 
intervention (Cases 2 and 3), and internal tension (all cases) based on conditions facing the Kim 
regimes.  These cases have similar background conditions (such as the same ruling regime and 
similar regional security conditions) and I evaluate these using the consistent independent 
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 Not all of these cases are “perfectly” congruent and comparable (although no case selection can achieve 
perfect symmetry), but this selection allows for a representative sample of events that have occurred between 1960 
and 2011. 
168
 This includes conflicts involving North and South Korea.   
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variables.  Admittedly, these three cases encompass a wide timeframe, but one of the most 
effective methods to analyze North Korea’s activities is to encompass a broad historical 
spectrum as demonstrated by Michishita (2009).  This also leverages the advantages of the 
blending of both international relations qualitative methods and “history-centric” views (Levy 
1997; Gaddis 1997; Kennedy-Pipe 2000) of hostile foreign policy actions by North Korea. 
 When I apply the propositions (P1 and P2) to these cases, the following outcomes are 
expected: 
 
      Table 4.1  Case Study Expected Outcomes   
                        Independent Variables                                 Expected Outcomes 
Case 1 
(Emergence) 
Political Difficulties Low 
Lower than average 
levels of conflict 
Economic Difficulties Low to Medium 
Social Difficulties Low 
Case 2 
(Famine) 
Political Difficulties Medium 
Higher than 
average conflict 
Economic Difficulties High 
Social Difficulties High 
Case 3 
(Succession) 
Political Difficulties Medium to High 
Higher than 
average conflict 
Economic Difficulties Medium to High 
Social Difficulties Medium to High 
 
Table 4.1 shows the expected levels of conflict based on the internal conditions according 
to P1, the primary focus of this study, which expects that those conditions are related to external 
conflict.  The structured analysis of the case studies demonstrates that external conflict was 
related to domestic conditions, but not always in the manner expected.   
4.a.1.  Comparing Cases and Variables 
To test the hypotheses mentioned previously, I analyze each case using two methods:  
structured, focused comparison and process tracing.  Structured, focused comparison requires 
developing a set of questions and applying these to each case.  This case study analysis method 
allows for a “systematic comparison and culmination of the findings of the cases possible…and  
deals with only certain aspects of the historical cases examined” (George and Bennett 2005, 67).  
I focus the questions on a theoretical concept (diversionary theory) to examine whether or not 
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causal relationships exists between conditions faced by the Kim regime and external conflict. 
This method is “structured” for comparison and “focused” to limit the examination to important 
aspects of each case. The questions provide for an examination of the cases in light of both 
propositions.  Oakes (2012, 69) and Jung (2012, 90-91) use similar technique in their studies of 
diversionary behavior.
169
  The following questions focus on the presence and effects of the 
independent variables and the associated hypotheses are included in parenthesis:   
 
Measuring the level of conflict (dependent variable) 
1.  What was the level of hostile foreign policy (HFP) during the case study?  
 
Effects of internal conditions (independent variables): 
2.  Was political instability associated with heightened HFP activities?  (H1)  
3.  Were economic difficulties associated with increased HFP?  (H2) 
4.  Was social instability associated with periods of increased HFP?  (H3) 
 
Effects of external conditions (independent variables): 
5.  Were UN resolutions against the DPRK associated with increased HFP?  (H4) 
6.  Were ROK leadership changes associated with increased HFP?  (H5) 
7.  Were US leadership changes associated with increased HFP?  (H6) 
8.  Did ROK/US strategic-level military exercises associated with increased HFP?  (H7) 
9.  Was the presence of a conservative ROK government associated with increased HFP? 
(H8) 
 
Using a structured, focused comparison to initially review each case in the aggregate 
allows for a subsequent in-depth comparison of the characteristics or “processes” which exist in 
each case.  This method of within-case comparisons or "process-tracing" provides significantly 
more fidelity to my analysis.  Process-tracing involves analyzing the cases based on "causal 
mechanisms, or processes, events, actions, expectations, and other intervening variables, that link 
putative causes to observed effects" (Bennett and George 1997) and provides a useful method to 
examine North Korean conflict case studies.
170
  These questions represent the overall research 
design and will examine the linkage between the dependent variable (hostile foreign policy) to 
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 Jung (2012, 90-91) adapts a technique (the “hoop test”) developed by Van Evera (1997, 29-31) to 
measure the validity of his theories.  He notes that if the concept successfully passes the tests (by answering the 
questions or passing through the “hoops”), then the “confidence in the validity of a given hypothesis” is increased 
(Jung 2012, 91).  Admittedly, this is not a perfect measure, but given the subjective nature of qualitative analysis, it 
does provide a means to compare each case.    
170
 This method is particularly important for examining the North Korean cases in that process-tracing 
methods clarify inconsistencies between cases by “helping to assess whether differences other than those in the main 
variable of interest might account for the differences in outcomes” (George 1979, 81). 
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the independent variables (the internal and external conditions faced by the DPRK).  In the 
following section, I provide details on these variables and the methods chosen to examine them 
in the case studies.  
4.a.2.  Measuring Hostile Foreign Policy (Dependent Variable) 
 To support the case study analysis, I constructed a database of events that records 
reported instances of hostile foreign policy activities.  The sources for the events were 
government reports from the US, South Korea, and North Korea compiled by a number of ROK 
and US agencies.
171
  This database provides the basis to analyze North Korea’s hostile foreign 
policy events (see previous chapter for more details).  In the introduction to each of the case 
studies, I compare the level of conflict for each case to the overall average level of conflict 
throughout the study period to allow for an examination of the intensity levels in relation to the 
independent variables.  
4.a.3.  Internal conditions (Independent Variables) 
This qualitative analysis is consistent with the quantitative section and examines the same 
internal and external conditions faced by the Kim regime.  As noted previously, Proposition 1 
(P1) contends that difficult domestic conditions in North Korea are related to the incidence of 
conflict on the Korean peninsula.  If P1 is correct, the internal conditions present in North Korea 
will spur diplomatic and military conflict.  I test this by analyzing the political, social, and 
economic stability of North Korea in these case studies.  For these case comparisons, political 
instability measures the overall political control exercised by the North Korean regime and the 
government’s ability to remain intact.  I measure economic instability in North Korea by using 
historical cases of economic difficulties for North Korean citizens as indicated by the expansion 
or contraction of the economy.  Social instability indicates the ability of North Korea to meet its 
citizens’ basic needs and includes the availability of food, energy, and shelter using historic 
events, refugee testimonies and United Nations’ reports on overall food availability in the 
DPRK.     
4.a.4.  External Conditions (Independent Variables) 
                                                 
171
 I use six data sources to construct the event database used in this analysis: the USFK Command History 
Office, the United Nations Command (UNC), the South Korean government’s Korean Institute for National 
Unification (KINU), Fischer’s CRS Report, the New York Times Historical Archive, and Lexis-Nexis Academic 
Search.     
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The second proposition (P2) states that external conditions are more able to explain North 
Korea’s hostile foreign policy activities.  Thus if P2 is correct, then North Korea’s actions are 
based on exogenous influences such as international sanctions, external elections and “enemy” 
military exercises.  The presence of UN resolutions and sanctions are another key variable and I 
examine the effects of these decisions on the DPRK.
172
  Another possible influential factor in 
North Korean behavior is the presence of presidential elections (or succession) in the US and 
ROK.  I also include strategic-level US-ROK military exercises (such as “TEAM SPIRIT” or its 
equivalent)
173
 along with North Korean responses.    
4.a.5.  Methodological Concerns 
Research on closed stated such as North Korea often requires a refined approach based on the 
availability of data and this has influenced both the selection of cases and variables.  I chose 
cases for this research and identified variables based on theoretical concepts (diversion) and 
operationalize using generally accepted standards for qualitative analysis (Seawright and Gerring 
2008; Gerring 2001).  I also incorporate commonly used analytical methods used to examine 
authoritarian states when possible.  Additionally, scholars often use many of the variables 
mentioned (economic factors, military capabilities, election cycles, political stability, and 
societal factors) in diversionary literature.  Thus, these case study methods, selection techniques, 
and variables are among the best (and often the only) options available to support a 
comprehensive analysis of the Kim regime’s foreign policy choices.  In the following sections, I 
analyze three case studies using structured, focused and process tracing methods to identify and 
discuss the relationships between the conditions faced by North Korea and its external conflict 
activities.
                                                 
172
 I discuss ongoing resolutions, but only newly enacted resolutions are counted for this measure. 
173
 From 1976-1993, the US and ROK conducted “TEAM SPIRIT” strategic military exercises to improve 
joint and combined operations capabilities and to exercise US reinforcement of South Korea in the event of war with 
North Korea (Yoon 2003, 98).  The ROK and US also conducted other strategic exercises and relevant ones will be 
discussed in each case study.   
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4.b.  North Korea Becomes a Regional Power (1963-1969) 
There is no mistaking North Korea's assertion of independence.  Pyongyang's maturity in power and economic 
stability has enabled Kim Il-song to firmly establish his own autonomy and independence. 
Kim R. (1968) 
 
In this chapter, I analyze the relationship between the internal and external conditions 
North Korea experienced between 1963 and 1969 and the incidence of DPRK hostile foreign 
policy.  I use the questions identified in the previous section to analyze the relationship between 
conditions faced by the regime and the DPRK’s pursuit of military and diplomatic hostilities.  I 
find that North Korea experienced internal stability throughout much of the 1960s, although the 
levels of hostile foreign policy (HFP) activities during this period were at unprecedented levels.  
Although there was evidence of diversionary-type activities identified during this study, the 
much of this effort were focused on coalescing domestic support for external conflict actions, 
rather than distracting the public from internal conditions.
174
  At the same time, as the DPRK 
began to experience difficulties associated with centralized economic policies, the level of 
hostile foreign policy activities increase significantly.  But more significantly,  I find that a 
number of external conditions were associated with changes in the level of conflict, such as ROK 
and US leadership changes, military exercises, and the presence of a conservative South Korean 
government.  Other factors are also influential in HFP activities, such a Kim’s desire to reunite 
the peninsula,
175
 and the activities and characteristics of the South Korean government.  Analysis 
of the conditions within this case provide support to P2 and only limited support for both P1 and 
diversionary theory as possible explanations for North Korea hostile foreign policy activities. 
The case study begins with a discussion of North Korea’s initial success as an emerging 
communist state followed by an examination of the Kim regime’s decision to increase the level 
of hostilities on the peninsula.  Next, the case is subjected to the qualitative tests (questions) 
mentioned in the previous chapter to determine the validity of the two hypotheses.  These 
questions examine North Korea’s internal conditions (political, economic, and social), external 
influences (UN resolutions, South Korean elections, and ROK-US military exercises), and the 
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 During this case study, I find evidence that the Kim regime used diversionary behavior throughout the 
period to support a constant air of “wartime readiness” and mobilization of the population against external threats to 
sustain its grip on power.  Domestic conditions during this case study were generally stable, arguably the best during 
the entire study period (1960-2011).   
175
 Both North and South Korea considered the division of the peninsula by external powers an unnatural 
state of affairs as reunification was always a foreign policy priority for both states.     
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relevance of diversionary theory to the case.  The chapter concludes with a summary of the test 
results and a discussion of the relationships between the independent variables (questions), the 
dependent variable (hostile foreign policy), both hypotheses, and the concept of diversion.  
Finally, I enclosed a timeline (see Figure 4.6) at the end of the chapter to provide historical 
perspective to the events described in the analysis. 
4.b.1.  North Korea Emerges and then Risks War 
The 1960s were the “Golden Age” for North Korea compared to later, much more 
difficult times.  While the economy was not performing to its full potential, the DPRK enjoyed a 
standard of living higher than many of its neighbors, including South Korea and China.  North 
Korea provided free education and health care and literacy rates rose significantly.  Kim Il-sung 
had gained international prestige as his government navigated a political and economic path 
between both the PRC and USSR.  By the early 1960s, North Korea had successfully emerged 
from the devastation of the Korean War and firmly established itself as a stable communist state.   
North Korea demonstrated its unique international position by maintaining active 
diplomatic relations with both the Chinese and Soviets despite the Sino-Soviet split during that 
time.  Through 1962, the DPRK was able to remain relatively neutral in the disagreements 
between the Soviets and Chinese
176
 but soon began to “lean” towards China because of 
fundamental disagreements over Soviet ideological shifts and differences in how to approach the 
West, especially the US (Kiyosaki 1976, 55).
177
  Additionally, Chinese concessions to the North 
Koreans on border negotiations and disagreements over arms sales with the Soviets pushed Kim 
into closer alignment with Beijing (Westad 2007, 164; Shimotomai 2011, 139).
178
  Strained 
relations continued in 1963 and 1964 and the Soviets and North Koreans continued to experience 
a number of economic disputes.
179
     
                                                 
176
 One of the most significant outward signs of this neutral stance was Kim’s agreement to mutual defense 
treaties with both Moscow and Beijing in 1961.  Additionally, Scalapino (1963) provides a useful overview of North 
Korea’s balanced attitude in 1962 towards its “fraternal Socialist allies.”   
177
 Both North Korea and China considered the US an obstacle to their reunification policies and “favored 
the adoption of a tough posture toward the United States rather than an attitude of conciliation” (Kiyosaki 1976, 55).  
178
 These actions resulted in a reduction of both financial and technical support from Moscow (Koh 1976, 
126).  
179
 The Soviet Ambassador to North Korea mentioned a noticeable change in his communications with 
DPRK diplomats stating, “I am noticing as of late that all responsible Korean officials, beginning with the highest 
leadership, have turned into meteorologists. They cannot find any other topic for discussion except for weather” 
(Moskovsky 1963).   
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Khrushchev’s removal from power in October 1964 allowed the North Koreans to 
improve relations with Moscow without having to face the former communist leader directly 
(Kiyosaki 1976, 62).
180
  Relations between the North Koreans and Soviets immediately began to 
thaw and were enhanced by the reestablishment of military support, such as Moscow’s 
agreement to supply air defense systems to the DPRK in May 1965 (Kuznetsov 1965).
181
  
Additionally, after a series of coordination visits between the North Koreans and Soviets, both 
signed formal economic agreements in June 1966 providing long-term support for DPRK 
industrial projects and trade (RFE 1966).
182
  During this time, North Korea’s emergence as an 
active player within the communist bloc forever changed the relative balance of power within the 
region.   
In the early the 1960s, Kim’s national focus shifted from efforts to improve the DPRK’s 
economy towards prioritized support to the military, which signaled a change in foreign policy 
emphasis from “peaceful unification” to a more aggressive policy of “Korean revolution” in the 
South (Kim H. 1977, 208).
183
  Additionally, “it became clear that the North Korean regime had 
changed its tactics for national unification” by efforts to blend both political and military 
measures to destabilize the South (Kim H. 1977, 212-213).  As a result, North Korea’s military 
expenditures increased exponentially during this period.  As shown in Figure 4.1, from 1956 to 
1966, defense spending accounted for 4.3 percent of the DPRK’s total budget and this number 
rose to 30 percent of total spending from 1967 to 1970 (Vreeland and Shin 1976, 37):   
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 In 1964, North Korea chose to distance itself from Mao and engage the Soviets due primarily to the 
economic consequences of poor relations with Moscow.  The loss of Soviet military aid forced Kim to divert 
precious resources (both labor and materials) to North Korea’s defense industry and China’s aid was always 
insufficient to fill DPRK needs (Kun 1967, 48-49).
180
  Soviet diplomats also noted that North Korea became 
uncomfortable with “the negative consequences of their orientation only towards China” including Beijing’s alleged 
use of the DPRK to split the “international communist movement” (Borunkov and Gorovoi 1965).  Finally, the Kim 
regime reoriented its focus of the “main enemy” of international communism from “modern revisionism” (a key 
aspect of Soviet post-Stalin Soviet policies) to imperialism and called for unified action from socialist states (Kun 
1967, 56-57).
180
 
181
 Kim had been asking for these systems at least as early as 1962 (Moskovsky 1962). 
182
 This formally marked another political “tilt” by the DPRK, this time towards the Soviets. 
183
 Kim Il-sung declared in 1961 that South Korea’s “broad masses of the people came to realize…that 
without the peaceful reunification of the country they could not free themselves from poverty, complete lack of 
rights, and colonial slavery” (KIS 1961, 137).  He went on, “The only way for the South Korean people to 
completely free themselves from their present tragic situations is to drive out the U.S. army, overthrow the fascist 
dictatorship and reunify the country peacefully” (KIS 1961, 148).  Kim seemed to imply initial armed conflict 
against the Americans from the peninsula to pave the way for “peaceful reunification” with the South.  This policy 
of revolution in the South was often referred to as a “national salvation struggle” or “national liberation war” and 
was a major theme of Kim Il-sung beginning in September 1961 (Kim H. 1977, 211). 
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   Figure 4.1  DPRK Military Expenditures 1960-1970 
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Kim’s national slogan for North Korea became “A Gun in One Hand and a Hammer or a 
Sickle in the Other!” (DPRK 2001, 228).  In a 1965 speech in Indonesia, Kim also argued that 
the US used aid to oppress and “plunder” South Korea, and that “U.S. imperialism is the real 
ruler in South Korea” (KIS 1965, 240-241).184  Kim also accused the US of needing to occupy 
South Korea “as the logistical base for the occupation of the whole of Korea, as a bridgehead for 
hostile activities against the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China…[and] as an 
important strategic point for world domination” (KIS 1965, 244).  North Korea continued to 
view the United States as the biggest obstacle for eventual reunification of the Korean peninsula 
and actively began to pursue a foreign policy directed at destabilizing the South and straining 
US-ROK relations in hopes of the retreat of US forces from the South.  Yet there were other 
influential factors that influenced the Kim regime’s decision to pursue increased hostile foreign 
policy activities.   
                                                 
184
 Kim Il-sung noted that South Korea used US aid as a substantial part of its national budget and that the 
Americans controlled “45-50 percent of South Korea’s financial budget and 30 percent of its banking funds, and 
monopolize 70 to 80 percent of its raw materials supply and 80 percent of its import trade.  Today the South Korean 
economy is tied up entirely to the United States; the financial and economic organizations and enterprises in South 
Korea are in a situation where they will have to stop operations the moment US imperialist ‘aid’ is cut off” (KIS 
1965b, 240-241).  Other sources reported that US economic and military aid in the early 1960s actually declined 
(from $529 million in 1960 to $309 million in 1965), and averaged about $438 million per year (USAID 1998, 55-
56). 
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Beginning in the mid-1960s, North Korea’s military activities changed the overall 
security environment between the Koreas from an uneasy peace to an atmosphere of military 
confrontation.  Kim Il-sung sought to destabilize the peninsula and set the conditions for 
reunification while the South’s Park Chung-hee also strove to counter North Korea’s actions and 
achieve security through economic growth.
185
  As a result, tensions were high on the peninsula as 
military confrontations on both sides of the DMZ resulted in hundreds of casualties and cross-
border incursions became commonplace.  For example in 1966, there were many instances of 
DPRK military attacks including bombings of a US barracks, seizure of an American 
reconnaissance naval vessel (USS Pueblo), a direct attack against the South Korean president’s 
residence, the shooting down of a US Navy reconnaissance aircraft, and hundreds of smaller 
confrontations.  In fact, between 1965 and 1971, there were over 2,000 total casualties associated 
with North-South conflict (Finley 1984, 220).
186
 
Why did North Korea pursue intense levels of hostile foreign policy actions during this 
period when it was experiencing seemingly low levels of domestic distress?  On the surface, Kim 
had little to gain by war with the South and the near consistent provocations that occurred could 
have brought the US (and potentially China) into another Korean War.  Yet heightened levels of 
conflict did occur.  The following questions help analyze the internal and external conditions that 
were present during this period of both conflict and prosperity for the DPRK.  
4.b.2.  Structured Questions and Analysis 
In this section, I use a list of questions based on the variables described above to 
determine the relationship between conditions faced by the Kim regime, diversionary theory, and 
the incidence of hostile foreign policy activities.  These “tests” of the case study constitute a 
structured, focused method to examine this case (Levy 1989, 284; George and Bennett 2005, 67; 
George 1979) and allow for comparisons with the other cases in this study.  The following test 
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 The turmoil during this period has been analyzed by a few scholars including Bolger (1991), Michishita 
(2009, 1-51), and Park (2009).  Additionally, recently opened archival and declassified information has provided 
important perspectives to this period such as the Wilson Center’s North Korea International Documentation Project 
(2012), which includes primary source information on diplomatic relations with North Korea by the Soviet Union, 
China, and a number of other former communist states as Hungary, Bulgaria, and the German Democratic Republic.  
The CIA’s Freedom of Information Act Site (CIA FOIA 2012), Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS 
2012), and Finley’s (1984) history of US Forces in Korea also provide in-depth analysis of DPRK and regional 
interactions from a US perspective during this period.    
186
 From 1965 to 1971, there were 1,129 ROK casualties (including 203 civilians), 270 US losses 
(including 82 sailors from the USS Pueblo that were later repatriated) and 815 North Korean soldiers killed, 
captured or wounded (Finley 1984, 119, 128, 130 and 220). 
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questions provide for a nuanced examination of the Kim regime and its environment during this 
period.  
 
Question 1.  What was the level of hostile foreign policy activities during this period? 
 
 This period saw North Korea’s emergence as a viable communist state and included the 
Kim regime’s shift towards a more militant foreign policy towards South Korea and the US.  The 
events during this period were also the most intense levels of interstate conflict experienced on 
the peninsula since the Korean War.  Figure 4.2 shows the level of conflict from 1960-1970, as 
recorded in the event database (described in Chapter 3) and scored using Azar’s (1993) intensity 
scale.
187
   
 
        Figure 4.2  Hostile Foreign Policy Activities 1960-1970 
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 Figure 4.2 shows the entire decade of the case study for historical comparison.  See Chapter 3 for 
additional information on Azar’s (1993) scale and hostility score calculations. 
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As shown above, the conflict intensity levels during the first case study period (1963-1969) 
were 66 percent higher than historic norms during the entire study timeframe (1960-2011).
188
  
Additionally, when compared to the rest of the decade, the end of the 1960s were characterized 
by a noticeable increase in DPRK hostile foreign policy actions.  In the following sections, I 
provide descriptions of the most significant categories of HFP events during the case study. 
 DMZ Confrontations.  Beginning in 1966, clashes along the DMZ between North Korean 
and ROK-US troops occurred regularly, and these were often brutal and intense engagements.  
The following narrative of the November 1966 ambush of US and ROK troops was typical of 
many of these firefights: 
 
In the predawn darkness on 2 November, while the American president slept 
near Seoul under heavy guard, a KPA [North Korean People’s Army] squad 
tracked an eight-man patrol from Company A, 1-23 Infantry.  The northerners, 
probably from the 17th Foot Reconnaissance Brigade, paralleled the oblivious 
American soldiers.  Once the U.S. element reached a point about a kilometer 
south of the DMZ proper, the North Koreans estimated that the Americans had 
relaxed their vigilance.  The Communist soldiers swung in ahead of the plodding 
American file, assumed hasty ambush positions, and engaged the Americans with 
hand grenades and submachine guns.  
The U.S. squad disintegrated under a hail of bullets and grenade fragments. 
Despite later wishful stories of heroics, six Americans and a KATUSA [Korean 
soldier augmentee] went down almost instantly.  A seventh American survived by 
playing dead.  The KPA troops pumped a few more bursts into some of the 
corpses, plunged in a bayonet here and there, and disappeared into the night.  One 
northerner might have been wounded in the one-sided fight.  The sole American 
survivor ran for his life as soon as the attackers pulled out (Bolger 1991, 37-39). 
 
These types of infantry engagements occurred repeatedly along the DMZ and those 
attributed to the North Koreans are well documented.  Yet those initiated by ROK forces were 
rarely recorded in publically available literature, except for fleeting references in US intelligence 
memorandums (FRUS 1966b).  Indeed, the ROK media was controlled by the South Korean 
government until the 1990s (Park 2009, 3) and the US had no interest in having the situation in 
Korea portrayed as being related to South Korean military activities (FRUS 1967a).  During this 
case study, other more intense incidents also occurred, to include an attempt to kill South Korean 
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 Conflict intensity scores for the case study period (1963-1969) averaged 1222 per year while the scores 
for 1960-2011 were an average of 735 annually (Appendix C). 
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President Park, the seizure of a US naval intelligence ship and the downing of a US 
reconnaissance aircraft.   
The Blue House Raid.  In January 1968, the North Koreans crossed the DMZ during a 
commando operation intended to “destroy the ‘Blue House’ presidential mansion, and key 
members of the ROK government, most importantly, the ROK president” (EUSA 1968a).  The 
operation began on 18 January 1968 as the DPRK team, dressed as South Korean soldiers, cut 
through the fence in the 2ID sector in the DMZ.  The team encountered and detained four ROK 
civilian woodcutters, eventually releasing them.
189
  The civilians informed the ROK police and 
pursuit of the DPRK infiltrators began.  After engagements with the ROK Army and national 
police, the South Korean stopped the commandos a mere 800 meters from the ROK Blue House 
and firefights continued until 31 January (EUSA 1968b; NYT 1968b).  In the end, twenty-seven 
North Koreans were killed (one was captured and two were never found), thirty-eight South 
Koreans died and sixty-four were wounded (EUSA 1968b).
190
   
USS Pueblo Seizure.  One week after the North Korean raiders infiltrated into South 
Korea, the DPRK fired upon and boarded the US intelligence ship, the USS Pueblo, and towed it 
to North Korea’s east coast port of Wonsan (CIA 1966b, 1).191  This ship was the US Navy’s first 
seaborne electronic surveillance vessel used on a mission against the North Koreans (HASC 
1969, 1620).  While some within the US government considered the mission risky,
192
 the signals 
surveillance ship began its scheduled 17-day intelligence mission on January 11 (Gallery 1970, 
153-154).  On January 23, the Pueblo was initially shadowed, then fired upon by the North 
Koreans, and then boarded.  One US service member died and the North Koreans detained the 
                                                 
189
 The North Koreans held the civilians for five hours, provided them with propaganda items, “praised 
North Korean dictator Kim Il-sung, and boasted that Korea would be reunified in 1968,” threatened retaliation if the 
woodcutters reported their presence and one of the agents gave the civilians a watch to compensate for the “loss of a 
day’s work” (EUSA 1968b). 
190
 Bolger (1991, 62-65) provides a useful synopsis of the attack and an analysis of the effectiveness of 
ROK anti-infiltration efforts and noted that the incident had resulted in too many casualties, but the attack had been 
successfully stopped due to “DMZ enhancements” (which provided evidence of the infiltration) and ROK quick 
reaction force operations.  
191
 The USS Pueblo remained in North Korea as a tourist attraction and, as of this writing, possibly being 
refurbished for installation in a museum in Pyongyang (NK News 2013). 
192
 The US National Security Agency (NSA) sent a message to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) stating that 
the increased hostile attitude and actions of the North Korean regime possibly posed a danger to the Pueblo mission, 
although this was not brought to the attention of senior leaders or the crew prior to departure from Japan on 11 
January (HASC 1969, 1623).  Additionally, the USS Pueblo was never informed about the Blue House incident that 
occurred during its mission as the Seventh Fleet intelligence officers assumed that information would flow to the 
crew via routine intelligence reports (Armbrister 2004, 33).   
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remaining eighty-two crewmembers (US Embassy 1968a; FRUS 1968b; Bolger 1991, 65).  Six 
hours later, the Pueblo found itself docked at the DPRK port of Wonsan (Mobley 2003, 41).
193
       
The timing of the USS Pueblo seizure might seem illogical as North Korea had managed 
to conduct extremely serious attacks against both the US and ROK in the span of a few days.  
Yet, these incidents were related to the Kim regime’s strategic goals.  The CIA assessed that the 
seizure of the USS Pueblo was, among other things, a sort of “insurance policy” against ROK 
retaliation for the Blue House attack (CIA 1969a, 5).  The CIA notes that 
 
As the US became even more heavily engaged in Vietnam, Kim evidently decided 
that he could stage more risky provocations with relative impunity.  The Blue 
House raid and the seizure of the Pueblo followed.  The North Koreans clearly 
calculated that their possession of the Pueblo and its crew would exert an 
additional powerful deterrent against retaliatory action.  Pyongyang took pains to 
draw attention to its leverage by threatening to try to punish the Pueblo crews 
(CIA 1969a, 4-5). 
 
Additionally, Bolger (1991, 69) notes the timing of the Blue House raid and Pueblo 
seizure in relation to events in Southeast Asia:  in Vietnam, the NVA attacks against Khe Sanh 
and the Tet Offensive also occurred during January 1968.  Thus the Blue House and USS Pueblo 
attacks might have been Kim Il-sung’s contribution to the overall communist fight against the 
US “imperialists” and their allies, such as the “puppet” South Korean regime (US Embassy 
1968a).
194
  In any case, these actions had wide-ranging effects on the ROK-US alliance.   
When South Koreans compared the US response to North Korea’s attack on the Blue 
House with the response to the capture of the USS Pueblo, they noticed a significant difference.  
The US-led United Nations Command’s response to the Blue House raid was to call for a 
Military Armistice Committee meeting to criticize the incident while the USS Pueblo resulted in 
a US protest to the UN Security Council (FRUS 1968a).  The USS Pueblo incident also spurred 
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 Lerner (2002), Mobley (2003), and Armbister (2004) provide useful and in-depth narratives of the entire 
Pueblo incident.  Additionally, the US House Armed Services Committee meeting reports (HASC 1969) include a 
detailed investigation of the incident and the lessons learned from the US government’s perspective.  
194
 As the US Ambassador noted, “NK leadership may well have felt that they could make no greater 
contribution to Communist cause and to their own purposes in Korea than to take bold actions designed to reduce 
support in ROK for augmented or even continued participation in Vietnam, to take advantage of current political 
difficulties of and to further reduce public confidence in Park government, and to shake mutual confidence between 
U.S. and ROK. Bold action could also, of course, create a diversion in Korean peninsula and force U.S. to divert 
military resources from Vietnam effort and stimulate additional domestic and overseas pressures against U.S. Asian 
policy”  (US Embassy 1968a).   
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the deployment of a US naval carrier task group, led by the USS Enterprise and supported by the 
US Seventh Fleet, the movement of the Fifth Air Force to Osan (South Korea), the callup of over 
14,000 Air Force and Navy reservists, and the deployment of almost 200 aircraft to South Korea 
and Japan as a show of force (Bolger 1991, 71-72; EUSA 1968a, 6).
195
  While the North Koreans 
stated that the seizure of the Pueblo was in response to “a provocative act directed at gathering 
intelligence” (Romanian Embassy 1968a), the US perspective was that the motivation for the 
seizure of the USS Pueblo was, among other things, also related to an effort to “harass the US in 
its conduct of the [Vietnam] war” (FRUS 1968c).  The United States presented the Pueblo 
situation as a complaint to the UN Security Council, but no action resulted (UN 1968a).
196
  The 
North Koreans released the USS Pueblo crew in December 1968.   
 EC-121 Shootdown.  Just four months later, two NKAF MiGs shot down a US Air Force 
EC-121 reconnaissance aircraft, killing all thirty-one crewmembers (ROK MND 1986, 76; 
Beecher 1969a).  The US intelligence aircraft had been conducting signals surveillance and 
mapping North Korea’s modernized east coast air defense shield and radar sites (Mobley 2003, 
99).  For months, the US had conducted similar intelligence missions without incident and while 
North Korea had often scrambled aircraft in response (and previously attacked a US RB-47 on a 
similar mission four years earlier), there had been no current indications that the DPRK would 
undertake a lethal engagement (Mobley 2003, 100-103). 
In response to the EC-121 incident, North Korea accused the US of violating its airspace 
both in its domestic press and in Armistice Commission negotiations five days after the downing 
(NYT 1969; CINCPAC 1970, 134).  The immediate US reaction was to activate a task force of 
warships to the area, including six aircraft carriers and a battleship (Zagoria and Zagoria 1979, 
38-39).  While the shootdown resulted in a three-week cessation of reconnaissance flights and a 
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 This overwhelming US reaction to the Pueblo crisis and seemingly lower priority given to the Blue 
House attacks resulted in negative reactions by the South Korean public and its leaders.  Bolger (1991, 70) notes that 
many in the South “urged Park to ‘go north’ – with or without the Americans.”  There were reports of student 
demonstrations at the US embassy in Seoul that had to be dispersed by US soldiers firing weapons into the air as the 
South Koreans felt “that the United States was far more concerned over the humiliating loss of the Pueblo” than an 
attack against a sitting head of state (NYT 1968c) .  From South Korea’s view, the ROK fully supported the United 
States as a reliable ally, as demonstrated by the deployment of over 48,000 South Korean troops to fight in Vietnam.  
Thus the perceived lack of action by the US to this personal attack was alarming to the Park regime.   
196
 In discussions, the USSR noted that the captain himself (who was in North Korean captivity) admitted to 
entering the territorial waters of the DPRK and that the UN Security Council did not have the jurisdiction to act on 
matters involving territorial water violations (UN 1968a).  Yet in diplomatic communications between the Soviet 
embassy and the North Koreans, the Soviets made it clear that they did not support DPRK efforts to “to hasten 
reunification through the use of force” (Romanian Embassy 1968b).  Additionally, the official Security Council 
record included no mention of the Blue House attacks (UN 1968a). 
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flurry of US government meetings, the final response from the Nixon administration was to 
conduct a naval show of force with several aircraft carriers, publically denounce the attack, and 
to resume flights (Mobley 2003, 139; Bolger 1991, 101-107).
197
  On 28 April 1969, the US 
began moving its “show of force” naval fleet (Task Force 71) out of Korean waters (Lydons 
1969).  In an effort to decrease tensions, the Soviets made an effort to distance them from 
responsibility for the incident, provided on-site assistance to the US naval effort to find 
survivors, and offered condolences for the loss of personnel (CINCPAC 1970, 139).
198
  This 
event and the others described above demonstrate the intense level of conflict that occurred 
during this period.  These types of spectacular events and the constant air of tension brought the 
peninsula closer to all-out conflict that any other time since the Korean War.    
 
Question 2.  Was political instability associated with heightened HFP activities?  (Hypothesis 1) 
  
Political instability during this period was low.  Kim Il-sung reaffirmed his position as 
leader of the DPRK throughout the mid-1960s, both through non-violent purges in the North 
Korean leadership structure, active participation in domestic activities, and international actions 
such as the re-establishment of diplomatic and economic ties with the USSR and increased 
engagement with developing nations.  Kim conducted political purges during the 1960s over 
policy failures
199
 including the removal of civilian party officials who were considered 
supporters of Chinese ideology (in 1966), others who opposed the “hawkish” strategy towards 
reunification (in 1967) and several military generals in 1968 after the attack against the South 
Korean presidential residence (DVO 1967; Nam 1974, 146-147).  The North Korean leader also 
remained engaged with the public and used “on-the-spot guidance” visits to industrial sites, 
farms, and military units.  These visits were intended to portray Kim as a “young and energetic 
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 Military responses were considered, but none were undertaken (Mobley 2003, 139).  The lack of 
military retaliation by the Nixon administration was seen by North Korea as proof that the US was a “paper tiger” 
and that the North Koreans “had nothing to fear” from the Americans (Kim I. 1975, 312).  Nixon is reported to have 
considered an immediate air strike as a response, but was dissuaded by logistical problems (few US forces were in 
the area that were capable of an effective strike), recommendations by aids to find a diplomatic solution, and 
parallels to US actions in the Gulf of Tonkin in 1964 which included airstrikes against targets in North Vietnam and 
a widened American commitment to that war (Beecher 1969b) 
198
 More narrative details on the EC-121 incident are available in Zagoria and Zagoria (1979, 39-58), 
Mobley (2003, 98-167) and CINCPAC (1970, 133-145). 
199
 The motivation for these political demotions differed significantly from those that occurred in the past.  
Previous purges were often based on power struggles while the ones during this time were due to policy 
disagreements and failures (Nam 1974, 146-147).  
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leader” and were an attempt to inspire and sustain the North’s expanding economic progress by 
focusing on the individual worksites and citizens (Suh 1988, 163-164). 
The DPRK’s national capacity expanded throughout the 1960s as measured by the 
Correlates of War CINC (Composite Indicator of National Capabilities) index (CINC 2011).
200
  
In this study, I use this index to measure the overall political stability of the Kim regime, as 
increased capacity provides North Korea an enhanced ability to maintain control over its 
population and thus increases the overall stability of the North Korean government.
201
  The 
following chart shows the overall CINC scores for North Korea during the 1960s with South 
Koreas added for comparison. 
 
Figure 4.3  Composite Index of National Capacity Scores 1960-1970 
 
Source:  CINC 2011  
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 This index provides a composite score based on defense personnel levels, military spending, population, 
iron and steel production and energy consumption (CINC 2011).  
201
 Other scholars have measured political instability based on mass and elite unrest in a given society.  For 
example, Banks’ (2004) Cross-National Time-Series (CNTS) Data Archive has reporting on internal instability 
(including purges, strikes and riots) has been cited by a number of scholars as a measure of political unrest 
(Pickering and Kisangani 2005; Bell 2009; Tir 2010), although the CNTS contains only limited information on 
North Korean instability.   
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As shown in Figure 4.3, North Korea maintained and improved its national capacity 
levels throughout the decade.
202
  Fluctuations in 1965 were most likely related to stagnated 
military spending during that period and defense spending rose significantly beginning in 1966 
(CINC 2011).  This graduated increase in overall capacity during the 1960s provided Kim with 
the means to both maintain power and pursue hostile foreign policy activities.
203
     
Kim also sought to secure North Korea’s place in the international community through 
active engagement the Soviet Union.  North Korea never completely severed its diplomatic 
contacts with the Soviets in the early 1960s and with the departure of Khrushchev in 1964, began 
efforts to improve their relationship with the USSR (Shimotomai 2011, 139-140).
204
  Relations 
began to improve and, in 1965, the Soviets and North Koreans agreed to resume military and 
economic cooperation.  That same year, the USSR provided 150 million rubles (about 75 million 
US dollars) in military equipment and after personally thanking the Soviet Ambassador for the 
aid, Kim immediately asked for more military assistance (Kuznetsov 1965).  In 1966, the DPRK 
made efforts to change the nature of its dealings with the PRC based primarily on economic 
factors.  The North’s economy was having trouble and the Kim regime needed Soviet capital to 
finance both its economic and military goals (Koh 1969, 953).  To appease the Soviets, North 
Korea began to dampen contacts with the PRC, ceased cultural exchanges, limited diplomatic 
contacts, and stopped both the publishing of Chinese written materials and the radio broadcast of 
Chinese news programs (Soviet Embassy 1966).
205
  Kim understood that maintaining a 
productive relationship with the Soviet Union was essential to achieving his own foreign policy 
goals and was willing to dampen relations with the PRC to ensure Soviet aid remained intact.  
This “balancing act”206 by Kim between the Soviets, who installed Kim as leader of the DPRK in 
1948 and provided critical financial support, and the Chinese, who had saved North Korea from 
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 South Korean gains in national capabilities were largely due to increases in defense spending beginning 
in 1966, and expanded industrial capacity due to increases iron and steel production and energy consumption 
throughout the decade (CINC 2011). 
203
 Of note, World Governance Indicators (WGI) are not discussed in this case as that index is only 
available beginning in the 1990s. 
204
 In fact, trade between the Soviets and North Koreans remained relatively steady despite tense relations 
(between 1961 and 1964) and ranged from $156 to $170 million per year (Carter 1972, 114-115). 
205
 Kim Il-sung was quoted in private conversations as referring to Mao’s Cultural Revolution as 
“incredible madness” and also made similar statements in closed KWP meetings (DVO 1967). 
206
 Shimotomai (2011) and Koh (1969) provide useful historical discussions on Kim Il-sung’s ability to 
maintain North Korea’s independence and generally cordial relations with both communist hegemons. 
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annihilation during the Korean War, served to solidify his political power in both the DPRK and 
the international community.  
Finally, North Korea pursued international relations with less powerful states, such as 
those associated with the Non-Aligned Movement, an international forum for developing 
states.
207
  For example, between 1964 and 1967, Kim hosted visits by the leaders of a number of 
states such as Mali, the Congo, and Mauritania (Suh 1988, 224).  Nam (1974, 147) comments 
that “the basic characteristics of the North Korean leadership – namely, the absolutism of Kim Il-
song and the pervasive influence of his former partisans from Manchuria – remained the same.”  
Throughout this period, Kim Il-sung was clearly in control of North Korea and its domestic and 
international activities.  Thus during this period, there was little overall political instability and 
domestic conditions allowed the Kim regime to pursue its foreign policy goals without 
significant resistance from the DPRK citizens or the ruling elite. 
 
Question 3.  Were economic difficulties associated with increased HFP?  (Hypothesis 2)  
  
 Although the economy performed well during the first half of the 1960s, the onset of 
economic downturns coincided with an initiation of a period of heightened hostile foreign policy 
activities.  This period began with North Korea’s economy showing indications of strength and 
robust expansion, yet beginning in 1966, the DPRK’s successes began to demonstrate the limits 
of command-directed economic systems.  Yet North Korea’s economy did perform well enough 
for Kim to commit significant levels of resources to the defense sector and to support “military 
adventurism” beginning in the mid-1960s.   
 North Korea’s official industrial growth statistics were impressive and Kim Il-sung stated 
that between 1957 and 1970, North Korea’s industrial production increased at a rate of 19.1 
percent per year (Kim 1972, 412).  In 1957 alone, the North Koreans reported that industrial 
output had increased by 44 percent and that grain production (in excess of requirements) was 12 
percent (DPRK 2001, 203).  North Korea's reported GDP per person grew steadily throughout 
the 1960s, rising from an estimated $1,104 per person in 1960 to $1,954 in 1970 with growth 
                                                 
207
 “Non-aligned” nations generally included those involved with the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM).  The 
NAM was initially established in 1955 in Indonesia and included 29 developing nations with the overall goal of 
“resisting the pressures of the major powers, maintaining their independence and opposing colonialism and neo-
colonialism, especially western domination” (NAM 2012). 
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rates ranging from -1.0 to 12 percent per year (Maddison 2008).
208
  Additionally, North Korea’s 
trade levels also rose throughout the decade from $320 million per year in 1960 to $710 million 
per year in 1970 (COW 2011).
209
  At least on paper, North Korea’s economy was robust enough 
to support the redirection of funds in support of increased defense spending. 
 Yet Eberstadt (2007, 29-31) notes that while the DPRK’s per capita income steadily rose 
throughout the 1960s, “there is no reason to invest any great confidence in official DPRK claims 
about per capita national income or national output” due to inconsistencies in reporting methods 
and data.  Additionally, North Korea experienced significant problems during this time with 
“unbalanced growth” (over-allocation of resources to heavy industry), inconsistent levels of 
assistance from the Soviet Union and China, poor harvests and production difficulties due to 
poor economic planning (Lee 1993, 13).  By 1966, North Korea realized that its national goals 
were not being met, and Kim Il-sung commented, “industry and agriculture are not balanced” 
and called for “general equilibrium” in the North’s economic plan (KIS 1965, 256 and 274).  
These difficulties resulted in an extension of its ongoing economic plan by three years to 1970 
and beginning at this time, North Korea ceased to report “detailed economic statistics to the 
outside world” (Lee 1993, 13).  
  During the latter half of the 1960s, North Korea’s command economy began to 
demonstrate signs of distress.  Per capita income was reportedly double that of the South, 
although one analyst observes that “A North Korean has to work five or six times as long as a 
South Korean to earn enough money to buy a comparable item” (Trumbull 1967, 14).  Further, 
the Kim regime’s economic priorities had shifted from domestic production to military defense.  
Due to the “military coup d’état” in South Korea in 1961, the North switched its economic focus 
in the 1960s towards defense and away from economic development, setting back the North 
Korean economy “at least 10 years” (Trumbull 1967, 14).  By the mid-1960s, economic 
development slowed for North Korea as the result of the "diversion of resources to military 
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 Maddison’s (2008) data is reported in 1990 international dollars. 
209
 Additionally, the economic growth that North Korea did experience was directly related to external aid.  
The Kim regime was often able to obtain aid based on the competition between the Soviets and Chinese and those 
states’ efforts to establish strong alliances and shape the development of fledgling communist states such as the 
DPRK.  Prybyla (1964, 468-469) notes that Sino-Soviet support to the communist regimes in Vietnam and Korea 
included loans, grants, industrial goods and equipment, training, and workers.  Park (1984, 277) calculates that the 
Soviet Union and the PRC provided the majority of economic aid to North Korea (until the early 1970s) compared 
to other communist states and the rest of the world.  From 1945 to 1980, total economic aid provided to North Korea 
was $2.76 billion (1984 rates), with the Soviets providing the majority (57.7 percent) followed by China (30.5 
percent) (Park 1984, 275).   
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modernization,” cessation of aid from China and the Soviets, and "unrealistic economic 
planning" (CIA NIE 1972, 9-10).  During the latter half of the 1960s, North Korea was spending 
30 percent of its national income on defense (Axen and Matern 1967). 
      
        Figure 4.4  North Korea’s Economic Priorities 1961-1971 
 
Source:  Kim I. 1975, 302-303 
Note:  “Socio-Cultural Expenses” were costs associated with North Korea’s own 
“cultural revolution” and emphasis on public (and political) education and other efforts 
to improve DPRK society (Kim I.1975, 288). 
    
 As shown in Figure 4.4, “economic expenses” (which were costs associated with 
domestic production) decreased significantly beginning in 1966 and military spending jumped 20 
percent between 1966 and 1967 (Kim I. 1975, 288).  By 1967, North Korea had only achieved 57 
percent of its goals under its economic development plan initiated in 1960 (Trumbull 1967, 
14).
210
  In discussions with the Soviet Embassy (1968), Kim Il-sung admitted that while 
industrial and agricultural production was meeting target goals, domestic construction was 
lagging behind other sectors.  Energy production deficits were negatively affecting metal and 
chemical production (both were running at 50 percent as a result) and drought in the winter of 
1967 and spring of 1968 cut wheat and barley production in half (Soviet Embassy 1968).  It was 
at this same time when a significant increase in North Korea’s hostile foreign policy activities 
occurred.  Between 1966 and 1967, North Korea’s hostile foreign policy events increased nine-
                                                 
210
 For more details on the Seven-Year Plan, see Chung (1972). 
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fold (from a score of 264 to 2328) in intensity between 1966 and 1967 and through the end of the 
decade, remained at their highest levels since the Korean War.    
These difficulties resulted in efforts by the Kim regime to invigorate the economy 
through increased contacts with the international community for economic assistance.  By the 
1970s, North Korea began to purchase “turn-key” plants from both Japan and the West to 
increase industrial capabilities; these purchases and continued economic distress resulted in high 
external debt and marked the beginning of a sustained financial downturn (Savada 1993, 41).  
Chung (1972, 527) describes North Korea’s economic experiences during the 1960s as a “decade 
of mixed achievements and failures.  For the first time since the inception of the North Korean 
regime, it experienced setbacks and slowdowns throughout the economy, a far cry from the days 
of unparalleled growth during the 1950's.”  North Korea’s economy did support Kim’s efforts at 
sustained military activities against the South in the latter half of the decade; yet this reallocation 
of resources, as mentioned above, came at a high price.  Overall, there was economic progress 
during this period and relative economic stability, but when difficulties did occur, there was also 
an increase in HFP activities.   
 
Question 4.  Was social instability associated with periods of increased HFP?  (Hypothesis 3) 
 
Social instability during this period was low and unrelated to HFP activities.  By most 
accounts, North Korea was able to provide for its citizens’ needs.  The North Korean public 
enjoyed more food availability (as compared to the ROK), better access to advanced medicine, 
higher levels of employment, and an overall quality of life that outpaced the South.  During the 
1960s, North Korean citizens reportedly benefited from heavily subsidized food rations and 
housing, free healthcare, an 8-hour workday, equal opportunity for both sexes, and no taxes 
(LOC 2007; Barrett 2011, 53; Fukushima 1975, 221, 245-246).  One defector notes that during 
this time,  
 
…even though it was difficult to have an easy and comfortable lifestyle, at least 
the rations came regularly – never delayed [sic]…There were actually goods 
made in North Korea that you could buy in the stores –  clothing, material, 
underwear, candy [sic] (Martin 2006, 121). 
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The DPRK also made significant progress in other basic necessities, including electricity 
for 71 percent of its population by 1963 and by 1970, nearly all citizens had access to power 
(Cha 2012, 24).  In addition, the DPRK instituted compulsory primary education in 1956 and by 
the mid-1960s, the DPRK had twice as many university students as the ROK (Kim I. 1975, 290-
291).  Food availability, which would become a devastating problem in the 1990s, was at levels 
similar to other states in the region.   DPRK cereal (grain) availability per person outpaced both 
the ROK and PRC through 1968 and remained consistent throughout the rest of the period as 
shown in Figure 4.5.
211
   
      
     Figure 4.5  Yearly Cereal (Grain) Availability per Person (in metric tons) 
 
Sources:  FAOSTAT (2012); US Census Bureau (2012) 
 
Another measure of social stability, the levels of defectors, provides a proxy measure of 
the level of satisfaction citizens feel towards their society.  While defections from North Korea to 
the South most likely happened during this period, they were most likely limited to only a 
handful each year and exact numbers are not available.
212
  Individual North Korean defections to 
the South were at low levels, with only a handful of persons fleeing each year.  But those that 
were reported included a spectacular escape in 1967 by a North Korean journalist (who was later 
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 In 1967, the DPRK experienced problems with flooding (Soviet Embassy 1968), probably due to 
monsoon rains, and this potentially affected harvest levels in 1968. 
212
 South Korean government statistics on defectors are only published in aggregated form prior to 1989.  
This database shows that “prior to 1989,” 607 refugees from the DPRK entered South Korea (ROK MOU 2012a).  
Most likely, this means that between 1953 and 1989, the ROK documented 607 refugees fled the DPRK.  
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found to be a North Korean agent) through the Joint Security Area at Panmunjom and the 
defection of a North Korean air force pilot and his MiG-15 in 1970 (NYT 1967; UNC 2012).   
Alternatively, North Korea did experience an influx of repatriated Koreans who returned 
from Japan and other locations during the early 1960s.  While approximately 1.4 million Koreans 
returned from Japan immediately after the end of World War II in 1945, over 600,000 remained 
(in Japan) although they were denied Japanese citizenship and faced severe discrimination 
(Creamer 2003, 14; Morris-Suzuki 2006, 305).  For those willing to return to the DPRK, North 
Korea offered free education, health care, jobs, and housing (Morris-Suzuki 2005, 372).
213
  
Comparatively, the South Koreans offered “practically no assistance” for returnees from Japan 
(Foster-Carter 1978, 147, quoting DeVos and Wetherall 1974, 15).  As many as 75,000 ethnic 
Koreans were repatriated from 1959 to 1962 as part of the Calcutta Agreement between the 
DPRK and Japanese government (Mitchell 1967, 154 and Creamer 2003, 23-24).
214
  The number 
of returnees slowed significantly by the mid-1960s and stopped completely between 1967 and 
1971 due in part to Japanese government efforts to limit the activities of the Chosen Soren, a pro-
North Korean group of ethnic Koreans in Japan (Foster-Carter 1978, 148).
215
  Despite willing 
repatriation to their ancestral home, most of the returnees found life in North Korea difficult and 
often were persecuted in the DPRK as “distrusted as outsiders”: in fact, thousands “vanished into 
prison camps, and of these, many were never heard from again” (Morris-Suzuki 2005, 259).   
  Indeed, North Korea solidified itself as a police state during this period.  After Kim Il-
sung came to power, he immediately began to establish a “Stalinist” atmosphere in North Korea 
(Martin 2006, 60) and in 1946, the DPRK formed the Ministry of People’s Security (MPS) to 
                                                 
213
 As (Morris-Suzuki 2005, 372 ) notes, the Koreans in Japan were “debarred by law from all forms of 
public sector employment, including teaching in public schools and even the most menial local government jobs, 
while careers in large companies were in effect closed, not by law but by entrenched tradition. The very limited 
welfare that they could obtain was not a right but a ‘gift’ bestowed by administrative discretion…Now, suddenly 
they were presented with the offer of cheap housing, guaranteed jobs and free welfare in [the DPRK] where they 
would be full citizens. Pictures published by North Korea at the height of the repatriation movement contrasted the 
spotless new apartments promised to returnees with the squalor of their slum dwellings in Japan.”   
214
 Ironically, there a few young American soldiers who defected to defected to North Korea during the 
1960s.  Between 1961 and 1965, four US Army enlisted soldiers (all between 19 and 21 years old) defected to North 
Korea including Charles Robert Jenkins, an American NCO who was released by North Korea in 2004 to reside in 
Japan (UNC 2012; Brooke 2012).  Jenkins reportedly crossed the DMZ and defected to the DPRK in order to “avoid 
military service in Vietnam” (Brooke 2012). 
215
 The Chosen Soren was founded in 1955 by “overseas citizens of the DPRK” living in Japan and fully 
supported both Kim Il-sung and North Korea’s policy for eventual reunification (Creamer 2003, 2). 
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provide internal security and protect the borders (Hyun 2004, 7).
216
  Beginning in 1958, efforts 
began to classify all North Korean citizens based on political loyalty and between 1967 and 
1970, the population was divided into three overarching classes with fifty-one subordinate 
designations (Hassig and Oh 2009, 198 and KINU 2011b, 149).
217
  As part of this campaign, 
North Korea designated thousands as sectarians or anti-revolutionaries and these individuals 
were either executed “or sent to remote sites” (Gause 2012, 104).  During the 1960s, the MPS 
reportedly sent 70,000 individuals to political prison camps and executed more that 6,000 North 
Korean citizens (KINU 2011b, 149).   
 Nevertheless, while the Kim regime was repressive and continued to refine its ability to 
control DPRK society, it did adequately provide for the welfare of North Korean citizens during 
this period.  Yet this quality of life had a price, which included consistent pressure by the Kim 
regime to increase efficiency and production and prepare for “inevitable war with the South.”  
During the 1960s, North Korea provided food for its citizens on par with other East Asian states 
and DPRK citizens did receive the education and healthcare benefits promised by the Kim 
regime.  Nevertheless, it was a bland and repressive atmosphere as choices for the consumer 
were limited, and as one analyst observes, “Everything is uniform. There is no poverty, but no 
prosperity either” (Trumbull 1967, 14).  During this period, North Korean society was stable and 
Kim Il-sung’s extensive control allowed him to pursue domestic and internal policy goals.  
Concurrently, I find that there was no direct relationship between social instability and the level 
of HFP activities. 
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 The MPS assumed the security duties of the departing Japanese military forces.  While this organization 
went through some changes, namely subordination to the Department of Internal Affairs in the 1950s and 
subsequent re-emergence as an independent bureau in 1962, the MPS was tasked with internal security and policing 
throughout most of the 1960s (Hyun 2004, 10-12). 
217
 There were three primary class designations:  the core, wavering or “basic,” and hostile or “complex” 
classes (Hassig and Oh 2009, 198; KINU 2011b, 219-221).  The core class (28 percent of the population) included 
those loyal to the regime, the wavering or "basic" class (45 percent) consisted of those not in the core class, 
generally workers and low-level technicians and the hostile or "complex" class (27 percent) were those that were 
"branded enemies, impure elements, and reactionaries" (KINU 2011b, 219-221).  This classification system remains 
in place today. 
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Question 5.  Were UN resolutions against the DPRK associated with increased HFP?  
(Hypothesis 4)  
 
 From 1963 to 1969, the UN Security Council passed no resolutions on the Korea 
situation, but there was periodic discussion in both the Council and General Assembly on the 
future of the peninsula.  After 1953 and throughout the 1960s, the United Nations General 
Assembly participated in an annual “ritual” of debating the future of the Koreas (Koh 1995, 31-
32).  These included the consideration of five topics on the Korean issue: invitations for both 
Koreas to participate in the discussion, the annual UN Commission on the Unification and 
Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK) report, the disbanding of the UNCURK, withdrawal of 
foreign military forces from the peninsula and the ending of discussion of the Korean question 
(Pak 2000, 52-53).  North Korea objected to these debates in the UN General Assembly and 
demanded that “all parties” participate, including the DPRK (Kim H. 1977, 224-225).  As Kim 
H. (1977, 225) notes, “the North Korean regime still utilized the world forum [UN] for its cause.  
Thus every year, the [DPRK] transmitted its unification formula to the United Nations.”218  As a 
result, North Korea ensured that the Korea question was consistently submitted the United 
Nation for debate, despite little hope of UN action on the issue.    
 In 1969 and 1970, UN supporters of North Korea submitted a draft resolution (which 
failed to pass) calling for the expulsion of foreign troops from the peninsula and the dissolution 
of the UNCURK which had been established in 1954 to facilitate the economic recovery of the 
peninsula after the Korean War (Koh 1995, 31).  The UNCURK issued a yearly report (which 
was put before the General Assembly for approval) which detailed not only economic and 
political progress in South Korea, but also North Korean “provocations” and issues surrounding 
reunification (Pak 2000, 55).
219
  While these discussions occurred yearly, there were also at least 
two General Assembly resolutions that passed on the Korean issue, such as Resolutions 2516 and 
2668 (enacted 1969 and 1970), both reaffirming UN objectives to establish a unified, democratic 
and peaceful Korea (UN 1969 and UN 1970).  Both North and South Korea viewed reunification 
as something that had to occur under either a communist or Western democratic system, but not 
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 This was the same proposal that the DPRK consistently used in discussions with the ROK and included 
removal of US forces, reduction of armed forces to 100,000 on each side, an international conference to discuss 
solutions, and direct DPRK-ROK negotiations (Kim 1977, 225). 
219 
The UN established this organization in 1950 (and disbanded it in 1973) with the purpose of oversight of 
“relief and rehabilitation in Korea, as determined by the [General] Assembly in accordance with the [UN] Economic 
and Social Council” (Pak 2000, 7).   
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both, thus stifling any hope of a negotiated solution under the purview of the United Nations.  
Thus the effects of UN Security Council resolutions on hostilities are difficult to measure 
(because there were no actual UNCR resolutions passed), yet the UN’s forum allowed for debate 
on issues surrounding the ongoing division between the Koreas.  Likewise, there was no 
discernible relationship between these UN activities and the levels of North Korean hostile 
foreign policy actions.       
 
Question 6.  Were ROK leadership changes associated with increased North Korean hostile 
foreign policy activities?  (Hypothesis 5) 
 
 During this period, another external influence, national elections, were associated with 
HFP activities.  After assuming control of South Korea by coup in 1961, Park Chung-hee shed 
his military uniform, ran for president in democratic elections, and narrowly won presidency in 
South Korea in both 1963 and 1967 (Savada and Shaw 1990, 39).
220
  Park then pushed through 
constitutional change allowing for a third term and narrowly won against his liberal political foe, 
Kim Dae-jung, in 1971 (Durdin 1972).  
Few North Korean incidents of note occurred during Park’s election in 1963, but an 
intense spike in DPRK hostile foreign policy activity coincided with Park’s reelection bid in 
1967 (see Figure 4.2).  North Korea’s activities during Park’s campaign and election 
demonstrated a significant shift towards military action against the ROK and US forces in South 
Korea.  In fact, North Korean activity began in earnest in March 1967 and by mid-year, the US 
government reported over 300 DMZ incidents (ranging from non-violent confrontations to 
firefights) – a six-fold jump compared to previous years – and significant increases in the 
infiltration of DPRK agents in rear areas of South Korea for guerilla and sabotage missions (CIA 
NIE 1967, 2).  Additionally, between Park’s party nomination in February 1967 and his election 
in May 1967, military incidents included infiltration attempts, ambushes, the sinking of a DPRK 
naval vessel, and a six-hour small arms and artillery engagement between dozens of troops on 
both sides of the DMZ (Finley 1984, UNC 2012).  Non-military hostile actions by the North 
Koreans included pronouncements against US actions in Vietnam, South Korean activities, and 
DMZ incidents.  Thus during this period, the reelection of South Korea’s Park Chung-hee in 
1967 did occur in conjunction with a significant increase in conflict on the peninsula.     
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 Kim ran for election in 1963 after pressure from the Kennedy to transition his government to a 
representative democracy (FRUS 1961b; Oberdorfer 1997, 32).  
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Question 7.  Were US leadership changes associated with increased North Korean hostile 
foreign policy activities?  (Hypothesis 6) 
 
North Korea’s hostile foreign policy activity levels varied during the US election periods, 
but showed noticeable increases during the 1968 presidential election timeframe. The US 
administration underwent three leadership changes during the case study period:  Lyndon B. 
Johnson’s assumption of the presidency after Kennedy’s assassination in 1963; Johnson’s 
election in 1964; and Richard Nixon’s selection as US president in 1968.  The installation of 
Vice President Johnson as the US leader in December 1963 occurred at a time when conflict 
between the Koreas was at a relatively low level (see Figure 4.2).  Although there were a few 
military confrontations between North Korea and US-ROK forces in 1963,
221
 there was no 
discernible relationship between Johnson’s assumption of the presidency of the United States and 
hostile foreign policy actions on the peninsula.  There was no significant change in North Korean 
activities during Lyndon Johnson’s campaign and subsequent election in 1964.  
Four years later, conflict on the Korean peninsula was at unprecedented levels.  North 
Korea’s actions between the US political party conventions in August 1968 and national 
elections in November included at least 12 firefights along the DMZ with a total of 30 US and 
ROK casualties (killed and wounded) and 31 North Korean casualties (Bolger 1991, 138-139;  
ROK MND 1986, 107-108).  Other hostile foreign policy actions included diplomatic 
pronouncements criticizing US policy in Laos and Okinawa and negative statements concerning 
US actions along the DMZ.  There was little mention of the US presidential contenders (Nixon 
and Humphrey) in North Korea’s press until after Nixon won by a slim margin.  After that, the 
DPRK government described him as a “notorious war maniac” who would continue “pursuing 
vicious and shame-less aggression” (NYT 1968a).  In retrospect, Kim Il-sung might have felt 
that the Democrats and Humphrey could offer a “better deal” for the Communists than Richard 
Nixon and similar views were held by the Soviets and North Vietnamese (Small 2004, 526). 
 The increased HFP activity during the final months of the US presidential election might 
have been related to DPRK efforts to demonstrate that instability on the peninsula required the 
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 Military confrontations during 1963 occurred primarily between May and August and included the 
downing of a US helicopter and the capture of its crew, the shootdown of a small US transport plane (killing six), 
and the deaths of three US soldiers in a DMZ firefight (Finley 1984, 113).  South Korea’s CIA chief attributed these 
attacks as North Korean responses to the killing of nine DPRK agents in South Korea (Finley 1984, 113).   
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attention of both the ROK and US governments.  While this was not an effort to open a “second 
front” for the Vietnam War against the United States (FRUS 1966b; Borunkov 1966), Kim 
hoped to weaken the resolve of the South Korean’s government and its decision to send troops 
overseas while a significant threat existed on the Korean peninsula (Porter 1966).  Distracting the 
US effort in Vietnam provided assistance to the international communists’ struggle against 
“imperialist” nations and, as the North Korean ambassador to the USSR noted, “keeping tensions 
high along the demarcation line is a kind of help for the Vietnamese people, because it is 
distracting a part of the US forces from Vietnam” (Podgorny 1967).  During this time, North 
Korean hostile foreign policy actions aimed to disparage US operations against communist 
forces in Vietnam and to negatively affect the ROK-US alliance.  
Nixon’s election in November 1968 came at the height of increased hostilities between 
the DPRK and the ROK-US alliance and at the same time, North Korea still held the 82-member 
crew of the USS Pueblo.  In fact, the 1968 election might have spurred North Korea to release 
the USS Pueblo’s crew prior Nixon’s assumption of office in January 1969 (Mobley 2003, 
88).
222
  While it is difficult to determine if North Korea’s increased hostilities during the late 
1960s were associated with US presidential elections, there was an undeniable increase in DPRK 
hostile actions during the 1968 US campaign and general election compared to previous changes 
in US leadership.    
 
Question 8.  Were ROK/US strategic-level military exercises associated with increased hostile 
foreign policy activities?  (Hypothesis 7) 
 
ROK/US strategic military exercises often coincided with changes in North Korea’s 
hostile foreign policy activities.  During some exercises, DPRK activity increased, while during 
others, HFP remained unchanged.  The DPRK often framed its responses in the context of the 
threat posed by the United States and its regional alliances.  The United States maintained a 
substantial presence in the region, not only in Korea, but also with military bases spread 
throughout Japan.  US troop levels in Korea during this time averaged between 50,000 and 
60,000 personnel while the US assigned over 80,000 service members annually to Japan and 
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 During negotiations, the outgoing Johnson administration emphasized to the North Koreans that they 
would not get a better “deal” from the Nixon administration and the US offered to sign a letter that included a 
“qualified” apology (Mobley 2003, 88-89).  The US signed the statement and the crewmembers of the USS Pueblo 
were released by North Korea on December 23, 1968 (Lerner 2002, 212-214). 
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Okinawa (US DOD 2011c).  The US also stationed a robust air, naval and nuclear posture in the 
region.  Between 1966 and 1970, the US maintained between 80 and 120 combat aircraft, 
including F-5 jet fighters and at least two squadrons of advanced F-4s; the ROK’s aircraft 
inventory included 11 squadrons with a mix of Korean War-era F-86s and the more modern F-5s 
(Beecher 1970).  While there was limited US naval presence on the peninsula, the US stationed 
its Seventh Fleet in nearby Japan.  US ships from the Seventh Fleet base at Yokosuka were used 
as a deterrent to rising tensions between China and Taiwan in 1955 and 1958 (Whiting 2001, 
108) and routinely patrolled the Taiwan Strait (Marolda 2012, 84).  The US Navy was also active 
as a deterrent to Vietnamese activity and instability in Laos and South Vietnam (1961), carried 
marines for deployments to Thailand (1962) and after the South Vietnam Gulf of Tonkin incident 
(1964), the Seventh Fleet became an active combatant in Southeast Asia (Marolda 2012).   
 Along with a permanent US presence in the region and significant aid packages, the US 
and ROK conducted both command post and field training events throughout the period.  
Although a number of small-scale annual military exercises
223
 occurred each year, the late 1960s 
saw an increase in the number and scope of larger, strategic-level exercises based on the defense 
of South Korea.  The most significant of these was a ROK-US command post exercise (CPX), 
dubbed “FOCUS LENS,” which began in 1968 and was conducted throughout this period,224 was 
designed to test plans for the defense of Korea (CINCPAC 1970, 158).  The FOCUS LENS 
exercise, scheduled for March 1968,  was postponed due to the Blue House attacks and Pueblo 
crisis but occurred in October 1968
225
 and was “based on a general attack from the north” (Finley 
1968, 125 and CINCPAC 1969, 151).  This was followed in March 1969 by an exercise 
designated “FOCUS RETINA,” which included 7,000 total troops and the paradrop of a brigade 
of soldiers from the US-based 82nd Airborne Division to “scatter a mythical aggressor” near the 
Han river (Bolger 1991, 99-101 and CINCPAC 1970, 158).  During this exercise, the US moved 
2,500 troops from US state-side bases to Korea (8,500 miles) in 31 hours (Finley 1984, 129), 
                                                 
223
 These included both command post exercises (CPXs) focused on training headquarters and their staffs 
and field training exercises (FTXs) that included deployments of ROK-US troops to on-peninsula location to 
exercise combined war plans.  For example in 1962, US and ROK defense forces participated in seven exercises 
(four CPXs, three FTXs and one amphibious landing exercise) (CINCPAC 1963, 136).   
224
 This exercise still occurs, now designated “ULCHI FREEDOM GUARDIAN,” and remains focused on 
“strengthening the readiness of Republic of Korea and U.S. forces” (USFK 2012).  
225
 Beginning in 1968, Focus Lens (or a similar exercise) occurred annually in the fall. 
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demonstrating its response capability in the event of hostilities with the North.
226
  In October 
1969, the annual FOCUS LENS exercise occurred in October 1969 (and each fall thereafter) and 
all headquarters at the division level (and air force and naval equivalents) took part (CINCPAC 
1970, 158).  These types of exercises raised tensions on the Korean peninsula and the consistent 
North Korean reaction was to declare that the peninsula was on the “brink of war” (NYT 1967c).  
In published speeches, Kim Il-sung mentioned these exercises and others conducted by the US 
its regional allies (KIS 1976, 96 and 272).  
 The levels of North Korean hostilities during these exercises were mixed with increases 
in hostile foreign policy actions generally during October of each year (especially in 1968 and 
1969), but no increases (compared to adjacent months) each year in the months of February and 
March (KINU 2011; Finley 1984; UNC 2012).  Thus, there was an increase in hostilities for 
some, but not all of the strategic exercises during this period.  Another key relationship identified 
was that the North Korean downing of an EC-121 US intelligence aircraft in April 1969 was 
possibly a response to the FOCUS RETINA exercise, based on the timing of the shooting down 
and North Korean rhetoric at the time (Zangoria and Zangoria 1979, 9-34 to 9-35).
227
  While 
these strategic exercises did help maintain tension between the North and South throughout this 
period, ROK-US joint military operations in Vietnam were much more influential in North 
Korean decisions to use force on the Korean peninsula.  These exercises and the continued 
presence of American troops on the peninsula were a stark reminder to North Korea of the 
continued military alliance between the United States and South Korea.  At the same time, there 
were changes in DPRK hostile foreign policy activities during exercise periods.   
 
Question 9.  Was the presence of a conservative ROK government associated with increased 
HFP? (Hypothesis 8) 
 
Park Chung-hee’s conservative and staunch anti-communist foreign policy most likely 
increased the level of North Korean hostile foreign policy events during this period.  While 
future ROK administrations (to include those in the 2000s) generally shunned direct military 
responses to DPRK actions, the Park administration was, at least in the 1960s, determined to 
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 Ironically, this worried the South Koreans as well, as it signaled that the US was testing its ability to 
support the ROK during hostilities using means that did not require a permanent troop presence on the Korean 
peninsula (Shabecoff 1969).  
227
 Additional details on the EC-121 incident are provided in the “Divergent Outcomes” section below. 
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respond directly to North Korean security threats.  In the early 1960s, the Park regime first 
acquired the economic means to increase its defensive posture (through economic success) and 
then began to actively counter the DPRK’s hostile actions by the end of the decade.  Yet while 
the Park administration had tense relationship with the DPRK throughout this period, it did not 
pursue the same political objectives in regards to North Korea as previous leaders, such as 
Syngman Rhee.  Rhee’s 1950s slogan of “March north and unify!” was replaced by the Park 
regime’s call in the early 1960s for “Unification after Construction” (Kim H. 1977, 176, 197).  
Park’s assumption of power in May 1961 solidified South Korea’s emphasis on priorities other 
than reunification.
228
  His initial priorities were focused on “national reconstruction” which 
rested on policies (or “prerequisites”) of economic progress and anti-communism (Kim 2004, 
71).  Park’s prioritized goals for South Korea in the 1960s included economic prosperity at the 
top of the list, followed by national security, efforts to reconstruct “genuine democracy,” and 
finally reunification (Kim, YJ 2011, 98). 
Park Chung-hee gradually established his control over the ROK and by 1965, he was 
“firmly anti-Communist…[and] in a position of unchallenged authority in Seoul and appears to 
have the support, or at least acquiescence, of a majority of the population” (CIA NIE 1967, 5).  It 
was at this same time that defense spending on both sides of the DMZ began to increase 
substantially, followed by a significant increase in tensions and military activities.  Compared to 
North Korea’s more technologically advanced but smaller military (370,000 troops), South 
Korea maintained a much larger force (600,000 personnel) (CINC 2012).  While the DPRK had 
mutual defense treaties with both the USSR and China, the US presence on the peninsula (and 
defense treaty with the ROK) ensured that any conflict between the Koreas would quickly 
involve both sides of the ongoing Cold War conflict. 
South Korea’s economic success229 and the military aid obtained from the United States 
enabled the conservative Park regime to effectively counter North Korean military activities.
230
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 Although the Soviets charged that the US may have instigated the coup (NYT 1961), Joungwon Kim 
(1975a, 226) argues that the initial reaction by the US was to demand a return to the previous “lawful government 
authorities” rather than to support the new government.  Kim (1975a) referenced statements made by the Chief of 
the UN Command’s public statement that called “upon all military personnel in his Command to support the duly 
recognized Government of the ROK headed by Prime Minister Chang Myon [and he] expects that the Chiefs of the 
Korean Armed Forces will use their authority and influence to see that control is immediately turned back to the 
government authorities and that order is restored in the armed forces” (FRUS 1961). 
229
 By the 1970s, industrial production was reportedly growing 25 percent annually (Savada and Shaw 
1990, 143).  The CIA notes that by 1965, it was actually South Korea’s economy that was stronger compared to 
113 
 
This was a response to developments on the peninsula as infiltrations and armed incursions 
increased and were intended to “test the effectiveness and reaction of South Korean forces 
deployed along the DMZ as well as to undermine troop morale” (FRUS 1966b).  In October 
1966, The North Koreans began more intense operations and conducted seven “surprise attacks” 
against South Korean forces (FRUS 1966b).  Despite US objections, ROK troops responded by 
crossing the DMZ and killing or wounding as many as 30 North Koreans (FRUS 1966c and CIA 
NIE 1967, 2).
231
   
 The United Nations Command considered this an Armistice violation, while the South 
Korean generals felt that the raid was justified and that the US “paid too little attention to ROK 
casualties” (Bolger 1991, 36).  The South Korean position was articulated by Park Chung-hee in 
1967 as he stated,   
 
Whenever the North Koreans violate the military demarcation line…all the United 
Nations Command has done so far is to table the complaint at Panmunjom, where 
the North Koreans categorically deny it. For the last 14 years, the United Nations 
Command has abided by the armistice while the North Korean side has ignored 
it… whenever the North Koreans violate the armistice they must be made to pay 
by retaliation (FRUS 1967a). 
 
This raid and other ROK activities that followed were disconcerting to US leaders who 
reminded Park that “such actions undercut the ROK's position at the UN, provided fodder for 
North Korean propaganda, undercut General Bonesteel's authority, and jeopardized U.S. 
Congressional support for military assistance to Korea” (FRUS 1967a).232  The Park government 
considered North Korea’s actions along the DMZ as a direct threat to South Korea’s security 
while the US, with its increasing commitment to Vietnam, had no interest in heightened tensions 
and military clashes with the DPRK (Hungarian Embassy 1967).  Throughout the 1960s, the 
                                                                                                                                                             
North Korea (CIA NIE 1967, 4).  In fact, between 1961 and 1965, South Korea’s GDP averaged $3.2 billion per 
year and grew at an average annual rate of 5.9 percent (World dataBank 2012).    
230
 Economic and military aid of $400-$450 million per year (USG 1998, 56) from the United States did 
provide stability and support to the Park regime between 1960 and 1965.   
231
 The UN Commander, US General Charles Bonesteel, heard rumors concerning a planned ROK response 
(a retaliatory combat raid) and met with the ROK Minister of National Defense in efforts to dissuade this action 
(Sarantakes 2000, 441).  Bonesteel reminded him that an attack against North Korea “could have severe and 
unintended political and diplomatic impact on the pending visit of President Lyndon B. Johnson to the peninsula and 
a scheduled UN General Assembly debate on Korea” (Sarantakes 2000, 441).   
232
 Very little information is available on other ROK military actions, but these activities by the South 
Korean defense forces happened often enough to warrant the attention of both USFK and the US Congress (FRUS 
1967a). 
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conservative Park government continued these types of activities to counter North Korea’s 
increased level of military confrontations, resulting heightened levels of DPRK hostile actions. 
   
4.b.3.  Summary and Case Study Conclusions 
 Throughout the 1960s, Kim Il-sung solidified his grip on power over North Korean 
society, built the DPRK’s economy and enhanced its military capabilities, and established a 
legitimate and stable communist state.  North Korea’s foreign policy activities evolved from an 
emphasis on diplomatic solutions to the division of Korea to active military measures intended to 
cause the downfall of the Park government.  Kim’s efforts to destabilize the South Korean 
government failed and the South Korean government remained intact.  Nevertheless, the hostile 
actions by the North Koreans forecasted the DPRK’s future patterns of relations with the rest of 
the international community and the Kim regime’s unique ability to conduct sustained 
provocations, with little regard to the potential reactions of either South Korea or the US. 
 
  Table 4.2  Structured Analysis Results:  Regional Power (1963-1969) 
Category Question Test Result Details 
Dependent Variable 
(HFP) 
1.  What was the level of hostile 
foreign policy during the case 
study? 
High 
Conflict scores were 
higher than historical 
averages and averaged 
1222 each year.
233
 
Internal Conditions  
 
Independent 
Variables 
(Proposition 1) 
2.  Was political instability 
associated with heightened HFP 
activities?  (H1) 
No 
There was low 
political instability 
during this period. 
3.  Were economic difficulties 
associated with increased HFP?  
(H2) 
Yes 
Although the DPRK 
did make economic 
gains, as downturns 
began, HFP increased. 
4.  Was social instability associated 
with periods of increased HFP?  
(H3) 
No 
Social instability 
during this period was 
low and unrelated to 
HFP activities.   
External Conditions  
 
Independent 
Variables 
(Proposition 2) 
5.  Were UN resolutions against the 
DPRK associated with increased 
HFP?  (H4) 
n/a 
No Security Council 
resolutions were 
enacted during this 
period. 
6.  Were ROK leadership changes 
associated with increased HFP 
actions?  (H5) 
Yes 
National elections 
during this period 
were associated with 
HFP activities. 
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 The average hostile foreign policy yearly conflict score between 1960 and 2011 was 735 (Appendix C). 
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7.  Were US leadership changes 
associated with increased HFP 
actions?  (H6) 
Yes 
Activity levels varied 
during the election 
periods, but did 
increase during the 
1968 US election.  
8.  Did ROK/US military exercises 
consistently influence DPRK 
hostile actions?  (H7) 
Yes 
Activities did increase 
during some exercises, 
but not during others. 
9.  Was the a conservative ROK 
government associated with 
increased HFP? (H8) 
Yes 
Park’s foreign policy 
influenced North 
Korea’s HFP 
incidents. 
 
 In Table 4.2, I summarize the structured, focused analysis of the relationship between the 
incidence of hostile foreign policy activities, conditions faced by the Kim regime, and alternate 
explanations.  This period saw significantly higher levels of North Korean hostile foreign policy 
activities compared to historical averages (see Figure 4.2).  In fact, the conflict levels between 
the Koreas in the 1960s were at the highest level found between 1960 and 2011.  Additionally, 
although there was evidence of an increase in hostilities in conjunction with a slowing of the 
North Korean economy, this was an overall period of internal stability for the DPRK.  Thus 
while there is evidence of a relationship between economic instability and the beginnings of 
heightened levels of HFP activities in support of P1, the overall political, social, and economic 
internal stability of the DPRK during the entire case study period shows the opposite.  From an 
overall viewpoint, the stability enjoyed by the DPRK during this period, along with heightened 
levels of HFP activities, does not support the contention that diversionary activity (as defined in 
the operationalization of the dependent variable) occurred.  Thus, while the Kim regime pursued 
activities focused on uniting the population against an external foe, an analysis of the individual 
conditions generally does not support the argument proposed by diversionary theory or P1.  
Alternatively, the external conditions faced by the regime do provide some support to P2 as ROK 
elections, and the conservative, anti-communist nature of the Park administration were related to 
increases in DPRK hostilities.     
The relationship between hostile activities and South Korea’s conservative administration 
was as expected as Park pursued an increasingly harder line (especially during the latter half of 
the 1960s) towards the DPRK as tensions on the peninsula increased.  Additionally, North Korea 
enjoyed significant support from the Communist Bloc because of Cold War alliances and the 
overall foreign policy objectives of both Moscow and Beijing.  These Cold War relationships 
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provided the Kim regime with the military and economic support to pursue North Korea’s policy 
goals.  Yet there are important findings in the relationships that were not found:  for example, 
North Korean hostile foreign policy activities were did not increase consistently with strategic 
military exercises
234
 and US leadership changes had little effect on DPRK hostile activity levels.  
The Kim regime used hostile foreign policy events and external threats in attempts to solidify 
domestic support for national priorities and to a limited extent, potentially attempted to divert 
public attention away from economic difficulties.
235
 
The Kim regime based its decision to shift tactics towards more violent actions against 
South Korea and the US on a variety of factors.  These factors included DPRK concerns about its 
economy, the policy decision by the Kim regime that South Korea was ready for revolution, the 
opportunities afforded by US involvement in Vietnam, and the evolving regional security 
situation faced by North Korea.  The Kim regime was also contending with the complications of 
dedicating nearly one-third of its national income to defense programs, its desire to be a viable 
and influential communist state, and the need for continued economic and military aid from its 
allies.  By the mid-1960s, conditions in the South were continuing to improve and the possibility 
of a ROK revolution (in support of the communists) seemed to be slipping away.  Thus, the 
pursuit of external “adventures” by the Kim regime was a logical response for the DPRK in 
hopes of supporting reunification efforts and in hopes of bolstering its position at home 
(Michishita 2010, 31).      
The Kim regime followed a political course similar to the Soviets as it embraced both 
ideological and practical means to vilify threats the DPRK’s communist system and to maintain 
Kim Il-sung’s grip on power over the DPRK.236  Through the establishment of a domestic 
environment that included a sustained threat of war with the ROK-US alliance, the Kim regime 
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 The DPRK always issued provocative statements during these exercise periods, but the intensity of 
military conflict during exercises did not vary consistently during the 1960s (KINU 2011; Finley 1984). 
235
 This is consistent with Lerner’s (2010) contention that North Korean actions during the mid-1960s were 
linked to diversionary behavior.  Through an in-depth analysis of the diplomatic communications records of 
communist embassies in Pyongyang, Lerner (2010, 44-45) argues that the Kim regime was focused on furthering the 
concept of juche while simultaneously using a constant state of tension to “further his political agenda at home.”  
Lerner’s (2010) archival analysis provides some of the best information on the motivations of the Kim regime's 
activities from the perspective of those stationed in the DPRK.  The examination of similar communications during 
the other two case study periods (diplomatic communications in Pyongyang throughout the 1990s and in the late 
2000s) might hold similarly revealing insights into Kim regime actions, although that information is not currently 
available.   
236
 Kennan’s (1946) “Long Telegram” proposed that the Soviets made full use of Marxist-Leninist ideology 
“because it offered them an external threat in capitalism that could be used to validate their repressive regime” 
(Lerner 2010, 47).   
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managed to keep its population both on edge and under control (Hungarian Embassy 1963 and 
NYT 1967c).  Thus, the North Korean regime was able to use the specter of a rising threat posed 
by South Korea, as the impetus to rally the North Korean population.  Additionally, the sustained 
focus on the US as the enemy of the Korean people (KIS 1972, 198) and references to the rise of 
Japanese militarism (Romanian Embassy 1971) were clear attempts by the Kim regime to keep 
North Korea’s citizens focused on external threats.    
The existence of a successful South Korean government was disconcerting to the Kim 
regime:  Park Chung-hee was enjoying economic progress and international political prestige 
reflected negatively on the DPRK’s claim of establishing “legitimate” socialist system (Kim I. 
1975, 287).  Thus, North Korea’s efforts to destabilize the South hinged on heightened guerilla 
warfare and attacks against the perceived core of South Korea’s success:  the ROK President.  
The DPRK hoped that the 1968 Blue House raid, if successful, would “reduce South Korea to 
leaderless chaos, and thus set in motion a social revolution that would pave the way for 
unification under his regime…” (Martin 2006, 127).  While North Korea’s attacks against the 
South failed to cause the instability sought by the Kim regime, they did prove that the Johnson 
and Nixon administrations were unwilling to respond in kind to provocations against the ROK-
US military alliance.  The lack of an American military response to both the USS Pueblo capture 
and EC-121 downing and the US ability to block ROK retaliation for the Blue House raid set a 
precedent for future reactions to similar DPRK activities: US reactions to spectacular attacks 
would primarily involve diplomacy, rather than military retaliation. 
North Korea’s other behaviors were based on Kim’s desire to maintain power and 
reactions to international conditions, which supports P2 and arguments surrounding external 
influences.  The Kim regime maintained domestic tension by using the threat of the US and 
South Korean invasion to maintain the public’s focus on regime goals (CIA 1969a, 8; Zagoria 
and Zagoria 1979, 49).  Additional efforts to malign increasing ties between Japan and South 
Korea (Romanian Embassy 1971) also served similar purposes in attempts to keep the North 
Korean population focused on external threats.  Whether or not the Kim regime was actually 
successful in distracting DPRK citizens from internal concerns is difficult to determine, but in 
any case, there is substantial evidence (as discussed above) that the North Korean leaders did 
intend to use external threats in an effort to affect domestic attitudes.   
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Finally, one of the most significant findings is that while lower levels of hostilities were 
expected during this period (because of relative domestic stability), in fact, high levels of HFP 
occurred.  This lends support to arguments against the applicability of the diversionary 
hypothesis (which hinges on domestic distress) in this case.  Yet at the same time, efforts to 
focus public attention on external threats did occur in tandem with North Korea’s establishment 
of a police state (as discussed above).  These policies allowed the Kim regime to continue to 
pursue foreign policy goals with public support (at least on the surface).  Thus, while the 
overarching relationship between the individual conditions faced by North Korea and its 
propensity for conflict provides little support for P1, a more nuanced examination reveals that 
some evidence of diversion-style behavior is present.Finally, this period also saw the DPRK’s 
use of brinksmanship tactics and the Kim regime’s realization that provocative actions usually 
resulted in muted responses from the ROK and US.  In the future, these responses often became 
economic concessions, as will become clear in the next case study.  
 
119 
 
Figure 4.6  Timeline:  North Korean and US Events 1963-1971 
North Korean Events
DPRK begins to “lean” towards China
Soviet-DPRK relations deteriorate
DPRK-Soviet relations improve
DPRK obtains military aid from 
USSR
Heightened DPRK military activities
North Korea’s defense spending at 
30% of budget
DPRK  deploys MiGs to Vietnam
ROK navy vessel sunk
Intense combat along DMZ
Commando attack against Blue House
USS Pueblo seized
USS Pueblo crew released
US reconnaissance aircraft shot down
Large scale military exercises
Tensions along the DMZ decrease
1963
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1964
US-ROK Events
US President Kennedy assassinated
Johnson becomes US President
Johnson elected as US President
US deploys combat troops to 
Vietnam
ROK deploys troops to Vietnam
President Johnson visits ROK
ROK President Park reelected
US commitment to Vietnam peaks
Richard Nixon elected US President
US-ROK FOCUS RETINA exercise
Large scale military exercises
US withdraws 20,000 troops from 
ROK
ROK withdraws troops from 
Vietnam
ROK President Park reelected
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4.c.  The Arduous March: North Korea's Great Famine (1993-1999) 
If catastrophic famine does occur, it will be due to political decisions  
made in Pyongyang, not shortages of food. 
Noland (1997) 
 
In this chapter, I analyze the relationship between the internal and external conditions 
North Korea experienced from 1993 to 1999 and hostile foreign policy levels.  From 1993 to 
1999, the Kim regime endured one of the most catastrophic events in recent history: a famine 
that resulted in up to 2.5 million deaths (Natsios 1999, 7-8), representing approximately 11% of 
North Korea’s population at the time.  Diversionary theory suggests that leaders seek external 
uses of force to distract public attention from domestic distress (such as famine).  The low levels 
of overall conflict during this case study and the concurrent presence of significant domestic 
distress conditions stand in contrast to the predictions made by both Proposition 1 and 
diversionary theory.  Diversionary theory suggests that external conflict should have increased 
significantly during the famine, yet the overall levels of HFP during this period were well below 
historic averages.  This period did include significant conflict and diversionary-type activities by 
the Kim regime such as its initiation of nuclear and missile programs.  These were both attempts 
to gain concessions from the international community and, to a lesser extent, distract its citizens.  
Alternatively, an analysis of the individual external influences faced by the Kim regime 
generally provides support for the second proposition (P2).  External conditions, such as ROK 
elections and strategic military exercises influenced North Korea’s propensity to conduct hostile 
foreign policy (HFP) activities.  
I selected North Korea’s famine as a case study based on the overall “political shock” 
(Goertz and Diehl 1995, 31; Figure 3.1) of this event and its profound impact on North Korea’s 
socialist society and its relationship with the international community.  Aside from the extreme 
death toll, the famine caused DPRK citizens to become disillusioned with the Kim regime and 
allowed international aid organizations unprecedented domestic access to the most closed society 
on the planet (Natsios 1999, 9).
237
  Additionally, during the 1990s North Korea established itself 
as a nation that had an emerging, yet dangerous, nuclear program and a substantial reliance on 
international aid to meet its food shortages.  In the following sections, I provide a synopsis of the 
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 Natsios (1999, 9) observes, “The food aid program is visible evidence of the failure of juche, the 
governing state ideology; it has undermined state propaganda about the outside capitalist world; and it has 
accelerated the privatization of the economy.” 
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crisis, pose the same structured questions as in the previous case study, and conclude with a 
comparative analysis of the results and timeline (Figure 4.11) for reference.   
4.c.1.  The Great Famine 
Prior to the crises during the 1990s, North Korea experienced a number of food 
shortages, but these did not fundamentally change the DPRK’s societal structure or relationship 
with external actors.
238
  The famine in the 1990s was a stark exception as it established North 
Korea’s chronic dependence on external assistance to feed its citizens.  A number of authors 
thoroughly document key events surrounding the famine (Noland 2000; Natsios 2001; Lee 2003; 
Haggard and Noland 2007), and a brief synopsis follows. 
Through the 1980s, North Korea fed its citizens through a combination of domestic 
production and imports of food and other products (such as fuel) at discounted prices to support 
its agricultural industry.  The Soviet Union was North Korea’s most important trading partner, 
followed by China, and both provided fuel and fertilizer to the DPRK at a substantially reduced 
rate (Noland 2000, 97-99; Bennett 1998, 3).
239
  Organizational choices, such as the DPRK’s 
emphasis on large state farms and centralized decision-making, historically influenced the 
incidence and severity of food shortages (Noland, Robinson and Wang 2001, 73).  These 
choices, along with agricultural practices, corruption, and conflicting policies all contributed to 
the poor harvests of the 1990s.  Noland (2003, 4) observes,  
 
…[in 1987] the North Koreans initiated a number of at times conflicting policies 
in the agricultural sector, including the expansion of state farms, tolerance of 
private garden plots, expansion of grain-sown areas, transformation of crop 
composition in favor of high-yield items, maximization of industrial inputs 
subject to availability, and the intensification of double-cropping and dense 
planting.  Continuous cropping led to soil depletion, and the overuse of chemical 
fertilizers contributed to acidification of the soil and eventually a reduction in 
yields.  As yields declined, hillsides were denuded to bring more and more 
marginal land into production.  This contributed to soil erosion, river silting, and 
ultimately, catastrophic flooding.  
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 North Korea’s previous shortages were associated with external influences or natural disasters including 
food shortages in 1945 (attributed to coordination problems after the end of Japanese rule); post-Korean War effects 
in 1954; and due to poor weather, increased spending based on military confrontations, and industrial 
underperformance from 1970 to 1973 (Lee 2003, 8).  
239
 The Soviets provided oil at two-thirds the current world price to the North Koreans, but that Moscow 
also received goods from North Korea “at less than world prices…so the net magnitude of the subsidy is unknown” 
(Noland 2000, 97).  Additionally, China routinely sold oil to North Korea at half of the current world price (Patrick 
1991, 34, quoted in Noland 2000, 97).  
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Press reports from 1994 began to mention visible signs of strain on the Kim regime and 
Pyongyang’s official radio broadcast stated, “in parts of the country people go hungry” (Noland 
2000, 13).  Prior to the famine period, the DPRK government’s Public Distribution System 
(PDS)
 240
 supplied food to approximately sixty percent of the population with the other forty 
percent receiving rations through alternate methods (Haggard and Noland 2011a, 48; Natsios 
2000, 96).
241
  Refugee surveys indicate that by 1993, less than 20 percent (of those who were 
previously supported by the PDS) could depend on the Kim regime as their primary supplier of 
food (Haggard and Noland 2011a, 48).  As Haggard and Noland (2011a, 48) comment, 
 
As the PDS broke down, people were forced to turn to foraging and the nascent 
markets for sustenance.  Such coping responses included rearing livestock, 
growing kitchen gardens, and collecting wild foods like edible grasses, acorns, 
tree bark, and sea algae. 
  
In 1994, Chinese analysts warned that North Korea was headed for severe food shortages 
(Eberstadt 1997, 233).
242
  As DPRK refugees began to flee across the Sino-Korean border 
looking for food, North Korea began to reach out to its neighbors and other organizations for aid 
((KBSM 1998; Lee 2003, 142; Kristof 1996).  The North quietly requested food aid from Japan 
in the fall of 1994 and again in January 1995 (Haggard and Noland 2011a, 137).  They also 
requested aid from non-governmental organizations such as World Vision International (WVI) 
(Noland, Robinson and Wang 2001, 750).
243
  
Unsurprisingly, North Korea could not compensate for the poor harvests that occurred in 
1995 due to severe flooding.  The DPRK leadership consistently stated that natural disasters 
caused the famine (KCNA 1996c), while refugees often blamed the DPRK leadership for the 
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 The PDS is a food allocation system used by North Korea to ration foodstuffs.  In this system, the North 
Korean government purchases food from collective farms and redistributes it to all citizens (Apte and Mokdad 1998, 
1315).  Up until 1995, the system was structured with 10 levels, based on work type and productivity, and 
afterwards, it was restructured to a three-tiered system based on age (Bennett 1999, 9).  One of the key indicators of 
problems with food availability in North Korea was changes to this system, which reportedly began to falter in the 
late 1980s (Lee 2005, 5).   
241
 For example, farmers and their families were given their rations for a year at the end of harvest and were 
not included in the standard PDS system food allocations (Natsios 2000, 94), 
242
 Eberstadt (1997, 233) was quoting an article in a South Korean newspaper, the Tong-a Ilbo (13 May 
1994). 
243
 Although North Korea had unsuccessfully sought 500,000 metric tons of food aid from South Korea in 
the early 1990s (Woo-Cumings 2002, 21), this was first time the DPRK solicited help from the wider international 
community. 
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shortages (Natsios 2001, 127).
244
  While natural events certainly played a role in the food 
shortages, the proximate causes were the North Korean economic system and other structural 
problems (Cumings 2005, 443-444; Haggard and Noland 2007, 209; Lee 2003, 313).  As Natsios 
(2001, 177) observes, “even without flooding, North Korea would have entered the mid-1990s 
with a substantial food deficit.”   
The crisis was one of the worst famines in the 20
th
 century, with the most severe stages 
lasting from 1996 to 1997.  The DPRK famine was “the century’s fifth great totalitarian famine,” 
and ranked alongside the Soviet Ukraine (1930-1933), China (1958-1962), Ethiopia (1984-1985) 
and Cambodia (1975) (Natsios 2001, 49-54).  Ironically, the famine in the Ukraine under Stalin’s 
rule and severe food shortages from 1958-1962 during China’s “Great Leap Forward” period 
were the result of political choices and institutional failures, rather than natural disasters 
(Bernstein 1984).  Similar to the Kim regime, both Stalin and Mao relied on grain procurements 
and redistributions to deal with the crisis, which often exacerbated the shortages (Bernstein 1984, 
369-370).  This period, often referred to by North Koreans as the “Arduous March,”245 was 
undoubtedly the most traumatic period for the DPRK since the Korean War. 
4.c.2.  Structured Questions and Analysis 
I use the same set of structured questions introduced in the first case study in an effort to 
identify linkages and determine the influence of diversionary behavior.  These questions and my 
analysis of the case study results follow. 
 
Question 1.  What was the level of hostile foreign policy activities during this period? 
 
Compared to historic norms, overall hostility levels were low during this period.  Yet a 
number of significant events punctuated this conflict as North Korea pursued two primary, yet 
distinctive, foreign policy goals during the famine period.  The first goal was a sustained effort to 
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 Natsios (2001, 219) also notes that 60 percent of North Korea refugees surveyed from 1997-1999 
blamed the famine on the North Korean leaders, economic lapses, priority given to the military (only 25 percent 
blamed natural disasters).   
245
 This term harkens back to the “Arduous March” period of Kim Il Sung.  According to the DPRK 
Government (2001, 86-87), Kim Il Sung and the unit under his command (the 2
nd
 Directional Army) marched for 
100 days while being pursued by Japanese Army forces in southern Manchuria.  The DPRK Government (2001, 86) 
notes, “The KPRA [Korean People’s Revolutionary Army] had to continue its forced march and fight bloody battles 
against the enemy all the while, without properly eating, sleeping or resting in the face of the tenacious and 
persistent attacks of the enemy, biting cold and raging snow storms unprecedented for 100 years.”   
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gain international aid,
246
 something in which the DPRK had little experience, but quickly used to 
avoid economic and social collapse.  The second goal was the maintenance of North Korea’s 
stability through efforts to ensure the Kim regime and its supporters remained in power.  These 
two goals were often at odds with each other: the influx of international aid workers had the 
potentially destabilizing effect of exposing the secretive North Korean society to the 
international community (Smith 1999; Natsios 2001, 217-236).  Additionally, the DPRK’s 
pursuit of security objectives, which often resulted in hostile foreign policy actions, typically 
made the international community reluctant to provide aid.  Despite this, North Korea was able 
to obtain a continuous stream of aid throughout the crisis period
247
 while also engaging in a 
moderate number of hostile military and diplomatic activities.   
Figure 4.7 shows the levels of hostile foreign policy actions that occurred during the 
famine period.  In comparison to the average conflict levels during the 1960s, the severity of the 
hostile foreign policy incidents during the famine period were almost 50 percent lower.
248
   
 
Figure 4.7  Hostile Foreign Policy Activities 1990-2000 
  
Source:  Korean Conflict Database (Appendix C)  
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 This included humanitarian aid (food and medicine), energy aid (heavy fuel oil), developmental grants 
and loans, and a variety of other external assistance. 
247
 Between 1994 and 1999, the DPRK received over 3.7 million tons of food aid through the World Food 
Program and $370 million in fuel subsidies from KEDO (UN FAIS 2012 and KEDO 2001).  
248
 The HFP scores for the famine period averaged 601 per year while the first case study scores were 1222 
per year (Appendix C). 
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North Korea’s famine seemed to dampen the overall incidence of hostile foreign policy 
activities compared to the rest of the period examined in this study (Figure 4.7 above).  
Additionally, the only time that hostility levels reached the overall average level for the entire 
study period (shown by the dotted line in the chart) was during the Taepodong missile crisis 
period in 1998 (discussed below).  In fact, overall conflict intensity scores during this period 
were 18 percent lower than historical norms for the entire study period.
249
  Yet, significant 
incidents did occur, including efforts to develop nuclear weapons and long-range missile 
systems. 
The Nuclear Crisis.  The onset of the initial phase of the famine in the 1990s coincided 
with enhanced North Korean efforts to develop its nuclear capabilities.
250
  From a security 
standpoint, and in line with Kim’s concept of national self-reliance, obtaining nuclear weapons 
was a key priority for Pyongyang.
251
  The international community became concerned in 1993 as 
DPRK announced that it intended to withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).  
Subsequent negotiations with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the US and 
its allies also increased tensions on the peninsula and led to a number of military and diplomatic 
hostile actions by the DPRK.   
In the early 1990s, both the US and the international community began to pursue efforts 
to denuclearize the Korean peninsula in an effort to dissuade Pyongyang from developing 
nuclear weapons.  These efforts included the removal of all nuclear weapons from South Korea, 
offers to cease strategic-level ROK-US military exercises, and a US diplomatic exchange (the 
first since the Korean War) with the DPRK in New York in January 1992 (Mazarr 1995, 94-95).  
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 Conflict intensity scores during the famine period were 601 compared to 735 during the entire study 
period (1960-2011) (Appendix C). 
250
 North Korea’s nuclear energy program had been around since at least the mid-1950s, when the Soviets 
began providing technical support and in the 1960s, the USSR helped North Korea build its first reactor at 
Yongbyon (CIA 1982).  The program evolved into dedicated efforts to develop a nuclear bomb in the 1980s 
(Oberdorfer 2001, 252-254).   
251
 North Korea’s quest for nuclear weapons was not without reason as nuclear weapons had been present 
in South Korea and controlled by the US since 1958: balancing against this threat was an unfulfilled goal for the 
Kim regime (Yun 2005, 14-15).  These US weapons included the 280mm nuclear cannons and “Honest John” 
nuclear capable missiles manned by the US army and the addition (in 1959) of a US Air Force Matador cruise 
missile squadron (Jackson 2005, 65; Oberdorfer 2001, 257).  In 1977, Jimmy Carter (then a candidate for president) 
announced that the US had stationed over 700 of these weapons in the South (Oberdorfer 2001, 89).  The actual 
figure (683 weapons) from US government sources was very close to Carter’s statement.  North Korea’s acquisition 
of nuclear weapons provided the Kim regime a means to support its national goal of continued state sovereignty 
(Oberdorfer 2001, 89). 
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Although North Korea joined the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1985, it had declined to 
allow inspectors to visit is facilities, citing the presence of US nuclear weapons in the ROK 
(Spector 1992, 28).  When the US removed its nuclear weapons from the peninsula in 1992,
252
 
the Kim regime signed additional IAEA agreements but “continued to find excuses to delay and 
restrict inspection” (Nye 1992, 1295).  The following two years (1993 and 1994) were 
characterized by failed attempts to inspect the DPRK facilities, IAEA demands for more access, 
a restart of US-ROK military exercises, and threats by North Korea to withdraw from the NPT 
(Mazarr 1995, 95-96).
253
 
Former US President Jimmy Carter helped ease the mounting crisis by travelled to 
Pyongyang in June 1994 for negotiations and provided “what turned out to be a successful exit 
ramp to allow the North Koreans to give in to the substance of American demands” (Wit 2004, 
243).  In late 1994, North Korea agreed to halt its nuclear program in exchange for a number of 
international aid concessions, to include the delivery of annual fuel and food aid and 
developmental assistance to built two light water nuclear reactors in the DPRK (KEDO 2012).
254
   
The tentative agreements included a freeze on nuclear-related activities and agreeing to meet 
with South Korea in a North-South summit (Oberdorfer 2001, 332-335).  In return, North Korea 
received annual oil shipments and the promise of two light-water nuclear reactor power plants 
funded by the international community (KEDO 1994).  The groundwork was laid for future 
negotiations and tensions regarding nuclear concerns eased.  
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 President Bush directed the removal in November 1991 (CINCPAC 1991, 91). 
253
 This crisis has been well documented by scholars such as Wit (2004) and Oberdorfer (2001, 249-336), 
who both provide a detailed and useful account of the entire nuclear crisis period. 
254
 The “Agreed Framework” was the official agreement between North Korea and the United States that 
resulted.  This agreement was not a standard treaty (it was not ratified by the US Congress) but rather a formal set of 
pledges by both the US and North Korea intended to increase cooperation on the nuclear issue (Cha and Kang 2003, 
136; US State Department 1994).  Under the Framework, North Korea agreed to dismantle its graphite-moderated 
reactors, freeze its nuclear weapons program and remain part of the NPT, and allow IAEA inspectors to monitor its 
progress (Agreed Framework 1994).  The US pledged to provide a light water reactor “project” (which equated to 
two nuclear power generating reactors), 500,000 tons annually of heavy oil for energy use, normalization of political 
and economic ties, and assurances that it would not attack the DPRK with nuclear weapons (Agreed Framework 
1994).  While this agreement eventually broke down in 2002 and is now defunct, annual deliveries of heavy fuel oil 
did occur (over $400 million) between 1995 and 2002 (Manyin and Nikitin 2010, 2) and about one-third of the 
reactor project was completed (KEDO 2005, 6).  The Agreed Framework broke down in 2002 when the 
implementing organization (KEDO) suspended oil shipments and work on the nuclear plants.  This was in reaction 
to reports that North Korea had begun enriching uranium (essential for nuclear weapons production) in violation of 
the Framework agreements.  In early 2003, North Korea expelled IAEA inspectors, withdrew from the NPT, and 
resumed reprocessing activities at its Yongbyon nuclear facility (KEDO 2012 and Breen 2004, 38).  Throughout the 
famine period, the Agreed framework did provide two needed advantages to the DPRK:  a “free” source of energy 
supplies (heavy fuel oil shipments) and, just as importantly, decreased tensions with the US and its allies. 
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Infiltration Activities.  Yet other types of hostilities (such as reconnaissance and 
infiltration operations against South Korea) did occur, albeit at lower levels than during the 
1960s.
255
  North Korean special operations troops continued to conduct operations intended to 
both destabilize South Korea and gather intelligence information.
256
  South Korea and its allies 
detected many infiltration incidents occurred during the famine period, although North Korea 
sought to keep these out of the public’s view (Bermudez 1997, 159).257  North Korea’s 
infiltration activities supported the Kim regime through the acquisition of intelligence 
information and the conduct of destabilizing activities.  The North Koreans considered strategic 
reconnaissance and other special operations missions in South Korea as an essential part of the 
Kim regime’s overall security strategy to survive and eventually reunify the two Koreas (Hodge 
2003).
258
  These events routinely decreased during periods of relative peace and increased 
substantially when tensions rose on the peninsula. 
The most significant infiltration events during this period were primarily associated with 
naval activity beginning in 1995 and continued throughout the period.
259
  These included agent 
infiltrations via water near the Imjin River (north of Seoul) and near Cheju, a South Korean 
island just south of the peninsula (Bermudez 1997, 160; Fischer 2007, 12).
260
  These operations 
also included the 1996 grounding of a North Korean Sang-o class spy submarine on the East 
coast near Kangnung, South Korea on a mission to recover a three-person DPRK reconnaissance 
                                                 
255
 The average conflict intensity from 1960 to 1970 was twice as high as during the 1990s (Appendix C). 
256
 In the 1990s, these units were considered well-trained and capable of conducting a variety of clandestine 
missions deep into South Korea (MCIA 1997, 102-104; Martin 2006, 538-542).   
257
 In the late 1980s, infiltration operations into the ROK “decreased dramatically” based on high-level 
negotiations resulting in a 1992 agreement on non-aggression and reconciliation (Bermudez 1997, 159).  At the 
same time, the levels of hostile foreign policy activities, based on the nuclear issue and missile development and 
tests, were at significantly higher levels. 
258
 The DPRK’s special forces, which constituted fifteen percent of North Korea’s overall ground troop 
structure, were fully capable of conducting these types of operations and had constructed elaborate training facilities, 
such as an eight kilometer long underground mockup of Seoul for “reality training” (Chosun Ilbo 1994; Martin 
2006, 539; Yonhap News 1994a).  Refugees reported other training included kidnapping techniques, methods to 
destroy ships from within, ways to destroy telecommunications systems, and how to bomb institutions (Martin 2006, 
540). 
259
 North Korea often conducts infiltration operations against the ROK via sea routes, due to the porous 
nature of South Korea’s coastlines and detected activities in the 1990s were typical of previous patterns.   
260
 In the Imjin river incident, one agent escaped, the other was killed by ROK security forces; the two 
North Koreans who came in via Cheju island conducted operations for about two months before being detected in 
Puyo, South Korea (about 100 miles south of Seoul) with both agents being killed by ROK soldiers (Bermudez 
1997, 160 and Fischer 2007, 12). 
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team (Bermudez 1997, 163).
261
 During the following years, additional infiltration and spy 
incidents occurred, including DPRK agent operations in Seoul and other naval incidents.  In 
November 1997, South Korea’s Agency for National Security Planning (NSP) announced the 
detection of a spy ring involving a number of individuals including a professor at Seoul National 
University
262
 (Kristoff 1997c; Yonhap News 1997c).
263
  This was followed by another submarine 
incident in June 1998 which occurred when a Yugo-class mini-submarine was discovered 
grounded and entangled in fishing nets near Sokcho (approximately 40 kilometers south of the 
DMZ on South Korea’s east coast) (KBS 1998).264  In December 1998, the South Korean navy 
sank a DPRK infiltration vessel (semi-submersible high-speed boat) with at least 6 persons, all 
suspected of committing suicide prior to capture (Lee 1998).  Finally, in March 1999, North 
Korea’s spy efforts against Japan led to a naval clash between DPRK infiltration ships and “a 
small armada” of Japanese military vessels (Daily Telegraph 1999; Fischer 2007, 18).265  
Ironically, these incidents occurred while North Korea was desperately seeking international 
assistance.  Throughout the late-1990s, the Kim regime solicited food aid from the international 
community while concurrently continuing a program of aggressive hostile foreign policy 
targeting the ROK as described above.   
Missile Development and Testing.  Additionally, North Korea’s ongoing efforts to 
develop missile technology remained an ongoing concern for the international community.  
These missiles were a provocative aspect of North Korea’s overall military efforts because they 
provided the DPRK a long-range “first strike” and retaliatory capability.  From the Kim regime’s 
perspective, missiles provided a source of income as exportable weapons and increased its ability 
to use “asymmetric means” to balance against the military power of both South Korea and the 
                                                 
261
 After a local taxi driver spotted the submarine, localized chaos ensued as the South Korean military 
mobilized over 40,000 soldiers and chased DPRK agents who had left the vessel (Witter 1996; Fischer 2007, 13).  
The incident resulted in the deaths of all but one of the infiltrators and 17 South Korean (military and civilian) (Koh 
1997, 2).  After significant international pressure on North Korea, the Kim regime “expressed regret” over the 
incident, which negatively affected the DPRK’s ongoing efforts to obtain international aid (Bermudez 1997, 165; 
Myers 1996).  Bermudez (1997, 161-168) provides a detailed account of the incident focusing on the equipment and 
methods used by the DPRK special operations forces.  
262
 Seoul National University is generally considered South Korea’s most prestigious university. 
263
 One of the key missions of these agents was to “was to recruit leading members of South Korean society 
including scholars and politicians” (O 1997).  
264
 All nine crewmembers were found dead of apparent suicide (Oh 1999, 100). 
265
 This was the first time the Japanese had fired on naval vessels since World War II (Daily Telegraph, 
1999). 
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United States.
266
  Over the next few years, North Korea improved upon the Scud platform and 
began working on an advanced version capable of carrying a nuclear warhead, the Scud-D or 
No-dong that was test-launched in May 1993 and subsequently deployed throughout North 
Korea (Yomiuri Shimbun 1993; Kyodo News 1995).  Although US Patriot anti-missile systems 
had been deployed to South Korea in 1994 (Shin 1994), the longer range No-dong missile (up to 
1500 kilometers) resulted in protests from Tokyo and requests to also deploy the Patriot systems 
to Japan (Yomiuri Shimbun 1993).        
 After the No Dong missile tests and the 1994 Agreed Framework accords were 
concluded, North Korea’s missile program became a key issue for US diplomats (Michishita 
2010, 118-119).  Lower-level negotiations occurred throughout 1995, followed by official talks 
in April 1996, which were interrupted by preparations for an additional No-dong
267
 test in 1997, 
and then resumed in 1998 and again halted by another  pending missile launch that same year 
(Michishita 2010, 118-123).  This time, talks stalled due to North Korea’s most ambitious 
missile project to date:  the Taepodong-1 (Samore 2004a, 75).
268
  That same year, North Korea 
caused significant concern in the region as it test-launched the Taepodong-1 in a trajectory over 
Japan (eventually landing in the Pacific Ocean) (Nihon Keizai Shimbun 1998; Cumings 2005, 
502).  The Taepodong-1 system could range further than North Korea’s previous systems and 
potentially target all of South Korea and Japan and US forces stationed at those locations 
(Bermudez 2001, 276).    
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 North Korea’s ballistic missile efforts have been part of its overall defense program since the 1960s 
when the Soviet Union provided FROG (Free Rocket Over Ground) surface to surface missile systems (Yun 2004, 
122; Samore 2004a, 63).
266
  In the late 1960s, the USSR refused to provide upgrades or additional assistance for the 
program and the Kim regime turned to China for cooperation and assistance, establishing an extensive set of 
technology and exchange agreements (Bermudez 2001, 239).
266
  In the 1970s, North Korea pursued its own 
program, spurred by South Korean efforts to develop its own short-range surface-to-surface missiles (Pinkston 2008, 
15; Bermudez 2001, 240).
266
  In 1976, while China and the Soviets declined to sell newer systems to North Korea, 
the Kim regime arranged to procure Scud-B (short range ballistic missiles) from Egypt, which had acquired these 
from the Soviets (Worden 2008, 257-258).  North Korea reverse-engineered these systems, renaming them as 
“Hwasong-5” missiles and conducted their first test launches in 1984 (Yun 2004, 124-125).266  For more information 
on North Korea’s ballistic missile program and its relationship to the Kim regime’s foreign policy and security 
goals, see Bermudez (1999), Bermudez (2001, 236-291), and Michishita (2009, 117-137). 
267
 The North Koreans canceled this launch as part of the negotiations process (Michishita 2009, 119). 
268
 The Taepodong-1 system had been in production at the same time as the No dong missiles and provided 
the DPRK an intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) that was nuclear payload-capable and could range up to 
1,500 kilometers (Worden 1999, 258).  Concurrently, the Taepodong-2 was also being developed as an ICBM (inter-
continental ballistic missile) with a range of up to 12,000 kilometers, which was long enough to target the United 
States (Worden 2009, 258; Bermudez 2001, 276).  
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In 1999, the US government determined that both the nuclear and missile technology 
capabilities of the North Koreans threatened the stability of the region and pursued intense 
diplomatic discussions to secure agreements with the Kim regime to curtail both efforts in 
exchange for international aid (Perry 1999; Cumings 2005, 502-503).  After further negotiations 
and after preparing to test launch the longer-range Taepodong-2,
269
 North Korea announced in 
September 1999 that it would freeze missile development and testing (Michishita 123-125).
270
    
Naval Clash.  Another significant hostile foreign policy was a nine-day naval battle in 
June 1999 in which North Korean ships confronted and engaged ROK vessels along the Northern 
Limit Line (NLL) (Fischer 2007, 18-19; Van Dyke 2003).  The incident, often referred to as the 
“First Battle of Yeonpyeong,”271 occurred along the disputed NLL272 in the waters just to the 
west of the Koreas.  The naval engagements began in early June 1999 when North Korea started 
to aggressively enforce the 12 nm boundary claimed by the DPRK (KCNA 1999b; ICG 2010, 6).  
The incident culminated with an exchange of fire that left up to 30 DPRK sailors dead, one North 
Korea torpedo boat destroyed (with four others damaged), five ROK vessels damaged, and nine 
South Korean sailors wounded (Van Dyke 2003, 143; Whymant and Watts, 1999).
273
   
 While the level of hostile foreign policy during this period was significantly lower than 
during the other two case studies, significant events did occur.  Many of these were based on 
Kim regime efforts to increase political stability, and some (such as the nuclear program and 
missile launches) were directly tied to Kim regime efforts to divert public attention while 
concurrently seeking international food and energy aid.  I discuss these linkages further in the 
sections below. 
 
                                                 
269
 Michishita (2009, 132) notes that “in terms of missile range and capabilities, the No Dong was designed 
for use against Japan and the Taepo Dong, or more specifically, the Taepodong-2 was designed for use against the 
United States.” 
270
 This lasted through the end of the famine period and was reaffirmed by North Korea in 2001 (Worden 
2009, 258). 
271
 This was the first of two significant naval engagements between the ROK and DPRK in the region 
between 1999 and 2002.  The second clash occurred in June 2002 when DPRK boats and opened fire on South 
Korean vessels near the NLL resulting in the deaths of six South Korean sailors, the sinking of a ROK speed boat 
and severe damage to a North Korean ship (CSIS 2010). 
272
 The NLL is the maritime extension of the Military Demarcation Line (MDL), which is the official 
boundary between North and South Korea.  On both the north and south side of the MDL there is a 2 km buffer zone 
(or DMZ) that is the land-based separation zone between the DPRK and ROK.   
273
 Appendix F includes a map of the West (Yellow) Sea area.   
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Question 2.  Was political instability associated with heightened HFP activities?  (Hypothesis 1)  
 
Direct links between instability and external HFP actions were difficult to identify.  But, 
there was a significant level of political turmoil during this period as the DPRK faced a 
leadership power transition from Kim Il-Sung (father) to Kim Jong-il (son).  In fact, in 1994 
when the DPRK power transition occurred, there was a marked decrease in North Korean hostile 
foreign policy activities in contrast to the argument proposed by H1 (see Appendix C).   
On 8 July 1994, Kim Il-sung
274
 died of an apparent heart attack after an on-the-spot 
inspection to a collective farm (Oberdorfer 2001, 339).
275
  As Natsios (2001, 127) observes, “In 
any country, the death of the sitting head of state would be disruptive and perhaps destabilizing; 
in North Korea, given the cult of personality surrounding the Great Leader, it was an apocalyptic 
event [author emphasis].”276  Kim’s death was a national shock to the North Koreans, who had 
depended on his regime for over four decades, and resulted in a national outpouring of grief, both 
genuine and instigated by the government (Lintner 2005, 84).  The official period of mourning 
lasted three years (Suh 1998, 13).  Although the younger Kim had been groomed to succeed his 
father and the international community was well aware of the regime’s plans for power 
transition, the Great Leader’s death was seen as a threat to both the peace process and political 
stability in the DPRK (Wit 2004, 257).
277
  Yet, due to the careful preparation and the strong 
Stalinist institutions in North Korea, the succession from father to son brought few structural 
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 Kim Il-sung was the founding father of the North Korean state, appointed and sponsored by the Soviets 
during their post-WWII occupation of the DPRK.  After spending the 1930s as a communist guerilla fighter against 
the Japanese in Manchuria and much of the 1940s training in Soviet camps, Kim returned to Korea in September 
1945 to a hero’s welcome (Eckert and Lee 1990, 341).  Kim was instrumental in the early formation of the DPRK 
and by early 1948, after a purge of older communists, he established firm control of the North Korean Workers Party 
(Buzo 2002, 56).  In September 1948, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea announced itself as an 
independent nation, with Kim Il-sung as its leader.  Kim led North Korea for over 45 years:  through war with the 
South and rebuilding (supported by both the Soviets and the PRC); challenges to his authority in the late 1950s; 
industrial and social achievements and an “undeclared war” with South Korea and the US in the 1960s; limited 
reconciliation with the ROK in the 1970s; and the beginnings of economic stagnation in the 1980s. 
275
 While there was some suspicion of foul play because of the timing of the elder Kim’s death (which 
occurred just prior to the next round of negotiations), the US and South Korean governments concluded that there 
was no credible evidence of extraordinary circumstances (Wit 2004, 256). 
276
 The term “Great Leader” is an honorific phrase referring to Kim Il-sung.  Kim Jong-il was often referred 
to as the “Dear Leader” by the North Korean public. 
277
 In fact, South Korea took a much harder line towards North Korea in the wake of the elder Kim’s death, 
including forbidding ROK citizens from attending the funeral in Pyongyang, crackdowns on student dissidents, and 
the release of archival documents “proving beyond a shadow of a doubt the Great Leader’s responsibility for starting 
the Korean War” (Wit 2004, 261).   
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changes to the DPRK.
278
  Kim Jong-il sought to continue his father’s legacy and the “essential 
structure of North Korea’s self- proclaimed ‘Juche system’ is being preserved much as it has existed 
for nearly half a century” (Quinones 2003, 13).  The intent of the Kim Jong-il regime was a 
continuation of previous economic and political policies, despite inherent flaws and 
shortcomings.        
Although a tremendous outpouring of grief occurred following the death of Kim Il-sung, 
the reaction of most North Koreans to the onset of the famine and reductions in government 
rations was muted.
279
  Protests did occur, but they were uncoordinated and resulted in severe 
government responses.  North Korea has “no institutions capable of channeling mass discontent 
into effective political action” (Noland 1997, 106).  The penalties in North Korea for protesting 
government actions or violating government policies were harsh and often resulted in individuals 
and their families being sent to prison camps or executed depending on the violations.
280
  
Additionally, the social characteristics of collectivist-family oriented societies, such as North 
Korea, often limits actions that stray outside of the norms of expected conduct (Triandis 2001).  
Thus, the North Koreans were limited in their responses social distress due to both institutional 
(societal) and cultural constraints.  Yet, the famine period was an unprecedented situation for the 
North Koreans and there were sporadic reports of riots and other actions during the famine 
period.
281
  Table 4.3 below lists reported incidents in the 1990s. 
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 Beginning in 1971, Kim’s son was promoted through positions of increasing power in the KWP and in 
September 1973, Kim Jong-il was “formally anointed as his father’s successor” during a secret KWP politburo 
meeting (Savada 1994, 169 and Oh 1988, 6).  Although most of Kim Il-sung's faction supported the choice of the 
younger Kim to succeed the "Great Leader,” there were some who considered the “monarchist” transition of DPRK 
power as inappropriate and there were obvious questions of the younger Kim’s credibility (Cha and Sohn 2012, 49).  
Kim Jong-il did attempt to establish his bona fides as a capable “revolutionary” successor.  Kim was reported to 
have engineered a number of hostile incidents, including the 1974 poplar tree (“Axe Murder”) incident in which two 
US officers were killed by North Koreans during a tree-trimming dispute along the DMZ; an assassination attempt 
against the South Korean president during a visit to Canada in 1983; another presidential assassination attempt in 
1983 in  Rangoon in which a bomb killed 17 senior ROK officials; the 1986 bombing of South Korea’s Kimpo 
airport; and the downing of Korean Airlines flight 857 in which 115 passengers and crew died after North Korean 
agents planted a bomb on the flight (Becker 2005, 154-155).   
279
 The food distribution system (the PDS), which had existed for decades, faltered and in some areas 
stopped completely, resulting in a cessation of government-supplied food rations (Lee 2005, 6-11). 
280
 Defector testimony is the primary source of information on North Korea’s police and penal system.  See 
Haggard and Noland (2007, 81-99), Hassig and Oh (2009, 195-215), Martin (2006, 290-304) and Kang and Rigoulet 
(2001). 
281
 Riots and protests during the famine period were significantly higher than during the other two cases.  
During the 1960s, there were no significant instances found and the only significant protests during the 2000s were 
associated with the DPRK’s 2009 currency reform (KINU 2011b, 542).   
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Table 4.3  Riots and Coup Attempts (1992-1999)  
July 1992 
Riots occurred in several North Korean cities over monetary policy 
adjustments and food availability (Kyodo News 1992). 
August 1992 
North Korea reportedly executed 18 military officers, including 
generals, involved in a coup attempt against Kim Il-sung and Kim 
Jong-il (The Age 1993; Lim 1993). 
March 1993 
DPRK State Security Department detected and prevented a coup 
attempt by officers of the KPA’s 7th Infantry Division (Bermudez 
1997, 158). 
April 1993 
Large scale riots associated with food shortages and unrest occurred 
in Sinuiju near the Yalu River estuary involving 40,000 individuals.  
Approximately 30,000 North Korean troops suppressed the riots, 
making 3,000 arrests. (Cho 1993; KBS Radio 1993; Chon 1993). 
Autumn 1995 
The Korean People’s Army’s (KPA) 6th Corps (Hamhung Province) 
was purged and reorganized “under circumstances suggesting disarray 
in the ranks” (Oberdofer 1997, 375).  Reports surfaced that the 6th 
Corps had been planning a coup (Natsios 2001, 217). 
February 1996 
Approximately 200 students protested in Chonjin over food 
embezzlement by party cadres (No and Choe 1996). 
March 1996 
In Yanggang Province, 800 North Korean forestry workers missed 
work in protest of the suspension of food rations.  (Chungang Ilbo 
1996a). 
October 1996 
At least 200 North Korean soldiers from the KPA 6th Corps in Najin-
Sonbong (North Hamhung Province) participated in a “massive riot” 
over food rations and labor conditions.  The North Koreans execute 
approximately 120 soldiers as a result (Chungang Ilbo 1996b). 
March 1999 
Statues of Kim Il-sung are vandalized throughout North Korea (Korea 
Times 1999a).
282
 
October 1999 
Riots occurred in coal mining areas near Onsong, North Hamgyong 
province.  These were suppressed by a North Korean “special 
espionage unit” (Chi 1999). 
 
The 1992 coup attempt was, at least on the surface, the most serious challenge to the Kim 
regime.  Defectors reported that in September 1992, a group of DPRK generals planned to use 
their troops to occupy key government buildings in Pyongyang and arrest both Kim Il-sung and 
Kim Jong-il.  The plot failed when one of the officers informed regime authorities (The Age 
1993; Lim 1993).  Other rumors also surfaced of localized food riots (Snyder 2000, 528), 
although the numbers are unknown.  Yet these occurrences in North Korea (ten incidents 
between 1992 and 1999) are low in comparison to the number strikes and protests that occur in 
South Korea each year, which can number in the hundreds.
283
  Food riots and other forms of 
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 While these events might be considered instances of petty crime in most states, this type of activity 
rarely occurs and indicated growing public dissatisfaction with the Kim regime.  Pictures and statues of both Kim Il-
sung and Kim Jong-il are considered “the very embodiment of those leaders, beyond mere art, and are treated 
accordingly” and disrespect or defamation usually incurs severe penalties or imprisonment (Korea Times 1999). 
283
 This observation is based on the author’s experience while living in South Korea. 
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protest certainly occurred in North Korea, but not at levels that seriously challenged the overall 
ability of the Kim regime to remain in power:  the governmental apparatus was too strong and 
North Korea’s civil society was much too weak (Bennett 1994, 4).284  The average North Korean 
most likely focused on basic survival during the famine, rather than efforts to challenge the Kim 
regime (Cha 2004).  Thus during this period, the Kim regime retained enough control over North 
Korean society to ensure the DPRK government remained intact and politically stable.  While 
the Kim regime might have used hostile foreign policy to distract the public’s attention, there 
was no evidence of an increase in HFP due to political instability. 
 
Question 3.  Were economic difficulties associated with increased HFP?  (Hypothesis 2) 
 
There is some evidence of a link between North Korea’s economic difficulties and its 
hostile foreign policy activities as proposed in H2.  The DPRK used its nuclear program to both 
threaten the international community and seek external aid and concessions.  For example, North 
Korea’s announcement that it intended to withdraw from the NPT in 1993 and declaration of its 
intent (in a crisis) to use nuclear weapons against Seoul in 1994
285
 both occurred at the beginning 
of the famine period.  For the DPRK, the limits of its centrally controlled economy became 
painfully apparent as North Korea’s emphasis on “self-reliance,” failure to trade with the 
international community, “promotion of state-owned heavy industries,” disproportional emphasis 
on defense spending, and weather conditions all served to cause severe economic stress (Nanto 
2008, 6).   
Despite the emergence of increased economic ties with South Korea in the 1990s (and 
just prior to the famine period), the DPRK economy was characterized by significant trade 
deficits with its neighbors.  Between 1990 and 1991, North Korea’s total trade decreased 44% 
from $4.7 billion to $2.6 billion (Nozoe 1997, 26).  North Korea’s most significant trading 
partner through 1990 remained the USSR (56% of total trade) followed by China (11%); after 
the fall of the Soviet Union, DPRK-China trade increased to approximately 25-30% of total trade 
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 North Korea’s overall reaction to the famine situation was fundamentally different than other societies.  
Bennett (1994, 4) compared reactions in Africa to famine to those of North Korea and observes, “In contrast to 
famine in Africa, where state disintegration and a weakening of civil society are often the norm, North Korea is 
characterized by stability, centrality and civil order. Social control permeates all aspects of society; there is no ‘civil 
society’ association which is not state run, and information is closely guarded. The current [DPRK] humanitarian 
crisis has emerged in a fully mature Stalinist polity in which the notion of ‘humanitarian space’ is alien.” 
285
 The threat, issued in 1994 by a DPRK diplomat, was intended to demonstrate the DPRK’s ability to use 
nuclear weapons against the ROK (Financial Times 1994). 
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(Nozoe 1997, 26), yet the overall level of North Korean trade was substantially lower than in 
previous years. 
 Thus by the early 1990s, North Korea’s economy was in severe trouble and the loss of 
Soviet support coupled with changes in its relationship with China demonstrated the inherent 
weaknesses in the DPRK’s economic system.  North Korea’s industrial capacity faltered because 
of the loss of economic support and trade after the “demise of the Soviet Union, and a 
subsequent collapse in the energy regime necessary to sustain industry” (Woo-Cumings 2002, 
21).  At the beginning of the famine period GDP levels plunged, shrinking an average of 13 
percent each year between 1992 and 1997 (Maddison 2008).  Figure 4.8 below shows the historic 
levels of North Korea’s GDP. 
  
      Figure 4.8  North Korea GDP Change (year on year)    
 
        Maddison 2008  
 
 Figure 4.8 shows exactly how dire the economic circumstances were during the famine 
years.  The contraction of the DPRK’s economy had resounding effects throughout North Korean 
society and the Kim regime sought alternate means to obtain needed international aid.  As a 
result, North Korea also made efforts to enhance its missile capabilities, and a number of 
launches and tests occurred during beginning in 1996, during the worst years of the famine.  The 
missile launches (especially the Taepodong) came at a time when North Korea was suffering 
from the effects of both the famine and economic catastrophe.  The DPRK used its missile 
program as part of the aid negotiation process, eventually agreeing to a test ban in exchange for 
international support (Michishita 123-125).  These events were diversionary in nature and served 
to provide a means for the DPRK to obtain external assistance.  North Korea’s official news 
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announcement (KCNA 1998d) demonstrated the domestic perceptions Pyongyang hoped to 
reinforce by stating that the DPRK had “set up a new milestone in the building of a strong and 
prosperous socialist country…[signifying]… the strength of the DPRK, independent in politics, 
self-sufficient in the economy and self-reliant in national defense.”  The missile development 
program and launches served multiple purposes, primarily focused on forcing external states to 
provide needed economic support and maintaining an air of tension between the Koreas to 
support that end.   
Yet, despite the presence of diversionary-type behaviors, a comparison of the level of 
economic difficulties (which were high) and the overall level of HFP activities does not provide 
support to H2 and P1.  The severe economic distress experienced by North Korea should have 
spurred high levels of conflict actions (based on the diversionary hypothesis and the 
operationalization of P1).  Conflict actions did occur during this period, but they did not occur in 
the manner predicted by P1 and were more focused on efforts to secure aid for the regime.  
 
Question 4.  Was social instability associated with periods of increased HFP?  (Hypothesis 3) 
 
Social instability, caused by the lack of food and incidence of starvation, was extremely 
high throughout the famine period, yet there was not a corresponding increase (compared to 
historic averages) in overall hostile foreign policy activity levels, as diversionary theory would 
suggest.  In the previous section on economic stability, I note that the nuclear program and 
missile tests occurred at both the beginning and peak of the famine.  In the case of social 
instability, present throughout the entire case study period, the linkage between specific 
conditions, such as food shortages and rising mortality rates, and heightened levels of HFP 
actions were much more difficult to detect.   
Food shortages were rampant in certain parts of the country, and access to sustenance 
often depended upon party affiliation and geographic location.  During the famine, members of 
North Korea’s “core class” (who were loyal supporters) and Pyongyang residents fared much 
better compared to the “hostile class” (under suspicion by the DPRK government) and those who 
lived in the urbanized areas of the eastern provinces (Cumings 2005, 443; Hassig and Oh 2009, 
203; and Haggard and Noland 2007, 51-52).
286
  Visitors to Pyongyang saw few indications of the 
chaos that existed in the countryside (Yonhap 1996c), especially the northeastern area, which 
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 For a discussion on North Korea’s political “caste” system, see Hassig and Oh (2009, 198-204). 
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was the first to lose food shipments from the PDS in 1993 (Natsios 1999, 105).
287
  Yet this was 
not initially apparent to aid workers, whose movements were carefully monitored and controlled 
by the North Korean authorities, often being shown extreme cases of famine in some areas and 
barred entry to others (Haggard and Noland 2007, 89).  
Prior to 1995, North Korea did not receive international aid from the UN and other 
donors in a formalized method, although China and the Soviets habitually provided commodities 
at “favorable” prices.  Beginning in 1995, North Korea obtained massive amounts of public and 
private international assistance (Haggard and Noland 2011a, 55).  Figure 4.9 below shows the 
levels and donor distribution of international food assistance recorded by the UN World Food 
Program between 1995 and 2000. 
 
Figure 4.9  International Food Aid to North Korea (1995-2000) 
International Food Aid to North Korea 1995-2000
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International Food Aid to North Korea by Country 
1995-2000
EU 9%
ROK 13%
Japan 14%
China 18%
USA 28%
Other 18%
 
                           UN FAIS 2012                  UN FAIS 2012    
 
 As shown in Figure 4.9, food aid to North Korea generally increased throughout the 
famine period and between 1995 and 2000, with four nations (the US, China, Japan, and ROK) 
providing 73% of the total aid (UN FAIS 2012).  Despite the increasing levels of aid, North 
Korea continued to pursue its missile development programs and hostile foreign policy activities, 
albeit at levels lower than historic norms (see Appendix C).    
Child mortality rates, another indicator of social distress, increased significantly during 
the crisis and were 170 percent higher in 1996 than in 1990 (UN IGME 2012).  Changes in 
longevity information also demonstrated the severity of the crisis.  A child born in 1991 in North 
Korea could expect to live to age 70 (which is comparative to most modern states) while a child 
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 Natsios (2000, 105-106) argues that North Korea’s northeastern provinces were “triaged” (denied aid) 
by the Kim regime to ensure adequate food was available in Pyongyang.   
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born just 5 years later could only expect to live to age 64 (World dataBank 2012; Goodkind and 
West 2001, 226).  Additionally, the effects of malnutrition were widespread.  World Food 
Program survey data including almost 4,000 children in 1997 indicated 16.5% were “wasted” 
(underweight for their height) and 38.2% were “stunted” (not tall enough for their age), both of 
which are signs of chronic malnutrition (Katona-Apte and Mokdad 1998, 1317).  Figure 4.10 
shows child mortality rates on the Korean peninsula during the crisis. 
 
        Figure 4.10  Child Mortality Rates Compared   
 
Source:  UN Inter-agency Group for Child Mortality Estimation (IGME) (2012) 
 
Other surveys confirmed long-term effects of North Korea’s lack of food.  For example, 
In 1997-1998, the average DPRK seven-year-old was 22 pounds lighter and 8 inches shorter than 
children who were the same age in South Korea (Eberstadt 2000, 875-876).  While these 
domestic conditions demonstrated that North Korean social structures were under significant 
stress, none of these conditions seriously challenged the Kim regime.  In fact, at least one 
assessment (Kaufman 2010) indicated that overall societal stability actually increased during this 
period.
288
  This was possibly due to factors such as the citizens’ focus on obtaining the basic 
needs for survival, the ability of the Kim regime to maintain the support of the military and the 
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 Kaufman’s (2010) World Governance Indicators assessment of North Korea between 1996 and 2000 
actually showed an increasing level of political stability during the famine period.     
139 
 
international aid, and the control exercised by the DPRK government over its people.
289
  Overall, 
despite the shock of famine and its effects, North Korean society “muddled through”290 and the 
regime remained under stress but intact.     
As with food shortages, evidence of instances of direct linkages between social instability 
and hostile foreign policy are difficult to determine.  The social effects of the crisis undoubtedly 
affected the Kim regime’s choices to engage in HFP activities, and the North Korean leaders did 
pursue diversionary activities during this period (as discussed at the end of this section).  Thus 
while direct evidence of increased HFP due to domestic distress was limited, the social crisis 
caused by the famine probably resulted in some hostile actions by the Kim regime in efforts to 
force international concessions.   
 
Question 5.  Were UN resolutions against the DPRK associated with increased HFP?  
(Hypothesis 4) 
 
The sole UN Security Council resolution enacted on North Korea just prior to this case 
study had little to do with hostile foreign policy activity levels.  When North Korea announced 
its withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in March 1993, the UN responded with 
Security Council Resolution 825, which rebuked the DPRK and called for it to return to the NPT 
(UN 1993; Lee and Choi 2009, 29).
291
  Political rhetoric dominated hostile foreign policy events 
during that period and these incidents were at levels consistent with previous periods (Appendix 
C).  Thus, I find that the UN Security Council resolutions were unrelated to DPRK activities 
during this period.   
However, other sanctions imposed unilaterally by the US and other states
292
 did seem to 
affect DPRK activities and the Kim regime’s attempt blame its difficulties on the international 
community.  The United States has a long history of enacting sanctions against the Kim regime, 
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 As Oh and Hassig (2000, 145) notes, “Arguably, no government in the twentieth century has succeeded 
in exercising as much control over its people as has the Kim government.” 
290
 Many authors (Noland 1997; Cha 2004; Eberstadt 1993) have used this phrase to describe North Korea’s 
ability, despite all odds, to survive both economic and social crises intact. 
291
 There were no other UN Security Council Resolutions enacted on North Korea until the mid-2000s. 
292
 International community responses to North Korean provocative actions ranged from strongly worded 
denouncements to economic sanctions.  Sanctions are defined as “deliberate, government-inspired withdrawal, or 
threat of withdrawal, of customary trade or financial relations” (Hufbauer 1990, 2).  Despite the debate on the 
effectiveness of sanctions regimes (Hufbauer 1990), these have become common foreign policy responses to North 
Korea’s actions.  For states concerned about DPRK activities, sanctions provided a diplomatic option with little risk 
(compared to more violent, armed solutions) and gave policymakers the satisfaction that at the very least, 
“something was being done” in response to North Korean activity. 
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dating back to 1950, based on the DPRK’s actions as a communist government and other 
perceived threats to US security.  During the famine period, at least 17 US sanctions were in 
place including limits on almost all types of economic interaction.  This had the overall effect of 
minimizing US trade and foreign aid to the DPRK (except for humanitarian aid approved by US 
leaders), and blockage of any arms transfers or sales (Rennack 2011).  Additionally, the US froze 
assets for certain DPRK businesses and individuals associated with missile technology and 
weapons transfers (Rennack 2011, 21-22).  South Korea and Japan also imposed limitations on 
economic contact, often based on hostile foreign policy actions, such as the 1998 Taepodong-1 
missile launch over Japan (Fischer 2007, 17; Lee and Choi 2009).   
North Korea’s reactions to sanctions and the UN resolution followed previous diplomatic 
patterns:  forceful denouncements and rhetorical public statements by the Kim regime, followed 
by protests and threats.  In fact, the DPRK called the Security Council action a “declaration of 
war” (AFP 1993a).  This allowed the Kim regime to generate an external threat, which was “a 
classic tool for suppressing dissent, demanding sacrifices, and consolidating power” (Wit 2004, 
37).
293
  North Korea was persuaded back to the negotiating table in June 1993, followed by a 
year’s worth of negotiations and the Agreed Framework accords in October 1994.  Other 
linkages between US sanctions, most of which were in place long before the 1990s (USITC 
1998), were not evident on the surface, but they certainly sustained the levels of hostility 
between the US and the DPRK (KCNA 1995a; KCNA 1996a; KCNA 1996b).  Thus while UN 
resolutions were not directly linked to increases in North Korean HFP activities, the ongoing US 
unilateral sanctions allowed the Kim regime to continue to blame external actors (such as the 
US) for its internal distress.   
 
Question 6.  Were ROK leadership changes associated with increased North Korean hostile 
foreign policy activities?  (Hypothesis 5) 
 
In examining ROK national election periods, I find that North Korea increased HPF 
activities during these South Korean presidential elections.  For the ROK, South Korean politics 
were still emerging from a legacy of authoritarian rule during this period.
294
  In fact, South Korea 
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 Wit (2004) provides a detailed account of the crisis and negotiations from a US diplomat’s vantage 
point. 
294
 After a history of authoritarian rule and public dissatisfaction, South Korea’s government revised its 
constitution in 1987 to allow for direct democratic elections.  In 1987, Roh Tae-woo was the first democratically 
elected South Korean leader followed by Kim Young-sam’s election in 1993 which solidified the democratic 
141 
 
staged its second-ever modern democratic election in 1992 and Kim Young-sam emerged as the 
first non-military head of state in over 30 years.  This was followed by continued democratic 
elections of civilians beginning with the 1997 election of Kim Dae-jung who took office in 1998.   
Kim Young-sam’s 1992 campaign elicited negative responses from North Korea, 
including a “freezing of relations” in November 1992 ahead of the national elections in 
December (Lee 1992).  During this same time, negotiations were ongoing in an effort to establish 
an  “inter-Korean treaty” but were halted due to a number of key events.  These included North 
Korean protests against  pending ROK-US military exercises (the most significant being “TEAM 
SPIRIT”), Seoul’s discovery of a large underground DPRK spy ring,295 and the ongoing tensions 
associated with North Korea’s nuclear efforts (Lee 1992).  The spy scandal along with 
allegations that North Korea instructed its operatives in South Korea to vote for Kim Young-
sam’s opponent (former dissident Kim Dae-jung)296 and that the DPRK had used its “its 
propaganda machine” to influence the election, might have tipped the balance in conservative 
Kim Young-sam’s favor (Lee 1992; Breen 1992).  When Kim Young-sam was elected with 41 
percent of the popular vote (versus Kim Dae-jung’s 33 percent), North Korea denounced the 
elections and accused the US of manipulating the election (Lee 1992).  Additionally, hostile 
foreign policy activities during early 1993 (when Kim Young-sam assumed office) were at 
higher levels than the adjacent time periods (before and after), but they were at levels lower than 
historic norms (see Appendix C).  Thus, there was an indentified relationship between the ROK 
election and DPRK hostile activities in support of H5. 
South Korea’s next presidential campaign occurred in 1997, when former dissident Kim 
Dae-jung faced the incumbent party led by establishment candidate and former Prime Minister 
Lee Hoi Chang.
297
  During the previous presidential campaign, North Korea allegedly supported 
Kim Dae-jung (Lee 1992; Breen 1992) and again used public statements to criticize the ruling 
                                                                                                                                                             
electoral process for the ROK.  See Eckert (1990, 379-387) and Cumings (2005, 342-403) for more detailed 
information.   
295
 South Korea discovered a 400-member North Korean spy ring in Seoul which had been establishing a 
command and control center for covert operations in the South (Fischer 2007, 11; Breen 1992).   
296
 Kim Dae-jung had a long history of conflict with the South Korean political establishment and was a 
presidential challenger to longtime authoritarian ruler Park Chung Hee in 1971.  Park had intelligence operatives in 
Tokyo kidnap Kim in 1973 and Kim remained either in prison or under house arrest until 1978 (Oberdorfer 1997, 
126; Eckert 1990, 364-372).   
297
 Kim Young-sam had resigned from the ruling party and declared that he was “neutral” in the election 
(Sullivan 1997).  South Korean law limits each president to a single five-year term limit.  
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party and sitting President Kim Young-sam (KCNA 1997).
298
  At this time, the North Korean 
famine was at its worst and South Korea was struggling through the Asian financial crisis in 
efforts to comply with International Monetary Fund (IMF) lending requirements.
299
  Aside from 
North Korean rhetoric criticizing the sitting ROK government and media outlets the DPRK had 
little say about the election.
300
  Yet during the 1997 elections, North Korea’s tendency for 
provocative actions was most likely dampened because of the undecided South Korean 
presidential election and the DPRK’s crucial need for humanitarian aid.  In December 1997, Kim 
Dae-jung was declared the winner with 40 percent of the popular vote.  The Kim regime’s 
response was positive as it officially “expressed hopes for improved relations with South Korea 
under President-elect Kim Dae-Jung” (Japan Economic Newswire 1997).   
DPRK actions in 1992 were a visible, but ultimately unfruitful, attempt to influence 
elections in its favor.  North Korea’s HFP activities in 1997, although at a lower level than 
during the 1992 elections (see Figure 4.7), were also indicative of its intent to influence the 
South Korean presidential election.  North Korea’s actions provide support to the idea that North 
Korea increased (or intended to increase) its HFP activities in conjunction with ROK leadership 
changes.    
 
Question 7.  Were US leadership changes associated with increased North Korean hostile 
foreign policy activities?  (Hypothesis 6) 
 
US presidential elections during the North Korean famine period occurred in 1996, with 
Bill Clinton seeking to retain his incumbent status as president.  North Korea’s hostility levels 
during the campaign and in the quarter afterwards were at consistent levels demonstrating no 
relationship to this US leadership change.  Two years prior to the election, the Clinton 
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 North Korea focused its propaganda attacks on the Kim Young-sam government, who spent much of 
1997 responding to accusations of accused of a number of corruption scandals and was blamed for South Korea’s 
financial crisis (Kristof 1997b). 
299
 The Asian financial crisis, which lasted from May 1997 to around February 1998, was triggered by a 
loss of confidence by international investors in Asian currencies and stocks (Nanto 1998).  In October 1997, the 
South Korean won dropped significantly and Seoul applied for International Monetary Fund (IMF) assistance, 
eventually receiving $57 billion in bailout support.  Throughout 1997, South Korean government officials were 
reluctant to provide additional funds to alleviate the famine while the ROK itself was experiencing its own domestic 
crisis and receiving financial aid from the IMF (Korea Times 1998a).  For a useful review of the crisis and its effects 
on Korea and the region, see Nanto (1998), Yoo (1999), and Noland (2000, 195-250). 
300
 North Korea publically threatened a number of South Korean media organizations for publishing first-
hand accounts of incidents ranging from the relationship between Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il to the daily lives of 
North Korean citizens (Fischer 2007, 14-15; DPRK 1997). 
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administration successfully weathered a nuclear crisis with North Korea and signed the Agreed 
Framework, which provided heavy fuel oil shipments to the DPRK (Manyin and Nikitin 2010, 
2).  During Clinton’s campaign, famine in North Korea was well underway after crop losses 
partially due to monsoon flooding in July and August 1995 and early 1996.  In response, the 
Clinton administration took a number of steps to both support North Korea and to ease tensions, 
namely the unilateral provision of $2 million and removal of North Korea from the US “terrorist 
states” list.  While the Clinton administration stated that these actions were intended to support 
continued DPRK participation in the Agreed Framework, South Korean media charged that these 
efforts were intended to avoid conflict with the DPRK prior to the US elections in November of 
1996 (Yu 1996; Hanguk Ilbo 1996).  North Korea’s public rhetoric was relatively quiet during 
this period, refraining from criticizing either the South Korean or US leadership (Kim K.1996). 
While there was no evidence that North Korea actively supported the reelection of Bill 
Clinton, the alternative, conservative Robert Dole, publically took a more hawkish stance 
towards North Korea than the Clinton administration.  The DPRK indirectly criticized Dole, 
stating, “Amidst [sic] presidential election campaign in the United States, some forces are trying 
to improve their image by slandering the DPRK” (AFP 1996).  Clinton’s reelection was much 
more conducive to North Korean goals of continued aid and support from the West.  
Pyongyang’s government radio station briefly acknowledged Clinton’s reelection win in 
November 1996 by simply stating, “Analysts feel that even though Clinton has been reelected, he 
will be faced with grave challenges in domestic and foreign affairs” (DPRK 1996a).  
Considering their history of diplomatic pronouncements condemning the US and its actions, this 
was a relatively benign statement for the North Koreans.  
The most significant hostile foreign policy event during the US election period was the 
grounding of a North Korean spy submarine attempting to insert agents on the eastern coast of 
the ROK in September 1996, causing South Korea to withdraw its support to KEDO.
301
  While 
North Korea apologized, expressing “deep regret” (Myers 1996), this incident was indicative of 
the ongoing clandestine efforts by the DPRK in South Korea and the ROK considered this an 
“armed provocation” against the South (Yonhap News 1996d).  While North Korea certainly did 
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 This event resulted in a massive manhunt in South Korea and the mobilization of over 40,000 South 
Korean troops.  Two (of twenty-six) agents were captured alive (all others were killed) and seventeen ROK military 
and civilian personnel died (Koh 1997, 2; Fischer 2007, 13; CSIS 2010, 4).  This event was followed by the murder 
of a South Korean diplomat in Vladivostok, Russia attributed to North Korean agents following a DPRK threat of 
“retaliation” for South Korea’s actions during the submarine incident (Fischer 2007, 13). 
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not intend to allow one of its submarines to be detected by the ROK,
302
 this incident reinforces 
the argument that North Korea was seeking international assistance without changing its 
aggressive military posture and activities against South Korea.  Yet, despite this incident and 
others that occurred during this period, I find no clear relationship between North Korea’s hostile 
foreign policy actions and US presidential elections during this period. 
 
Question 8.  Were ROK/US strategic-level military exercises associated with increased hostile 
foreign policy activities?  (Hypothesis 7) 
 
 I find partial support for this hypothesis when examining the relationship between DPRK 
activities and strategic military exercises.  North Korea’s threat to withdraw from the NPT, one 
of the most significant North Korean HFP acts during this period, was a most likely in reaction to 
the restart of the 1993 US-ROK TEAM SPIRIT military exercises (Michishita 2010, 93).  These 
exercises had been suspended in 1992 in both an attempt to bring North Korea into multilateral 
negotiations and efforts to get the DPRK to allow IAEA inspections (Michishita 2010, 93).  The 
US and ROK jointly conducted TEAM SPIRIT exercises beginning in 1976 to exercise 
assistance to South Korea in the event of war with North Korea.  Although TEAM SPIRIT was 
held in 1993, it was scheduled, then cancelled each year between 1994 and 1996 (Yoon 2003, 
98) and has not been held since.  Other ROK-US strategic-level exercises continued each year 
during the famine period, including ULCHI FOCUS LENS and FOAL EAGLE, and were 
focused on similar tasks, although not at the overall scale of TEAM SPIRIT (Yoon 2003, 99).   
The North Korean leaders welcomed the suspension of TEAM SPIRIT but denounced the 
other ROK-US annual exercises as “the second TEAM SPIRIT” and an attempt to “stifle” the 
DPRK (KCNA 1995a and KCNA 1999a).
303
  Yet when examining the levels of hostile foreign 
policy during the exercise periods, I find little difference between the hostility levels during 
exercise periods and other times during the case study (see Appendix C).  Thus, at least one 
significant North Korean event (the NPT withdrawal threat) occurred in reaction the ROK-US 
military exercises, although during other periods, the levels of hostilities generally did not vary 
in relation to those external events.    
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 The official DPRK explanation was that the submarine had engine trouble in North Korean waters and 
drifted to the South Korean coast (Browne 1996). 
303
 In reality, although the other two biannual exercises were at a smaller scale than TEAM SPIRIT, the 
ROK and US also used those other exercises to rehearse the defense of the Korean peninsula against a North Korean 
attack.  
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Question 9.  Was the presence of a conservative ROK government associated with increased 
HFP?  (Hypothesis 8) 
 
Although the presence of a conservative ROK leader was associated with increased HFP 
activities in Case 1, South Korea’s government type has little effect on conflict levels in Case 2.  
Two distinctly different ROK administrations ruled during this period: the conservative Kim 
Yong-sam administration (1993-1998) and the more liberal Kim Dae-jung administration (1998-
2003).  Based on the DPRK’s preference for Kim Dae-jung, both during the 1993 and 1998 
elections (Lee 1992; Breen 1992; KCNA 1997), I expected hostility levels to be lower during the 
Kim Dae-jung presidency, beginning in 1998.  As one of his first official acts, Kim Dae-jung 
announced his “Sunshine Policy,” a new South Korean foreign policy aimed at enhanced 
engagement with North Korea, which eventually led to a North-South summit in 2000 (Kim, D 
1998).  Kim Dae-jung (1998) stated the three key principles of his Sunshine Policy in his 
inaugural address:  “First, we will never tolerate armed provocation of any kind.  Second, we do 
not have any intention to harm or absorb North Korea.  Third, we will actively push 
reconciliation and cooperation between the South and North beginning with those areas which 
can be most easily agreed upon.” 
Yet despite the election of an ROK leader that seemed more open to negotiation with the 
DPRK, I find that the level of HFP between 1998 and 1999 is similar to the 1993-1997 
timeframe (Appendix C).  Although the pre-1998 period includes a number of significant events, 
such as the nuclear crisis and several infiltration incidents, North Korea continued to conduct 
HFP actions after Kim Dae-Jung was elected.  These include North Korea’s missile program 
development and testing, nuclear program actions (fuel reprocessing), and continued infiltration 
operations (Fischer 2007; KINU 2012).  After analyzing actions across both administrations, 
North Korean hostile foreign policy activities did not change with the arrival of a more liberal 
ROK president. 
4.c.3.  Summary and Case Study Conclusions 
In October 2000, the Kim regime publicly declared that the “Arduous March” (famine) 
had ended (Kwon and Chung 2012, 173).  Kim Jong-il’s efforts to pursue “emergency 
management” measures, which involved the acceptance of international food aid, shifted the 
population’s focus away from ideology and towards solutions to the famine (McEachern 2010, 
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74).  Because of this shift, ideology now became one of many guiding factors for decisions made 
by the regime, rather than the sole focus of internal and foreign policies (McEachern 2010, 74).  
During the famine, international food aid supported up to one-third of North Korea’s population 
(8 million people) (Haggard and Noland 2007, 90), yet both the famine and international 
intervention had lasting effects on North Korean society.   
North Korea’s famine seemed to provide a perfect opportunity for diversionary behavior.  
The domestic distress caused by economic and social instability should have spurred the Kim 
regime to engage in diversionary behaviors and heightened levels of hostile foreign policy 
against its neighbors (Gelpi 1997, 256; Miller 1995).  As discussed previously, while the overall 
levels of DPRK hostile foreign policy activities were below historic norms (see Figure 4.7) 
during the famine period, the Kim regime did strive to use conflict activities to force 
international concessions, scapegoat external states and, to a limited extent, distract North 
Korea’s domestic audience.  
In many respects, North Korea’s pursuit of self-reliance limited its own capacity to reach 
out for assistance (either through purchase or international aid) (Haggard and Noland 2007, 23) 
and when food shortages occurred, the DPRK could not rely on Cold War mechanisms to 
respond.  During the famine, North Korea did use hostile foreign policy actions to alleviate the 
insecurity effects of the famine and to ensure the Kim regime remained in power, although the 
overall HFP levels were at historic lows.  The following table shows the results of this analysis.   
 
Table 4.4  Structured Analysis Results:  The Great Famine (1993-1999) 
Category Question Test Result Details 
Dependent 
Variable  
(HFP) 
1.  What was the level of hostile 
foreign policy during the case 
study? 
Low 
Conflict scores were 
lower than historic 
norms and averaged 
601 per year.
304
 
Internal 
Conditions  
 
Independent 
Variables 
(Proposition 1) 
2.  Was political instability 
associated with heightened HFP 
activities?  (H1) 
No 
Instability occurred but 
no links to HFP were 
found. 
3.  Were economic difficulties 
associated with increased HFP?  
(H2) 
Yes 
North Korea 
conducted nuclear 
provocations and 
missile launches in 
conjunction with 
efforts to obtain 
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 The average yearly conflict score between 1960 and 2011 was 735 (see Appendix C). 
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economic aid. 
4.  Was social instability associated 
with periods of increased HFP?  
(H3) 
No  
Although social 
instability was present 
throughout, there was 
no identifiable link 
between social 
instability and external 
conflict. 
External 
Conditions  
 
Independent 
Variables 
(Proposition 2) 
5.  Were UN resolutions against the 
DPRK associated with increased 
HFP?  (H4) 
No  
Although the UN 
enacted a resolution, 
there was no 
relationship to conflict. 
6.  Were ROK leadership changes 
associated with increased HFP 
actions?  (H5) 
Yes  
The DPRK increased 
HFP actions in a direct 
effort to affect the 
elections. 
7.  Were US leadership changes 
associated with increased HFP 
actions?  (H6) 
No  
Although the DPRK 
commented on the 
campaign, there was 
no evidence it 
attempted to pursue 
HFP to influence the 
outcome. 
8.  Were ROK/US strategic-level 
military exercises associated with 
DPRK hostile actions?  (H7) 
Yes 
In at least one instance 
(NPT withdrawal), 
there was a direct link 
between HFP and 
military exercises. 
9.  Was the presence of a 
conservative ROK government 
associated with increased HFP? 
(H8) 
No 
Conflict was consistent 
across South Korea’s 
conservative and 
liberal governments. 
 
 During high levels of domestic distress (such as those caused by the famine in this case 
study), diversionary theory predicts that heightened levels of conflict would occur.  Yet, the 
levels of HFP action that occurred during the famine case study period were much lower than 
historical averages.  As shown in Table 4.4, the only relationship found between internal 
conditions and external conflict was between economic distress and North Korea’s use of its 
ballistic missile and nuclear programs to force international economic concessions. Yet both 
social and political instability occurred throughout the famine period (food shortages, population 
migrations, and the death of Kim Il-sung), yet these were not linked to significant increases in 
hostility actions.  But there were relationships between at least two of the external influences and 
HFP actions in support of P2.  These included linkages between HFP activities and both ROK 
leadership changes and strategic exercises by the South Korean and US military forces.  
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Surprisingly, the presence of a more liberal ROK leader accompanied increases in HFP 
activities.   
Throughout the famine period Pyongyang’s efforts at nuclear and ballistic missile 
development did help the Kim regime to distract its own citizens, while concurrently presenting 
the international community with a security crisis.  However, there was no corresponding 
increase in the overall levels of HFP.  North Korea’s efforts to develop nuclear weapons were 
also related to efforts to obtain the security advantages of becoming a member of the “nuclear 
club.”305  Domestically, this also provided the Kim regime with a both an apparent deterrent 
from external attack and a rallying point for DPRK citizens.  In discussing the development of 
nuclear weapons, North Korea’s official news outlet stated    
 
It is only too natural that we took a self-defensive measure some time ago to deter 
a war beforehand and defend peace and security in face of the worst 
situation…the outbreak of war…on the Korean peninsula (KCNA 1996a). 
 
 The nuclear crisis and its resolution also provided Kim Jong-il with “his own myth of 
national rescue” as North Korea’s internal propaganda credited the 1994 Agreed Framework 
breakthrough solely to the “Dear Leader’s” negotiation skills (Myers 2010, 51).  From a practical 
standpoint, nuclear weapons provided Kim Jong-il with a means for the DPRK to maintain its 
international standing (Demick 2010, 66).  The nuclear crisis negotiations, which caused the 
temporary US resumption of its “TEAM SPIRIT” exercise in 1993, also enabled Kim Jong-il 
(with his father’s blessing) to issue a national order to “alert the entire North Korean armed 
forces for any eventuality and to put the entire nation and the people on a semi-war footing” (Suh 
1993, 61; Yonhap News Agency 2003, 992).  Domestically, the Kim regime fostered a sense of 
hatred and tension based on the actions of the US and its allies resulting in an atmosphere of 
national emergency.  As Michishita (2009, 115) notes, “North Korea’s nuclear diplomacy might 
have worked to divert people’s attention away from domestic difficulties,” such as domestic 
instability over food shortages and political unrest.  The crisis also helped to maintain the Kim 
regime’s grip on power domestically and was most likely intended to help bolster public support 
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 In 1993, the “nuclear club” only included the five signatories to the NPT (the US, China, Russia, Great 
Britain, and France) and two non-NPT states (Israel and India) (Norris and Kristensen 2010, 82; Sagan 1996, 59) 
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for the regime.  While diversion was not the only purpose of the Kim regime’s endeavors to 
develop nuclear capabilities, it was one among many effects of that effort. 
 In May 1993, after the launch of its No Dong missile,  “North Korea showed its first 
signs of using missiles as a diplomatic tool” Michishita (2009, 118).  While the No Dong 
program was likely focused on pressuring the US and South Koreans during the nuclear 
negotiations, the DPRK intended the Taepodong program to influence both domestic and 
international audiences.  Despite the apparent failure of the 1998 Taepodong missile to achieve 
orbit (Pinkston 2008, 25), the event became a source of national pride, with a launch video 
appearing on North Korean and international television repeatedly during the weeks that 
followed.
306
  The Taepodong-1 launch “worked as a catalyst, giving new momentum” to the 
ongoing missile and nuclear talks between the US and North Korea (Michishita 2010, 123).  
Thus, North Korea was able to use this event, like so many of its other foreign policy actions, for 
several purposes, namely creating international pressure for negotiations and domestic diversion 
during the famine period.   
 North Korea’s other military activities, such as its infiltration operations, were also 
indirectly linked to domestic concerns.  The DPRK’s ongoing efforts to maintain its military 
posture sent a clear sign to its military establishment that the Kim regime valued their defense 
efforts.  Intensified defense training events (such as the Winter Training Cycle exercises in 1996-
1997), military weapons displays and parades, and the Songun (military first) policy were all 
efforts to increase military morale in hopes of improved domestic stablity (Yonhap 1997a; 
Yonhap 1997b).  Additionally, these events potentially helped divert public attention from the 
ongoing famine and the defection of North Korea’s “father of the Juche Ideal”: Hwang Jang Yop 
(Yonhap 1997a).  The historic role and integration of the military in North Korean society, 
referred to by Kim Il-sung as an “instrument of socialism” (Vreeland 1976, 316), made the 
sustainment of that institution critical to the survival of the regime.  Thus, the Kim regime’s 
efforts to placate the military during the famine enabled the DPRK to maintain social and 
political control over the state. 
 The June 1999 naval Battle of Yeonpyong was the most aggressive conventional military 
action undertaken by the North Koreans during this period and was another example of the Kim 
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 Author observations while working in Seoul in 1998. 
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regime dealing with multiple concerns through a single provocative event.  After the clash, North 
Korea stated,  
 
As a result of the [South Koreans’] reckless provocation, our People's 
Army soldiers' lives were threatened gravely, a warship of our side was 
sunk, and three other warships were damaged severely….The enemy's 
armed provocation in the West Sea did not expand into a full-scale war 
entirely because of our People's Army soldiers' extreme patience and self-
restraint (KCBN 1999).  
 
In this case, North Korea publicized this event as an unwarranted provocation, which 
helped reinforce the national position that external forces continued to cause economic and social 
problems within the DPRK.  The Kim regime repeatedly issued public statements claiming, “war 
might break out at any time” (KCNA 1999c).  This incident, along with ongoing military 
activities on both sides of the DMZ helped reinforce the constant state of political crisis that the 
Kim regime sought to foster during the famine period.  This sense of national emergency and 
continued military conflict with both the US and ROK helped maintain Kim Jong-il’s position as 
undisputed leader of the DPRK and usher in his era of “military-first” policies (Michishita 2010, 
160).   
Thus, these types of efforts to unify the public’s support of the Kim regime were present 
during the famine.  Other measures the Kim regime used to weather the domestic crisis (not 
explored in this dissertation) included the DPRK’s adroit control of the media, maintenance of 
secure borders, and its willingness to accept international aid.  These measures helped ensure the 
Kim regime remained in power.  The Kim regime also engaged in ongoing hostile foreign policy 
activities while simultaneously seeking economic and humanitarian assistance for its people.  
This type of dual track diplomacy worked well for the Kim regime as it was able to survive the 
“Arduous March” intact.  The DPRK secured future guarantees of economic and developmental 
aid, which also supported the Kim regime’s grip on power.  North Korea did this while retaining 
its ability to continue to threaten regional and international stability, a characteristic that 
provided distinct advantages both from a security and negotiation standpoint.  This threat to the 
international community served to ensure that North Korea continued to portray itself as a 
“strong” independent state to both domestic and international audiences.  As Noland (2000, 10) 
stated, “The threat that North Korea poses is its sole asset.  It is unlikely to negotiate away this 
asset very easily.”  Hostile foreign policy activities and diversionary-type behaviors, while not 
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the only measures the DPRK used to deal with the catastrophic effects of the famine period, were 
both necessary for the Kim regime’s survival during this crisis.     
 
        Figure 4.11  Timeline:  North Korea's Great Famine (1993-1999) 
North Korean Events
DPRK withdraws from the NPT
Nuclear crises
Signs of pending famine
Death of Kim Il-sung
Kim Jong-il becomes DPRK leader
PDS breaks down
Harvest lost due to flooding
Famine begins
DPRK publicly acknowledges famine
DPRK sub grounded on ROK coast
Large-scale population movements
Famine eases
Taepo Dong I missile launch
Famine ends
1993
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
1994
US-ROK Events
Kim Young-sam elected ROK 
President
UN Security Council Resolution 
825 enacted
Agreed Framework initiated
Food aid provided to DPRK
International aid workers present 
throughout DPRK
US President Bill Clinton reelected
More food aid provided to DPRK
Kim DJ elected ROK President
Japan, ROK and US impose 
sanctions
Food aid levels drop, but quickly 
return to previous levels
Battle of Yeonpyeong naval clash
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 4.d.  Regime Succession (2008-2011) 
Meet the new boss, same as the old boss.   
                                                                                The Who (1971) 
 
In this final case study, I examine the conditions North Korea experienced between 2008 
and 2011 in relation to the Kim regime’s use of hostile foreign policy activities.  This case 
includes efforts by the Kim regime to set the stage for the second communist "dynastic" 
succession from Kim Jong-il to Kim Jong-un, continued internal economic distress, and a 
number of provocative events such as North Korea's second nuclear test.  Under these 
circumstances, diversionary theory predicts that the internal distress surrounding the Kim 
regime's succession and chronic economic difficulties should spur increased external conflict 
behavior.  I find that some of the internal conditions support P1 evidenced by connections 
between economic conditions and both the onset of a period of hostilities between the Koreas 
and the overall levels of HFP activities during the study period. I also find support for P2 in 
comparing the relationships between UN resolutions and military exercises and increases in 
DPRK hostile foreign policy activities. 
I chose this case in the same manner as the famine study, using Goertz and Diehl’s (1995, 
31) concept of “political shocks” to North Korea’s domestic conditions and its effect on the 
international system based emergence of Kim Jong-un and other events surrounding the Kim 
regime’s succession.  North Korea’s concerns over the succession were related to increased HFP 
actions during this period, including nuclear tests, missile firings, and direct clashes with South 
Korea.  In the following sections, I include an overview of the case, explore the same set of 
focused questions, and conclude with a summary and analysis of the results.
307
    
4.d.1.  The Kim Regime Endures 
North Korea’s experiences during the 2000s were filled with events just as dramatic as 
those described in the two previous case studies.  After over 50 years of rule, the Kim family still 
retained power and remained firmly in control of most aspects of North Korea’s society.  
Additionally, after weathering the 1990s famine period intact, the Kim regime continued to 
concurrently seek aid and conduct provocative actions, to the dismay of the international 
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 A timeline (Figure 4.15) is also enclosed at the end of this section for reference. 
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community.  Hostile foreign activities included events such as nuclear weapons and missile tests, 
which significantly raised international tensions and spurred United Nations sanctions.   
During this time, the DPRK attained unofficial membership in the “nuclear club” due to 
its weapons research program and nuclear weapons tests in 2006 and 2009.  It also (again) 
withdrew from the Non-Proliferation Treaty:  a sign that North Korea not only had nuclear 
weapons technology, but was willing to share it with other states.  Additionally, North Korea 
conducted a series of short and long-range missile tests that began with "Silkworm" missiles 
fired from coastal batteries
308
 followed by longer-range missile tests, using systems such as the 
Taeopodong-2 that had "the theoretical capacity to reach the continental U.S." (Fischer 2007, 
32).  North Korea also engaged in conventional attacks in the Yellow Sea against ROK military 
and civilian targets and this incident was the first of its kind since the Korean War (Hom and 
Thompson 2010; Klinger 2010).  These events indicated that North Korea’s security relationship 
with both the region and the international community had entered a new and much more 
dangerous phase.   
At the same time, North Korea’s economy continued to flounder as the DPRK struggled 
in many areas, especially with an inability to feed its people.  Finally, the North Korean 
leadership dealt with preparations for its second succession from father to son, as Kim Jong-il’s 
failing health spurred plans for the next Kim generation to assume control of the DPRK.  Upon 
the “Dear Leader’s” death in December 2011, Kim Jong-il’s son took control.309  Moreover, the 
Kim regime remained focused on its primary goal of retaining power, regardless of the domestic 
or international implications.  Between 2008 and 2011, the DPRK solidified its process of 
succession to the next Kim family member, maintained enough control over domestic conditions 
to ensure the regime remained intact, and continued to use hostile foreign policy actions against 
external states.   
4.d.2.  Structured Questions and Analysis 
In this section, I use the same questions (based on the independent variables described 
above) to determine the relationship between conditions faced by North Korea, the DPRK’s 
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 These missile firings, the first in five years, ended North Korea’s 1999 missile test moratorium which 
was brokered during negotiations on energy aid and the provision of two light water nuclear reactors to be built in 
the DPRK and funded by the international community (Fischer 2007, 25; Kimball 2012). 
309
 As of this writing, the transition to the newest member of the Kim dynasty, Kim Jong-un had gone 
relatively smoothly, which stands in stark contrast to the level of turmoil that surrounds the DPRK and its 
relationship with the international community.   
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hostile foreign policy activities, and whether diversionary theory helps explain these 
relationships.  The following questions focus on North Korea’s most recent succession period 
between Kim Jong-il and his son, Kim Jong-un.  
 
Question 1.  What was the level of hostile foreign policy activities during this period? 
 
Hostile foreign policy activity levels during this period are at levels not seen since the 
first case study and demonstrate that the Kim regime chose HFP as a means to achieve national 
goals.  In fact, the incidence of conflict, along with the individual conditions of domestic distress 
that occurred during this period, provide generalized support to P1.  The Kim regime entered the 
millennium politically intact and in firm control of civil society, despite the devastating effects of 
the famine of the 1990s.  Yet the DPRK government also relied upon external aid to sustain itself 
and remained vulnerable to the conditions imposed by donor states.  At the end of the famine 
period, North Korea desperately required both food and energy to “meet the minimum survival 
requirements of its population” (Noland 2000, 335).  However, North Korea did manage to 
maintain a robust military force that was capable, at the very least, of defending the DPRK from 
external attack and not reluctant to conduct limited military engagements against South Korean 
forces.
310
  Thus, the DPRK continued to require international assistance while concurrently 
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 Bell (2006, 7) notes that the North Koreans had over 800 ballistic missiles (600 SCUDs and 200 
medium range Nodong systems) with capabilities to range as far as Japan.  The North Koreans also possessed a 
significant unconventional war capability with 88,000 special operations troops (20 brigades) that would be most 
likely be employed in a wartime scenario (Samore 2004; Bell 2008, 16).  These numbers might seem extreme and 
North Korea’s ability to sustain this rate of fire (considering its constant resource challenges) certainly could be 
disputed.  Nevertheless, by the mid-2000s, KPA artillery and missile units were in position to directly fire upon 
areas along the DMZ and the northern areas of Seoul.  Additionally, Bell (2008, 16) testified before the US Senate 
stating, “North Korea also maintains the world’s largest special operations force (SOF), with over 80,000 in its ranks. 
Tough, well trained, and profoundly loyal, these forces are capable of conducting strategic reconnaissance and 
asymmetric attacks against a range of critical civilian and military targets.  Among the best resourced in its military, 
North Korean special operations forces provide an asymmetric enabler to North Korea in crisis, provocation, or 
war.”  North Korean air and naval forces, while severely limited in capability and extremely outdated, remained 
focused primarily on defensive missions.  The DPRK navy remained focused on coastal defense, but was often used 
near the maritime border to react to and sometimes engage South Korean naval and Chinese and ROK fishing 
vessels.  The North Korean navy includes over 1,000 ships with 430 surface combatants and about 60 submarines 
with the latter sometimes used to support infiltration operations (Worden 2008, 253-254).  As of 2008, the NKAF 
was primarily focused on air defense and included approximately 1,600 aircraft (including 780 fighters), mostly 
Soviet-made antiquated first- and second-generation planes (MiG-15s through MiG-21s) although it did have a 
limited number of more advanced aircraft (MiG-23s, MiG-29s and Su-25s) (Worden 2008, 252).  North Korea’s air 
and naval forces actively patrolled North Korea’s borders and occasionally engaged in cross-border actions aimed at 
South Korea and the United States. 
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posing a threat to regional security.  Figure 4.12 shows the level of DPRK hostilities during the 
2000s, to include the case study period. 
   
Figure 4.12  Hostile Foreign Policy Activities 2000-2011 
 
 
Source:  Korean Conflict Database (Appendix C) 
 
North Korea’s conflict levels between 2008 and 2011 are generally above the average 
level of conflict for the entire study period and at levels that approach the first case’s scores.  
Compared to historical averages, conflict scores between 2008 and 2011 are 61 percent higher 
than the average for the case study period (1960-2011).
311
  Conflict during this period also 
showed significant variations with both the nuclear tests and conventional military attacks 
against South Korea causing intensity scores to soar between 2009 and 2010.   
Between 2008 and 2011, North Korea achieved the status of a “defacto” nuclear state as 
the Kim regime made visible strides towards the weaponization of its nuclear technology (Nanto 
and Chanlett-Avery 2010, 10).  These developments concerned the international community, 
which feared not only North Korea’s security threat, but also potential reactions from nearby 
Japan and South Korea: an Asian nuclear arms race would likely destabilize the region (Gates 
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 Conflict scores for this period (2008-2011) average 1188 per year while the historical (yearly) average is 
735 (1960-2011) (Appendix C). 
156 
 
2009).  Beginning in March 2009, North Korea’s actions demonstrated it intended to proceed 
with its missile development program and its nuclear efforts.  Additionally, the Kim regime 
demonstrated that it remained ready to use military and diplomatic actions to support both 
domestic and international policy objectives.  A synopsis of the most intense conflict activities 
during the case study period follows.  
Missile Program and Launches.  North Korea’s continued efforts to develop missile 
technology provided a number of advantages for the Kim regime including testing of a possible 
weapons delivery platform for use against the US-ROK alliance, continued research and 
development for missile exports, and a domestic source of national pride.  Beginning in the 
spring of 2009, after refusing aid and expelling UN workers, North Korea conducted a series of 
ballistic missile launches.
312
  The first was North Korea’s launch of a Taepodong-2 rocket in 
April (KCNA 2009c), which was both a legitimate attempt to launch a small (albeit non-
functioning) satellite and a developmental step for the DPRK’s long-range missile technology 
efforts (Kimball 2012).  Although the attempt failed (both the missile and its components fell 
into the sea), it demonstrated that the Kim regime had an active and potentially dangerous 
intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) program (Broad 2009).  This launch demonstrated that 
North Korea intended to continue developing both its missile technology and its nuclear weapons 
program: both of the components required for an active long-range nuclear capability that could 
threaten not only the region, but also the continental United States (Wit 2011, 3; Broad 2009).   
Subsequent launches followed in July 2009.
313
  While the regime touted these as 
examples of the North Korea’s scientific progress for its domestic audiences, the timing of these 
events occurred with DPRK efforts to seek direct negotiations with the United States and 
concessions from the international community (Asano 2009).  In fact, the DPRK’s ballistic 
missile program, often portrayed as a serious threat to the peace and stability of the region, was 
most likely of limited capability and primarily used as a symbolic threat for political purposes 
                                                 
312
 The impetus for the expulsion was unclear, although US officials at the time linked it to the request for 
the UN’s World Food Program to send Korean-speaking food aid monitor personnel (intended to ensure the proper 
distribution of food) (Na 2009).  Additionally, there was speculation that the program was shut down due to overall 
deterioration in relations between the DPRK and both the US and ROK (Manyin 2012, 18).   
313
 These launches occurred on July 2-4, coincided with America’s “Independence Day” holiday, and 
included a mix of short and intermediate range missiles (Kyodo 2009).  North Korea also launched a similar number 
of missiles on July 4-5, 2006 and Schiller (2012, 60) argued that these events were clear political signals to the 
United States in efforts to influence ongoing diplomatic actions.  
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(Schiller 2012, 60).
314
  Thus the international community’s reaction to North Korea’s April 2009 
missile launches with additional sanctions, rather than continued negotiations, was one of the 
influential factors that prompted the Kim regime to demonstrate its other, much more dangerous, 
“symbolic” threat: North Korea’s nuclear weapons capabilities.   
Nuclear Program.  Pyongyang viewed the development of nuclear technology as 
providing two distinct advantages:  increased respect from the international community and a 
“credible deterrent” against external attack (Nanto and Chanlett-Avery 2010, 14).  In May 2009, 
the Kim regime gained the world’s attention when it restarted its nuclear program (Landler 
2009).  Unconfirmed reports claimed that the DPRK had manufactured “small nuclear warheads” 
that were compatible with its No Dong missiles (Chosun Ilbo 2009), but North Korea’s 
proclaimed resumption of its nuclear program and expulsion of inspectors did not arouse 
widespread concern about a pending nuclear test.
315
  Nevertheless, at the end of April, the Kim 
regime stated that it was preparing to conduct “nuclear tests and test-firings of intercontinental 
ballistic missiles” in response to UN Security Council Sanctions (Fedchenko 2009, 1; KCNA 
2009g).   
In late May 2009, North Korea announced that it conducted a successful underground 
nuclear test “as part of the measures to bolster up its nuclear deterrent for self-defence” (KCNA 
2009h).  The US confirmed that the DPRK conducted its second nuclear test at the same location 
as 2006 (at the P’unggye facility) with the yield of “approximately a few kilotons” (DNI 
2009).
316
  This test was larger than the previous one with a yield of up to seven kilotons, 
estimated as “about five times stronger” than the detonation in 2006 (Fedchenko 2009, 3).317    
The international community, led by the US and Japan, responded by beginning to work 
on a draft UN Security Resolution to tighten sanctions.  Additionally, South Korea joined the 
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 Schiller (2012, 20) contends that North Korea primarily uses its missile technology to “create the 
illusion of a sophisticated threat for domestic and foreign policy reasons.”  He also notes that the maximum threat 
posed by North Korean missiles is limited to 1,000 kilometers and DPRK systems with longer ranges “seem not to 
be operationally deployed or sufficiently reliable” (Schiller 2012, xvi). 
315
 In fact, prior to the May 25, 2009 test, open source international press reporting made no apparent 
mention of a nuclear test preparations (LexisNexis 2013).   
316
 North Korea reportedly informed the US and China that it would conduct a nuclear test one hour prior to 
the event (Fedchenko 2009, 1; AFP 2009a).  At least according to one report, U.S. officials admitted that the nuclear 
test “caught the United States by surprise” (Rosen 2009). 
317
 The DPRK also mentioned this test as part of heir-apparent Kim Jong-un’s “150-day campaign” which 
began on April 20, 2007 and was intended to “resolve food shortages and rebuild the country's antiquated 
infrastructure” (Yonhap 2009; KCNA 2009h).  Western analysts speculated that this campaign was an attempt to 
refocus public attention away from Kim Jong-il’s health and questions about succession (Hoare 2012, 295-296).   
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Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI),
318
 which a pending UN resolution ultimately strengthened 
(Choe 2009c).  The next day, North Korea “called the [South Korean PSI] decision an act of 
war,” test launched at least two coastal defense missiles, and declared the 1953 Korean War 
Armistice null (Oh and Hassig 2010, 92; Harden 2009).
319
  These events, and the missile launch 
in April, demonstrated the advancing threat posed by North Korea to the region.  Although these 
actions were taken seriously, the test or use of a nuclear weapon by the DPRK had the potential 
for significant local damage on Korean soil.  Additionally, the actual use against the United 
States potentially would incite efforts to destroy the Kim regime, or at least respond with similar 
measures.
320
  Thus, while North Korea’s test and threats associated with its nuclear program 
were disconcerting to the US and its allies, these were actually “empty gestures” and simply a 
technique to force negotiations in hopes of international concessions. The Kim regime had too 
much to lose by actually using the nuclear weapons it was developing.   
The nuclear and missile tests served a wide range of purposes for the regime, both as a 
signal to the international community that North Korea requires attention and domestically, that 
the DPRK faces external threats so dangerous that its only option is a “nuclear deterrent” 
(KCNA 2009h).  As Nanto and Chanlett-Avery (2010, 14) observes 
 
Without the DPRK nuclear program, North Korea would be a humanitarian aid 
“basket case” and a reclusive society that would be hard pressed to draw more 
world notice than countries such as Laos or Mongolia. Instead, North Korea is 
high on the world’s security agenda. Pyongyang has become adept at using this 
attention to extract economic assistance and has used actions by other countries 
(such as sanctions or U.S. military exercises in the region) as propaganda tools to 
fuel nationalism and strengthen support for its regime. 
 
Thus, the Kim regime’s efforts to maintain and further develop its nuclear capabilities 
should have been of little surprise to external observers.  Nuclear capabilities provide a means to 
ensure the DPRK maintains its sovereignty, domestic stability (through both the emphasis on 
external threats and the acquisition of aid), and that the Kim regime remains high on the agendas 
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 The PSI is a US-led “global effort that aims to stop trafficking of weapons of mass destruction (WMD)” 
and associated equipment through interdicting transfers of these types of equipment between states (US DoS 2013). 
319
 Pyongyang made the same declaration of nullification four times previously in 1994, 1996, 2003 and 
2006 (Oh and Hassig 2010, 92; Harden 2009).   
320
 The oft-repeated quote attributed to US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice was that if North Korea 
were to attack the US or its allies with a nuclear weapon, the US would respond decisively and turn North Korea 
into a “parking lot” (Natsios 2013).   
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of the key powers in the region.  The test in May 2009 was a clear sign that North Korea had “no 
serious intention of negotiating away its nuclear capability” and that the world must accept North 
Korea as a nuclear state (Haggard 5, 2012).  For the North Korean public, the nuclear program 
was a demonstration of how dangerous the world really is for the DPRK and helped the Kim 
regime justify “continued sacrifices by and harsh treatment of its people” (Heckler 2010, 51).   
Next, North Korea's efforts to engage the world took another turn:  the DPRK embarked 
upon a “charm offensive” which sought to improve dialogue with the US, South Korea, and 
China (Japan Times 2009; Nanto and Manyin 2010).  In August 2009, the North Koreans hosted 
former US president Bill Clinton and he successfully obtained the release of two American 
journalists held in North Korea since March 2009 (KCNA 2009i).  The Kim regime also held 
meetings with the head of the South Korean conglomerate Hyundai, discussed a willingness to 
reopen Mount Kumgang for tourism, began hinting it would return to the Six-Party Talks, and 
concluded an agreement with Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao for substantial levels of food aid (Oh 
and Hassig 2010, 95).  Yet these events were part of a predictable cycle in which the DPRK 
conducted provocative activities, sought negotiations and aid, and then returned to hostile actions 
when diplomatic progress stalled (Nanto and Manyin 2011, 96).  In this case, the return to deadly 
hostile foreign policy actions occurred just a few months later. 
The Kim regime’s diplomatic shift lasted through the beginning of 2010, and the Kim 
regime’s annual New Year’s Message sounded “less bellicose” than in previous years (Foster-
Carter 2010a, 76), stressed the importance of the historic June 2000 North-South summit, and 
emphasized that “National reconciliation and cooperation should be promoted actively” (KCNA 
2010a).  Just two weeks later, North Korea resumed hostile foreign policy statements, reportedly 
in reaction to press reports of discussions between the US and South Korean administrations on 
contingency plans concerning the DPRK: the Kim regime charged that the US and South 
Koreans had drafted a “scenario for toppling the system in the DPRK…with an aim to bring it to 
a ‘collapse’” (KCNA 2010b; Kim, S. 2010).  North Korea’s actions during this time were among 
the most serious seen on the peninsula since the 1960s and the conventional attacks against naval 
and ground targets were the most deadly since the Korean War.  North Korea’s recent nuclear 
test, continued missile firings, and these attacks constituted a heightened period of hostilities on 
the peninsula, but followed previous DPRK patterns of state conduct. 
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The Sinking of the Cheonan.  The Yellow (West) Sea and the NLL continued to be an 
area of both interest and tension between not only the two Koreas, but with Chinese fishermen 
who routinely worked along the boundary areas in search of crab and a variety of fish (Van Dyke 
2003, 149; Yonhap 2013a).
321
  The Yellow Sea area includes South Korea’s shipping routes to 
China and North Korea and a number of islands claimed by both the ROK and DPRK.  
Additionally, the area represents a consistent security challenge for South Korea and includes a 
significant DPRK and ROK naval presence.  North Korea’s navy has routinely used the area to 
insert special operations agents for operations against the South (Roehrig 2008, 25-26)   Due to 
these considerations, South Korea maintained an active military presence along the NLL and 
routinely conducted maritime patrols in the area. 
In November 2009, the ROK navy exchanged fire with a North Korean vessel that 
crossed the NLL near Daecheong Island (see map in Appendix F) (Kim J. 2010).  The DPRK 
ship sustained heavy damage and retreated back across the border line and the North Koreans 
sustained at least four casualties (one killed and three wounded personnel) while South had none 
(CSIS 2010, 5).  The South Koreans sent additional naval vessels to the area and stated “This is a 
regrettable incident in which the North targeted the South” while the North Koreans called the 
incident a “deliberate and premeditated provocation” and demanded an apology (KCNA 2009j; 
KCNA 2009k; Kim J. 2010).  In any case, the incident did not escalate was not disruptive 
enough to prevent a pending visit by President Obama to South Korea and ongoing direct 
negotiations between North Korea and the US on the nuclear issue (AFP 2010; Choe 2010a).  
 Tensions receded and it was not until the events of mid-January that relations again began 
to deteriorate between the Koreas, although North Korea demonstrated both belligerence and a 
willingness to accept international aid.  For the first time in two years, North Korea received 
food aid from the South, consisting of 10,000 tons of maize, while concurrently denouncing the 
South’s discussion of “collapse scenario” contingency plans (Foster-Carter 2010a, 77-78).  Three 
days later, the Kim regime announced that it would not return to the Six Party Talks unless 
international sanctions were lifted and called for an agreement to permanently replace the 1953 
Armistice (KCNA 2010c).  In late January, tensions also increased as the DPRK began 
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 A description of the history of the NLL is included in the Famine case study above in the section entitled 
the “The Battle of Yeonpyeong.”  Additionally, a map of this area is included in Appendix F. 
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conducting a series of naval training drills on the North Korean side of the NLL near the ROK-
held islands of Baeknyeong and Daecheong (Foster Carter 2010a, 78).   
 In mid-February, the South Koreans reported that the DPRK increased naval drills and 
reinforced the coastal areas with additional artillery (including multiple rocket launchers) 
(Yonhap 2010b).  Additionally, at the end of February, the North Koreans began criticizing both 
the South Koreans and US over the pending “KEY RESOLVE-FOAL EAGLE” exercise (slated 
to begin a few weeks later) stating that the event included “operations and nuclear war exercises 
aimed to preempt a surprise attack on the DPRK” (AFP 2010; KCNA 2010j).  At the same time, 
analysts predicted that “absent foreign aid North Korea will be 1.2 million tons short of its food 
needs this year” (Foster-Carter 2010a, 88).  Thus, by mid-March 2010, North Korea had not 
participated in the Six Party Talks since June 2008 (Liang 2012), it increased its military 
presence near the NLL in the west, and faced significant food shortages in the coming months.  
Conditions were ripe for another spectacular event to force a new round of negotiations.  
In mid-March 2010, a South Korean navy patrol craft, the Cheonan,
322
 left the ROK port 
of Pyeontaek on a routine patrol mission (ROK MND 2010, 36).  At approximately nine p.m. on 
26 March, there was an onboard explosion and the Cheonan sank, resulting in the deaths of 46 of 
the 104 crewmembers onboard (Bechtol 2010).  Two months later, after an extensive 
investigation, the ROK’s Ministry of National Defense concluded that North Korea attacked and 
sank the Cheonan using a submarine-launched torpedo (ROK MND 2010, 220).  Additionally, 
US Secretary of State Clinton charged “The evidence is overwhelming and condemning. The 
torpedo that sunk the Cheonan ... was fired by a North Korean submarine” (Lee 2010).  In April 
2010, North Korea denied the charges, stating that it was a “regretful accident” and after the 
ROK MND report was issued, the Kim regime declared that a “state of war” existed (KCNA 
2010d; KCNA 2010e).   
Assuming that the DPRK conducted the attack (and all evidence, including testimony 
from a DPRK defector, implicated the Kim regime), this was the most serious direct attack 
against the ROK military since the Korean War and demonstrated both North Korea’s 
“asymmetric” military capabilities and willingness to conduct this type of operation (Cha and 
Kim 2010, 2; Korea Times 2012).  The UN Security Council discussed the Cheonan sinking, but 
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 The Cheonan was assigned to the 2
nd
 ROK Fleet and was a 1,200-ton corvette-class vessel built in 1989 
(Han 2010). 
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China refused to approve any language that blamed North Korea, and the final proclamation 
simply condemned the attack and noted South Korea’s restraint in the matter (UNSC 2010; Cha 
2012, 334-335).
323
  South Korea’s reaction to the sinking included the cessation of almost all 
trade with North Korea (with the exception of the Kaesong Industrial Complex), implementation 
of additional sanctions (along with the US) and ROK participation in the PSI (Hoare 2012, 85; 
VOA 2010b).  Additionally, the US and South Koreans conducted an unprecedented show of 
force operation, dubbed “INVINCIBLE SPIRIT,” in the Yellow Sea which included a mixture of 
over 20 ships and submarines, 200 aircraft, and 8,000 personnel (CNN 2010a; Fackler 2010).  
Aside from rhetoric in the North Korean press, there was no overt military response from the 
DPRK to these exercises (KCNA 2010f).  
 The Shelling of Yeonpyeong Island.  By the end of the summer, the tense atmosphere 
engendered by the Cheonan attack seemed to recede and the two Koreas seemed to experience a 
slight thawing of relations.  While the majority of trade between the North and South stopped, 
the Kaesong Industrial Complex continued to operate, with virtually no effects seen because of 
the Cheonan attack (Foster-Carter 2010b, 3).
324
  Although the ROK and US continued to conduct 
their annual fall military exercises (including ULCHI FREEDOM GUARDIAN), the North 
Korean responses were limited to public condemnations
325
 with no significant increase in hostile 
foreign policy actions (KCNA 2010g; KINU 2011; UNC 2012).
326
  In October 2010, South 
Korea provided 5,000 tons of rice aid
327
 in response to seasonal flooding two months earlier and 
the Koreas conducted family reunion meetings for the first time in over a year (Kim K. 2010; 
ROK MOU 2010).   
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 Song (2011, 1135) contends that that Beijing’s first priority is stability in the DPRK and as long as 
DPRK actions do not potentially cause circumstances that might result in US military retaliation, China will be 
reluctant to engage in actions it considers destabilizing (such as UN resolutions condemning the North).   
324
 In fact a South Korean government report stated that the “Kaesong Industrial Zone was almost 
unaffected by the Cheonan incident. Output at the zone in July was worth $26.4 million, only slightly down from 
$26.5 million in June and $28.1 million in April” (Foster-Carter 2011a, 12; Yonhap 2010c). 
325
 In one of many responses, the DPRK government stated “The large-scale DPRK-targeted war 
maneuvers staged by the South Korean puppet forces one after another in collusion with the U.S. are very grave 
military provocations, little short of a declaration of war against the DPRK” (KCNA 2010g) 
326
 For example, the only two military events during this period included North Korea’s firing of over 100 
artillery rounds into the sea near the NLL in early August 2010 and a DMZ incident in October with only a few 
rounds fired and no injuries (KINU 2011; UNC 2012).  
327
 This is a relatively small amount compared to the previous support provided by Seoul (as much as 
500,000 tons of rice per year), but it was the first aid provided by the South in over two years (Foster-Carter 2011a, 
3). 
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While these events demonstrated the North Koreans’ willingness to cooperate with the 
South, at least in some areas, the Kim regime also faced a significant amount of domestic 
pressure.  Shortages of critical supplies continued as the World Food Program observed that the 
DPRK had difficulty with food and medical supplies because of both the 2009 currency reform 
and the August 2010 floods (Kyodo 2010a).  Additionally, the North Koreans continued to call 
on the South to allow for renewed tourism at the Mount Kumgang Resort, which the South 
Koreans disallowed for over two years (Foster-Carter 2011a, 16).  While this remained a difficult 
time for the North Koreans, they continued to actively engage the ROK in negotiations and there 
were few indications that another deadly hostile foreign policy event was about to occur. 
South Korea’s military began its annual “Hoguk” amphibious training exercise in 
November 2010 with over 70,000 participants in both the Yellow Sea and along the ROK’s west 
coast.
328
  On the same day, Kim Jong-il and Kim Jong-un reportedly visited the DPRK’s 
southwest coast and may have visited a number of artillery units in the area (KCNA 2010h; 
Joongang Daily 2010).  The following afternoon, the North Koreans conducted a rocket artillery 
attack against the South Korean-occupied island of Yeonpyeong; the North fired approximately 
120 rockets and the South responded with 80 rounds of artillery (CNS 2010).
329
  The attack left 
four South Koreans dead (two civilians and two ROK marines), 18 injured, 22 buildings 
destroyed, and resulted in the evacuation of most of the island’s 1,900 residents by the South 
Korean navy (Yonhap 2010d; Korea Times 2010; CNN 2010b).  It was unclear if the South 
Korean artillery caused any damage to North Korean personnel or facilities (JEN 2010).   
North Korea commented on the incident, stating that it fired in self-defense, responding 
to South Korea’s artillery that fell on the DPRK side of the “maritime border” (Xinhau 2010; 
KCNA 2010i).  In fact, the North Koreans warned the South not to conduct live fire exercises in 
the area and the DPRK artillery attack occurred at the end of ROK maneuver exercises in the 
area (Song 2010).
330
  At the same time there were unattributed South Korean government reports 
that Kim Jong-il and Kim Jong-un personally ordered the attack during their visits to the area the 
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 The US had been scheduled to join the ROKs with navy and marine personnel, but a few days prior to 
the exercise, announced it would not participate due to “scheduling issues” (Jung 2010). 
329
 The artillery exchange involved North Korean 120mm rocket launchers and South Korean K-9 self-
propelled artillery (CNS 2010).  This was the first artillery exchange of its kind since the 1960s. 
330
 The ROK military had previously announced these exercises (including the live firings) as it had done 
during similar events in the past (Hoare 2012, 407). 
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day prior and North Korean military propaganda documents surfaced that linked the attacks to 
Kim Jong-un (Joongang 2010; Chosun Ilbo 2011c). 
South Korea’s response was to immediately increase security levels, ban all travel to 
North Korea, cancel pending Red Cross talks, cease all pending aid to the DPRK, and to adjust 
the “rules of engagement” to allow for more decisive military responses in the future (Foster-
Carter 2011a, 7; Fackler and McDonald 2010).  The ROK did not conduct a retaliatory military 
response (aside from naval exercises in the area), although after the Cheonan sinking, President 
Lee declared that South Korea would “immediately exercise our right of self-defense if their 
territorial waters, airspace or territory are violated” (Armstrong 2010; CNN 2010c).331  China’s 
reaction, which included blocking a UN resolution condemning the Kim regime for the attack, 
was seen as an “enabling response [which] appeared to write North Korea a blank check for 
further provocations” (Snyder and Byun 2011, 78).  The US also condemned the attack, and 
conducted two large-scale joint naval exercises with both South Korea (near the location of the 
attack) and Japan (off the east coast of Korea) (Foster-Carter 2011a, 8; Kyoto 2010c).     
In contrast to the Cheonan sinking, North Korea immediately took full credit for this 
incident and on its two year anniversary, publicly celebrated the “Victorious Yonphyong Island 
Shelling
” 
(KCNA 2012a).  As with the Cheonan sinking, determining the motivation behind this 
event is difficult, but it was most likely associated with domestic efforts to solidify Kim Jong-
un’s place as the future ruler of North Korea (Chosun Ilbo 2011c) and concurrent work to restart 
negotiations with the South on aid and economic concerns.  Kim Jong-un’s lack of military 
experience probably made his visible involvement in Kim Jong-il’s military decisions essential 
to establish credibility, just as his father had done under Kim Il-sung.  At the same time, progress 
between the Koreas on economic issues (such as trade and the reopening of the Mount Kumgang 
Resort) stalled (Foster-Carter 2011a, 4-5) and this action might have been considered a means to 
break the negotiations impasse. 
The Cheonan sinking and Yeonpyeong shelling demonstrated the difficult situation that 
South Korea historically found itself in when responding to DPRK hostile military actions.  
While a military response by the ROK might seem like the most logical reaction, most analysts 
                                                 
331
 In a 2013 interview, President Lee stated that he had ordered the South Korean military to attack North 
Korean targets, but that “a high-ranking military official blocked him, saying that the Air Force mustn’t get involved 
per the rules of engagement, and that they needed to consult with the Americans” (Keohler 2013; Chosun Ilbo 
2013a). 
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(and most likely the South Korean government) note that retaliation against North Korea would 
result in additional DPRK aggression (Kang 2010).  Yet the South Koreans have not conducted 
known conventional retaliatory actions since the 1960s and instead relied on diplomatic and 
economic means to deal with DPRK since that time.  The ROK government (and the 
international community) historically took the view that any military action against North Korea 
will lead to war on the Korean peninsula and this belief shaped South Korean responses to these 
types of spectacular events (McDevitt 2011).  The DPRK leaders observed this South Korean 
(and international) behavior over the past few decades and have become exceedingly adept at 
conducting hostile foreign policy actions short of war that further their policy goals with little 
fear of military retaliation (Kaplan and Denmark 2011).  These heightened levels of HFP 
approached the levels seen during the 1960s and again pushed the peninsula towards the 
possibility of war. 
 
Question 2.  Was political instability associated with heightened HFP activities?  (Hypothesis 1) 
 
North Korea’s political system was significant stress as Kim Jong-il’s health failed and 
the DPRK leaders worked to set the stage for transition to Kim Jong-un.  At the same time, 
political instability did not threaten the Kim regime’s grip on power and I find no direct link 
between political instability and conflict.  Historically, despite domestic difficulties, there were 
few incidents of “dissatisfaction or opposition” directed at the Kim regime (Nanto and Chanlett-
Avery 2010, 14 and KINU 2011b, 290-291).
332
  In the 2000s, there were sporadic reports of 
social unrest, especially associated with Pyongyang’s decision to revalue its currency in 2009, 
but these were localized and their effects were limited to changes in the Kim regime’s policies 
rather than wide-ranging indications of instability (Choe 2009a and KINU 2011b, 56).
333
  The 
DPRK’s successful policies of oppression eliminated many of the conditions necessary for social 
revolution and, “The North Korean people may be hungry, may despise Kim Jong-il, and may 
envy their rich neighbors, but the people are unlikely to mobilize” (Byman and Lind 2010, 70).    
During this time, the North Korean system of societal control remained intact, and 
substantial political difficulties faced by the regime during the succession period were not 
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 The unauthorized gathering of individuals in an assembly is strictly prohibited by North Korean law and 
can result in up to sentences of up to “5 years of correctional labor” (KINU 2011b, 291). 
333
 Additionally, there were DPRK refugee reports of at least four executions of individuals accused of 
protesting against the 2009 currency reform (KINU 2011b, 542). 
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apparent to outside observers.  The Kim regime most likely eliminated any high-level political 
dissent (associated with the arrival of Kim Jong-un) through reshuffling and promotion of key 
individuals during the Third Party Congress in September 2010 (Kim, J. 2011, 15).  Additionally, 
changes were made at the provincial level as members who were older or considered “disabled” 
were redesignated as “honorary members” and replaced with younger individuals (in their 
twenties and thirties) in order to support the transition to Kim Jong-un (Ah 2012, 34-35).  
Despite the arrival of Kim’s relatively unknown son, and his rapid promotion as the future leader 
of the regime, there were few observable signs that North Korea’s military or elite opposed Kim 
Jong-il’s heir apparent (AFP 2012). 
The regime’s success in maintaining order and retaining power during this period resulted 
from North Korea’s legacy of authoritarian rule and its use of “restrictive social policies; 
manipulation of ideas and information; use of force; co-optation; manipulation of foreign 
governments; and institutional coup-proofing” (Byman and Lind 2010, 45).  As described later in 
this section, diversion became important for the regime, but only within the context of an overall 
system of control.  Rumors began almost immediately after Kim Jong-il’s stroke in 2008 and in 
January 2009, reports surfaced stating that his youngest son was a possible choice for succession 
(AFP 2009c).
334
   Ahn (2011, 27) notes that Kim Jong-un’s succession “can be considered an 
extremely compressed version of Kim Jong-il’s” and included three stages: apprenticeship, 
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 In September 2008, the South Korean Embassy in Beijing reported that on August 22, 2008, Kim Jong-il 
suffered a stroke and collapsed in Pyongyang (AFP 2008).  Kim was incapacitated and two months later, underwent 
brain surgery, reportedly by a French neurosurgeon (Kim and Yi 2008 and Erlanger 2008). While Kim Jong-il’s 
health prior to his 2008 stroke is unclear, there were reports of an installed pacemaker in 1991 and that since the 
1970s, Kim had suffered from a number of ailments attributed to his “heavy-drinking habits” (Erlanger 2008 and V. 
Cha 2012, 94).  As Kim Jong-il was recovering from his stroke, Kim Yong-nam, the Chairman of the Supreme 
People’s Assembly (SPA) assumed visible role as “ceremonial” leader of the DPRK while actual power reportedly 
resided with Jang Sung Taek, Kim’s brother-in-law (Jeffries 2010a and Hoare 2012, 226-227).  In early October, the 
North Korean press reported that Kim Jong-il reportedly attended a youth soccer match (KCNA 2008a), which was 
possibly his first public appearance in weeks.  Kim suffered a setback in late October requiring brain surgery and 
spurring speculation in the region on the stability of the regime (Lee 2008b and Kim and Yi 2008). North Korea 
denied rumors that Kim Jong-il was ill or dead, stating that international press reports on the North Korean leader’s 
condition were intended to “defame the indestructible political system in the DPRK” (KCNA 2008b).  Although the 
North Korean press reported that Kim had once again begun to conduct on-site guidance visits in early December 
2008 (KCNA 2008c), video footage of the North Korean leader was not seen until April 2009 during the DPRK’s 
12th SPA meeting (which had been postponed due to his stroke the previous fall) (Pollack 2009, 156).  Nevertheless, 
these events resulted in Kim Jong-il’s decision to promote his youngest son as the next leader of North Korea.  
Although Kim Jong-il had survived and remained firmly in control of North Korea (AP 2008), this event most likely 
forced the regime to take steps to solidify the process of succession to the next leader of the DPRK.  The regime 
relied upon the same process, albeit significantly compressed, as Kim Il-sung used when he moved to install his own 
son as the designated successor to lead the DPRK. 
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power sharing, and power transition.
335
  The “apprenticeship stage” for Kim Jong-un in early 
2009, when he registered for candidacy in the upcoming March parliamentary elections; in April 
2009, Kim Jong-il named his son, along with Jang Sung-taek, to the National Defense 
Commission (Chang 2009; CNN 2009).
336
  This stage of succession culminated in the September 
2010 official “unveiling” of the next ruler of Korea after he was promoted to Vice Chairman of 
the Central Military Committee and four-star general (Ahn 2012, 33; Kwon and Chung 2012, 
186).   
From this point on, Kim Jong-un shared power with the elder Kim followed by his 
emergence  (“power transition”) as leader of the DPRK in December 2011 (Ahn 2012, 27).  The 
rise of at least three key figures provided the youngest Kim legitimacy in the DPRK power 
structure.  Elevated along with Kim Jong-un were Jang Sung-taek (Kim Jong-il’s sister and her 
husband) and KPA Chief of Staff Ri Young-ho, who was reportedly “charged with securing the 
military's support for Kim Jong-un” (Kim J. 2011, 15; Choi and Shaw 2010, 189).  According to 
some analysts, Jang was expected to assume the primary leadership role (Choi and Shaw 2010, 
176) and possibly “relegate Kim Jong-un to the role of a figurehead” (Manyin 2012, 5; 
Economist 2011). 
  Many analysts predicted that the succession would result in internal instability and 
possibly might spell the end of the regime as a “leadership transition from Kim Jong-il to Kim 
Jong-un…promises even more disaffection in the party and military” (Klinger 2010; Cha and 
Anderson 2012, 21).  Additionally, speculation persisted on how Kim Jong-un could effectively 
lead the reclusive state, given his age and lack of experience.
337
  In fact, in March 2010, a DPRK 
analyst observed, “North Korea is on the verge of collapse…not only because of Kim's illness, 
the food shortage, and failed currency reform, but also because of a failed government” 
(Ramstad 2010).  Another noted that after Kim Jong-il’s death, “The DPRK is now sailing into 
uncharted waters, formally under a greenhorn skipper whose seamanship is untested and 
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 For Kim Jong-il, the “apprenticeship” phase lasted from 1974-1980; from 1980-1991, a period of 
“power sharing” occurred; and from that point until Kim Il-sung’s death in 1994 was the “power transition” stage 
(Ahn 2011, 27).  
336
 Just a few months later, reports surfaced that Kim Jong-il had pancreatic cancer (AFP 2009d), although 
during a visit in July 2009 by former President Bill Clinton (to secure the release of two American journalists), Kim 
was said to look “unexpectedly spry” (Landler and Mazzetti, 2009). 
337
 Yet the Kim family have been relatively young when chosen to lead, as Kim Il-sung was about thirty-
three years old when he was chosen by the Soviets (Cha 2012, 76) and Kim Jong-il was approximately the same age 
when his father introduced the younger Kim as the next DPRK ruler.  Thus the choice, rushed by Kim Jong-il’s 
ailing health, of a young successor as the next DPRK ruler somewhat followed similar events in North Korea’s past.   
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unknown” (Foster-Carter 2012, 1).  Yet despite these dire predictions, the succession process had 
been underway since 2008, three years prior to Kim’s death in 2011.  The Kim regime had been 
engineering the succession with “on-the-job training,” systemic changes, and personnel changes 
“to ensure that the young leader would have a supportive environment” (Revere 2011).   
During the last year of Kim Jong-il’s life, there was a noticeable increase in Kim Jong-
un’s public appearances, especially his participation in on-site inspections of civilian and 
military units, and being present alongside Kim Jong-il during state visits of foreign dignitaries 
(Kim B. 2011; Foster-Carter 2012, 12).  Aside from seeking domestic support, Kim Jong-il 
visited both China and Russia during the succession period in order to “secure the assent of 
Beijing and Moscow to a second dynastic succession in North Korea” (Pollack 2011).  Thus, 
when Kim Jong-il died at the end of 2011, efforts to place his son in a position to govern North 
Korea (with the help of an inner core of advisors) were well underway.  Political instability did 
occur, yet I find no significant relationships between threats to the Kim regime’s grip on power 
and the level of HFP activities.  
 
 
Question 3.  Were economic difficulties associated with increased HFP?  (Hypothesis 2) 
 
Economic difficulties continued throughout the case study period and at least one 
incident (the sinking of South Korea’s Cheonan naval vessel) occurred right after the end of a 
“currency crisis” indicating a possible connection between these two events.  Although the 
DPRK’s economy performed better than in the 1990s, it was still was recovering from the famine 
period.  During this time, North Korea became a state with an institutionalized need for foreign 
humanitarian aid.  Despite heavy reliance on international aid, North Korea’s trade with China 
was at unprecedented levels and the DPRK seemed to continue to “muddle through.”  While the 
Kim regime faced domestic challenges on a number of fronts during this period, its own political 
system and the framework of a pending succession to Kim Jong-il limited its reactions to these 
internal problems.
338
  Nevertheless, the Kim regime continued to exercise continuity in its 
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 North Korea historically blames its economic problems on two key factors:  the loss of trade with the 
Soviet bloc at the end of the Cold War and the restrictions imposed upon it by US efforts to limit aid and enact 
economic sanctions (Eberstadt 2011, 3).  Western scholars tend to cite North Korea’s overall political structure as 
the primary reason for the DPRK’s economic difficulties in the 2000s.  North Korea’s economic problems are the 
direct result of system characteristics such as an inability to do long-range economic planning; the “hyper-
militarization of the national economy” through the DPRK’s Songun system;  problems with providing honest 
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domestic policies and even with the nomination of a young and inexperienced Kim family 
member as the next regime ruler, the DPRK leadership remained, at least to external observers, 
stable and in control of its society. 
The public response to the economic chaos of the 1990s and continued problems with 
North Korea was the emergence of an alternate market system that was “outside of the state 
economy” consisting of private services, manufactured goods, and local markets (Lankov 2012, 
15).
339
  Women generally ran these businesses, which evolved from isolated local and regional 
markets in the 1990s to a “unified national market” with cross-border links to China (Ishimaru 
2010, 346).  North Korean officials tolerated these markets and informally legitimized and 
regulated them beginning in 2003 (Hassig and Oh 2009, 75-76).  In 2007, the North Korean 
government began to limit the markets and began banning professionals (such as teachers and 
doctors) from working there. An internal KWP directive stated that  
  
a majority of women reaching employment age [were] working in the markets. 
[The report] criticizes in particular female university graduates quitting from their 
original jobs as teachers and doctors and becoming merchants due to poverty, 
saying: "Abandoning their duties to do business in the markets is an act lacking 
the basic conscience and morality."  (Sankei Shimbun 2007) 
 
Additionally, the document quoted Kim Jong-il as criticizing the markets for “taking 
away our socialist system and transforming it into a place susceptible to all sorts of non-socialist 
phenomenon” (Ryu 2010, 111).  In November 2009, the Kim regime introduced currency reform 
aimed at curbing black markets and other types of private enterprise in an effort to reestablish 
state control over the economy (Choe 2009a).  North Korean citizens were forced to exchange a 
limited amount of old money for new currency, which set off a market panic “with the prices of 
staples such as rice and corn rising 6,000% to 8,000% and the black market value of the won 
collapsing” (Haggard and Noland 2010, 549).340  In February 2010, the DPRK government took 
                                                                                                                                                             
feedback to decision makers on the status of the economy; poor or non-existent monetary, banking and credit 
policies; the inability to pay foreign debt; "allergy to licit international trade" and the development of legitimate 
markets for overseas customers; and a restrictive international business environment (Eberstadt 2011, 10-11). 
339
 Between 1998 and 2008, it was estimated that 78% of the income in North Korean households came 
from these types of ventures, which included agricultural products made from private fields and manufactured goods 
in homes or at “passively tolerated private workshops” (Lankov 2012, 15; Kim and Song 2008, 373).  
340
 The limits on the currency exchange meant that any personal funds above the relatively low exchange 
limits were effectively worthless, thus the extra cash that many North Korean citizens had saved to tide them over 
during the winter was lost (Choe 2009a). 
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the unprecedented step of issuing a public apology for the reform effort and executed the DPRK 
officials associated with the new monetary policy (Choe 2010 and KINU 2011b, 545).   
In March 2010, North Korea sank a South Korean navy patrol craft (the Cheonan), as 
described above in the first question.  The timing of this event and Pyongyang’s economic chaos 
surrounding its currency policy suggests that a relationship was potentially present and that 
North Korea attempted to use the attack to distract the public (or elites) from internal 
difficulties.
341
  This event also might have been a case of attempted diversion by the Kim regime 
that had unintended effects (i.e. the high number of South Korean deaths), to the extent that 
North Korea was unwilling to publically take credit for involvement in that event.   
Between 2008 and 2011, the DPRK’s economy grew slightly, averaging less than 1 
percent per year (BOK 2012).  Analysts attribute North Korea’s economic stagnation to the same 
conditions that the DPRK faced over the years including the inability of the North’s economy to 
interact with world markets, continued efforts at autarky, and overall industrial and technological 
obsolescence (Nanto and Chanlett-Avery 2010, 28).  North Korea’s national priorities continued 
to favor the military and the DPRK spent an estimated 15 to 27 percent of its GDP on national 
defense during the 2000s (Nanto and Chanlett-Avery 2010, 27).
342
  While estimates vary on 
North Korea’s defense spending, most analysts agree that it constitutes a disproportionate 
amount of the yearly DPRK budget and that the Kim regime has the most “militarized economy” 
in the world (Noland 2000, 72).
343
  Other estimates of North Korea’s economy are striking, such 
as the influence of agriculture, which constitutes 20.8%
344
 of the economy, and an 
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 This is one of many explanations for that attack.  North Korea’s attack on the Cheonan could have been 
part of posturing by military hardliners, an effort to change the disputed sea border, an attempt to force additional 
aid negotiations, part of Kim Jong-un’s rise as North Korea’s next leader, or revenge for either the naval skirmish in 
November 2009 or Seoul’s refusal to provide additional aid in 2010 (Bechtol 2010; Pomfret and Harden 2010; 
Chosun Ilbo 2013a).  While the motive for this action may never be known, it is clear that North Korea did not use 
this incident as part of its overt propaganda effort as it did with its nuclear and missile tests.  Thus, this event may 
have been intended for a select North Korean audience, possibly to appease a specific faction in the DPRK 
leadership (possibly the military).  The idea that the Cheonan sinking was instigated by the hard liners in North 
Korea’s military is reminiscent of the alleged attackers (in Kim Il-sung’s words “extreme leftists”) in the Blue 
House attack of 1968 (SK Foreign Ministry Archives 1972).  In any case, as in the Blue House attack, this incident 
was not something for which North Korea was willing to admit responsibility to either the DPRK public or the 
international community.    
342
 North Korea’s government reported that it spends 15.8% of its GDP in 2009, unchanged from 2008 
(EIU 2009, 19). 
343
 In the early 2000s, North Korea reportedly spent as much as $5 billion per year, or 25 percent of its 
GDP, on national defense (Samore 2004b). 
344
 In comparison, South Korea’s agricultural section makes up only 2.6% of its GDP, yet the ROK 
produces more food each year than the North (EIU 2011, 18). 
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underdeveloped service sector (31% of GDP), both of which continue to be centrally guided by 
the DPRK’s government (EIU 2011, 18).   
In comparison, the DPRK remained the poorest nation in East Asia, and among the most 
economically challenged in the world.  Yet North Korea’s continued economic struggles were 
not surprising, since the types of changes required to achieve financial success were not 
congruent with the Kim regime’s efforts to maintain its state of authoritarian isolationism.  To 
achieve growth and economic success, North Korea needed to make systemic changes to its 
economy, such as opening its economy to the international markets, taking active steps to reduce 
the DPRK’s stance as threatening to the international community, and normalizing ROK-DPRK 
relations (Eberstadt 2007, 304-305).  These types of concessions never occurred
345
 and thus the 
DPRK economy had little hope of approaching its potential.   
During the last year of the succession, the DPRK experienced some domestic economic 
gains, but also continued to struggle with food availability.  After expanding trade with China, 
North Korea’s economic output increased, but assessments from the World Food Program notes 
that millions of North Korean citizens lacked adequate food (ECOS 2013; UN WFP 2011, 4).
346
  
Additionally, inter-Korean aid began to show signs of resuming as Seoul approved limited 
amounts of food and medical aid for delivery by South Korean NGOs throughout the year 
(Foster-Carter 2011b, 8; Foster-Carter 2012, 16).  At the end of the case study period, the 
majority of the hostile foreign policy activities were diplomatic pronouncements and it was not 
until after Kim Jong-il’s death that the only substantial military activity occurred: the test launch 
of at least one short-range missile from North Korea’s east coast (KINU 2011; Yonhap 
2011a).
347
  As described above, there was at least one incident (the sinking of the Cheonan) that 
occurred simultaneously with a significant economic difficulties, suggesting a possible 
relationship between these events. 
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 Arguably, these types of economic and political actions would have threatened the Kim regime’s control 
over DPRK society and thus would never occur under the current political system in North Korea. 
346
 In November 2011, the World Food Program (UN WFP 2011, 4) surveyed portions of the DPRK and 
comments that during the next year, the DPRK’s estimated overall food shortage was 414,000 tons.  They also note 
that North Korea had decreased PDS allowances per person from May to September 2011 to 200 grams per person 
per day (well below the requirement) and that “Health officials interviewed reported a 50 to 100 percent increase in 
the admissions of malnourished children into pediatric wards compared to last year, a sharp rise in low-birth weight, 
and the mission team observed several cases of edema.  Inadequate food intake has clearly compounded the health 
and nutrition status of vulnerable groups” (UN WFP 2011, 4) 
347
 This event received limited attention in the press and from the ROK government. 
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Question 4.  Was social instability associated with periods of increased HFP?  (Hypothesis 3) 
 
There were significant levels of social instability during the case study period, but I find 
no direct relationships between the levels of social instability and the DPRK’s use of hostile 
foreign policy activities.  North Korea’s ability to feed itself improved by the mid-2000s, but 
problems persisted.  In addition to international food aid, the North Koreans became dependent 
on privatized markets to support their efforts to obtain needed goods, including food.  However, 
these markets were vulnerable to the actions of the regime and to food production levels.  The 
Kim regime’s 2005 ban on the private trade of grain resulted in criminalizing “the primary 
mechanism through which most Korean families obtained food” (Haggard and Noland 2009, 
384).  Floods in 2006 and 2007, coupled with continued efforts by the DPRK government to 
control the private markets made matters worse and famine again became a real possibility for 
the North Korean people.   
 The difference between the onsets of food shortages in the 2000s compared to the 1990s 
was the level of the “marketization of the North Korean economy” (Haggard and Noland 2008, 
20-21).  During the Great Famine, substantial aid did not arrive until two years after the crises 
began to emerge in 1993, while in the 2000s, international aid associations monitored and 
accessed much of Korea for over a decade, which allowed a more timely response, albeit still 
controlled by the DPRK authorities (Haggard and Noland 2008, 20).  Additionally, the increase 
of markets for private trading throughout North Korean society, including cross-border (DPRK-
PRC) grain trade, reduced the vulnerability of the average North Korean citizen to food 
shortages (Haggard and Noland 2008, 20).   
In July 2008, the UN reported “a progressive improvement in food security between 2000 
and 2005” due to both increased domestic production and high levels of international food 
assistance (UN 2008a, 1).  Yet flooding in 2006 and 2007 decreased harvests and left hundreds 
of thousands homeless resulting in significant food shortages in 2008.  The military and 
Pyongyang’s elite were not substantially affected, but more than 75% of the rest of North Korea 
reportedly had reduced their food intake and were eating “only two meals per day” 
(MacFarquhar 2008).  The UN (2008a, 1) also notes that access to food had decreased 
significantly via North Korea’s food distribution system (the PDS) and rations decreased from 
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500 grams (per person per day) in November 2007 to only 150 grams per day in June 2008.
348
  
Significant health problems for vulnerable groups, including persistent malnutrition, persisted 
and the UN (2008b, 22) notes, 
 
Some 37 percent of children under 6 were stunted, 23 percent were underweight 
and 7 percent were wasted. One third of all mothers with small children were 
malnourished, anemic, and dietary diversity (poor in protein, fats, minerals, and 
vitamins) was lacking. 
 
Additionally, infant and under-five mortality rates during this period stabilized and 
between 2005 and 2011, were at levels fifty percent lower than during the height of the 1990s 
famine (World dataBank 2012).  Thus while much of North Korea was suffering, the mortality 
rates for two of its most vulnerable groups were significantly better than during the previous 
decade. 
North Korea’s relations with the international community greatly influenced the levels of 
food available to the Kim regime during this time.  The nuclear test in 2006 resulted in South 
Korea’s suspension of fertilizer shipments, which were critical for DPRK food production.  This 
resulted in decreased harvests and, along with “general donor fatigue” on the part of both South 
Korea and other states, negatively affected humanitarian aid levels (Haggard and Noland 2009, 
384).  The DPRK’s second nuclear test in May 2009 and naval and artillery attacks against South 
Korea in 2010 also affected the international community’s willingness to provide additional aid, 
and resulted in the US, South Korea, and even China significantly curtailing their aid programs 
(Kim, S. 2010 and Hwang 2011).  In March 2011, the UN concluded that North Korea’s PDS 
would run out of food in two months and that over six million DPRK citizens were in “urgent 
need of international food assistance” (UN 2011).  Yet following Kim Jong-il’s death in 
December 2011, China reportedly began sending “significant” amounts of food and fuel aid to 
“ensure a successful power transition” (Snyder and Byun, 2012).349    
Refugee flows are another indicator of social distress for North Korea.  In the 2000s, 
refugees arriving in South Korea were at their highest levels ever, increasing from an average of 
fourty-nine per year in the 1990s to over two-thousand annually between 2000 and 2011 (MOU 
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 The benchmark of 450 grams per day was often used as the minimum required to satisfy human needs 
(Haggard and Noland 2011, 48), thus the ration of only 100 grams per day was substantially below required 
nutrition levels.   
349
 Details on the amount and type of Chinese humanitarian and energy aid were not made public. 
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2012a).
350
  Yet during this time, the border between China and North Korea became much “less 
porous” as both states enacted measures to tighten security along the Sino-DPRK border areas 
(Lankov 2009, 64).  The number of DPRK refugees living in China dropped significantly, 
decreasing from around 100,000 during the 1990s (Foster-Carter 2001, 4) to between 5,000 and 
10,000 in 2009 (Haggard and Noland 2011a, 2 quoting figures from Robinson 2010); scholars 
attributed this to both improving living conditions (food availability) in North Korea and 
increased border security (Lankov 2009, 64).  This data on refugees indicate that North Koreans 
seeking temporary solutions to difficult circumstances in the DPRK may have returned as 
conditions improved.  Those who chose to permanently leave the DPRK are possibly reflected in 
the numbers of refugees who left the DPRK for other countries, including South Korea.
351
      
While the declining numbers of DPRK refugees in China may or may not indicate 
improving domestic conditions, North Korea’s food availability and the DPRK’s ability to feed 
its population increased during this period.  In December 2012, the UN determined that 
improved harvests in both 2011 and 2012 narrowed the food gaps significantly and that a 
“consistent food assistance pipeline”352 helped reduce malnutrition rates (UN WFP 2012, 4).  Yet 
North Korea’s overall situation, despite its gains, remained dire.  Eberstadt (2011, 5) observes 
that North Korea was the only industrialized society in history to accomplish “such a fateful 
retrogression” in its decline from a state with a relatively modern economy to one that relied 
heavily on the international community to feed its people.  North Korea remained subject to 
“exogenous shocks in the form of both weather and rising world prices” because of the Kim 
regime’s inability and unwillingness to change its agricultural and governmental systems to 
function more efficiently (Haggard and Noland 2009, 385).  Yet, despite these domestic 
challenges, the Kim regime again weathered another significant food crisis, actually made 
progress (at least to external observers) towards its historic goal of juche, and reduced 
dependence on other states.  At the same time, I find no relationship between social instability 
and heightened HFP activities.    
                                                 
350
 Significant increases began in 1999, when reported refugee numbers doubled from the previous year to 
148, and numbers increased yearly thereafter and by 2002, there were over 1,000 North Koreans arriving in South 
Korea each year and by 2006, that number increased to over 2,000 (ROK MOU 2012a). 
351
 This description omits the complicated situations and extreme hardships faced by DPRK refugees.  For 
more details on both the circumstances and motives of DPRK refugees, see KINU (2011b), Hassig and Oh (2009) 
and Haggard and Noland (2011a).  
352
 This may have been referring to the Chinese food and energy support cited by Snyder and Byun (2012). 
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Question 5.  Were UN resolutions against the DPRK associated with increased HFP?  
(Hypothesis 4) 
 
UN sanctions were related to hostile foreign policy activities, and significant increases in 
the level of HFP by the Kim regime generally occurred during and after Security Council 
activities.  For example, North Korea’s April 2009 Taepodong-2 test prompted UNSC 
condemnation and the DPRK's nuclear test the following month resulted in the Security 
Council's passage of Resolution 1874, intended to impose stricter sanctions on the Kim regime’s 
missile and nuclear programs (Kimball 2012).  This resolution was expected to be more 
comprehensive than those enacted in 2006
353
 and provided for financial sanctions on any DPRK 
trade associated with its weapons programs (Nikitin 2010, 2).  Again, the effectiveness of these 
sanctions hinged on China’s participation, which continued to seek a role in negotiation and 
mediation, rather than active enforcement of the Security Council resolution (Haggard and 
Noland 2011b, 64).   
As with other high-profile hostile foreign policy actions by North Korea, this event began 
an oft-seen cycle of actions and reactions from the international community and North Korea.  
The United Nations Security Council condemned the launch as a violation of resolution 1718 and 
stated that it would pursue a tightening of sanctions (UN 2009a).  North Korea reacted by 
declaring that there “was no need for the six party talks anymore,” expelling UN nuclear 
dismantlement inspectors, and stating that the DPRK would resume its nuclear program (Landler 
2009; UN 2009b; KCNA 2009e).
354
  The KCNA stated that the UN Security Council’s 
condemnation and “challenging even the satellite launch for peaceful purposes, compels the 
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 In 2006, the United Nations Security Council passed two resolutions (1695 and 1718) condemning 
North Korea’s ballistic missile activities and nuclear test (UNSCR 2006a and 2006b).  These sanctions were 
primarily focused on North Korea’s trade in military and luxury goods and were intended to punish the Kim regime 
and its defense sector.  Yet Noland (2008, 9) found that there was no evidence that these UN sanctions had any 
effect on the DPRK’s luxury goods trade with China (its biggest trading partner) or on North Korea’s overall trade.  
Indeed most observers contend that PRC participation and enforcement was required for any meaningful sanctions 
against the Kim regime (Lee and Choi 2009, 57).  Thus, China’s lack of enforcement of the 2006 sanctions limited 
their overall effectiveness (CRS 2010, 2).  Additionally, rather than punishing the North Koreans, sanctions often 
have unintended domestic consequences and have been used by the Kim regime to fuel national sentiment as 
“propaganda tools” to support its grip on power (Nanto and Chanlett-Avery 2010, 14).   
354
 North Korea originally agreed in September 2005 to abandon “all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear 
programs,” although with no agreement on the implementation date (Kahn and Sanger 2005).  During the Six Party 
Talks in October 2007, North Korea agreed to begin physical dismantlement of its nuclear facilities (Cooper 2007).  
In April 2009, after disagreements over verification methods and the provision of aid, the DPRK announced it was 
expelling UN inspectors and restarting its nuclear program (Landler 2009). 
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DPRK to further increase its nuclear deterrent” (KCNA 2009e).  Three days after the UN 
Security Council Resolution passed, North Korea staged a 100,000-person rally in Pyongyang to 
denounce the UN action (KCNA 2009a).  During the protest, North Korean officials stated that 
the Korean People’s Army was “technically at war with the U.S.” and that it would “promptly 
exercise the right to preemptive strike to beat back the enemies' slightest provocation” (KCNA 
2009a). 
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1874 provided additional means to enforce 
previous sanctions.  This resolution included sanctions on “all arms-related trade and all training 
or assistance related to it” (UNSCR 2009; Haggard and Noland 2010, 562-563).  North Korea 
responded to these sanctions by stating, “It has become an absolutely impossible option for the 
DPRK to even think about giving up its nuclear weapons…Any attempted blockade of any kind 
will be regarded as an act of war” (KCNA 2009m).  Around the same time, the Kim regime also 
sentenced two American journalists (apprehended two months earlier on the Sino-DPRK border 
while doing research for a documentary) to 12 years in prison and launched a number of short 
and medium-range test missiles on 4 July: both actions were most likely intended to pressure the 
United States (Oh and Hassig 2010, 92-93).
355
  
These sanctions did little to change North Korea’s military behavior, as demonstrated by 
high-profile military engagements against South Korea (Cheonan and artillery attacks) and 
countless other hostile foreign policy actions during this period (Hom and Thompson 2010; 
Klinger 2010).  While the international community considered economic sanctions as a means to 
punish the North Koreans, these actions did little to inhibit their tendency to engage in high 
profile actions aimed at the “enemies” of the DPRK regime.  Thus, there were links between UN 
resolutions and increased levels of DPRK hostile actions as predicted by Hypothesis 4.  
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 Former US President Bill Clinton visited Pyongyang in August 2009 to secure the journalists’ release 
after their five month detention (Chanlett-Avery 2013, 8).  North Korea’s press stated that “Clinton expressed words 
of sincere apology to Kim Jong Il for the hostile acts committed by the two American journalists against the DPRK 
after illegally intruding into it. Clinton courteously conveyed to Kim Jong Il an earnest request of the U.S. 
government to leniently pardon them and send them back home from a humanitarian point of view” (KCNA 2009i).  
After their release, the US journalists stated that they entered the DPRK “for less than a minute,” returned across the 
border, and then were arrested by DPRK guards in China and taken to North Korea (Kirk 2009).   
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Question 6.  Were ROK leadership changes associated with increased North Korean hostile 
foreign policy activities?  (Hypothesis 5) 
 
 During the South Korean presidential election in 2007 and new president’s assumption 
of office in 2008, there were relatively low levels of DPRK hostilities and most were related to 
political rhetoric, rather than significant HFP actions.  South Korea’s presidential race during this 
period included the election of conservative Lee Myung Bak as leader of the ROK ushering in a 
new, more conflict-ridden period for both North and South Korea.   
 As it had during previous elections, North Korea voiced its concern on its preferences of 
liberal versus conservative South Korean presidential candidates during the months preceding 
the 2007 ROK elections (Lee 1992; Breen 1992; KCNA 2007a; KCNA 2007b).  Kim Jong-il’s 
hosting of South Korea’s President Roh in the second-ever inter-Korean summit in early October 
2007 demonstrated that the DPRK regime preferred the liberal candidate Chung Dong-young 
(Sudworth 2007; Snyder 2009, 93-94).  Alternatively, the North Korean regime made negative 
public references to Lee and referred to his conservative Grand National Party as a “pro-U.S. 
flunkeyist traitor party which is selling off the nation” (KCNA 2007a).  North Korean hostile 
foreign policy actions from September through December 2007 were limited to political 
statements and rhetoric, rather than military activities (UNC 2012).  Yet there were a number of 
specifically targeted statements in the North Korean press against the third candidate, ultra-
conservative independent Lee Hoi-chang who entered the race in November (one month before 
elections) and advocated both denuclearization and regime change for the DPRK (Onishi 2007; 
KCNA 2007b; KCNA 2007c).  
Lee Myung-bak won the 2007 election with 48.6 percent of the vote versus liberal 
candidate Chung Dong-young’s 26.2 percent and the largest margin of victory in recent history 
(Herman 2007).
356
  Lee’s election effectively spelled the end of the “Sunshine Policy” as he 
immediately proposed to abolish South Korea’s Ministry of Unification while declaring that 
reinvigorating the ROK-US alliance was his top policy goal (Choe 2008; Snyder 2009, 87).
357
  
Beginning in March 2008 (the month following Lee’s assumption of office), North Korea began 
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 Independent candidate Lee Hoi Chang received 15 percent of the overall vote (Herman 2007).  
357
 In November 2010, South Korea’s Ministry of Unification formally declared the end of the “Sunshine 
Policy” and that “a decade of cooperation, cross-border exchanges and billions of dollars in aid did not change 
Pyongyang's behavior or improve the lives of North Korean citizens.” 
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to engage in a series of provocative actions,
358
 ultimately culminating in the intense HFP 
activities in 2010.  Thus while the election period itself was not associated with heightened levels 
of North Korean activity, Lee’s election as president occurred at the beginning of a period of 
increased tensions on the peninsula. 
   
Question 7.  Were US leadership changes associated with increased North Korean hostile 
foreign policy activities? (Hypothesis 6) 
 
I find no direct connection between the US presidential election and DPRK hostile 
foreign policy actions.  The 2008 US presidential election occurred at a time when the US was 
involved in two long-term overseas conflicts (Iraq and Afghanistan), and although much of the 
public’s attention was focused on domestic issues (especially the economy), the candidates had 
clear and substantially different positions on how to deal with the DPRK.  The Republican 
Party’s candidate, John McCain (a decorated Vietnam veteran), was reportedly dissatisfied with 
the Bush administration’s policies towards the DPRK.  Aside from demanding a complete and 
verified dismantlement of North Korea’s nuclear program, McCain also wanted to purse “human 
rights, illegal and illicit activities, economic and political reform, proliferation, and reduction of 
the conventional military threat from North Korea” (Cheon 2008; USAPC 2008; Shorts and Min 
2008, 32-36).   
The challenger, first-term democratic Senator Barak Obama, advocated direct talks with 
North Korea along with participation in multilateral negotiations, such as the Six Party Talks, as 
a means to coax the DPRK to abandon its nuclear program.  Obama stated that he would be 
willing to meet directly and unconditionally with the leaders of Iran, Syria, Venezuela, Cuba, and 
North Korea to improve relations with those states (USAPC 2008; Olsen 2008; Phillips 2008).  
Given the choice of the two candidates, it seems likely that North Korea favored Obama and his 
pledge to conduct open dialogue with the DPRK and this supported Kim Jong-il’s previous 
contention that bilateral negotiations (between the DPRK and US) were the only way to move 
forward on the nuclear issue (Shorts and Min 2008, 32; Powell 2009).  McCain’s hawkish 
policies potentially would complicate the Kim regime’s negotiations by subjecting North 
Korea’s government to international scrutiny and multilateral diplomacy (USAPC 2008).  Yet, 
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 These began with missile launches in late March 2008 and included a series of events (generally at least 
one event involving the DPRK military every 1-2 months) through the end of 2010 (UNC 2012; KINU 2011). 
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despite the characteristics of both US presidential candidates, the DPRK refrained from any 
significant public statements of support or denouncement of either Obama or McCain 
(KCNAWatch 2013).  
North Korea’s hostile foreign policy actions during 2008 (through the November 
elections) were generally lower than in previous years and dominated by diplomatic 
pronouncements criticizing the US or ROK governments (KINU 2011; UNC 2012).  The most 
significant DPRK activities during this time included the killing of a South Korean tourist by a 
North Korean soldier (resulting in the closing of the Mount Kumgang tourist resort) and coastal 
short range missile tests in March, May and October (UNC 2012; KINU 2011; BBC 2011b).  
Also during this time, North Korea negotiated 500,000 tons in heavy fuel oil shipments and 
500,000 tons of food aid in exchange for its continued dismantling of its nuclear program (which 
began in 2007) and participation in the Six Party Talks (Manyin and Nikitin 2010, 5-8; Niksch 
2010, 7).  Along with this aid, the US made two symbolic concessions to the DPRK in efforts to 
spur continued negotiations:  the Bush administration removed North Korea from the “Trading 
with the Enemy Act” (allowing for the lifting of some sanctions) and delisted the DPRK from the 
“state sponsors of terrorism” designation (Niksch 2010, 8).359  Hence, during this time the North 
Koreans had significant incentives to limit conduct of aggressive foreign policy actions in order 
to sustain the external aid provided by the Six Party Talk participants.  
After Obama’s election win in November 2008 (with a 12 percent margin of victory over 
McCain), the DPRK issued no public statements on the results (Nagourney 2010; KCNAWatch 
2013).  The KCNA did acknowledge Obama’s inauguration in January 2009 by noting, “Barack 
Obama took office as the 44th president of the United States on Jan. 20” with no accompanying 
rhetoric (KCNA 2009l).  In March 2009, just two months after Obama was sworn in as US 
president, negotiations with North Korea broke down and by May 2009, the North launched a 
long range rocket (the Taepodong-2), restarted its nuclear program and conducted its second 
nuclear weapons test (Manyin and Nikitin 2010, 7; Choe 2009b; Kimball 2012).  While the 
incidence of DPRK hostile foreign policy decreased significantly during the months prior to the 
election of Barak Obama, this hiatus did not last.  The following year, hostility levels of Kim 
regime foreign policy actions rose to levels not seen since the late 1960s.  
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 Cheon (2008) notes that these actions seemed to be more congruent with then-candidate Obama’s policy 
line of directly engaging “rogue regimes” than Republican candidate McCain’s more hard line approach to North 
Korean issues.  
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Question 8.  Did ROK/US strategic-level military exercises correspond with increased hostile 
foreign policy activities?  (Hypothesis 7) 
 
During the case study period, military exercises continued on both sides of the DMZ, 
ranging from the tactical to the strategic, and annual joint ROK-US exercises seemed to cause 
heightened levels of DPRK denouncements.  Additionally, there were linkages between other 
types of conflict and ROK-US exercise periods.  Between 2008 and 2011, ROK and US military 
forces conducted at least four strategic-operational (and countless lower level military) annual 
exercises intended to both increase readiness and act as a visible deterrent to DPRK provocative 
actions (D’Orazio 2012, 276-277; author analysis).  For example, the large-scale exercises listed 
in Table 4.5 all occurred in 2010: 
 
Table 4.5  US-ROK Military Exercises (2008-2011) 
Exercise Month Type Purpose Sources 
KEY 
RESOLVE 
March 
(annual)  
Command 
post  
Designed to “repel assault from North 
Korea.” 
Halloran 2011, 
74 
FOAL 
EAGLE 
March 
(annual) 
Field training 
exercise 
Focused on “operational plans in case 
of an all-out war on the Korean 
Peninsula” 
Halloran 2011, 
74; Chosun 
Ilbo 2010a 
Invincible 
Spirit
360
 
July  
2010 
Maritime and 
air readiness  
Exercise was “in response to the 
sinking of the South Korean warship 
Cheonan and intended to send a strong 
message to Pyongyang to stop 
‘provocative and warlike acts’” 
Halloran 2011, 
75; CNN 
2010a 
ULCHI 
FREEDOM 
GUARDIA
N 
August 
(annual) 
Command 
post  
Conducted “to ensure that our 
Alliance is prepared 
to respond to threats across the 
spectrum of conflict, including north 
Korean provocations.” 
USFK PAO 
2010; Ham 
2010 
Unnamed November 
2010 
Maritime 
readiness 
Exercise was “meant as a warning to 
North Korea for recent provocations, 
including last week’s deadly artillery 
attack on an island populated by South 
Koreans in the Yellow Sea.” 
Fackler 2010 
 
 These exercises provoked hostile statements from the North Koreans, such as a published 
DPRK response to the Invincible Spirit event (in July 2010) stating that it would respond with a 
“powerful nuclear deterrence” (Harlan 2010; KCNA 2010a).  The US and South Korea 
conducted the Invincible Spirit exercise in reaction to the North Korean sinking of a ROK naval 
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 This was the first time this exercise was held and it was conducted in direct response to the sinking of 
the ROK naval vessel Cheonan in March 2010. 
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vessel (the Cheonan) in March 2010 (ROK MND 2010, 220; Halloran 2011, 75; CNN 2010a).  A 
similar exercise occurred in November 2010 after the Yeonpyeong Island shelling (Fackler 
2010).  Thus, while DPRK hostile foreign policy actions often occur in response to ROK-US 
military exercises, in these two cases a ROK-US “show of force” exercise was conducted as a 
direct result of a specific DPRK hostile action.  In these instances, a DPRK military action 
initiated a ROK-US response, but in other cases, exercises conducted by the ROK and its allies 
were sometimes accompanied by changes in the levels of HFP by North Korea. 
 North Korea’s hostile foreign policy actions between 2008 and 2011 are well-
documented from external sources
361
 and a cursory examination of the levels of DPRK activity 
during ROK-US military examination follows. 
 
Figure 4.13  DPRK Conflict Level and ROK-US Military Exercises 
 
  KINU (2011); UNC (2012)
362
  
 
As shown in Figure 4.13, there is a visual correlation between the levels of hostility and 
military exercises, at least during the KEY RESOLVE – FOAL EAGLE (KR-FE) exercises 
(denoted by yellow diamonds) each March from 2008 to 2010.  Additionally, significant hostile 
foreign policy actions occurred in August 2010, around the same time as ULCHI FREEDOM 
GUARDIAN (UFG), and during the Yellow Sea naval exercise in November 2010.  After that 
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 As previously noted, the lack of access to reliable information from inside North Korea remains a key 
limitation of this study. 
362
 Although this chart is formatted differently than previous ones, it provides an important example of the 
relationship between military exercises and hostile foreign policy actions by month, demonstrating that there is a 
correlation, at least during some events, of conflict to strategic exercises. 
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point, activities decreased steadily.  Concurrently, there were comparatively lower levels of 
activities during UFG exercises in 2008, 2009, and 2011 and during the KR-FE exercise in 2011.  
Nonetheless, there is evidence that at least some of the exercises coincided with heightened 
levels of DPRK activity.  This conclusion contrasts with D’Orazio’s (2012, 291) quantitative 
examination of military exercises from 1998-2010 which found that North Korea’s “response to 
US and South Korea joint exercises is not unique and not systematically different from regular 
DPRK activity.”  Thus, while there was a correlation between heightened levels of HFP activities 
and ROK-US exercises, it was not consistent throughout the case study period. 
 
Question 9.  Was the presence of a conservative ROK government associated with increased 
HFP? (Hypothesis 8) 
 
Conservative Lee Myung-bak was the ROK President throughout the case study and his 
political orientation most likely contributed to increased HFP action by the DPRK.  Although 
relations between the Koreas had historically been tenuous, the Kim Dae-jung administration 
(1998-2003) pursued a policy of engagement with the DPRK, culminating in the 2000 North-
South Summit (ICG 2010, 8).  The Roh Myoo-hung administration (2003-2008) continued to 
follow his predecessor’s “Sunshine Policy” of cooperation and reconciliation with the DPRK 
(Kim, DJ 1998; Kim C. 2005, 12).
363
  During this time, the South Korean administration altered 
its relationship (at least at the national level) with the US and pursued a more independent 
foreign policy with the DPRK.  This policy was a continuation of the Kim Dae-jung’s efforts 
based on the concept of “peace and prosperity” towards North Korea and reflected rising anti-
American sentiment in South Korea at the time (Zhu 2007, 75).
364
   
In November 2004, Roh criticized the Bush administration’s pressure on the DPRK to 
give up its nuclear ambitions and defended “North Korea’s assertion that it needed a “nuclear 
deterrent” in view of its perception of a threat from the United States” (Niksch 2005, 1).  
Although both the US and South Korea focused on the Six Party Talks as a venue to 
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 Levin (2004, 21) notes that during his election campaign, Roh often criticized the US and increased 
“‘anti-American’ sentiment (intentionally or otherwise) in an apparent effort to appeal to young Korean voters who 
want a more ‘equal’ relationship with the United States.” 
364
 The rise of anti-American sentiment was strongest among the younger Koreans, who increasingly 
viewed the US as a major impediment to ROK-DPRK reconciliation.  Incidents involving US service members 
stationed in South Korea, criticism of US operations in Iraq, fewer concerns over attacks by the DPRK military, and 
US inaction over legacy disagreements between Japan and South Korea all served to influence increasingly negative 
views of the United States policy towards North Korea (Zhu 2007, 75-76) 
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diplomatically address North Korea’s nuclear program, the South seemed less concerned with 
North Korea’s 2006 test than the US.365  The Roh administration focused on avoiding military 
conflict with the DPRK through an emphasis on economic relations “as a means to forestall the 
North’s collapse and to support its economic reform” (Snyder 2007, 36-37).  This emphasis on 
economic cooperation with North Korea despite its hostile actions contrasted with South Korean 
conservatives, such as Lee Myung-bak, elected to succeed Roh in 2007. 
Lee’s policies were exactly as the North feared: one of his first acts was to end 
“unconditional aid” to the DPRK and required progress on the nuclear issue as a prerequisite to 
economic aid cooperation with the Kim regime (Haggard and Noland 2010, 558).  North Korea’s 
reaction was to condemn Lee publically (the first direct criticism of a South Korean leader since 
2000) by stating that the “Lee regime will be held fully accountable for the irrevocable 
catastrophic consequences to be entailed by the freezing of the inter-Korean relations” (Foster-
Carter 2008; KCNA 2008a).   
In fact, many in South Korea blamed Lee’s policies for antagonizing North Korea to take 
actions such as the sinking of the Cheonan (Klinger 2011).  Others criticized the Lee 
administration for its lack of action during incidents such as the killing of a South Korean tourist 
at a North Korean resort, and the two Yellow Sea attacks in 2010 (Fackler 2010).
366
  In any case, 
from 2008 to 2011, the South Korean administration was much less willing to negotiate with the 
Kim regime, which complicated DPRK efforts to gain additional humanitarian aid from the 
South , which had, along with the United States, provided the majority of humanitarian aid to the 
DPRK prior to Lee’s election (Manyin 2010, 20-21).  While the Lee administration sometimes 
interfered with North Korea’s efforts to obtain international aid and continue its intra-Korean 
cooperative business ventures,
367
 a “hostile” administration in the South did ultimately provide 
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 In fact, South Korea seemed more concerned with US reactions to the nuclear test, than with the 
DPRK’s emerging nuclear capability.  Cha (2012, 268) notes that after North Korea’s nuclear test, the South 
Koreans feared the US might take military action and during a phone call with US President Bush on addressing the 
test in the UN Security Council, Roh “rapidly read talking points about how the United States should not provoke a 
war in Korea.”   
366
 Lee was criticized for seemingly tepid responses to the killing of a South Korean tourist (South Korea 
suspended tours to the resort and banned civilian groups from visiting the DPRK) and the Cheonan sinking as he 
responded with “mild measures like reducing the South’s already minuscule trade with the North” (Fackler 2010). 
367
 North and South Korea operated two joint economic ventures during this time:  the Kaesong Industrial 
Complex and the Mount Kumgang tourist resort.  Accessible to South Koreans, both of these special economic 
zones were the result of Kim Dae-jung’s Sunshine Policy and intended to "nudge the North toward embracing 
economic reforms and opening up to the world" (Onishi 2006).  While the Mount Kumgang tourist resort was closed 
in 2008 (BBC 2011b), the Kaesong Industrial complex included around 100 South Korean companies employing 
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additional support to the Kim regime’s domestic propaganda efforts.  North Korea routinely 
referred to the Lee administration as the “puppet regime” and branded the South Korean 
president “Traitor Lee” and “the puppet prime minister” (KCNA 2009b; KCNA 2011b).  Thus 
while the Lee administration made North Korea’s efforts to obtain international aid more 
difficult, it did help sustain the Kim regime’s efforts to divert public attention by reminding the 
public that North Korea was constantly being threatened by both the Lee “puppet government” 
and US “imperialist forces” (KCNA 2011c).  Thus, the presence of Lee’s conservative 
government was most likely related to increases in North Korea’s HFP activities during the case 
study period. 
4.d.3.  Summary and Case Study Conclusions 
On 19 December 2011, North Korean media announced that Kim Jong-il died of “great 
mental and physical strain…on a train during a field guidance tour” and that a medical exam 
confirmed it was a heart attack (KCNA 2011d; KCNA 2011e).
368
  US and South Korean 
intelligence organizations knew nothing about Kim's death until it was announced by the KCNA.  
This was a stark reminder of the "secretive nature of North Korea, a country not only at odds 
with most of the world but also sealed off from it in a way that defies spies or satellites" (Landler 
and Choe 2011).  While this event did catch the entire world by surprise, North Korea showed no 
signs of instability or pending collapse as a result (ITAR 2011).  By all accounts, the North 
Koreans began a period of public mourning that was not accompanied by any detectable moves 
by factions to seize control of the government, mass defections, or any other sign of internal 
distress (JEN 2011).  The regime succession that the North Koreans had been planning for had 
finally come.   
North Korean media announcements not only mourned the death of their “Dear Leader” 
but also noted public and military allegiance to Kim Jong-un (KCNA 2011f).  For example, on 
the same day Kim Jong-il’s death was announced, the KCNA (2011g) noted, “Our army and 
people will struggle staunchly for an ultimate victory true to the leadership of Kim Jong-un.”  
The younger Kim was declared “Supreme Leader” and head of both the North Korea's military 
                                                                                                                                                             
40,000 North Koreans to produce “light industrial goods to be sold in South Korea” (Oh and Hassig 2010, 93) and 
was still in operation as of early 2013. 
368
 There was speculation over the actual circumstances of Kim's death.  South Korean intelligence sources 
note that the train Kim reportedly died on while travelling never left Pyongyang, leading to rumors that the North 
Korean leader had been “killed as a result of power struggles” (Straits Times 2011; Parry 2011).  Whether or not this 
was true is difficult (if not impossible) to verify. 
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and the Korean Worker's Party; by the end of December 2011, Kim Jong-un formally became the 
leader of the DPRK (Choe 2011a; KCNA 2011h).   
This examination of the conditions surrounding North Korea's foreign policy activities 
from 2008 to 2011 provides insight into why the Kim regime, despite challenging domestic 
conditions, continued to pursue hostile actions regardless of the international consequences.  
While there were collateral benefits to the development and testing of nuclear technology (such 
as regional security posturing), these types of hostile foreign policy actions seems to have also 
been targeted at North Korea's domestic audience.  The Kim regime took a significant risk 
during its most provocative actions:  both the direct attacks against South Korea could have 
potentially escalated into a sustained conflict.  Additionally, the testing of both nuclear devices 
and potential delivery systems (missiles) was not only alarming to South Korea, but of 
significant concern to the entire international community.  Surprisingly (but probably not to 
North Korea), the external reactions from the ROK, US and other states to these events were 
muted and demonstrated the unique and threatening security position North Korea holds in the 
international order.  Table 4.6 summarizes and analyzes these findings on North Korea’s actions 
as it navigated the succession process. 
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Table 4.6  Structured Analysis Results:  Regime Succession (2008-2011) 
Category Question Test Result Details 
Dependent Variable 
(HFP) 
1.  What was the level of hostile foreign 
policy during the case study? 
Higher 
Conflict scores averaged 
1188 per year and were 
higher than historic 
norms.
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Internal Conditions  
 
Independent 
Variables 
(Proposition 1) 
2.  Was political instability associated 
with heightened HFP activities?  
(H1) 
No 
Instability occurred, but 
there were no direct links 
to HFP during this period. 
3.  Were economic difficulties 
associated with increased HFP?  
(H2) 
Yes 
The DPRK conducted at 
least one significant event 
in conjunction with 
economic difficulties.
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4.  Was social instability associated with 
periods of increased HFP?  (H3) 
No 
Although social instability 
was present in this case, 
no links with HFP were 
found. 
External Conditions 
 
Independent 
Variables 
(Proposition 2) 
5.  Were UN resolutions against the 
DPRK associated with increased 
HFP?  (H4) 
Yes 
HFP activities occurred in 
reaction to UN 
resolutions. 
6.  Were ROK leadership changes 
associated with increased HFP 
actions?  (H5) 
No 
The DPRK increased 
rhetoric but not 
significant HFP actions. 
7.  Were US leadership changes 
associated with increased HFP 
actions?  (H6) 
No 
The DPRK refrained from 
commenting on the 
campaign. 
8.  Did ROK/US strategic-level military 
exercises consistently influence 
DPRK hostile actions?  (H7) 
Yes 
There were changes, 
although inconsistent, in 
DPRK activities in 
conjunction with strategic 
exercises. 
9.  Was the presence of a conservative 
ROK government associated with 
increased HFP? (H8) 
Yes 
Conflict levels increased 
with the arrival of a new 
ROK conservative 
government. 
 
As shown above, Proposition 1 finds limited support in the linkage between North 
Korea’s economic conditions and external hostility behavior, at least in the case of its sinking of 
the Cheonan (H2), although not without qualification.  This event occurred at the same time as a 
significant economic crisis (currency reform), but for some reason, the DPRK did not 
acknowledge the act.  Thus, the event was potentially linked to DPRK economic conditions.  I 
find support for P2 in the relationship between UN resolutions and conflict:  heightened levels of 
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 The average yearly conflict score between 1960 and 2011 was 735 (see Appendix C). 
370
 North Korea never admitted responsibility for this incident (the Cheonan sinking), which occurred in 
conjunction with the end of the DPRK’s 2009-2010 currency crisis (Chosun Ilbo 2013a). 
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HFP, such as missile firings and intense rhetoric, were present in the weeks following the UN 
Security Council declarations.  Additionally, in support of P2, I find that strategic-level exercises 
were also associated with changes in HFP levels, although on a varied basis.  Finally, the 
explanation that DPRK conflict is simply the result of a ROK conservative administration (H8) 
in power finds support as the arrival of Lee Myung-bak coincided with increases in HFP 
activities.  
The Kim regime potentially used hostile foreign policy events (such as the nuclear and 
missile tests and Yellow Sea incidents) as means to coalesce domestic support around Kim Jong-
il’s appointed successor.  While the actions also served to enable other policy objectives, such as 
obtaining enhanced bargaining positions with the ROK and United States, there is a clear linkage 
between these actions and the rise of Kim Jong-un.  These actions also enabled the regime to 
retain its grip on power and again demonstrated that North Korea could weather external 
pressures from the international community to change its behavior.  Internal collapse had been 
predicted repeatedly yet it never happened, at least to outside observers.
371
  The 2008 to 2011 
succession between Kim Jong-il and his son, Kim Jong-un was another perceived crisis for the 
regime and again, the international community predicted that North Korea would finally meet its 
end as it attempted an unprecedented third dynastic-communist assumption of power. 
Another source of domestic stress for the North Korean government was both the 
declining health of its leader and how to manage a second “dynastic succession.”  North Korea 
followed a compressed version of its first familial success in the introduction and installation of 
Kim Jong-un (Ahn 2011, 27).  By all external indications, aside from “administrative” shuffling 
(or purges) of some individuals, Kim Jong-un rose to power in North Korea with few difficulties 
(Kim, J. 2011, 15; ITAR 2011).  The hostile foreign policy events during this period (especially 
the Yellow Sea incidents and nuclear test) accompanied succession efforts and helped solidify 
Kim Jong-un as the unquestioned successor in the minds of the DPRK public, military and elite 
class (Kim B. 2011; Foster-Carter 2012, 12).  Thus, while the analysis of the individual 
conditions faced by North Korea this case study provides some support to P1 and more 
substantial support to P2, a more important conclusion is that diversion was a policy tool used by 
the Kim regime to contend with the conditions it faced. 
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 Cumings (2011, 54) notes that North Korea did, as a society, collapse during the 1990s as a result of the 
loss of external communist support and famine, yet this did not result in the “collapse of state power” which often 
has been the case in other states. 
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           Figure 4.14  Timeline: The Succession 
North Korean Events
Food security improves
Kim Jong-il’s health declines
Kim Jong-un chosen as KJI’s 
successor
Taepodong II missile test
DPRK conducts second nuclear test 
(first was in 2006)
DPRK attempts currency reform
ROK Cheonan naval vessel sunk
Severe flooding decreases harvests
Yellow sea island (held by ROKs) 
shelled by DPRK
Death of Kim Jong-il
Kim Jong-un becomes DPRK leader
2008
2010
2011
2012
2009
US-ROK Events
Lee Myung-bak elected ROK 
President
Barack Obama elected US President
UN Security Council Resolution 
1874 passed
Large-scale ROK-US naval 
exercises
More large-scale ROK-US naval 
exercises
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 4.e.  Case Study Summary and Quantitative Analysis Comparison 
 
In these three cases, I examine and test the relationships between the conditions North 
Korea faces and its use of hostile foreign policy.  These cases provide insight into critical periods 
of North Korea’s development and its conflict activities had a significant impact on both regional 
and international systems.  In the 1960s, North Korea emerged as viable communist state that 
was willing to use military force to achieve national goals.  Next (in the 1990s), the DPRK’s 
famine left the Kim regime dependent on international aid for survival.  Finally, in the late 
2000s, the Kim regime’s succession and nuclear program heralded a new phase of insecurity for 
both East Asia and the international community.  In the following sections, I discuss the case 
study conclusions and then compare these results to the quantitative analysis.    
4.e.1.  Case Study Comparisons 
These cases also show North Korea’s progression from a lesser communist state to a 
nuclear-capable nation that is concurrently dependent on international aid for survival.  Yet 
throughout its history, the DPRK never hesitated to engage in intense levels of conflict with 
South Korea or the US to achieve national goals.  The following chart provides a comparison of 
the intensity levels of North Korea’s hostile foreign policy throughout the study period. 
 
Figure 4.15  Hostile Foreign Policy Levels Compared 
  
Source:  Korean Conflict Database (Appendix C)   
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The conflict levels during the late 1960s (and the first case study) are at levels higher than 
at any other time between 1960 and 2011 (66 percent higher than historical norms).  This period 
includes direct attacks against South Korea and the US (such as the Blue House attack, the USS 
Pueblo seizure, and the EC-121 downing) and almost daily clashes along the North-South land 
and maritime borders.  Conflict levels ebbed and flowed through the end of the Cold War and 
were at much lower levels during the 1990s and the famine period (18 percent below the study’s 
annual rates).  During the 2000s, North Korea’s hostility levels increase again, approaching Case 
1 levels (61 percent higher than historical averages), as the Kim regime pursued a more 
aggressive foreign policy through its nuclear program, missile tests, and conventional military 
engagements with South Korea.  Yet the historic intensity scores alone do not provide enough 
information about the relationships argued by the propositions or hypotheses.  In Table 4.7 
below, I provide a more detailed comparison of the cases in relation to the proposals, hypotheses, 
and structured analysis.   
 
Table 4.7  Case Study Comparisons 
  
 
Case 1 
DPRK  
Emerges 
Case 2 
Famine 
Case 3 
Regime 
Succession 
Dependent 
Variable 
Hostile foreign policy level compared to 
    historic norms?
372
 
 
Higher  
 
Lower 
 
Higher 
     
P1 
Supported? 
H1 – Political Instability No No No 
H2 – Economic Instability Yes Yes Yes 
H3 – Social Instability No No No 
 
    
P2 
Supported? 
H4 – UN Resolutions n/a No Yes 
H5 – ROK Leadership Changes Yes Yes No 
H6 – US Leadership Changes Yes No No 
H7 – Strategic Military Exercises  Yes Yes Yes 
H8 – ROK Administration Type Yes No Yes 
 
The first two cases show relationships between economic instability and hostile foreign 
policy activities, but these observations are insufficient to provide overall support to P1.  In Case 
1, relative domestic stability occurred within the DPRK, but there were heightened levels of 
external conflict that occurred during that period.  During Case 2, the domestic distress caused 
by famine conditions should have (based on diversionary theory and P1) caused heighted levels 
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 Cases 1 and 3 were 66 percent and 61 percent higher than yearly historical averages respectively.  Case 
2 was 18 percent lower than annual averages (Appendix C).  
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of conflict.  In both cases, despite some linkage between HFP and conflict actions, the overall 
relationships between conflict and domestic difficulties are inadequate to provide support to P1.   
In the third case study, North Korea experienced significant levels of domestic distress 
(both from an economic and political perspective).  Although direct linkages between domestic 
conditions and conflict were difficult to identify, except for the timing of the sinking of the 
Cheonan, the heightened levels of HFP during the case study period help provide support to P1.  
In all three of the case studies, P2 finds significant support, as external conditions were 
influential and often related to DPRK hostile foreign policy actions.  The characteristics of the 
ROK government, to include leadership changes, administration type, and military exercises 
(H5, H6, H7, and H8), are related to heighted levels of HFP.   
At the same time, diversionary-type activities were present in all three cases.  In the 
1960s, increased prosperity for North Korea occurred, but HFP behavior was at its highest levels 
and diversionary-type behavior, associated with Kim’s efforts to reunify the Koreas, was present.  
Almost three decades later, the DPRK experienced significant levels of domestic distress 
(famine) and, it responded (albeit at lower levels than the 1960s) with HFP actions to include the 
development of nuclear technology, ballistic missile advances and testing, clandestine infiltration 
activities and naval clashes.  The DPRK effectively used these events to bolster its negotiating 
position, obtain needed aid, and distract the public, eventually allowing the Kim regime to 
weather the crisis.  The final case also included significant levels of economic difficulties and 
concurrently demonstrated that the Kim regime’s primary goal is to remain in control of the 
DPRK.  Beginning in 2008, the Kim regime began to socialize the DPRK public with the next 
hereditary succession, punctuated by additional nuclear tests, missile launches, and attacks in the 
Yellow Sea.  These actions appeared to be related to the Kim regime’s focus on maintaining 
sovereignty and power over North Korea’s elites, military, and citizens.   
 Throughout all three cases, the Kim regime continued to use the threat of external actors 
(the US, ROK, and Japan) as a means to maintain an air of constant “wartime readiness.”  This 
method of maintaining political stability (control over the DPRK public) through fostering social 
instability has been a characteristic of all three of the Kim regimes.
373
  Yet, diversion was only 
one method used by the Kim regime to respond to domestic conditions, and other techniques, 
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 The Kim Jong-un regime continues to emphasize that North Korea constantly faces war with both the 
US and South Korea (KCNA 2013a). 
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such as suppression, imprisonment, and executions were used as a response to the challenges 
experienced by the DPRK (Hassig and Oh 2009, 231; Lim 1993; Cho 1993).  North Korea has 
also continued, at least since the 1990s, to reach out to the international community for aid to 
sustain its economy and feed its people.  This “institutionalization of support” has become 
required for the DPRK to survive as a sovereign state
374
 and thus actions, both of concession and 
hostility, often occur simultaneously.    
Finally, the Kim regime pursued divergent and often conflicting policies in attempts to 
maintain power.  One enduring characteristic of the Kim regime was its willingness to use varied 
foreign policy approaches (from peaceful engagement to armed conflict) to achieve its domestic 
goals.  These foreign policy approaches were influenced by internal conditions, such as domestic 
economic considerations, as well as the influence of external factors, including ROK election 
periods and strategic military exercises.  Yet in all cases, the Kim regime continued attempts to 
focus its citizens on conditions outside the regime.  The continued presence of a strong ROK-US 
alliance structure (an external threat) helped to provide a justification for the DPRK to sustain 
effort to distract its citizens.  These case studies demonstrate that both internal and external 
considerations influence DPRK conflict behavior (at varying levels) and that diversion is one of 
many tools were used by the regime to remain in power.  
4.e.2.  Case Study and Quantitative Analysis Comparisons 
  When comparing case study analysis with statistical outputs (quantitative analysis), 
scholars cannot simply extend the methods used in quantitative analysis all of the “standard 
conventions for quantitative analysis” (George and Bennett 2005, 106).  In this study, both 
research methods (quantitative and qualitative analysis) have revealed specific characteristics in 
relation to North Korean conflict.  For example, each of the case studies encompass a number of 
years, ranging from four to seven years, while the quantitative analysis examines fifty-two years 
of conflict.  Thus, the quantitative analysis demonstrates overall trends, but provides limited 
evidence on why particular trends actually occurred.  The case studies provide detailed 
information on why particular hostile foreign policy events occurred in relation to overall 
conditions faced by the Kim regime, but are limited in scope and have difficulty in accounting 
for conflict over the entire study period.  However, the mixing of these methods provides 
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 Eberstadt (2011, 16) notes that foreign aid was potentially an “enabler” of DPRK hostile activities and  
that North Korea could not have afforded to “maintain such predictably destructive policies and practices” without 
massive amounts of international support. 
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evidence of relationships between conditions faced by the regime and hostile foreign policy 
conflict levels throughout North Korea’s history.  Table 4.8 compares the case studies and 
quantitative analysis as follows:  
 
Table 4.8  Case Study and Statistical Analysis Comparison 
  
 
Qualitative 
(Case Study) 
Analysis 
Quantitative 
(Statistical) 
Analysis 
    
P1 
Supported? 
H1 – Political Instability No Yes 
H2 – Economic Instability Yes No 
H3 – Social Instability No Yes 
 
   
P2 
Supported? 
H4 – UN Resolutions Yes No 
H5 – ROK Leadership Changes Yes Yes 
H6 – US Leadership Changes Yes No 
H7 – Strategic Military Exercises  Yes No 
H8 – ROK Administration Type Yes Yes 
 
As shown above, both P1 (internal conditions) and P2 (external conditions) find mixed support 
across both the case studies and statistical analysis.  The argument that internal conditions are 
related to external conflict, which supports the idea that the Kim regime used diversionary tactics 
to achieve internal stability, finds alternating support between the case studies and regression 
analysis.  Additionally, the decreases in political and social stability (and increased HFP) were 
evident in the longer-term analysis rather than in the cases, which might indicate that the case 
periods were inadequate to analyze specific relationships between those conditions and conflict.  
Within the case studies, a limited number of historic events support P1, but only the quantitative 
analysis provides substantial evidence of a relationship between deteriorating internal conditions 
and heighted HFP activities. 
 The idea that external factors are influential in North Korea’s conflict activities (P2) finds 
support in both the case studies and statistical analysis.  Two of the hypotheses (H5 and H8) 
demonstrate continuity in the case studies and quantitative analysis.  This demonstrates that 
within the cases and throughout the DPRK’s history, the characteristics of the ROK government 
have impacted the level of hostile foreign policy activities.  Additionally, throughout most of the 
case studies, external events did have an impact on the Kim regime’s tendency to use diplomatic 
or military force against the ROK or US.  However, as with the evidence found in P1, the 
comparisons between the case studies and regression analysis require further explanation.  For 
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example, while the case studies indicate relationships between UN resolutions, US leadership 
changes, and military exercises, the statistical analysis of these events show that between 1960 
and 2011 there was no correlation between these events.  In these cases, the case studies 
potentially demonstrate “anecdotal evidence” of relationships that exist to a limited extent during 
the case study periods, but that are not consistently present over time.  For example, the presence 
of ROK-US military exercises might seem to increase hostilities on the Korean peninsula based 
on case study evidence, but when considered over the span of the study, these events 
demonstrate a limited relationship with HFP activities.  This mixed-method approach sheds light 
on the conditions that influence North Korean conflict actions, but also demonstrates the 
complexity of these relationships.  
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Chapter 5 - Conclusions 
North Korea's political economy and its external relations render it remarkably insensitive to either 
sanctions or inducements.  Instead, its behavior appears driven to a significant extent by domestic 
political considerations and a preoccupation with regime survival. 
Haggard and Noland (2011b) 
 
This dissertation examines the relationship between North Korean conflict behavior and 
conditions faced by the regime and if diversionary theory provides a viable explanation for these 
activities.  I test a number of hypotheses focused on the internal and external factors that are 
potentially related to the Kim regime’s use of hostile actions.  I find that under very limited 
circumstances, domestic conditions do influence the Kim regime’s tendency to engage in hostile 
foreign policy activities.  However, I find more substantial support for idea that external 
conditions are influential in HFP levels and that the Kim regime often reacted to external 
pressure with diplomatic and military HFP activities.  To North Korean analysts, these 
conclusions will come as no surprise.  But this study provides both statistically-sound 
(quantitative) and case study (qualitative) evidence to support the argument that North Korean 
conflict activities are related to specific conditions faced by the Kim regime.  Although I have 
discussed most of the conclusions in previous chapters, the following paragraphs include a 
synopsis of the study, a brief review of the findings, policy implications, and suggestions for 
future research.  
 5.a. Goals, Methods and Limitations  
In this research, I explore the historic relationship between the domestic conditions North 
Korean leaders experienced and their propensity to engage in “hostile” diplomatic and military 
activities.  Additionally, I examine whether or not the concept of diversionary theory is an 
explanation for these actions.  I initially propose there is a positive relationship between 
domestic unrest and external conflict activities.  To test these ideas, I use statistical regression to 
analyze North Korean event data collected from both US and Korean sources from 1960-2011 
and qualitative analysis using structured, focused, and process-tracing techniques to examine 
three case studies.  I also demonstrate a method to examine closed states using mixed-method 
approaches.  Academics have rarely used both history and political science methodology to 
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examine North Korean activities,
375
 often because of the lack of empirical data, but also because 
these two disciplines have separate research philosophies.  In this study, I demonstrate the 
strengths of both disciplines: the inductive approach preferred by historians and the deductive 
analysis favored by political scientists.  International relations scholars have used these methods 
to examine other states, but this research is currently the only publically available longitudinal 
study of its type on North Korea.
376
   
Additionally, this research demonstrates that despite being a “closed state,” North 
Korea’s characteristics and actions do allow for empirical study.  The US and other states have 
declassified large amounts of information on the DPRK and the use of “mirror statistics” from 
nations that interact with North Korea provides an extensive amount of detailed data for analysis.  
This study also supports the contention that the DPRK is a unique country, perhaps 
unprecedented not only among communist nations, but among all states.  North Korea’s national 
character is similar to former Stalinist states such as Romania and Albania, but it has managed to 
remain intact without substantial change (Buzo 1999, 245).
377
  In addition, unlike China and 
Vietnam, North Korea has not attempted significant reform or engagement of the international 
community, retaining the moniker “the Hermit Kingdom” despite the vast progress enjoyed by 
those states and its other half, South Korea.  This analysis is an important effort to analyze a state 
that is both distinctive and rarely studied in a mixed-methods manner.  
As with all studies, this one has its limitations.  My own “Western bias” and personal 
experiences working in South Korea might have affected this examination of North Korea.
378
  
Yet North Korea’s actions are generally recognized as threatening to the region and the 
international community shares concerns about the effects of DPRK foreign policy activities.  At 
the same time, I have sought to objectively explain why the Kim regime engages in peaceful 
interaction at some times and in hostile behavior during others, regardless of the consequences of 
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 As previously discussed, Michishita (2011) and Jung (2012) are the only other scholars that have used 
these types of methods to examine DPRK conflict activities.  
376
 Jung’s (2012) study remains an exception and his study of diversion using quantitative cross-national 
analysis and case studies on Korea is a useful addition to scholarship on the DPRK.   
377
 Buzo (1999, 245) notes that although North Korea was similar to these states, “it has not shared their 
fate” and remains intact.  The fact that North Korea has eluded collapse over the past few decades (especially during 
periods of severe distress, such as the famine in the 1990s) has continued to puzzle scholars and policymakers.  
Analysts, such as Eberstadt (1993, 1999), have consistently predicted the end of North Korea is near, yet the Kim 
regime continues to “muddle through.”   
378
 I spent three military “tours of duty” in Korea.  The first (1995 to 1997) was with 2ID and the 501st 
Military Intelligence Brigade, and during the second and third (2002-2004 and 2005-2008), I was assigned to the 
USFK J2.  As of this writing, I am now again working at the USFK J2 during my fourth tour in Korea.  
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those activities (e.g., significant levels of ROK and US casualties).  Another limitation for this 
study was the availability of dependent variable data (conflict events).  Although the sources 
used for this analysis are among the best currently available, not all diplomatic and conflict 
incidents are reported in the open press.  Additionally, there is only limited reporting on ROK 
and US military actions taken against the DPRK.  For example, over the last few decades, the 
ROK conducted infiltration operations against the DPRK that were rarely acknowledged in the 
open press (Rennie and Mars 2000).  A full account of actions on both sides of the DMZ would 
provide for a better understanding of the nature of conflict on the peninsula.  Finally, this study 
only considered diversionary theory as an explanation for the Kim regime’s actions.  
Diversionary concepts are important, but might not be completely able to explain North Korea’s 
conflict activities.  Expanding the scope of this study to examine other conflict theories that 
provide explanations for North Korean conflict, a technique used by Jung (2012), might result in 
a more comprehensive explanation of the regime’s actions from a theoretical perspective.379 
Despite the limitations mentioned above, one of the most important outputs of this 
research is to provide an example of how to analyze North Korea’s conflict behaviors.  While the 
data sources and the statistical analysis methods might change, the overall concept of how to 
approach this security dilemma in a systematic manner is an important contribution of this study.   
 5.b. Findings  
This study provides a glimpse into the conflict activities of a closed state that academics 
have rarely studied in a systematic manner.  My findings provide only very limited support to the 
argument that internal conditions are influential in the Kim regime’s external conflict activities 
(P1).
380
  External conditions, especially those associated with the ROK government and strategic 
exercises, were found to be significant across both the quantitative and qualitative studies in 
support of P2.  Additionally, I find that diversionary theory provides only limited explanatory 
power for North Korean HFP activities.  Diversion might be a necessary component of the Kim 
regime’s policies to achieve national goals, but it remains insufficient to adequately explain the 
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 This is an important limitation of this study, but both propositions are theoretically-grounded,  
Proposition 1 is based on diversionary theory and Proposition 2 is based on traditional views of conflict (Waltz 
1954; 1979;Wendt 1992).  For my intended scope of this study, the focus on diversionary theory (in both the 
literature review and analysis) is sufficient to support the examination of DPRK conflict. 
380
 This confirms Michishita’s (2009; 2011) finding and comments that diversion was not the primary 
impetus for DPRK conflict activities. 
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scope of conflict actions pursued by the DPRK.  Finally, this research also confirms the idea that 
the Kim family’s primary objective is to maintain power and survive.381   
My quantitative and case study analyses demonstrate that some of the domestic 
conditions experienced by the Kim regime occur in conjunction with changes in the levels of 
conflict.  The quantitative study demonstrates that as North Korea’s political (CINC score) and 
social (food availability) stability decreases, there are increases in conflict.  The qualitative study 
added that specific economic events (e.g., the economic downturns in the late 1960s and 1990s, 
and the currency crisis in the 2000s) were related to specific hostile foreign policy events.  
Additionally, both the quantitative and qualitative studies find that conflict actions were 
influenced by a number of external conditions in South Korea, such as election cycles and type 
of ROK government tended throughout the entire span of the study.  I also find that North Korea 
did engage in heightened levels of conflict after the Cold War (as supported by the quantitative 
analysis), but the DPRK also engaged in significant conflict during the height of the Cold War 
(as supported by both the event data and first case study).   
Finally, the proposal that diversionary behavior occurred was difficult to discern from the 
quantitative analysis, and required additional research using three case studies.  The three case 
studies did include instances of diversionary-type behavior.  Yet when the overall hostility levels 
were compared to the conditions present in the case studies, support for P1 and diversionary 
concepts were limited as a means to explain North Korea’s activities.  Diversion was one of 
many methods used by the Kim regime to control its people and other more oppressive methods 
were routinely used in response to domestic challenges.   
 5.c. Policy Implications 
An important output of this research is identification of how North Korea uses force as a 
means to achieve policy objectives, whether oriented towards domestic goals or in reaction to 
external threats.  My conclusions in this study, including observations on the use of diversionary 
means and the Kim regime’s emphasis on retaining power, help provide insight into the cyclic 
nature of how the DPRK interacts with other states.  The strength of this research is that it 
provides empirical evidence on the historic characteristics and patterns of the Kim regime.  The 
findings support the view that international community actions have only a limited effect on 
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 A number of authors have come to similar conclusions including Suh (2002, 170) and Haggard and 
Noland (2011b). 
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North Korea’s behaviors and the strongest influencers tend to be the activities of the ROK 
government.   
International diplomatic efforts and economic sanctions that have sought to change North 
Korea’s behavior have generally failed, as evidenced in the second and third case studies.  All 
three of the case studies show that internal dynamics are important influencers of DPRK 
behaviors. This research provides support to the idea that international community policies 
aimed at changing those internal conditions are more likely to be successful.  Additionally, 
China’s efforts to support North Korea in times of extreme domestic challenges have most likely 
kept the Kim regime solvent.  Based on its historic interactions with the DPRK, Beijing seems to 
prefer a divided Korean peninsula with a sovereign North Korea.  Thus, this study provides 
support to the contention that China’s primary policy objective is to keep North Korea solvent 
through aid and economic support (CRS 2010, 1; Lee and Choi 2009, 57).  Any policy action 
that leaves the support channel between China and North Korea intact is likely to have little 
impact. 
Yet, North Korea continues to pose significant threat to the international community and 
the Kim Jong-un regime seems more willing than his father to directly threaten both the US and 
South Korea with nuclear warfare (KCNA 2013b).  Additionally, the DPRK’s actions since the 
death of Kim Jong-il, which have included additional nuclear testing and missile launches, have 
demonstrated that the North possesses the capability to make good on its threats of attack against 
the US or ROK.  Consequently, the international community has little choice but to take North 
Korea’s actions seriously and deterrence efforts, such as strong regional security alliances and 
anti-proliferation activities, are useful responses to these types of behaviors. 
Despite international community efforts to change North Korea’s behavior, the Kim 
regime’s enduring trait has been its ability to chart an independent course regardless of internal 
or external circumstances.  Thus, while deterrence efforts are necessary, they often have little 
effect on North Korea’s proclivity to engage in conflict actions.  Other methods of engagement 
with North Korea that focus on its lack of information about the outside world, are alternative 
policy options, and might help the North Korean people understand the nature of both their 
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government and its leader.
382
  Additionally, continued exposure of North Korea to the 
international community through academic, cultural, or even technological exchanges might also 
serve to lessen the strict control that the Kim regime has on its people.  These types of exchanges 
had a profound impact on the Soviet Union (Richmond 2003) and, while the DPRK is culturally 
different from the former USSR,
383
 visits by sports teams, scholars, or musicians are often 
welcomed by the regime (Wakin 2008; Zinser 2013).  “Soft power” actions of these types are 
relatively inexpensive, entail little risk to participants, and might spur small changes to North 
Korean society that would otherwise be impossible.   
 5.d. Future Research 
This analysis of North Korea only begins to explore what is possible given publically 
available DPRK conflict data.  Additionally, this dissertation provides a foundation for further 
research and debate on North Korea’s armed and political actions.  Methods described here, 
especially the longitudinal analysis of a single state, can be used as a template for gathering and 
analyzing data on other states with limited outside access.  Analyzing other sources of event data 
information, such as King and Lowe’s (2003b) “10 Million International Dyadic Events,” might 
provide additional insight to DPRK activities.  Additionally, scholars’ use of automated methods 
to extract data from media sources to compare against these findings might also be an important 
way to verify (or refute) my conclusions in this study.  In addition, as mentioned in the 
limitations discussion above, expanding the view of DPRK actions beyond the theoretical 
concept of diversionary war might provide for a better understanding of North Korea’s 
willingness to engage in conflict and peace.
384
  Finally, as more accurate or additional DPRK 
data becomes available, using these same methods to examine new information would be an 
important way to determine if the trends identified in this study continue to occur in the “newest” 
Kim regime. 
                                                 
382
 Hassig and Oh (2009, 251-252) discuss the merits of “information warfare” and note that an effective 
campaign could “successfully introduce the North Korean people to a new way of thinking about their government 
and their society.”    
383
 Compared to North Korea, the USSR historically demonstrated a much greater willingness to allow for 
international cultural and athletic exchanges with the West (Richmond 2003).  These types of exchanges do occur in 
North Korea, but they are relatively rare. 
384
 Jung (2012, 20) examines not only diversionary war theory, but also offensive realism, opportunistic 
war, and his own “diversionary target theory” while analyzing DPRK conflict actions. 
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 5.e. Final Thoughts 
Literature on the threat posed by the Kim regime is widely available from political 
scientists, historians, and practitioners.  These individuals continue to pursue the same question: 
“What should be done about North Korea?”  As I have shown in this study, only a handful of 
scholars have attempted to use social science and historical methods to analyze this isolated 
state.  My research begins to help fill this gap in current knowledge about this reclusive, yet 
potentially very dangerous nation.  The conclusion that external conditions are an influential 
force behind North Korea’s actions is a significant observation.  More importantly, the extensive 
use of historical data to empirically support this contention is an important step in understanding 
the recurrence of conflict on the Korean peninsula.  While deterrence and other efforts to 
mitigate North Korea’s military threat to the international community, other actions (such as the 
socio-cultural options mentioned above) also might help to nudge the Kim regime towards 
becoming a more active member of the international community.  In any case, this research 
provides not only important observations on the characteristics of the Kim regime, but also gives 
scholars a means to analyze a security problem that confounds the international community.  
More importantly, this research informs more effective policymaking in hopes of solving an 
enduring security dilemma in East Asia.  
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Appendix A - Azar’s Event Categories 
Azar (1993, 27-29) provided the following descriptions for each of his categories for 
coding events:   
 
“[category] 9. Mild verbal expressions displaying discord in interaction: Low key 
objection to policies or behavior; communicating dissatisfaction through third party; failing 
to reach an agreement; refusing protest note; denying accusations; objecting to explanation  
of goals, position, etc.; requesting change in policy.  
 
10. Strong verbal expressions displaying hostility in interaction: Warning retaliation for 
acts; making threatening demands and accusations; condemning strongly specific actions or 
policies; denouncing leaders, system, or ideology; postponing heads of state visits; refusing 
participation in meetings or summits; leveling strong propaganda attacks; denying support; 
blocking or vetoing policy or proposals in the UN or other international bodies.  
 
11. Diplomatic-economic hostile actions: Increasing troop mobilization; boycotts; 
imposing economic sanctions; hindering movement on land, waterways, or in the air; 
embargoing goods; refusing mutual trade rights; closing borders and blocking free 
communication; manipulating trade or currency to cause economic problems; halting aid; 
granting sanctuary to opposition leaders; mobilizing hostile demonstrations against target 
country; refusing to support foreign military allies; recalling ambassador for emergency 
consultations regarding target country; refusing visas to other nationals or restricting 
movement in country; expelling or arresting nationals or press; spying on foreign 
government officials; terminating major agreements.  
 
12. Political-military hostile actions: Inciting riots or rebellions (training or financial aid 
for rebellions); encouraging guerilla activities against target country; limited and sporadic 
terrorist actions; kidnapping or torturing foreign citizens or prisoners of war; giving 
sanctuary to terrorists; breaking diplomatic relations; attacking diplomats or embassies; 
expelling military advisors; nationalizing companies without compensation.  
 
13. Small scale military acts: Limited air, sea, or border skirmishes; border police acts; 
annexing territory already occupied; seizing material of target country; imposing 
blockades; assassinating leaders of target country; material support of subversive activities 
against target country.  
 
14. Limited war acts: Intermittent shelling or clashes; sporadic bombing of military or 
industrial areas; small scale interception or sinking of ships; mining of territorial waters.   
 
15. Extensive war acts causing deaths, dislocation or high strategic costs: Use of nuclear 
weapons; full scale air, naval, or land battles; invasion of territory; occupation of territory; 
massive bombing of civilian areas; capturing of soldiers in battle; large scale bombing of 
military installations; chemical or biological warfare.” 
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Appendix B - Database Construction 
 Research on a closed state can be a difficult task and North Korea is no exception.  Data 
from the North Korean government is often either not available or highly suspect – thus any 
study of the DPRK must incorporate reporting from external sources.
385
  Fortunately, the 
dependent variable data (hostile foreign policy events) was available from US and South Korean 
sources, and from official government pronouncements from North Korea.  Much of the other 
data was available from “mirror statistics” and relied upon information on DPRK from other 
states.  While data limitations are a concern, one of the overarching goals of this dissertation is to 
demonstrate a method (regardless of the data) to examine closed states.  Despite these 
shortcomings, the data used in this project is the best public information available on North 
Korean activities.   
Event data is typically taken from public sources (newspapers, journals, and broadcasts) – 
unfortunately, this information is often an “imperfect summary of the events…[that] varies 
according to the needs of the reporters rather than the scholarly need for representativeness” 
(King and Lowe 2003a, 617).
386
  The information used in this dissertation includes event data 
from multiple, often overlapping sources from government and media sources, in an attempt to 
ensure accurate recording of key events.
387
  The event dataset used for this research also relies 
upon US government reports (from on and off the peninsula), South Korean Unification Ministry 
data, and North Korea government reports from the DPRK’s official news agency, the Korea 
Central News Agency (KCNA).  The database is a compilation of events from these sources and 
I translated approximately 45% of the reports (1500 of over 3500 reviewed) from Korean to 
English (the dataset is enclosed in Appendix C). 
Other event data projects rely on automated collection of interstate actions, which saves 
considerable amounts of time and expense, as compared to individual data collection executed by 
hand.  King and Lowe (2003a) have used this technique to construct a database of over 10 
                                                 
385
 Internal surveys and research in North Korea are rare, although some important data was collected by 
aid organizations during the famine period on the social characteristics of North Korea (Woo-Cumings 2002).  Most 
survey data on North Korea social and political conditions comes from refugees, especially those in China (Haggard 
and Noland 2011a).   
386
 This demonstrates the pitfalls of using event data for analysis and the need for multiple sources of 
information to increase the fidelity of the data. 
387
 The government reports and chronologies used in this research rely heavily on media reporting from US, 
ROK and DPRK sources (Fischer 2007; UNC 2012). 
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million dyadic interstate activities from 1990 to 2004, coded into 200 events (using a typology 
based on the WEIS methodology).
388
  While the automated data collection technique is generally 
successful for states with freedom of the press, strictly using media reporting to analyze state 
behavior (Rummel 1966; Azar 1978; McClelland 1999; King and Lowe 2003a), can result in 
overlooking key events that may have been unreported due to political restraints.  
This is particularly problematic when examining South and North Korea, due to freedom 
of press issues.  For example, while the lack of press freedom in North Korea is well-known, it is 
less commonly known that the era of authoritarian regimes in South Korea (which ended with 
the election of Kim Young-sam in 1993) included significant limitations on press freedom 
through measures such as the ROK’s Military Secrets Protection Act (Youm 1994).389  Thus, the 
sole use of media reports to construct an event database on North Korea provides an inadequate 
representation of hostile foreign policy actions.  Using a mixture of official government reports, 
media, and other sources provides the best available data to form such a database.  For this 
reason, I compiled and standardized information from multiple sources to populate the database 
used in this study.  My intent was to construct a database with accurate information available 
from North Korean, U.S. and ROK government sources.     
The event data analyses techniques mentioned above provide the basis to analyze North 
Korea’s hostile foreign policy events and I categorized and scored these events using Azar’s 
COPDAB definitions and scaling.
390
  Using views of state interaction that expand beyond 
conflict provides for a more holistic analysis of the influencers of state actions, especially for 
totalitarian regimes such as North Korea.  For this research, a new database was constructed 
using hand coding of event intensity data from the resources mentioned previously.
391
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 While automated methods are useful in other project focused on large cross-national studies of English 
media sources, the information in this study of North Korea is both in English and Korean language.  Thus the hand 
coding of events, while painstaking and time-intensive, provided the most appropriate method to systematically 
categorize this data. 
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 Youm (1994) notes that critics of this law “claimed that the statute, which proscribed the unauthorized 
gathering and the intentional and negligent disclosure of military secrets, infringed upon their constitutional rights to 
free speech and free press.” 
390
 This method is based on Nincic (1975, 624), Azar (1982, 36), McClelland (1999, 1), and Goldstein 
(1992, 376-377).  See text above for an explanation of the scaling in the COPDAB and WEIS data. 
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 Hand coding refers to the analysis and selection of event data by an individual researcher or group of 
researchers without the aid of automated (computerized) scanning processes.  While automated (machine) coding 
could have been used for some of the data (and would have been much less time-intensive), hand coding was chosen 
due to language, analysis and duplication concerns.  For example, much of the event information was recorded an 
analyzed in Korean (rather than English) and other events needed additional context (relationship to other events and 
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I used a number of primary sources of information to construct the event database used in 
this analysis: the USFK Command History Office, the United Nations Command (UNC); South 
Korea’s Korean Institute for National Unification (KINU); Fischer’s CRS Report; and media 
reports from the KCNA website, New York Times Historical Archives, and Lexis-Nexis 
Academic Search.  The dataset used for this analysis includes event information from multiple, 
often overlapping, sources in an attempt to ensure inclusion of all key events.  While most of the 
reports were available in English, the KINU (2012) report from the South Korean government 
was only available in Korean and required translation.  For those reports, the accuracy of the data 
is limited by the translation method used.
392
  All of the events included in the database were hand 
coded, crosschecked for duplication, and scaled using Azar’s (1993) coding system.   
 
Figure B.1  Event Data Sources 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
conditions): both of these conditions required careful attention for accurate coding.  Duplicate reports of events also 
required that each event be carefully screened.  As a result, hand coding provided the best “fit” for this analysis. 
392
 These reports were translated initially using automated methods (Google Translate) and then were 
reviewed for accuracy. 
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I obtained information for military hostile foreign activity data from two primary sources: 
the USFK Command History Office’s history of US forces in Korea (which included event data 
from 1960-1982) (Finley 1984) and historical lists of events provided by the United Nations 
Command (UNC) in Korea.
393
  These two sources provided over 600 diplomatic and military 
events, all of which were included in the database.  The South Korean government’s Korean 
Institute for National Unification (KINU) maintains a database of “Korean Civil Interactions” 
which includes hostile and benign interactions between the DPRK and ROK (KINU 2011).  This 
database, available only in Korean, lists over 1,600 events that occurred between 1960 and 2011.  
Bond (2003) used this information previously to analyze DPRK conflict activity (KINU 2011).  
Another source was the Congressional Research Service chronology of DPRK “provocations” 
from 1950-2007 (Fischer 2007).  This report summarizes open source and media reports on 
DPRK activities and includes over 170 events.  Finally, I conducted keyword searches for 
incidents and military/political pronouncements in the New York Times Historical Archive and 
Lexis-Nexus Academic Search media databases, and the KCNA website resulting in over 1,200 
events for use.
394
  In the media searches, foreign ministry and military pronouncements were for 
the database (rather than all KCNA news reports which criticized the US and ROK) because 
those announcements represent the highest level of foreign policy communication by the North 
Korean government.  Of over 3,500 events analyzed for relevance and duplication, I constructed 
a database that included 2,100 incidents of DPRK hostile foreign policy. 
After reviewing the data, I had to make data adjustments to account for differences in 
characteristics of the dependent variable (conflict) data and the independent variables.  
Specifically, the DVAR was reported as events (with a specific date associated) and the IVARs 
and control variables were reported in yearly increments, thus I transformed the data to allow for 
statistical analysis.  Initially, I ran models using monthly, quarterly and yearly aggregation and 
found that the models using quarterly data provided the best representation (and best statistical 
fit) of the data to the research question.  Monthly data, although available for the hostility 
(dependent variable) data, required too much manipulation of the other variables while models 
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 An official with the United Nations Command in Seoul provided event data on DPRK-US-ROK 
interactions from 1960-2011 (UNC 2012).  The same information is publicly available in media reports. 
394
 I searched these sources, and usually found duplicate information (which allowed for cross-checking 
and verification).  Again, the only provocative statements used in the analysis were from  Lexis-Nexus, New York 
Times, and KCNA databases for foreign ministry and military pronouncements (rather than all negative reports on 
the US) since they represent the highest level of communication from the DPRK government. 
267 
 
using only yearly data provided too few observations (52 total).  Thus, using quarterly data 
provided a suitable “middle solution” that afforded an acceptable number of observations for 
analysis without causing significant problems with collapsing yearly data into reportable units.  
King, Keohane and Verba (1994, 221) discuss problems with research involving small numbers 
of observations.  Using quarterly (rather than yearly) data helped address this issue.  
As a result, I aggregated the hostile foreign policy events by quarter in order to provide 
enough occurrences to allow for regression analysis and consistency with independent 
variables.
395
  For each quarter, I summed and annotated the total event intensities and calculated 
scaled quarterly hostile foreign policy events using the following equation: 
HIqtr = 

n
i
ES
1
1
 
where HIqtr is the quarterly total intensity of hostile foreign policy events,  
1E
S is the Azar score 
for the i
th
 event, and n is the total number of events.  A simplified example and calculation 
follows: 
 Table B.1  Quarterly Hostile Intensity Scoring 
Hostile Event (Ei) in a given quarter:           
    Category         Azar Score ( 1E
S
)   
E1: DMZ firefight    13  50 
E2: Kidnapping of ROK citizen  12  44 
E3: Mild Diplomatic protest at UN      9    6 
E4: Expulsion of Foreign Press  11  29 
 
HIqtr = 129 
    Thus, the hostility intensity score in Table B.1 is 129, which is the product of all of the 
hostile events that occurred during that quarter.  For each quarter, I calculated the intensity level 
and included in the statistical analysis.  As noted previously, these measures allow for the 
proportionality of events to be included in the analysis.   
 My choice to use quarterly data did require adjustments due to missing data, as there 
were entire years in which data was not reported.  To fill in gaps in annual reporting, I used 
single imputation using arithmetic mean or the last known values.  While this is not optimal 
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 Monthly and yearly aggregation of events were both considered and tested.  Quarterly aggregation 
provided the most consistent event data calculations for analysis and provided enough fidelity to identify long-term 
trends without over-generalizing the data. 
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(original data is always preferred) and possibly induces some bias, this is more desirable than 
dropping the years with incomplete data (an alternate solution) which would result in the 
omission of critical observations.
396
  I included both the estimated and reported data in the 
analysis.    
 For the continuous variable data reported on a yearly basis, I collapsed that information 
into quarterly data reports for analysis using interpolation methods.  Table B2 provides an 
example of the interpolation technique I used in this analysis: 
 
Table B.2  Data Adjustments and Quarterly Estimate Examples
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Yearly Reports (original)        
 2000 2001 2002       
GDP Per Person 
(per year) 
$1,500 1,600 1,700 
 
   
Quarterly Reports (adjusted)  
 2000 2001 2001 2001 2001 2002 2002 2002 2002 
 4th Qtr 1st Qtr 2nd Qtr 3rd Qtr 4th Qtr 1st Qtr 2nd Qtr 3rd Qtr 4th Qtr 
GDP $1,500 1,525 1,550 1,575 1,600 1,625 1,650 1,675 1,700 
 
Note:  GDP is interpolated each quarter and yearly data is annotated as the final quarter 
 
As shown in Table B.2, I assume yearly reports are valid on 31 December – thus the 
reported data for 2000 was valid in the final quarter of that year.  GDP growth for each quarter in 
2001 was shown as increasing from $1,525 to $1,600 and interpolated to account for the change 
between 2001 and 2002.  I used the technique shown above for GDP for all of the continuous 
independent variables except for infant mortality.  For that measure, which included reporting 
that included averages spanning several years (especially during the Cold War period), I adjusted 
the data based on the reporting years and interpolated to account for increases or decreases in the 
observation values.  
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 Baraldi and Enders (2010), and Howell (2012) discuss the merits and risks of this approach.  While there 
are more sophisticated methods (such as multiple imputation) available (see King et.al 2001), after examining 
imputation options, the simplest solution and best fit for this data was to simply input data based on arithmetic mean 
or the last known value.  
397
 These numbers are simulated for clarity. 
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Appendix C - Korean Conflict Dataset 
Figure C.1  Korea Conflict Dataset (by quarter) 
Year Qtr Score 
DPRK 
CINC 
WGI 
GDP 
pp 
Trade pp Refugees  
Infant 
Mort 
Food 
pp 
UN 
Res 
Mil 
Exercise 
US Leader 
ROK 
Leader 
ROK 
Admin 
Cold 
War 
1960 1 6 0.005502   1116.2 0.033491   67 0.159218 0 0 0 1 1 1 
1960 2 0 0.005401   1112.46 0.032537   67 0.159097 0 0 0 1 1 1 
1960 3 6 0.005299   1108.73 0.031582   67 0.158975 0 0 0 1 0 1 
1960 4 42 0.005198   1104.99 0.030628   67 0.158853 0 0 1 0 0 1 
1961 1 6 0.00523   1109.74 0.030587   67 0.158731 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1961 2 18 0.005261   1114.49 0.030546   67 0.15861 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1961 3 6 0.005293   1119.24 0.030505   67 0.158488 0 1 0 0 0 1 
1961 4 24 0.005325   1123.99 0.030464   67 0.158366 0 1 0 0 0 1 
1962 1 6 0.005306   1123.48 0.030868   67 0.158321 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1962 2 18 0.005286   1122.98 0.031272   67 0.158276 0 0 0 0 1 1 
1962 3 50 0.005267   1122.47 0.031676   67 0.158232 0 1 0 0 1 1 
1962 4 112 0.005248   1121.96 0.032080   67 0.158187 0 1 0 0 1 1 
1963 1 0 0.00515   1137.98 0.033380   67 0.160255 0 0 0 0 1 1 
1963 2 50 0.005052   1154 0.034679   67 0.162324 0 0 0 0 1 1 
1963 3 230 0.004953   1170.03 0.035978   67 0.164392 0 1 0 1 1 1 
1963 4 30 0.004855   1186.05 0.037278   67 0.166461 0 1 1 1 1 1 
1964 1 56 0.004861   1202.8 0.036903   67 0.168218 0 0 0 0 1 1 
1964 2 18 0.004866   1219.55 0.036529   64.25 0.169974 0 0 0 0 1 1 
1964 3 12 0.004872   1236.3 0.036154   61.5 0.17173 0 1 0 0 1 1 
1964 4 12 0.004877   1253.05 0.035780   58.75 0.173487 0 1 1 0 1 1 
1965 1 24 0.004974   1263.54 0.036052   56 0.169855 0 0 0 0 1 1 
1965 2 124 0.005071   1274.02 0.036324   56 0.166222 0 0 0 0 1 1 
1965 3 50 0.005168   1284.51 0.036597   56 0.16259 0 1 0 0 1 1 
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1965 4 118 0.005265   1295 0.036869   56 0.158958 0 1 0 0 1 1 
1966 1 24 0.005204   1325 0.037042   56 0.160591 0 0 0 0 1 1 
1966 2 62 0.005144   1355 0.037215   56 0.162225 0 0 0 0 1 1 
1966 3 86 0.005084   1384.99 0.037387   56 0.163858 0 1 0 0 1 1 
1966 4 92 0.005023   1414.99 0.037560   56 0.165492 0 1 0 0 1 1 
1967 1 474 0.005037   1431.99 0.037988   56 0.161031 0 0 0 0 1 1 
1967 2 212 0.005051   1449 0.038416   56 0.15657 0 0 0 1 1 1 
1967 3 982 0.005065   1466 0.038843   56 0.15211 0 1 0 0 1 1 
1967 4 660 0.005079   1483 0.039271   56 0.147649 0 1 0 0 1 1 
1968 1 430 0.005151   1520.49 0.042687   56 0.147272 0 0 0 0 1 1 
1968 2 730 0.005223   1557.98 0.046103   56 0.146895 0 0 0 0 1 1 
1968 3 824 0.005296   1595.47 0.049519   56 0.146518 0 1 0 0 1 1 
1968 4 636 0.005368   1632.97 0.052935   56 0.146141 0 1 1 0 1 1 
1969 1 430 0.005363   1684.47 0.051748   56 0.149443 0 0 0 0 1 1 
1969 2 730 0.005359   1735.97 0.050562   53 0.152746 0 0 0 0 1 1 
1969 3 824 0.005354   1787.47 0.049376   50 0.156048 0 1 0 0 1 1 
1969 4 636 0.00535   1838.98 0.048190   47 0.15935 0 1 0 0 1 1 
1970 1 156 0.005401   1867.73 0.048765   44 0.158987 0 0 0 0 1 1 
1970 2 718 0.005453   1896.49 0.049340   44 0.158624 0 0 0 0 1 1 
1970 3 554 0.005505   1925.25 0.049916   44 0.158261 0 1 0 0 1 1 
1970 4 798 0.005556   1954.01 0.050491   44 0.157898 0 1 0 0 1 1 
1971 1 236 0.005661   2096.03 0.053529   44 0.158015 0 0 0 1 1 1 
1971 2 604 0.005765   2238.06 0.056566   44 0.158131 0 0 0 1 1 1 
1971 3 692 0.00587   2380.08 0.059604   44 0.158248 0 1 0 0 1 1 
1971 4 418 0.005975   2522.11 0.062642   44 0.158365 0 1 0 0 1 1 
1972 1 192 0.005892   2531.82 0.064366   44 0.158411 0 0 0 0 1 1 
1972 2 148 0.005809   2541.53 0.066090   44 0.158457 0 0 0 0 1 1 
1972 3 54 0.005726   2551.24 0.067813   44 0.158503 0 1 0 0 1 1 
1972 4 89 0.005643   2560.95 0.069537   44 0.15855 0 1 1 1 1 1 
1973 1 254 0.005658   2626.79 0.073897   44 0.159945 0 0 0 0 1 1 
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1973 2 506 0.005673   2692.63 0.078257   44 0.16134 0 0 0 0 1 1 
1973 3 142 0.005687   2758.47 0.082617   44 0.162735 0 1 0 0 1 1 
1973 4 204 0.005702   2824.31 0.086976   44 0.16413 0 1 0 0 1 1 
1974 1 268 0.005689   2828.46 0.097394   44 0.161583 0 0 0 0 1 1 
1974 2 318 0.005676   2832.6 0.107811   41.75 0.159035 0 0 0 0 1 1 
1974 3 174 0.005663   2836.75 0.118229   39.5 0.156488 0 1 1 0 1 1 
1974 4 236 0.00565   2840.89 0.128646   37.25 0.15394 0 1 0 0 1 1 
1975 1 292 0.005849   2840.91 0.125756   35 0.15623 0 0 0 0 1 1 
1975 2 262 0.006049   2840.93 0.122866   35 0.15852 0 1 0 0 1 1 
1975 3 222 0.006248   2840.95 0.119975   35 0.16081 0 1 0 0 1 1 
1975 4 124 0.006447   2840.97 0.117085   35 0.163101 0 1 0 0 1 1 
1976 1 24 0.006502   2840.96 0.110138   35 0.165034 0 0 0 0 1 1 
1976 2 144 0.006557   2840.94 0.103191   35 0.166968 0 1 0 0 1 1 
1976 3 134 0.006611   2840.93 0.096244   35 0.168902 0 1 0 0 1 1 
1976 4 50 0.006666   2840.92 0.089297   35 0.170836 0 1 1 0 1 1 
1977 1 56 0.006715   2840.92 0.092059   35 0.169082 0 1 0 0 1 1 
1977 2 174 0.006764   2840.92 0.094820   35 0.167327 0 1 0 0 1 1 
1977 3 56 0.006813   2840.92 0.097582   35 0.165573 0 1 0 0 1 1 
1977 4 56 0.006862   2840.92 0.100344   35 0.163819 0 1 0 0 1 1 
1978 1 34 0.007014   2840.95 0.103021   35 0.163128 0 1 0 0 1 1 
1978 2 168 0.007167   2840.98 0.105698   35 0.162437 0 1 0 1 1 1 
1978 3 0 0.007319   2841 0.108375   35 0.161747 0 1 0 1 1 1 
1978 4 118 0.007472   2841.03 0.111052   35 0.161056 0 1 0 0 1 1 
1979 1 50 0.007555   2841 0.121584   35 0.164674 0 1 0 0 1 1 
1979 2 50 0.007639   2840.98 0.132116   33.75 0.168292 0 0 0 0 1 1 
1979 3 174 0.007723   2840.95 0.142648   32.5 0.17191 0 1 0 0 1 1 
1979 4 50 0.007807   2840.93 0.153181   31.25 0.175528 0 1 0 1 1 1 
1980 1 162 0.007843   2840.96 0.145784   30 0.171102 0 1 0 0 1 1 
1980 2 144 0.007879   2841 0.138387   30 0.166676 0 1 0 0 1 1 
1980 3 18 0.007915   2841.03 0.130991   30 0.16225 0 1 0 1 1 1 
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1980 4 206 0.007952   2841.07 0.123594   30 0.157824 0 1 1 0 1 1 
1981 1 62 0.008035   2841.05 0.116438   30 0.160321 0 1 0 1 1 1 
1981 2 194 0.008118   2841.04 0.109283   30 0.162817 0 1 0 0 1 1 
1981 3 329 0.008201   2841.02 0.102127   30 0.165313 0 1 0 0 1 1 
1981 4 194 0.008285   2841 0.094971   30 0.167809 0 1 0 0 1 1 
1982 1 84 0.008364   2841.02 0.095307   30 0.160131 0 1 0 0 1 1 
1982 2 268 0.008444   2841.04 0.095644   30 0.152452 0 1 0 0 1 1 
1982 3 185 0.008524   2841.06 0.095981   30 0.144774 0 1 0 0 1 1 
1982 4 56 0.008604   2841.08 0.096317   30 0.137095 0 1 0 0 1 1 
1983 1 100 0.008635   2841.06 0.094307   30 0.136649 0 1 0 0 1 1 
1983 2 210 0.008667   2841.04 0.092296   30 0.136203 0 1 0 0 1 1 
1983 3 156 0.008699   2841.02 0.090286   30 0.135756 0 1 0 0 1 1 
1983 4 212 0.008731   2841 0.088275   30 0.13531 0 1 0 0 1 1 
1984 1 138 0.008822   2841 0.086236   30 0.13534 0 1 0 0 1 1 
1984 2 210 0.008914   2841 0.084197   29 0.13537 0 0 0 0 1 1 
1984 3 116 0.009005   2841.01 0.082157   28 0.1354 0 1 0 0 1 1 
1984 4 72 0.009096   2841.01 0.080118   27 0.13543 0 1 1 0 1 1 
1985 1 66 0.009061   2841 0.080122   26 0.135592 0 1 0 0 1 1 
1985 2 44 0.009026   2840.99 0.080126   26 0.135754 0 0 0 0 1 1 
1985 3 56 0.008991   2840.97 0.080131   26 0.135916 0 1 0 0 1 1 
1985 4 200 0.008955   2840.96 0.080135   26 0.136079 0 1 0 0 1 1 
1986 1 90 0.009043   2840.95 0.079897   26 0.138274 0 1 0 0 1 1 
1986 2 54 0.00913   2840.94 0.079659   26 0.14047 0 0 0 0 1 1 
1986 3 210 0.009218   2840.93 0.079422   26 0.142665 0 1 0 0 1 1 
1986 4 22 0.009306   2840.92 0.079184   26 0.14486 0 1 0 0 1 1 
1987 1 252 0.00937   2840.95 0.084605   26 0.14435 0 1 0 0 1 1 
1987 2 56 0.009435   2840.99 0.090027   26 0.143839 0 0 0 0 1 1 
1987 3 24 0.0095   2841.02 0.095448   26 0.143329 0 1 0 0 1 1 
1987 4 156 0.009565   2841.06 0.100869   26 0.142818 0 1 0 1 1 1 
1988 1 46 0.009562   2841.04 0.105468   26 0.141969 0 1 0 0 1 1 
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1988 2 58 0.00956   2841.02 0.110066   26 0.14112 0 0 0 0 1 1 
1988 3 24 0.009557   2841 0.114665   26 0.14027 0 1 0 0 1 1 
1988 4 80 0.009555   2840.98 0.119263   26 0.139421 0 1 1 0 1 1 
1989 1 124 0.009902   2840.99 0.115766   26 0.141026 0 1 0 0 1 1 
1989 2 18 0.010249   2841.01 0.112268   25.5 0.142632 0 0 0 0 1 1 
1989 3 24 0.010596   2841.02 0.108771   25 0.144237 0 1 0 0 1 1 
1989 4 42 0.010943   2841.03 0.105273   24.5 0.145843 0 1 0 0 1 1 
1990 1 90 0.01124   2841.04 0.106452   24 0.14913 0 1 0 0 1 1 
1990 2 66 0.011537   2841.05 0.107632   24.175 0.152418 0 0 0 0 1 1 
1990 3 42 0.011834   2841.06 0.108811   24.35 0.155705 0 1 0 0 1 1 
1990 4 30 0.012131   2841.07 0.109990   24.525 0.158993 0 1 0 0 1 1 
1991 1 78 0.012367   2841.05 0.108820   24.7 0.159065 0 1 0 0 1 1 
1991 2 34 0.012604   2841.04 0.107650   25.55 0.159137 0 0 0 0 1 1 
1991 3 74 0.01284   2841.02 0.106480   26.4 0.15921 0 1 0 0 1 1 
1991 4 92 0.013077   2841.01 0.105311   27.25 0.159282 0 1 0 0 1 1 
1992 1 86 0.013203   2775.22 0.105431 0.00081324 25.55 0.158697 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1992 2 236 0.013329   2709.43 0.105551 0.00080968 26.4 0.158113 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1992 3 30 0.013455   2643.65 0.105671 0.00080613 27.25 0.157528 0 1 0 0 1 0 
1992 4 98 0.013581   2577.86 0.105791 0.0008026 28.1 0.156943 0 1 1 1 1 0 
1993 1 289 0.013462   2568.72 0.107337 0.00079902 29.325 0.158532 1 1 0 0 1 0 
1993 2 114 0.013344   2559.58 0.108882 0.00079548 30.55 0.16012 1 0 0 0 1 0 
1993 3 72 0.013225   2550.44 0.110428 0.00079193 31.775 0.161708 0 1 0 0 1 0 
1993 4 120 0.013106   2541.3 0.111974 0.0007884 33 0.163296 0 1 0 0 1 0 
1994 1 102 0.012756   2368.59 0.108201 0.00079722 34.425 0.164326 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1994 2 254 0.012405   2195.87 0.104427 0.00080606 35.85 0.165356 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1994 3 130 0.012055   2023.16 0.100653 0.00081489 37.275 0.166386 0 1 0 0 1 0 
1994 4 92 0.011704   1850.44 0.096879 0.0008237 38.7 0.167416 0 1 0 0 1 0 
1995 1 126 0.01163   1768.14 0.099549 0.00108145 40.05 0.167592 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1995 2 189 0.011555   1685.83 0.102219 0.00133917 41.4 0.167768 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1995 3 96 0.011481   1603.53 0.104889 0.00159689 42.75 0.167944 0 1 0 0 1 0 
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1995 4 180 0.011406   1521.22 0.107559 0.0018546 44.1 0.16812 0 1 0 0 1 0 
1996 1 66 0.011453 -0.53 1454.38 0.114312 0.00201809 45.1 0.166358 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1996 2 338 0.0115 -0.53 1387.55 0.121064 0.00218156 46.1 0.164596 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1996 3 114 0.011547 -0.53 1320.71 0.127817 0.00234504 47.1 0.162834 0 1 0 0 1 0 
1996 4 130 0.011595 -0.53 1253.87 0.134570 0.0025085 48.1 0.161071 0 1 1 0 1 0 
1997 1 72 0.011432 -0.5175 1234.4 0.127040 0.00283937 48.55 0.160269 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1997 2 136 0.011269 -0.505 1214.93 0.119510 0.00317022 49 0.159466 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1997 3 154 0.011106 -0.4925 1195.46 0.111980 0.00350108 49.45 0.158664 0 1 0 0 1 0 
1997 4 128 0.010943 -0.48 1175.99 0.104450 0.0038319 49.9 0.157861 0 1 0 1 1 0 
1998 1 149 0.010671 -0.4675 1178.27 0.101147 0.00366343 49.725 0.156979 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1998 2 172 0.010398 -0.455 1180.55 0.097844 0.00349494 49.55 0.156097 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1998 3 250 0.010125 -0.4425 1182.83 0.094541 0.00332644 49.375 0.155214 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1998 4 164 0.009853 -0.43 1185.11 0.091238 0.0031579 49.2 0.154332 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1999 1 136 0.009843 -0.41375 1188.68 0.090646 0.00400606 48.475 0.154646 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1999 2 174 0.009834 -0.3575 1192.26 0.090054 0.00485418 47.75 0.154961 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1999 3 174 0.009824 -0.30125 1195.83 0.089463 0.00570229 47.025 0.155275 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1999 4 86 0.009815 -0.245 1199.41 0.088871 0.0065504 46.3 0.15559 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2000 1 110 0.009909 -0.18875 1197.13 0.099872 0.00833611 45.175 0.154008 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2000 2 58 0.010003 -0.1325 1194.86 0.110874 0.01012182 44.05 0.152426 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2000 3 30 0.010097 -0.07625 1192.58 0.121875 0.01190752 42.925 0.150844 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2000 4 18 0.010191 0.02 1190.31 0.132876 0.0136932 41.8 0.149262 0 1 1 0 0 0 
2001 1 48 0.010359 0.0375 1187.1 0.145749 0.01661321 40.5 0.147781 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2001 2 58 0.010526 0.055 1183.9 0.158622 0.01953321 39.2 0.146301 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2001 3 70 0.010694 0.0725 1180.7 0.171495 0.02245320 37.9 0.14482 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2001 4 142 0.010862 0.09 1177.5 0.184368 0.0253732 36.6 0.14334 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2002 1 86 0.010981 0.1075 1174.55 0.172596 0.03131136 35.475 0.143831 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2002 2 184 0.011101 0.125 1171.6 0.160823 0.03724952 34.35 0.144322 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2002 3 114 0.01122 0.1425 1168.66 0.149051 0.04318768 33.225 0.144813 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2002 4 462 0.01134 0.16 1165.71 0.137279 0.0491258 32.1 0.145305 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2003 1 577 0.011321 0.1475 1163.23 0.136805 0.05057134 31.25 0.145924 0 1 0 0 0 0 
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2003 2 386 0.011301 0.135 1160.75 0.136332 0.05201684 30.4 0.146543 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2003 3 272 0.011282 0.1225 1158.28 0.135859 0.05346234 29.55 0.147162 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2003 4 198 0.011263 0.11 1155.8 0.135386 0.0549078 28.7 0.147781 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2004 1 218 0.011635 0.11 1153.75 0.144138 0.06134956 28.175 0.147761 1 0 0 0 1 0 
2004 2 122 0.012006 0.11 1151.71 0.152891 0.06779127 27.65 0.147741 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2004 3 195 0.012378 0.11 1149.66 0.161643 0.07423299 27.125 0.147722 1 0 0 0 1 0 
2004 4 302 0.01275 0.11 1147.61 0.170395 0.0806747 26.6 0.147702 0 1 0 0 1 0 
2005 1 216 0.012809 0.065 1145.75 0.173408 0.07514343 26.4 0.148728 1 0 0 0 1 0 
2005 2 176 0.012869 0.02 1143.89 0.176420 0.06961215 26.2 0.149755 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2005 3 122 0.012928 -0.025 1142.03 0.179433 0.06408087 26 0.150781 1 0 0 0 1 0 
2005 4 242 0.012988 -0.07 1140.16 0.182446 0.0585496 25.8 0.151808 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2006 1 140 0.012958 -0.0775 1138.47 0.187499 0.06514179 25.85 0.15243 1 0 0 0 1 0 
2006 2 126 0.012928 -0.085 1136.77 0.192551 0.07173398 25.9 0.153051 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2006 3 209 0.012898 -0.0925 1135.07 0.197604 0.07832617 25.95 0.153673 1 0 0 0 1 0 
2006 4 205 0.012868 -0.1 1133.37 0.202657 0.0849184 26 0.154294 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2007 1 64 0.012882 0.055 1131.83 0.216320 0.09029075 26.05 0.151856 1 0 0 0 1 0 
2007 2 380 0.012896 0.21 1130.28 0.229982 0.09566313 26.1 0.149417 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2007 3 146 0.012911 0.365 1128.73 0.243645 0.10103551 26.15 0.146979 1 0 0 0 1 0 
2007 4 34 0.012925 0.52 1127.18 0.257308 0.1064079 26.2 0.144541 0 0 1 0 1 0 
2008 1 249 0.012925 0.5225 1125.79 0.285205 0.10900429 26.25 0.143748 1 0 0 0 1 0 
2008 2 218 0.012925 0.525 1124.41 0.313103 0.11160069 26.3 0.142956 0 0 0 1 1 0 
2008 3 188 0.012925 0.5275 1123.02 0.341000 0.11419708 26.35 0.142164 1 0 0 1 1 0 
2008 4 259 0.012925 0.53 1121.63 0.368898 0.1167935 26.4 0.141371 0 1 0 1 1 0 
2009 1 474 0.012925 0.3825 1316.22 0.345119 0.11784396 26.4 0.141836 1 0 0 1 1 0 
2009 2 631 0.012925 0.235 1510.82 0.321341 0.11889445 26.4 0.1423 0 0 0 1 1 0 
2009 3 395 0.012925 0.0875 1705.41 0.297563 0.11994493 26.4 0.142765 1 0 0 1 1 0 
2009 4 183 0.012925 -0.06 1900 0.273784 0.1209954 26.4 0.143229 0 0 0 1 1 0 
2010 1 341 0.012925 -0.145 1875 0.283855 0.11516488 26.375 0.143229 1 0 0 1 1 0 
2010 2 522 0.012925 -0.23 1850 0.293926 0.10933434 26.35 0.143229 0 0 0 1 1 0 
2010 3 330 0.012925 -0.315 1825 0.303997 0.10350381 26.325 0.143229 1 0 0 1 1 0 
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2010 4 401 0.012925 -0.4 1800 0.314067 0.0976733 26.3 0.143229 1 0 0 1 1 0 
2011 1 146 0.012925 -0.4125 1800 0.324554 0.10123263 26.3 0.143229 1 0 0 1 1 0 
2011 2 138 0.012925 -0.425 1800 0.335040 0.10479199 26.3 0.143229 0 0 0 1 1 0 
2011 3 139 0.012925 -0.4375 1800 0.345526 0.10835134 26.3 0.143229 1 0 0 1 1 0 
2011 4 138 0.012925 -0.45 1800 0.356013 0.1119107 26.3 0.143229 0 0 0 1 1 0 
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Appendix D - Diagnostic Tests 
 
Diagnostic Tests
Models 1-4
  
 
Purpose and Considerations
• These slides show the diagnostic tests 
conducted during the quantitative analysis 
portion of this research
• Data was aggregated quarterly (1960 to 2011)
• Initial analysis was done using OLS, then AR(1)
• Stata statistical software used to analyze data 
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Model Characteristics
• Model 1:  All data (minus WGI, UN 
Resolutions, and Refugees) (1960-1991)
• Model 2:  Model 1 plus WGI (1996-2011)
• Model 3:  Model 1 plus UN (1992-2011)
• Model 4:  Model 1 plus Refugees (1992-2011)
The final versions of these models are shown on 
the following slides
  
 
Durbin-Watson statistic (transformed) 2.306403
Durbin-Watson statistic (original)    0.926817
                                                                              
         rho     .5677332
                                                                              
       _cons     1741.878   520.8677     3.34   0.001     714.6206    2769.135
              
          1     -179.9121   58.40437    -3.08   0.002    -295.0975   -64.72679
  L.coldwarq  
              
          1      110.6997   49.11612     2.25   0.025      13.8327    207.5667
    L.adminq  
              
          1      93.37184   48.12031     1.94   0.054    -1.531239    188.2749
   L.rokldrq  
              
          1     -29.74627   23.42722    -1.27   0.206    -75.94952    16.45698
    L.usldrq  
              
          1     -18.91945   16.17652    -1.17   0.244    -50.82285    12.98395
 L.exerciseq  
              
         L1.    -3634.759   2140.799    -1.70   0.091    -7856.851    587.3327
     foodppq  
              
         L1.    -7.236242   5.246148    -1.38   0.169    -17.58272    3.110232
    infmortq  
              
         L1.    -43.57502   494.4618    -0.09   0.930    -1018.755    931.6046
totaltradepp  
              
         L1.    -.0917953   .0705419    -1.30   0.195    -.2309184    .0473278
       gdppp  
              
         L1.    -55154.67   17969.03    -3.07   0.002    -90593.27   -19716.08
   dprkcincq  
                                                                              
       score        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                           Semirobust
                                                                              
                                                       Root MSE      =  134.39
                                                       R-squared     =  0.1221
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0045
                                                       F( 10,   195) =    2.66
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =     206
Cochrane-Orcutt AR(1) regression -- iterated estimates
Iteration 7:  rho = 0.5677
Iteration 6:  rho = 0.5677
Iteration 5:  rho = 0.5677
Iteration 4:  rho = 0.5677
Iteration 3:  rho = 0.5672
Iteration 2:  rho = 0.5633
Iteration 1:  rho = 0.5301
Iteration 0:  rho = 0.0000
> coldwarq, corc vce(r)
. xi: prais  score l.dprkcincq l.gdppp l.totaltradepp l.infmortq l.foodppq l.i.exerciseq l.i.usldrq l.i.rokldrq l.i.adminq l.i.
Model 1
FINAL MODEL 1 – AR(1) Regression
Model is 
statistically 
significant
The Model 
explains 12% 
of the variation
AR(1) Significant 
variables (Robust 
SE)– DPRK CINC, 
Cold War (.01 level); 
Admin (.05 level), 
and both Food per 
person and ROK 
Leadership Change
(.10 level)
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. 
Durbin-Watson statistic (transformed) 1.756894
Durbin-Watson statistic (original)    1.124503
                                                                              
         rho     .4477095
                                                                              
       _cons     597.9962   2468.224     0.24   0.810     -4357.17    5553.162
              
          1     -14.34915   118.7285    -0.12   0.904    -252.7066    224.0083
    L.adminq  
              
          1      98.92562   70.27786     1.41   0.165    -42.16307    240.0143
   L.rokldrq  
              
          1     -5.589573   58.80727    -0.10   0.925    -123.6501    112.4709
    L.usldrq  
              
          1      23.24864   21.95039     1.06   0.295    -20.81861    67.31589
 L.exerciseq  
              
         L1.    -11065.66   12884.88    -0.86   0.394    -36933.13    14801.81
     foodppq  
              
         L1.     7.708937   11.94308     0.65   0.522    -16.26779    31.68566
    infmortq  
              
         L1.    -502.8026   1056.531    -0.48   0.636    -2623.877    1618.272
totaltradepp  
              
         L1.     .1348404   .3197684     0.42   0.675    -.5071215    .7768023
       gdppp  
              
         L1.     161.1741   277.9712     0.58   0.565    -396.8764    719.2246
        wgiq  
              
         L1.     77237.74    80520.1     0.96   0.342    -84413.11    238888.6
   dprkcincq  
                                                                              
       score        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                           Semirobust
                                                                              
                                                       Root MSE      =  108.88
                                                       R-squared     =  0.2025
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.1873
                                                       F( 10,    51) =    1.45
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =      62
Cochrane-Orcutt AR(1) regression -- iterated estimates
Iteration 7:  rho = 0.4477
Iteration 6:  rho = 0.4477
Iteration 5:  rho = 0.4477
Iteration 4:  rho = 0.4477
Iteration 3:  rho = 0.4474
Iteration 2:  rho = 0.4450
Iteration 1:  rho = 0.4213
Iteration 0:  rho = 0.0000
> q, corc vce(r)
. xi: prais score l.dprkcincq l.wgiq l.gdppp l.totaltradepp l.infmortq l.foodppq l.i.exerciseq l.i.usldrq l.i.rokldrq l.i.admin
Cochrane-Orcutt
AR(1) with
Robust Standard 
Error
[vce(r)]
Model 2
FINAL MODEL 2 – AR(1) Regression
Model is 
NOT 
statistically 
significant
The Model 
explains 20% 
of the variation
AR(1)
Significant 
variables
(Robust SE)–
None
 
 
Durbin-Watson statistic (transformed) 1.882319
Durbin-Watson statistic (original)    1.244623
                                                                              
         rho     .4079715
                                                                              
       _cons     787.4787   1037.268     0.76   0.450    -1282.916    2857.873
              
          1      46.22309   81.23314     0.57   0.571    -115.9189    208.3651
    L.adminq  
              
          1      107.4748   61.30165     1.75   0.084    -14.88376    229.8335
   L.rokldrq  
              
          1      3.086805   50.64341     0.06   0.952    -97.99787    104.1715
    L.usldrq  
              
          1      10.60475    20.5928     0.51   0.608    -30.49865    51.70814
 L.exerciseq  
              
          1     -16.00958   29.87347    -0.54   0.594    -75.63728    43.61812
    L.unresq  
              
         L1.     -3537.73   5751.358    -0.62   0.541    -15017.49    7942.028
     foodppq  
              
         L1.    -2.374974   5.832422    -0.41   0.685    -14.01654     9.26659
    infmortq  
              
         L1.     116.7253   703.9506     0.17   0.869    -1288.366    1521.816
totaltradepp  
              
         L1.       -.0527   .0612981    -0.86   0.393    -.1750514    .0696515
       gdppp  
              
         L1.     3736.401   41331.83     0.09   0.928    -78762.29    86235.09
   dprkcincq  
                                                                              
       score        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                           Semirobust
                                                                              
                                                       Root MSE      =  107.14
                                                       R-squared     =  0.1789
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.1444
                                                       F( 10,    67) =    1.54
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =      78
Cochrane-Orcutt AR(1) regression -- iterated estimates
Iteration 6:  rho = 0.4080
Iteration 5:  rho = 0.4080
Iteration 4:  rho = 0.4080
Iteration 3:  rho = 0.4078
Iteration 2:  rho = 0.4057
Iteration 1:  rho = 0.3728
Iteration 0:  rho = 0.0000
> adminq, corc vce(r)
. xi: prais score l.dprkcincq l.gdppp l.totaltradepp l.infmortq l.foodppq  l.i.unresq l.i.exerciseq l.i.usldrq l.i.rokldrq l.i.
Model 3
FINAL Model 3 – AR(1) Regression
Model is 
NOT 
statistically 
significant
The Model 
explains 17% 
of the variation
Cochrane-Orcutt
AR(1) with
Robust Standard 
Error
[vce(r)]
AR(1)
Significant 
variables
(Robust SE)–
ROK Leadership 
change (.10 
level)  
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Durbin-Watson statistic (transformed) 1.872192
Durbin-Watson statistic (original)    1.357885
                                                                              
         rho     .3549797
                                                                              
       _cons     540.1039   980.1962     0.55   0.583    -1416.376    2496.584
              
          1       52.4943   77.06109     0.68   0.498    -101.3203    206.3089
    L.adminq  
              
          1      100.9797   65.67377     1.54   0.129    -30.10573    232.0651
   L.rokldrq  
              
          1      16.76734   53.91637     0.31   0.757    -90.85019    124.3849
    L.usldrq  
              
          1      11.43339   20.29014     0.56   0.575    -29.06591    51.93269
 L.exerciseq  
              
         L1.    -2949.348   5301.901    -0.56   0.580    -13531.99    7633.291
     foodppq  
              
         L1.     2.756085   6.745713     0.41   0.684    -10.70841    16.22058
    infmortq  
              
         L1.     2868.563    1633.79     1.76   0.084    -392.4949    6129.621
   refugeesq  
              
         L1.    -828.2668   847.7516    -0.98   0.332    -2520.386    863.8524
totaltradepp  
              
         L1.     .0102596   .0714668     0.14   0.886    -.1323886    .1529079
       gdppp  
              
         L1.    -3189.311   37417.85    -0.09   0.932    -77875.65    71497.03
   dprkcincq  
                                                                              
       score        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                           Semirobust
                                                                              
                                                       Root MSE      =   105.2
                                                       R-squared     =  0.2235
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0621
                                                       F( 10,    67) =    1.89
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =      78
Cochrane-Orcutt AR(1) regression -- iterated estimates
Iteration 7:  rho = 0.3550
Iteration 6:  rho = 0.3550
Iteration 5:  rho = 0.3550
Iteration 4:  rho = 0.3549
Iteration 3:  rho = 0.3546
Iteration 2:  rho = 0.3512
Iteration 1:  rho = 0.3133
Iteration 0:  rho = 0.0000
> .adminq, corc vce(r)
. xi: prais score l.dprkcincq l.gdppp l.totaltradepp l.refugeesq l.infmortq l.foodppq  l.i.exerciseq l.i.usldrq l.i.rokldrq l.i
AR(1)
Significant 
variables
(Robust SE)–
Refugees (.10 
level)
Model 4
FINAL Model 4 – AR(1) Regression
Model is 
statistically 
significant
The Model 
explains 22% 
of the variation
Cochrane-Orcutt
AR(1) with
Robust Standard 
Error
[vce(r)]
  
 
Diagnostic Tests
• Model 1:  All data (minus WGI, UN 
Resolutions, and Refugees) (1960-1991)
• Model 2:  Model 1 plus WGI (1996-2011)
• Model 3:  Model 1 plus UN (1992-2011)
• Model 4:  Model 1 plus Refugees (1992-2011)
The diagnostic tests conducted on each of these 
models are shown on the following slides
 
281 
 
Model 1
Base Model (does not include WGI, 
UN Resolutions,  or Refugees) 
(1960-2011)
 
 
Data Summary – Model 1 (1960-2011)
Model 1
    coldwarq         208    .6153846     .487678          0          1
                                                                      
      adminq         208    .7788462    .4160251          0          1
     rokldrq         208    .0913462    .2887958          0          1
      usldrq         208    .0721154    .2593029          0          1
   exerciseq         208    .6201923    .4865098          0          1
     foodppq         208    .1543594     .009751     .13531    .175528
                                                                      
    infmortq         208    38.65601    13.13068         24         67
totaltradepp         208    .1148044    .0738334    .030464    .368898
       gdppp         208    1987.762    746.0711   1104.994   2841.079
   dprkcincq         208    .0089944    .0029551    .004855    .013581
       score         208    183.8269    184.0945          0        982
                                                                      
    Variable         Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max
. summarize  score dprkcincq gdppp totaltradepp infmortq foodppq exerciseq usldrq rokldrq adminq coldwarq
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Initial Regression Results – Model 1 
(1960-2011)
Model 1
                                                                              
       _cons     2173.678   321.7901     6.75   0.000     1539.083    2808.274
_Icoldwarq_1    -284.4178   66.52627    -4.28   0.000    -415.6128   -153.2227
  _Iadminq_1     185.7859   41.58591     4.47   0.000     103.7752    267.7966
 _Irokldrq_1    -54.45262   40.63883    -1.34   0.182    -134.5956    25.69036
  _Iusldrq_1    -43.06871   44.91563    -0.96   0.339    -131.6459    45.50847
_Iexercise~1     .0751792   24.75548     0.00   0.998    -48.74459    48.89495
     foodppq    -4350.457   1469.424    -2.96   0.003    -7248.278   -1452.636
    infmortq    -10.01718   2.822926    -3.55   0.000    -15.58421   -4.450144
totaltradepp    -335.5611   293.1077    -1.14   0.254    -913.5926    242.4704
       gdppp    -.1069331    .041064    -2.60   0.010    -.1879145   -.0259517
   dprkcincq    -71338.91   11701.44    -6.10   0.000    -94415.08   -48262.74
                                                                              
       score        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    7015391.77   207  33890.7815           Root MSE      =   164.9
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.1976
    Residual    5356961.67   197  27192.6988           R-squared     =  0.2364
       Model     1658430.1    10   165843.01           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F( 10,   197) =    6.10
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     208
i.coldwarq        _Icoldwarq_0-1      (naturally coded; _Icoldwarq_0 omitted)
i.adminq          _Iadminq_0-1        (naturally coded; _Iadminq_0 omitted)
i.rokldrq         _Irokldrq_0-1       (naturally coded; _Irokldrq_0 omitted)
i.usldrq          _Iusldrq_0-1        (naturally coded; _Iusldrq_0 omitted)
i.exerciseq       _Iexerciseq_0-1     (naturally coded; _Iexerciseq_0 omitted)
. xi: reg  score dprkcincq gdppp totaltradepp infmortq foodppq i.exerciseq i.usldrq i.rokldrq i.adminq i.coldwarq
  
 
                                                                              
       _cons     2239.494   315.9938     7.09   0.000     1616.309    2862.678
              
          1     -273.4435   65.21866    -4.19   0.000    -402.0639   -144.8231
  L.coldwarq  
              
          1       197.781   40.76947     4.85   0.000     117.3779    278.1842
    L.adminq  
              
          1      63.61228   39.83932     1.60   0.112    -14.95649     142.181
   L.rokldrq  
              
          1     -32.66524    44.0373    -0.74   0.459     -119.513    54.18253
    L.usldrq  
              
          1     -42.39629   24.35866    -1.74   0.083      -90.435    5.642414
 L.exerciseq  
              
         L1.     -4305.26   1442.024    -2.99   0.003    -7149.135   -1461.385
     foodppq  
              
         L1.    -11.09701   2.787999    -3.98   0.000    -16.59534   -5.598682
    infmortq  
              
         L1.    -365.8384   295.9783    -1.24   0.218    -949.5494    217.8727
totaltradepp  
              
         L1.    -.1233997   .0404498    -3.05   0.003    -.2031725   -.0436269
       gdppp  
              
         L1.    -70772.23   11473.03    -6.17   0.000    -93398.66    -48145.8
   dprkcincq  
                                                                              
       score        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    6983616.59   206  33901.0514           Root MSE      =  161.65
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.2292
    Residual    5121469.05   196  26129.9441           R-squared     =  0.2666
       Model    1862147.54    10  186214.754           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F( 10,   196) =    7.13
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     207
> ldwarq
. xi: reg  score l.dprkcincq l.gdppp l.totaltradepp l.infmortq l.foodppq l.i.exerciseq l.i.usldrq l.i.rokldrq l.i.adminq l.i.co
Correcting for Time Series - Lagging
Model 1
Note: This is to 
ensure that the 
variables are 
examined 
temporally 
(IVARs 
precede 
DVAR)…to 
correct for 
possible 
endogeneity
(dependent 
variable causing 
changes in 
indep variables)
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Corrections for Time Series Effects
• All of the independent variables were lagged by one 
quarter to ensure that the variables are examined 
temporally (IVARs precede DVAR).  Additionally, this 
attempts to correct for possible endogeneity 
(dependent variable causing changes in independent 
variables).
• Results are still disappointing - model explains only 
22% of the variance.
• This is an acknowledged characteristic of the data.
Model 1   
 
                                                                              
       _cons     42.56309   23.76407     1.79   0.075    -4.291591    89.41778
      _hatsq     .0035124   .0006354     5.53   0.000     .0022595    .0047652
        _hat     -.050231   .2186939    -0.23   0.819    -.4814213    .3809592
                                                                              
       score        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    6983616.59   206  33901.0514           Root MSE      =  147.77
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.3559
    Residual    4454352.85   204   21835.063           R-squared     =  0.3622
       Model    2529263.74     2  1264631.87           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  2,   204) =   57.92
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     207
. linktest
                  Prob > F =      0.0000
                 F(3, 193) =     17.46
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of score
. ovtest
Tests for Specification Errors
POSSIBLE SPECIFICATION ERRORModel 1
Specification bias not present
(should be > than .05)
_hat should be 
<.05 and _hatsq 
should be >.05 
(specification bias 
present)
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Corrections for Specification Errors
• Transformed model is possibly misspecified (based on 
Ramsey RESET and link test), but all of the variables 
are required for the theory.   Additionally, other 
variables are not available.
• This is acknowledged as a characteristic of the data.
Model 1   
 
Tests for Heteroscedasticity
Remedy (if needed):
Use Robust SE option or 
transform variables (log)
HETEROSCEDASTICITY MIGHT BE PRESENTModel 1
These numbers should 
both be >.10
Indicates possible 
problems with 
heteroscdasticity
Robust Standard Errors Option used (see next page)
                                                   
               Total       187.09     71    0.0000
                                                   
            Kurtosis         4.37      1    0.0365
            Skewness        50.77     10    0.0000
  Heteroskedasticity       131.94     60    0.0000
                                                   
              Source         chi2     df      p
                                                   
Cameron & Trivedi's decomposition of IM-test
. imtest
         Prob > chi2  =   0.0000
         chi2(1)      =    53.66
         Variables: fitted values of score
         Ho: Constant variance
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity 
. hettest
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       _cons     2239.494   371.5719     6.03   0.000     1506.701    2972.286
              
          1     -273.4435   60.51982    -4.52   0.000    -392.7971   -154.0899
  L.coldwarq  
              
          1       197.781    38.5316     5.13   0.000     121.7913    273.7708
    L.adminq  
              
          1      63.61228   54.26966     1.17   0.243    -43.41515    170.6397
   L.rokldrq  
              
          1     -32.66524   31.45628    -1.04   0.300    -94.70146    29.37099
    L.usldrq  
              
          1     -42.39629   25.20339    -1.68   0.094    -92.10095    7.308357
 L.exerciseq  
              
         L1.     -4305.26   1400.139    -3.07   0.002    -7066.531   -1543.989
     foodppq  
              
         L1.    -11.09701   2.752931    -4.03   0.000    -16.52618   -5.667842
    infmortq  
              
         L1.    -365.8384   279.9831    -1.31   0.193    -918.0045    186.3278
totaltradepp  
              
         L1.    -.1233997   .0403385    -3.06   0.003    -.2029529   -.0438464
       gdppp  
              
         L1.    -70772.23   12938.36    -5.47   0.000    -96288.51   -45255.95
   dprkcincq  
                                                                              
       score        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                                                       Root MSE      =  161.65
                                                       R-squared     =  0.2666
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F( 10,   196) =    5.43
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =     207
> ldwarq, robust
. xi: reg  score l.dprkcincq l.gdppp l.totaltradepp l.infmortq l.foodppq l.i.exerciseq l.i.usldrq l.i.rokldrq l.i.adminq l.i.co
New Regression w/ Robust Standard Errors
Model is
statistically 
significant
The Model 
explains 26% 
of the variation
Model 1
NOTE:  This is the NEW Model based on adding robust standard errors
Significant 
variables –
CINC, GDP, Inf 
Mort, Food, 
Admin, Cold War 
(.01 level); 
Exercise (.10 
level)
 
 
Tests for Autocorrelation
This number falls outside 
the rejection region 
indicating less chance of 
autocorrelation
BG LM indicates 
autocorrelation (P-
values should be > 
.05 if there is no 
autocorrelation)
AUTOCORRELATION POSSIBLY PRESENTModel 1
Gujarati amd Porter (2009, 889) Rejection Zones:
k=11 n=207
Rejection zone is 1.561 to 1.791
                        H0: no serial correlation
                                                                           
       3               70.158               3                   0.0000
       2               68.147               2                   0.0000
       1               59.496               1                   0.0000
                                                                           
    lags(p)             chi2               df                 Prob > chi2
                                                                           
Breusch-Godfrey LM test for autocorrelation
. estat bgodfrey, lags (1 2 3)
Durbin-Watson d-statistic( 11,   207) =  .9268168
. estat dwatson
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Durbin-Watson statistic (transformed) 2.306403
Durbin-Watson statistic (original)    0.926817
                                                                              
         rho     .5677332
                                                                              
       _cons     1741.878   527.2009     3.30   0.001     702.1301    2781.626
              
          1     -179.9121   101.3335    -1.78   0.077    -379.7625    19.93825
  L.coldwarq  
              
          1      110.6997   58.75089     1.88   0.061    -5.169023    226.5684
    L.adminq  
              
          1      93.37184   31.98074     2.92   0.004     30.29929    156.4444
   L.rokldrq  
              
          1     -29.74627   30.51361    -0.97   0.331    -89.92534     30.4328
    L.usldrq  
              
          1     -18.91945   16.23048    -1.17   0.245    -50.92926    13.09037
 L.exerciseq  
              
         L1.    -3634.759   2480.225    -1.47   0.144    -8526.268     1256.75
     foodppq  
              
         L1.    -7.236242   4.765377    -1.52   0.131    -16.63454    2.162053
    infmortq  
              
         L1.    -43.57502   498.0709    -0.09   0.930    -1025.872    938.7224
totaltradepp  
              
         L1.    -.0917953   .0682054    -1.35   0.180    -.2263102    .0427196
       gdppp  
              
         L1.    -55154.67   19288.61    -2.86   0.005    -93195.74    -17113.6
   dprkcincq  
                                                                              
       score        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    4011662.67   205  19569.0862           Root MSE      =  134.39
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.0771
    Residual    3521775.04   195  18060.3848           R-squared     =  0.1221
       Model    489887.627    10  48988.7627           Prob > F      =  0.0039
                                                       F( 10,   195) =    2.71
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     206
Cochrane-Orcutt AR(1) regression -- iterated estimates
Correcting for Autocorrelation
AUTOCORRELATION NOW UNLIKELY
Convergence 
achieved.  Now, 
autocorrelation 
is unlikely (see 
notes for 
explanation)
Model 1   
 
Robust Standard Errors AddedModel 1
Durbin-Watson statistic (transformed) 2.306403
Durbin-Watson statistic (original)    0.926817
                                                                              
         rho     .5677332
                                                                              
       _cons     1741.878   520.8677     3.34   0.001     714.6206    2769.135
              
          1     -179.9121   58.40437    -3.08   0.002    -295.0975   -64.72679
  L.coldwarq  
              
          1      110.6997   49.11612     2.25   0.025      13.8327    207.5667
    L.adminq  
              
          1      93.37184   48.12031     1.94   0.054    -1.531239    188.2749
   L.rokldrq  
              
          1     -29.74627   23.42722    -1.27   0.206    -75.94952    16.45698
    L.usldrq  
              
          1     -18.91945   16.17652    -1.17   0.244    -50.82285    12.98395
 L.exerciseq  
              
         L1.    -3634.759   2140.799    -1.70   0.091    -7856.851    587.3327
     foodppq  
              
         L1.    -7.236242   5.246148    -1.38   0.169    -17.58272    3.110232
    infmortq  
              
         L1.    -43.57502   494.4618    -0.09   0.930    -1018.755    931.6046
totaltradepp  
              
         L1.    -.0917953   .0705419    -1.30   0.195    -.2309184    .0473278
       gdppp  
              
         L1.    -55154.67   17969.03    -3.07   0.002    -90593.27   -19716.08
   dprkcincq  
                                                                              
       score        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                           Semirobust
                                                                              
                                                       Root MSE      =  134.39
                                                       R-squared     =  0.1221
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0045
                                                       F( 10,   195) =    2.66
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =     206
Cochrane-Orcutt AR(1) regression -- iterated estimates
Iteration 7:  rho = 0.5677
Iteration 6:  rho = 0.5677
Iteration 5:  rho = 0.5677
Iteration 4:  rho = 0.5677
Iteration 3:  rho = 0.5672
Iteration 2:  rho = 0.5633
Iteration 1:  rho = 0.5301
Iteration 0:  rho = 0.0000
> coldwarq, corc vce(r)
. xi: prais  score l.dprkcincq l.gdppp l.totaltradepp l.infmortq l.foodppq l.i.exerciseq l.i.usldrq l.i.rokldrq l.i.adminq l.i.
AR(1) with Robust Standard Errors
OLS Significant 
variables (Robust 
SE)– CINC, GDP, Inf 
Mort, Food, ROK 
Admin, Cold War
(.01 level); Exercise 
(.10 level)
AR(1) Significant 
variables (Robust 
SE)– CINC, Cold War
(.01 level); ROK 
Admin (.05 level); 
Food (.10 level)
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    Mean VIF        4.54
                                    
1.L.coldwarq        7.95    0.125756
  1.L.adminq        2.28    0.439395
 1.L.rokldrq        1.05    0.954055
  1.L.usldrq        1.03    0.968445
1.L.exerci~q        1.10    0.905978
         L1.        1.56    0.642515
     foodppq  
         L1.       10.57    0.094597
    infmortq  
         L1.        3.59    0.278770
totaltradepp  
         L1.        7.21    0.138646
       gdppp  
         L1.        9.03    0.110767
   dprkcincq  
                                    
    Variable         VIF       1/VIF  
. vif
Tests for 
Multicollinearity
Correlations
MULTICOLLINEARITY POSSIBLY PRESENT
Correlation is present
Model 1
         L1.    -0.0240  -0.7902   0.5424  -0.6249   0.2587   0.1626   0.1074   0.0278   0.1120   0.5129   1.0000
    coldwarq  
         L1.     0.0955  -0.2668   0.5957  -0.1345  -0.0484   0.1691   0.1119   0.0149   0.0894   1.0000
      adminq  
         L1.     0.1045  -0.1467  -0.0147  -0.1047   0.1417   0.1296  -0.0290   0.1048   1.0000
     rokldrq  
         L1.    -0.0362  -0.0552  -0.0150  -0.0092   0.0576   0.0070   0.1020   1.0000
      usldrq  
         L1.    -0.1441   0.0272   0.2667   0.0307  -0.2071  -0.0345   1.0000
   exerciseq  
         L1.    -0.1371  -0.3667  -0.0175  -0.3860   0.4594   1.0000
     foodppq  
         L1.     0.0596  -0.6941  -0.5082  -0.6170   1.0000
    infmortq  
         L1.     0.0632   0.7161  -0.1270   1.0000
totaltradepp  
         L1.    -0.1312  -0.0898   1.0000
       gdppp  
         L1.    -0.1214   1.0000
   dprkcincq  
       score     1.0000
                                                                                                                 
                  score dprkci~q    gdppp totalt~p infmortq  foodppq exerci~q   usldrq  rokldrq   adminq coldwarq
                               L.       L.       L.       L.       L.       L.       L.       L.       L.       L.
(obs=207)
. xi: corr  score l.dprkcincq l.gdppp l.totaltradepp l.infmortq l.foodppq l.exerciseq l.usldrq l.rokldrq l.adminq l.coldwarq
 
 
Tests for 
Multicollinearity: 
Joint f test
Correlations
VARIABLES ARE INDEPENDENT – MULTICOLLINEARITY 
PROBABLY NOT PRESENTModel 1
            Prob > F =    0.0000
       F(  3,   196) =   12.79
 ( 3)  L.infmortq = 0
 ( 2)  L.totaltradepp = 0
 ( 1)  L.dprkcincq = 0
. test l.dprkcincq l.totaltradepp l.infmortq
            Prob > F =    0.0000
       F(  5,   196) =   11.61
 ( 5)  L.foodppq = 0
 ( 4)  L.infmortq = 0
 ( 3)  L.totaltradepp = 0
 ( 2)  L.gdppp = 0
 ( 1)  L.dprkcincq = 0
. test l.dprkcincq l.gdppp l.totaltradepp l.infmortq l.foodppq
This number should be  
<.05.  If so, then reject 
the null that the 
coefficients are equal to 
zero (thus 
multicollinearity is 
probably not present)
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Durbin-Watson statistic (transformed) 2.306403
Durbin-Watson statistic (original)    0.926817
                                                                              
         rho     .5677332
                                                                              
       _cons     1741.878   520.8677     3.34   0.001     714.6206    2769.135
              
          1     -179.9121   58.40437    -3.08   0.002    -295.0975   -64.72679
  L.coldwarq  
              
          1      110.6997   49.11612     2.25   0.025      13.8327    207.5667
    L.adminq  
              
          1      93.37184   48.12031     1.94   0.054    -1.531239    188.2749
   L.rokldrq  
              
          1     -29.74627   23.42722    -1.27   0.206    -75.94952    16.45698
    L.usldrq  
              
          1     -18.91945   16.17652    -1.17   0.244    -50.82285    12.98395
 L.exerciseq  
              
         L1.    -3634.759   2140.799    -1.70   0.091    -7856.851    587.3327
     foodppq  
              
         L1.    -7.236242   5.246148    -1.38   0.169    -17.58272    3.110232
    infmortq  
              
         L1.    -43.57502   494.4618    -0.09   0.930    -1018.755    931.6046
totaltradepp  
              
         L1.    -.0917953   .0705419    -1.30   0.195    -.2309184    .0473278
       gdppp  
              
         L1.    -55154.67   17969.03    -3.07   0.002    -90593.27   -19716.08
   dprkcincq  
                                                                              
       score        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                           Semirobust
                                                                              
                                                       Root MSE      =  134.39
                                                       R-squared     =  0.1221
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0045
                                                       F( 10,   195) =    2.66
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =     206
Cochrane-Orcutt AR(1) regression -- iterated estimates
Iteration 7:  rho = 0.5677
Iteration 6:  rho = 0.5677
Iteration 5:  rho = 0.5677
Iteration 4:  rho = 0.5677
Iteration 3:  rho = 0.5672
Iteration 2:  rho = 0.5633
Iteration 1:  rho = 0.5301
Iteration 0:  rho = 0.0000
> coldwarq, corc vce(r)
. xi: prais  score l.dprkcincq l.gdppp l.totaltradepp l.infmortq l.foodppq l.i.exerciseq l.i.usldrq l.i.rokldrq l.i.adminq l.i.
Model 1
FINAL MODEL 1 – AR(1) Regression
Model is 
statistically 
significant
The Model 
explains 12% 
of the variation
  
 
Model 2
Model 1 plus WGI 
(limited to 1996-2011)
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Data Summary – Model 2 (1996-2011)
Model 2
Note:  Cold War variable not included (does not vary)
      adminq          64     .390625    .4917474          0          1
     rokldrq          64     .046875     .213042          0          1
                                                                      
      usldrq          64       .0625     .243975          0          1
   exerciseq          64     .546875    .5017331          0          1
      unresq          64      .09375    .2937848          0          1
     foodppq          64    .1495799    .0063382    .141371    .166358
    infmortq          64    34.33594    9.464516       25.8       49.9
                                                                      
totaltradepp          64    .1900897    .0846175    .088871    .368898
       gdppp          64    1285.569    241.3821   1121.631       1900
        wgiq          64   -.0803125    .3116647       -.53        .53
   dprkcincq          64    .0117826    .0011573    .009815    .012988
       score          64    201.6406    134.7728         18        631
                                                                      
    Variable         Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max
. sum score dprkcincq wgiq gdppp totaltradepp infmortq foodppq unresq exerciseq usldrq rokldrq adminq
  
 
Initial Regression Results – Model 2 
(1996-2011)
Model 2
                                                                              
       _cons     275.4112   1391.879     0.20   0.844    -2516.344    3067.166
  _Iadminq_1     37.78316   90.10906     0.42   0.677    -142.9527     218.519
 _Irokldrq_1    -33.58943   85.54753    -0.39   0.696     -205.176    137.9972
  _Iusldrq_1    -18.78588   68.24299    -0.28   0.784     -155.664    118.0922
_Iexercise~1    -20.10431    32.4323    -0.62   0.538    -85.15525    44.94664
     foodppq    -7292.799   8603.417    -0.85   0.400    -24549.07    9963.471
    infmortq     3.254328   9.228834     0.35   0.726    -15.25637    21.76503
totaltradepp    -1102.239   688.0891    -1.60   0.115    -2482.371    277.8928
       gdppp     .2598305   .1919533     1.35   0.182    -.1251791      .64484
        wgiq     169.3514    154.279     1.10   0.277    -140.0931     478.796
   dprkcincq     67338.65   65825.09     1.02   0.311    -64689.76    199367.1
                                                                              
       score        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    1144312.73    63  18163.6942           Root MSE      =  126.86
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.1140
    Residual    852949.941    53  16093.3951           R-squared     =  0.2546
       Model    291362.794    10  29136.2794           Prob > F      =  0.0813
                                                       F( 10,    53) =    1.81
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      64
i.adminq          _Iadminq_0-1        (naturally coded; _Iadminq_0 omitted)
i.rokldrq         _Irokldrq_0-1       (naturally coded; _Irokldrq_0 omitted)
i.usldrq          _Iusldrq_0-1        (naturally coded; _Iusldrq_0 omitted)
i.exerciseq       _Iexerciseq_0-1     (naturally coded; _Iexerciseq_0 omitted)
. xi: reg score dprkcincq wgiq gdppp totaltradepp infmortq foodppq i.exerciseq i.usldrq i.rokldrq i.adminq
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Correcting for Time Series - Lagging
Model 2
Note: This is to 
ensure that the 
variables are 
examined 
temporally 
(IVARs 
precede 
DVAR)…to 
correct for 
possible 
endogeneity
(dependent 
variable causing 
changes in 
indep variables)
                                                                              
       _cons    -379.1858   1371.741    -0.28   0.783    -3131.786    2373.415
              
          1      23.39095   88.00765     0.27   0.791    -153.2093    199.9912
    L.adminq  
              
          1      97.33378   83.68274     1.16   0.250    -70.58792    265.2555
   L.rokldrq  
              
          1      .7099954   66.63076     0.01   0.992    -132.9944    134.4144
    L.usldrq  
              
          1      .4411527   32.15767     0.01   0.989    -64.08793    64.97024
 L.exerciseq  
              
         L1.    -2830.546   8401.131    -0.34   0.738    -19688.65    14027.56
     foodppq  
              
         L1.     4.108633   9.132848     0.45   0.655    -14.21777    22.43503
    infmortq  
              
         L1.    -669.8161   695.0202    -0.96   0.340    -2064.476    724.8441
totaltradepp  
              
         L1.     .2718677   .1899763     1.43   0.158    -.1093477     .653083
       gdppp  
              
         L1.     244.3077    157.284     1.55   0.126    -71.30561    559.9211
        wgiq  
              
         L1.     55054.53   65501.15     0.84   0.404    -76383.14    186492.2
   dprkcincq  
                                                                              
       score        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    1125622.32    62  18155.1987           Root MSE      =  123.86
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.1550
    Residual    797763.442    52  15341.6047           R-squared     =  0.2913
       Model    327858.875    10  32785.8875           Prob > F      =  0.0376
                                                       F( 10,    52) =    2.14
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      63
. xi: reg score l.dprkcincq l.wgiq l.gdppp l.totaltradepp l.infmortq l.foodppq l.i.exerciseq l.i.usldrq l.i.rokldrq l.i.adminq
 
 
Corrections for Time Series Effects
• All of the independent variables were lagged by one 
quarter This is to ensure that the variables are 
examined temporally (IVARs precede DVAR) to correct 
for possible endogeneity (dependent variable causing 
changes in indep variables)
• Model explains 15% of the variance
Model 2  
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Tests for Specification Errors
POSSIBLE SPECIFICATION ERRORModel 2
Specification bias not present
(should be > than .05)
_hat should be 
<.05 and _hatsq 
should be >.05 
(specification bias 
present)
                                                                              
       _cons     26.96915   104.7685     0.26   0.798     -182.599    236.5373
      _hatsq     .0005878   .0020774     0.28   0.778    -.0035676    .0047433
        _hat      .732853   .9652992     0.76   0.451    -1.198033    2.663739
                                                                              
       score        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    1125622.32    62  18155.1987           Root MSE      =  115.23
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.2686
    Residual    796700.227    60  13278.3371           R-squared     =  0.2922
       Model    328922.091     2  164461.045           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  2,    60) =   12.39
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      63
. linktest
                  Prob > F =      0.0169
                  F(3, 49) =      3.74
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of score
. ovtest
  
 
Corrections for Specification Errors
• Transformed model is possibly misspecified (based on 
Ramsey RESET and link test), but all of the variables 
are required for the theory.  And other variables are not 
available.
Model 2  
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               Total        72.64     60    0.1268
                                                   
            Kurtosis         0.48      1    0.4862
            Skewness        15.48     10    0.1154
  Heteroskedasticity        56.68     49    0.2104
                                                   
              Source         chi2     df      p
                                                   
Cameron & Trivedi's decomposition of IM-test
. imtest
         Prob > chi2  =   0.0026
         chi2(1)      =     9.06
         Variables: fitted values of score
         Ho: Constant variance
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity 
. hettest
Tests for Heteroscedasticity
Remedy (if needed):
Use Robust SE option or 
transform variables (log)
HETEROSCEDASTICITY MIGHT BE PRESENTModel 2
These numbers should 
both be >.10
Indicates possible 
problems with 
heteroscedasticity
Robust Standard Errors Option used (see next page)
  
 
                                                                              
       _cons    -379.1858   1550.573    -0.24   0.808    -3490.637    2732.266
              
          1      23.39095   91.64451     0.26   0.800    -160.5072    207.2891
    L.adminq  
              
          1      97.33378   124.3485     0.78   0.437    -152.1898    346.8574
   L.rokldrq  
              
          1      .7099954   73.60461     0.01   0.992    -146.9885    148.4085
    L.usldrq  
              
          1      .4411527   31.57688     0.01   0.989    -62.92249     63.8048
 L.exerciseq  
              
         L1.    -2830.546    8408.43    -0.34   0.738    -19703.29     14042.2
     foodppq  
              
         L1.     4.108633   8.734167     0.47   0.640    -13.41775    21.63502
    infmortq  
              
         L1.    -669.8161   773.1786    -0.87   0.390    -2221.312    881.6803
totaltradepp  
              
         L1.     .2718677    .203777     1.33   0.188    -.1370408    .6807762
       gdppp  
              
         L1.     244.3077    171.449     1.42   0.160    -99.72988    588.3453
        wgiq  
              
         L1.     55054.53   61408.08     0.90   0.374    -68169.81    178278.9
   dprkcincq  
                                                                              
       score        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                                                       Root MSE      =  123.86
                                                       R-squared     =  0.2913
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0197
                                                       F( 10,    52) =    2.40
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =      63
>  robust
. xi: reg score l.dprkcincq l.wgiq l.gdppp l.totaltradepp l.infmortq l.foodppq l.i.exerciseq l.i.usldrq l.i.rokldrq l.i.adminq,
New Regression w/ Robust Standard Errors
Model is
statistically 
significant
The Model 
explains 29% 
of the variation
Model 2 NOTE:  This is the NEW Model based on adding robust standard errors
Significant 
variables – None
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Tests for Autocorrelation
This number falls within 
the rejection region 
indicating possible 
autocorrelation
BG LM indicates 
autocorrelation (P-
values should be > 
.05 if there is no 
autocorrelation)
AUTOCORRELATION PROBABLY PRESENTModel 2
Gujarati and Porter (2009, 889) Rejection Zones:
k=11 n=63
Rejection zone is 1.087 to 1.845
                        H0: no serial correlation
                                                                           
       2               12.845               2                   0.0016
       1               11.607               1                   0.0007
       1               11.607               1                   0.0007
                                                                           
    lags(p)             chi2               df                 Prob > chi2
                                                                           
Breusch-Godfrey LM test for autocorrelation
. estat bgodfrey, lags (1 2 1)
Durbin-Watson d-statistic( 11,    63) =  1.124503
. estat dwatson
 
 
. 
Durbin-Watson statistic (transformed) 1.756894
Durbin-Watson statistic (original)    1.124503
                                                                              
         rho     .4477095
                                                                              
       _cons     597.9962   2468.224     0.24   0.810     -4357.17    5553.162
              
          1     -14.34915   118.7285    -0.12   0.904    -252.7066    224.0083
    L.adminq  
              
          1      98.92562   70.27786     1.41   0.165    -42.16307    240.0143
   L.rokldrq  
              
          1     -5.589573   58.80727    -0.10   0.925    -123.6501    112.4709
    L.usldrq  
              
          1      23.24864   21.95039     1.06   0.295    -20.81861    67.31589
 L.exerciseq  
              
         L1.    -11065.66   12884.88    -0.86   0.394    -36933.13    14801.81
     foodppq  
              
         L1.     7.708937   11.94308     0.65   0.522    -16.26779    31.68566
    infmortq  
              
         L1.    -502.8026   1056.531    -0.48   0.636    -2623.877    1618.272
totaltradepp  
              
         L1.     .1348404   .3197684     0.42   0.675    -.5071215    .7768023
       gdppp  
              
         L1.     161.1741   277.9712     0.58   0.565    -396.8764    719.2246
        wgiq  
              
         L1.     77237.74    80520.1     0.96   0.342    -84413.11    238888.6
   dprkcincq  
                                                                              
       score        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                           Semirobust
                                                                              
                                                       Root MSE      =  108.88
                                                       R-squared     =  0.2025
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.1873
                                                       F( 10,    51) =    1.45
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =      62
Cochrane-Orcutt AR(1) regression -- iterated estimates
Iteration 7:  rho = 0.4477
Iteration 6:  rho = 0.4477
Iteration 5:  rho = 0.4477
Iteration 4:  rho = 0.4477
Iteration 3:  rho = 0.4474
Iteration 2:  rho = 0.4450
Iteration 1:  rho = 0.4213
Iteration 0:  rho = 0.0000
> q, corc vce(r)
. xi: prais score l.dprkcincq l.wgiq l.gdppp l.totaltradepp l.infmortq l.foodppq l.i.exerciseq l.i.usldrq l.i.rokldrq l.i.admin
Co recting for Autocorrelation #1
AUTOCORRELATION NOW UNLIKELYModel 2
Cochrane-Orcutt
AR(1) with
Robust Standard 
Error
[vce(r)]
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    Mean VIF       10.69
                                    
  1.L.adminq        7.50    0.133320
 1.L.rokldrq        1.30    0.766773
  1.L.usldrq        1.08    0.922465
1.L.exerci~q        1.05    0.953710
         L1.       11.45    0.087299
     foodppq  
         L1.       30.33    0.032976
    infmortq  
         L1.       13.32    0.075061
totaltradepp  
         L1.        8.00    0.124955
       gdppp  
         L1.        9.64    0.103694
        wgiq  
         L1.       23.23    0.043054
   dprkcincq  
                                    
    Variable         VIF       1/VIF  
. vif
Tests for 
Multicollinearity
Correlations
MULTICOLLINEARITY POSSIBLY PRESENT
Correlation is present
Model 2
         L1.     0.2646   0.4355  -0.1510   0.6167   0.5847  -0.0781  -0.0713  -0.0219   0.0638   0.1316   1.0000
      adminq  
         L1.     0.2028  -0.0055   0.1024  -0.1165  -0.0576   0.0381  -0.0158  -0.1000  -0.0582   1.0000
     rokldrq  
         L1.    -0.0025   0.0229   0.0904  -0.1110   0.0452   0.0349   0.0071  -0.0291   1.0000
      usldrq  
         L1.    -0.0494  -0.0926  -0.0575   0.0408  -0.0065   0.0516  -0.0422   1.0000
   exerciseq  
         L1.    -0.3693  -0.4384  -0.6862  -0.2944  -0.7139   0.7332   1.0000
     foodppq  
         L1.    -0.3759  -0.8497  -0.6431  -0.2316  -0.7465   1.0000
    infmortq  
         L1.     0.3860   0.8008   0.4251   0.5472   1.0000
totaltradepp  
         L1.     0.2273   0.3502  -0.3423   1.0000
       gdppp  
         L1.     0.3102   0.3701   1.0000
        wgiq  
         L1.     0.3666   1.0000
   dprkcincq  
       score     1.0000
                                                                                                                 
                  score dprkci~q     wgiq    gdppp totalt~p infmortq  foodppq exerci~q   usldrq  rokldrq   adminq
                               L.       L.       L.       L.       L.       L.       L.       L.       L.       L.
(obs=63)
. corr score l.dprkcincq l.wgiq l.gdppp l.totaltradepp l.infmortq l.foodppq  l.exerciseq l.usldrq l.rokldrq l.adminq
 
 
Tests for 
Multicollinearity: 
Joint f test
Correlations
MULTICOLLINEARITY POSSIBLY PRESENTModel 2
            Prob > F =    0.0543
       F(  7,    50) =    2.16
 ( 7)  L.foodppq = 0
 ( 6)  L.refugeesq = 0
 ( 5)  L.infmortq = 0
 ( 4)  L.totaltradepp = 0
 ( 3)  L.gdppp = 0
 ( 2)  L.wgiq = 0
 ( 1)  L.dprkcincq = 0
. test l.dprkcincq l.wgiq l.gdppp l.totaltradepp l.infmortq  l.refugeesq l.foodppq
This number should be  
<.05.  If not, then you 
cannot reject the null 
that the coefficients are 
equal to zero (thus 
multicollinearity is 
possibly present)
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. 
Durbin-Watson statistic (transformed) 1.756894
Durbin-Watson statistic (original)    1.124503
                                                                              
         rho     .4477095
                                                                              
       _cons     597.9962   2468.224     0.24   0.810     -4357.17    5553.162
              
          1     -14.34915   118.7285    -0.12   0.904    -252.7066    224.0083
    L.adminq  
              
          1      98.92562   70.27786     1.41   0.165    -42.16307    240.0143
   L.rokldrq  
              
          1     -5.589573   58.80727    -0.10   0.925    -123.6501    112.4709
    L.usldrq  
              
          1      23.24864   21.95039     1.06   0.295    -20.81861    67.31589
 L.exerciseq  
              
         L1.    -11065.66   12884.88    -0.86   0.394    -36933.13    14801.81
     foodppq  
              
         L1.     7.708937   11.94308     0.65   0.522    -16.26779    31.68566
    infmortq  
              
         L1.    -502.8026   1056.531    -0.48   0.636    -2623.877    1618.272
totaltradepp  
              
         L1.     .1348404   .3197684     0.42   0.675    -.5071215    .7768023
       gdppp  
              
         L1.     161.1741   277.9712     0.58   0.565    -396.8764    719.2246
        wgiq  
              
         L1.     77237.74    80520.1     0.96   0.342    -84413.11    238888.6
   dprkcincq  
                                                                              
       score        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                           Semirobust
                                                                              
                                                       Root MSE      =  108.88
                                                       R-squared     =  0.2025
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.1873
                                                       F( 10,    51) =    1.45
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =      62
Cochrane-Orcutt AR(1) regression -- iterated estimates
Iteration 7:  rho = 0.4477
Iteration 6:  rho = 0.4477
Iteration 5:  rho = 0.4477
Iteration 4:  rho = 0.4477
Iteration 3:  rho = 0.4474
Iteration 2:  rho = 0.4450
Iteration 1:  rho = 0.4213
Iteration 0:  rho = 0.0000
> q, corc vce(r)
. xi: prais score l.dprkcincq l.wgiq l.gdppp l.totaltradepp l.infmortq l.foodppq l.i.exerciseq l.i.usldrq l.i.rokldrq l.i.admin
Cochrane-Orcutt
AR(1) with
Robust Standard 
Error
[vce(r)]
Model 2
FINAL MODEL 2 – AR(1) Regression
Model is 
NOT 
statistically 
significant
The Model 
explains 20% 
of the variation
 
 
Model 3
Model 1 plus UN 
(limited to Post-Cold War,
1992-2011)
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Data Summary – Model 3 (1992-2011)
Model 3
Note:  Cold War variable not included (does not vary)
      adminq          80       .5125    .5029973          0          1
                                                                      
     rokldrq          80         .05      .21932          0          1
      usldrq          80       .0625    .2435887          0          1
   exerciseq          80         .55    .5006325          0          1
      unresq          80          .1    .3018928          0          1
     foodppq          80     .152287    .0080721    .141371     .16812
                                                                      
    infmortq          80        34.3    8.858219      25.55       49.9
totaltradepp          80    .1731398     .082926    .088871    .368898
       gdppp          80    1477.742    481.7935   1121.631    2775.22
   dprkcincq          80    .0119473    .0011444    .009815    .013581
       score          80    188.9875    126.9096         18        631
                                                                      
    Variable         Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max
. sum score dprkcincq gdppp totaltradepp infmortq foodppq unresq exerciseq usldrq rokldrq adminq
 
 
Initial Regression Results – Model 3 
(1992-2011)
Model 3
                                                                              
       _cons     1615.509   734.4022     2.20   0.031      150.417    3080.602
  _Iadminq_1     114.2387   68.20319     1.67   0.098    -21.82297    250.3003
 _Irokldrq_1    -42.31163   69.24778    -0.61   0.543    -180.4572    95.83392
  _Iusldrq_1    -28.66455   56.93208    -0.50   0.616    -142.2409    84.91185
_Iexercise~1    -20.80275    26.9933    -0.77   0.444    -74.65291    33.04741
  _Iunresq_1     71.28295   48.25024     1.48   0.144    -24.97364    167.5395
     foodppq    -7255.898   4866.737    -1.49   0.141    -16964.77    2452.975
    infmortq    -4.044738   5.602888    -0.72   0.473    -15.22219    7.132718
totaltradepp    -472.1883   523.3958    -0.90   0.370    -1516.334    571.9578
       gdppp    -.0724278   .0541728    -1.34   0.186    -.1804996    .0356441
   dprkcincq    -3712.225   42913.09    -0.09   0.931     -89321.5    81897.05
                                                                              
       score        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    1272376.99    79  16106.0378           Root MSE      =   118.7
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.1253
    Residual    972110.851    69  14088.5631           R-squared     =  0.2360
       Model    300266.136    10  30026.6136           Prob > F      =  0.0332
                                                       F( 10,    69) =    2.13
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      80
i.adminq          _Iadminq_0-1        (naturally coded; _Iadminq_0 omitted)
i.rokldrq         _Irokldrq_0-1       (naturally coded; _Irokldrq_0 omitted)
i.usldrq          _Iusldrq_0-1        (naturally coded; _Iusldrq_0 omitted)
i.exerciseq       _Iexerciseq_0-1     (naturally coded; _Iexerciseq_0 omitted)
i.unresq          _Iunresq_0-1        (naturally coded; _Iunresq_0 omitted)
. xi: reg score dprkcincq gdppp totaltradepp infmortq foodppq  i.unresq i.exerciseq i.usldrq i.rokldrq i.adminq
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Correcting for Time Series - Lagging
Model 3
Note: This is to 
ensure that the 
variables are 
examined 
temporally 
(IVARs 
precede 
DVAR)…to 
correct for 
possible 
endogeneity
(dependent 
variable causing 
changes in 
indep variables)
                                                                              
       _cons     1143.345   728.4789     1.57   0.121    -310.3118    2597.002
              
          1      81.36383   67.82996     1.20   0.234    -53.98875    216.7164
    L.adminq  
              
          1      106.1182   67.93636     1.56   0.123    -29.44666    241.6831
   L.rokldrq  
              
          1       1.64689   55.66573     0.03   0.976    -109.4323    112.7261
    L.usldrq  
              
          1      -10.4923   26.66124    -0.39   0.695    -63.69397    42.70936
 L.exerciseq  
              
          1     -13.36988   47.53556    -0.28   0.779    -108.2256    81.48584
    L.unresq  
              
         L1.    -4254.885   4811.648    -0.88   0.380    -13856.38    5346.608
     foodppq  
              
         L1.     -4.37016   5.481318    -0.80   0.428    -15.30796    6.567641
    infmortq  
              
         L1.    -31.40237   537.5445    -0.06   0.954    -1104.056    1041.251
totaltradepp  
              
         L1.    -.0524561    .054674    -0.96   0.341    -.1615563    .0566442
       gdppp  
              
         L1.    -9306.563   42029.41    -0.22   0.825    -93174.95    74561.82
   dprkcincq  
                                                                              
       score        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total     1261636.3    78  16174.8244           Root MSE      =     116
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.1681
    Residual    915031.237    68  13456.3417           R-squared     =  0.2747
       Model    346605.067    10  34660.5067           Prob > F      =  0.0105
                                                       F( 10,    68) =    2.58
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      79
> minq
. xi: reg score l.dprkcincq l.gdppp l.totaltradepp l.infmortq l.foodppq  l.i.unresq l.i.exerciseq l.i.usldrq l.i.rokldrq l.i.ad
  
 
Corrections for Time Series Effects
• All of the independent variables were lagged by one 
quarter This is to ensure that the variables are 
examined temporally (IVARs precede DVAR) and to 
correct for possible endogeneity (dependent variable 
causing changes in independent variables)
• Results indicate no relationships and model explains 
16% of the variance.
Model 3   
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Tests for Specification Errors
POSSIBLE SPECIFICATION ERRORModel 3
Specification bias not present
(should be > than .05)
_hat should be 
<.05 and _hatsq 
should be >.05 
(specification bias 
present)
                                                                              
       _cons     25.50731   98.10574     0.26   0.796    -169.8872    220.9018
      _hatsq      .000619   .0021998     0.28   0.779    -.0037622    .0050003
        _hat     .7338876   .9638211     0.76   0.449    -1.185728    2.653504
                                                                              
       score        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total     1261636.3    78  16174.8244           Root MSE      =  109.67
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.2564
    Residual    914078.803    76  12027.3527           R-squared     =  0.2755
       Model    347557.501     2  173778.751           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  2,    76) =   14.45
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      79
. linktest
                  Prob > F =      0.0154
                  F(3, 65) =      3.73
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of score
. ovtest
 
 
Corrections for Specification Errors
• Transformed model is possibly misspecified (based on 
the Ramsey Reset test), but all of the variables are 
required for the theory.  And other variables are not 
available.
• This is an acknowledged characteristic of the data.
Model 3  
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Tests for Heteroscedasticity
Remedy (if needed):
Use Robust SE option or 
transform variables (log)
HETEROSCEDASTICITY MIGHT BE PRESENTModel 3
These numbers should 
both be >.10
Indicates possible 
problems with 
heteroscedasticity
Robust Standard Errors Option used (see next page)
               Total        66.67     61    0.2885
                                                   
            Kurtosis         0.88      1    0.3469
            Skewness        17.99     10    0.0551
  Heteroskedasticity        47.79     50    0.5625
                                                   
              Source         chi2     df      p
                                                   
Cameron & Trivedi's decomposition of IM-test
. imtest
         Prob > chi2  =   0.0001
         chi2(1)      =    15.22
         Variables: fitted values of score
         Ho: Constant variance
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity 
. hettest
  
 
                                                                              
       _cons     1143.345   770.4729     1.48   0.142    -394.1095      2680.8
              
          1      81.36383    66.4776     1.22   0.225    -51.29016    214.0178
    L.adminq  
              
          1      106.1182   98.51197     1.08   0.285    -90.45932    302.6958
   L.rokldrq  
              
          1       1.64689   52.44227     0.03   0.975         -103    106.2938
    L.usldrq  
              
          1      -10.4923      25.69    -0.41   0.684     -61.7559     40.7713
 L.exerciseq  
              
          1     -13.36988   37.85278    -0.35   0.725    -88.90393    62.16416
    L.unresq  
              
         L1.    -4254.885   4149.248    -1.03   0.309    -12534.58    4024.811
     foodppq  
              
         L1.     -4.37016   4.016659    -1.09   0.280    -12.38528    3.644959
    infmortq  
              
         L1.    -31.40237   550.1095    -0.06   0.955    -1129.129    1066.324
totaltradepp  
              
         L1.    -.0524561   .0474854    -1.10   0.273    -.1472118    .0422996
       gdppp  
              
         L1.    -9306.563   29407.69    -0.32   0.753    -67988.69    49375.56
   dprkcincq  
                                                                              
       score        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                                                       Root MSE      =     116
                                                       R-squared     =  0.2747
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0245
                                                       F( 10,    68) =    2.25
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =      79
> minq, robust
. xi: reg score l.dprkcincq l.gdppp l.totaltradepp l.infmortq l.foodppq  l.i.unresq l.i.exerciseq l.i.usldrq l.i.rokldrq l.i.ad
                                                   
New Regression w/ Robust Sta dard Errors
Model is
statistically 
significant
The Model 
explains 27% 
of the variation
Model 3 NOTE:  This is the NEW Model based on adding robust standard errors
Significant 
variables – None
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Tests for Autocorrelation
This number falls within 
the rejection region 
indicating possible 
autocorrelation
BG LM indicates 
autocorrelation (P-
values should be > 
.05 if there is no 
autocorrelation)
AUTOCORRELATION PROBABLY PRESENTModel 3
Gujarati and Porter (2009, 889) Rejection Zones:
k=11 n=79
Rejection zone 1.205 to 1.810
                        H0: no serial correlation
                                                                           
       2               11.570               2                   0.0031
       1               11.506               1                   0.0007
       1               11.506               1                   0.0007
                                                                           
    lags(p)             chi2               df                 Prob > chi2
                                                                           
Breusch-Godfrey LM test for autocorrelation
. estat bgodfrey, lags (1 2 1)
Durbin-Watson d-statistic( 11,    79) =  1.244623
. estat dwatson
  
 
Durbin-Watson statistic (transformed) 1.882319
Durbin-Watson statistic (original)    1.244623
                                                                              
         rho     .4079715
                                                                              
       _cons     787.4787   1037.268     0.76   0.450    -1282.916    2857.873
              
          1      46.22309   81.23314     0.57   0.571    -115.9189    208.3651
    L.adminq  
              
          1      107.4748   61.30165     1.75   0.084    -14.88376    229.8335
   L.rokldrq  
              
          1      3.086805   50.64341     0.06   0.952    -97.99787    104.1715
    L.usldrq  
              
          1      10.60475    20.5928     0.51   0.608    -30.49865    51.70814
 L.exerciseq  
              
          1     -16.00958   29.87347    -0.54   0.594    -75.63728    43.61812
    L.unresq  
              
         L1.     -3537.73   5751.358    -0.62   0.541    -15017.49    7942.028
     foodppq  
              
         L1.    -2.374974   5.832422    -0.41   0.685    -14.01654     9.26659
    infmortq  
              
         L1.     116.7253   703.9506     0.17   0.869    -1288.366    1521.816
totaltradepp  
              
         L1.       -.0527   .0612981    -0.86   0.393    -.1750514    .0696515
       gdppp  
              
         L1.     3736.401   41331.83     0.09   0.928    -78762.29    86235.09
   dprkcincq  
                                                                              
       score        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                           Semirobust
                                                                              
                                                       Root MSE      =  107.14
                                                       R-squared     =  0.1789
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.1444
                                                       F( 10,    67) =    1.54
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =      78
Cochrane-Orcutt AR(1) regression -- iterated estimates
Iteration 6:  rho = 0.4080
Iteration 5:  rho = 0.4080
Iteration 4:  rho = 0.4080
Iteration 3:  rho = 0.4078
Iteration 2:  rho = 0.4057
Iteration 1:  rho = 0.3728
Iteration 0:  rho = 0.0000
> adminq, corc vce(r)
. xi: prais score l.dprkcincq l.gdppp l.totaltradepp l.infmortq l.foodppq  l.i.unresq l.i.exerciseq l.i.usldrq l.i.rokldrq l.i.
C rrecting for Autocorrelation
AUTOCORRELATION NOW UNLIKELYModel 3
Cochrane-Orcutt
AR(1) with
Robust Standard 
Error
[vce(r)]
OLS 
Significant 
variables
(Robust SE)–
None
AR(1)
Significant 
variables
(Robust SE)–
ROK Leadership 
change (.10 
level)
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    Mean VIF        6.22
                                    
  1.L.adminq        6.75    0.148111
 1.L.rokldrq        1.30    0.767765
  1.L.usldrq        1.08    0.927207
1.L.exerci~q        1.03    0.971120
  1.L.unresq        1.21    0.828264
         L1.        8.71    0.114765
     foodppq  
         L1.       13.70    0.073013
    infmortq  
         L1.       10.94    0.091420
totaltradepp  
         L1.        4.05    0.246896
       gdppp  
         L1.       13.45    0.074323
   dprkcincq  
                                    
    Variable         VIF       1/VIF  
. vif
Tests for 
Multicollinearity
Correlations
MULTICOLLINEARITY POSSIBLY PRESENT
Correlation is present
Model 3
         L1.     0.1113   0.4878   0.6344   0.2577  -0.0715   0.2922   0.0797  -0.0142   0.0487   0.1126   1.0000
      adminq  
         L1.     0.2297   0.0532   0.0183  -0.0564  -0.0086  -0.0357  -0.0775  -0.0265   0.1771   1.0000
     rokldrq  
         L1.     0.0607   0.0624  -0.0083   0.0378  -0.0059  -0.0367  -0.0873   0.0225   1.0000
      usldrq  
         L1.    -0.0524  -0.0723   0.0024  -0.0066   0.0580  -0.0232  -0.1230   1.0000
   exerciseq  
         L1.     0.0225   0.3273   0.1668   0.1973  -0.2790  -0.0663   1.0000
      unresq  
         L1.    -0.3936  -0.1467   0.3733  -0.7356   0.5479   1.0000
     foodppq  
         L1.    -0.3440  -0.8249  -0.2228  -0.6455   1.0000
    infmortq  
         L1.     0.4191   0.5390  -0.1133   1.0000
totaltradepp  
         L1.    -0.0697   0.4998   1.0000
       gdppp  
         L1.     0.2562   1.0000
   dprkcincq  
       score     1.0000
                                                                                                                 
                  score dprkci~q    gdppp totalt~p infmortq  foodppq   unresq exerci~q   usldrq  rokldrq   adminq
                               L.       L.       L.       L.       L.       L.       L.       L.       L.       L.
(obs=79)
. corr score l.dprkcincq l.gdppp l.totaltradepp l.infmortq l.foodppq  l.unresq l.exerciseq l.usldrq l.rokldrq l.adminq
  
 
Tests for 
Multicollinearity: 
Joint f test
Correlations
Model 3
            Prob > F =    0.5571
       F(  3,    68) =    0.70
 ( 3)  L.infmortq = 0
 ( 2)  L.totaltradepp = 0
 ( 1)  L.dprkcincq = 0
. test  l.dprkcincq l.totaltradepp l.infmortq
This number should be  
<.05.  If not, then you 
cannot reject the null 
that the coefficients are 
equal to zero (thus 
multicollinearity is 
possibly present)
MULTICOLLINEARITY POSSIBLY PRESENT  
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Durbin-Watson statistic (transformed) 1.882319
Durbin-Watson statistic (original)    1.244623
                                                                              
         rho     .4079715
                                                                              
       _cons     787.4787   1037.268     0.76   0.450    -1282.916    2857.873
              
          1      46.22309   81.23314     0.57   0.571    -115.9189    208.3651
    L.adminq  
              
          1      107.4748   61.30165     1.75   0.084    -14.88376    229.8335
   L.rokldrq  
              
          1      3.086805   50.64341     0.06   0.952    -97.99787    104.1715
    L.usldrq  
              
          1      10.60475    20.5928     0.51   0.608    -30.49865    51.70814
 L.exerciseq  
              
          1     -16.00958   29.87347    -0.54   0.594    -75.63728    43.61812
    L.unresq  
              
         L1.     -3537.73   5751.358    -0.62   0.541    -15017.49    7942.028
     foodppq  
              
         L1.    -2.374974   5.832422    -0.41   0.685    -14.01654     9.26659
    infmortq  
              
         L1.     116.7253   703.9506     0.17   0.869    -1288.366    1521.816
totaltradepp  
              
         L1.       -.0527   .0612981    -0.86   0.393    -.1750514    .0696515
       gdppp  
              
         L1.     3736.401   41331.83     0.09   0.928    -78762.29    86235.09
   dprkcincq  
                                                                              
       score        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                           Semirobust
                                                                              
                                                       Root MSE      =  107.14
                                                       R-squared     =  0.1789
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.1444
                                                       F( 10,    67) =    1.54
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =      78
Cochrane-Orcutt AR(1) regression -- iterated estimates
Iteration 6:  rho = 0.4080
Iteration 5:  rho = 0.4080
Iteration 4:  rho = 0.4080
Iteration 3:  rho = 0.4078
Iteration 2:  rho = 0.4057
Iteration 1:  rho = 0.3728
Iteration 0:  rho = 0.0000
> adminq, corc vce(r)
. xi: prais score l.dprkcincq l.gdppp l.totaltradepp l.infmortq l.foodppq  l.i.unresq l.i.exerciseq l.i.usldrq l.i.rokldrq l.i.
Model 3
FINAL Model 3 – AR(1) Regression
Model is 
NOT 
statistically 
significant
The Model 
explains 17% 
of the variation
Cochrane-Orcutt
AR(1) with
Robust Standard 
Error
[vce(r)]
AR(1)
Significant 
variables
(Robust SE)–
ROK Leadership 
change (.10 
level)  
 
Model 4
Model 1 plus Refugees 
(limited to Post-Cold War,
1992-2011)
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Data Summary – Model 4 (1992-2011)
Model 4
Note:  Cold War variable not included (does not vary)
      adminq          80       .5125    .5029973          0          1
                                                                      
     rokldrq          80         .05      .21932          0          1
      usldrq          80       .0625    .2435887          0          1
   exerciseq          80         .55    .5006325          0          1
     foodppq          80     .152287    .0080721    .141371     .16812
    infmortq          80        34.3    8.858219      25.55       49.9
                                                                      
   refugeesq          80    .0449841    .0446442   .0007884   .1209954
totaltradepp          80    .1731398     .082926    .088871    .368898
       gdppp          80    1477.742    481.7935   1121.631    2775.22
   dprkcincq          80    .0119473    .0011444    .009815    .013581
       score          80    188.9875    126.9096         18        631
                                                                      
    Variable         Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max
. sum score dprkcincq gdppp totaltradepp  refugeesq infmortq foodppq  exerciseq usldrq rokldrq adminq
  
 
Initial Regression Results – Model 4 
(1992-2011)
Model 4
                                                                              
       _cons     1019.475   696.2982     1.46   0.148    -369.6019    2408.552
  _Iadminq_1     93.66493    63.6592     1.47   0.146     -33.3317    220.6616
 _Irokldrq_1     -59.7236   65.89296    -0.91   0.368    -191.1764    71.72925
  _Iusldrq_1    -6.458542   54.64388    -0.12   0.906    -115.4701     102.553
_Iexercise~1    -25.51275    25.5004    -1.00   0.321    -76.38466    25.35916
     foodppq    -6345.491    4625.47    -1.37   0.175    -15573.05    2882.069
    infmortq      4.47073   5.793069     0.77   0.443    -7.086127    16.02759
   refugeesq     4100.104   1298.189     3.16   0.002     1510.287     6689.92
totaltradepp    -1753.741    655.587    -2.68   0.009    -3061.601   -445.8805
       gdppp     .0398343   .0603093     0.66   0.511    -.0804794     .160148
   dprkcincq     1026.082   40147.05     0.03   0.980     -79065.1    81117.27
                                                                              
       score        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    1272376.99    79  16106.0378           Root MSE      =  112.69
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.2116
    Residual    876193.128    69  12698.4511           R-squared     =  0.3114
       Model    396183.859    10  39618.3859           Prob > F      =  0.0025
                                                       F( 10,    69) =    3.12
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      80
i.adminq          _Iadminq_0-1        (naturally coded; _Iadminq_0 omitted)
i.rokldrq         _Irokldrq_0-1       (naturally coded; _Irokldrq_0 omitted)
i.usldrq          _Iusldrq_0-1        (naturally coded; _Iusldrq_0 omitted)
i.exerciseq       _Iexerciseq_0-1     (naturally coded; _Iexerciseq_0 omitted)
. xi: reg score dprkcincq gdppp totaltradepp  refugeesq infmortq foodppq   i.exerciseq i.usldrq i.rokldrq i.adminq
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       _cons     908.6308   696.8621     1.30   0.197    -481.9358    2299.197
              
          1      84.91766   63.96308     1.33   0.189    -42.71869     212.554
    L.adminq  
              
          1      94.73141   65.59542     1.44   0.153    -36.16222     225.625
   L.rokldrq  
              
          1       26.0627    54.1783     0.48   0.632     -82.0484    134.1738
    L.usldrq  
              
          1     -9.758607   25.49653    -0.38   0.703    -60.63615    41.11894
 L.exerciseq  
              
         L1.     -3838.59   4633.393    -0.83   0.410    -13084.38    5407.202
     foodppq  
              
         L1.      .930735   5.741868     0.16   0.872    -10.52698    12.38845
    infmortq  
              
         L1.     3004.291   1288.369     2.33   0.023      433.391     5575.19
   refugeesq  
              
         L1.    -1066.319   672.5503    -1.59   0.117    -2408.373    275.7339
totaltradepp  
              
         L1.     .0182166   .0607029     0.30   0.765    -.1029142    .1393475
       gdppp  
              
         L1.     -15638.9   39939.34    -0.39   0.697    -95336.62    64058.82
   dprkcincq  
                                                                              
       score        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total     1261636.3    78  16174.8244           Root MSE      =  111.69
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.2288
    Residual    848265.045    68   12474.486           R-squared     =  0.3276
       Model    413371.259    10  41337.1259           Prob > F      =  0.0015
                                                       F( 10,    68) =    3.31
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      79
> dminq
. xi: reg score l.dprkcincq l.gdppp l.totaltradepp l.refugeesq l.infmortq l.foodppq  l.i.exerciseq l.i.usldrq l.i.rokldrq l.i.a
Correcting for Time Series - Lagging
Model 4
Note: This is to ensure 
that the variables are 
examined temporally 
(IVARs precede 
DVAR)…to correct for 
possible endogeneity
(dependent variable 
causing changes in indep 
variables)
  
 
Corrections for Time Series Effects
• All of the independent variables were lagged by one 
quarter This is to ensure that the variables are 
examined temporally (IVARs precede DVAR) and to 
correct for possible endogeneity (dependent variable 
causing changes in independent variables)
• Results indicate no statistically significant relationships 
and model explains 22% of the variance
Model 4  
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Tests for Specification Errors
POSSIBLE SPECIFICATION ERRORModel 4
Specification bias not present
(should be > than .05)
_hat should be 
<.05 and _hatsq 
should be >.05 
(specification bias 
present)
                                                                              
       _cons    -54.06873   96.61421    -0.56   0.577    -246.4926    138.3551
      _hatsq    -.0012294   .0020616    -0.60   0.553    -.0053355    .0028766
        _hat     1.551893   .9398683     1.65   0.103    -.3200172    3.423803
                                                                              
       score        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total     1261636.3    78  16174.8244           Root MSE      =   105.4
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.3132
    Residual    844314.257    76  11109.3981           R-squared     =  0.3308
       Model    417322.047     2  208661.024           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  2,    76) =   18.78
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      79
. linktest
                  Prob > F =      0.1171
                  F(3, 65) =      2.04
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of score
. ovtest
 
 
Corrections for Specification Errors
• Transformed model is possibly misspecified (based on 
the link test), but all of the variables are required for the 
theory.  Other variables are not available.
• This is an acknowledged characteristic of the data.
Model 4  
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Tests for Heteroscedasticity
Remedy (if needed):
Use Robust SE option or 
transform variables (log)
HETEROSCEDASTICITY MIGHT BE PRESENTModel 4
These numbers should 
both be >.10
Indicates possible 
problems with 
heteroscedasticity
Robust Standard Errors Option used (see next page)
                                                   
               Total        67.51     62    0.2944
                                                   
            Kurtosis         1.54      1    0.2145
            Skewness        13.54     10    0.1948
  Heteroskedasticity        52.43     51    0.4184
                                                   
              Source         chi2     df      p
                                                   
Cameron & Trivedi's decomposition of IM-test
. imtest
         Prob > chi2  =   0.0001
         chi2(1)      =    15.38
         Variables: fitted values of score
         Ho: Constant variance
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity 
. hettest
 
 
                                                                              
       _cons     908.6308   731.9904     1.24   0.219    -552.0333    2369.295
              
          1      84.91766   61.87777     1.37   0.174    -38.55751    208.3928
    L.adminq  
              
          1      94.73141   99.67891     0.95   0.345    -104.1748    293.6376
   L.rokldrq  
              
          1       26.0627   58.19754     0.45   0.656    -90.06868    142.1941
    L.usldrq  
              
          1     -9.758607   24.94694    -0.39   0.697    -59.53945    40.02224
 L.exerciseq  
              
         L1.     -3838.59   3989.855    -0.96   0.339    -11800.22    4123.042
     foodppq  
              
         L1.      .930735   4.691946     0.20   0.843    -8.431897    10.29337
    infmortq  
              
         L1.     3004.291   1145.069     2.62   0.011     719.3415     5289.24
   refugeesq  
              
         L1.    -1066.319   678.3717    -1.57   0.121    -2419.989    287.3503
totaltradepp  
              
         L1.     .0182166   .0543171     0.34   0.738    -.0901714    .1266047
       gdppp  
              
         L1.     -15638.9   27478.78    -0.57   0.571    -70471.96    39194.16
   dprkcincq  
                                                                              
       score        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                                                       Root MSE      =  111.69
                                                       R-squared     =  0.3276
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0014
                                                       F( 10,    68) =    3.35
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =      79
> dminq, robust
. xi: reg score l.dprkcincq l.gdppp l.totaltradepp l.refugeesq l.infmortq l.foodppq  l.i.exerciseq l.i.usldrq l.i.rokldrq l.i.a
                                                   New Regression w/ Robust Standard Errors
Model is
statistically 
significant
The Model 
explains 32% 
of the variation
Model 4 NOTE:  This is the NEW Model based on adding robust standard errors
Significant 
variables –
Refugees 
(.05 level)
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Tests for Autocorrelation
This number falls within 
the rejection region 
indicating possible 
autocorrelation
BG LM indicates 
autocorrelation (P-
values should be > 
.05 if there is no 
autocorrelation)
AUTOCORRELATION PROBABLY PRESENTModel 4
Gujarati and Porter (2009, 889) Rejection Zones:
k=11 n=79
Rejection zone 1.205 to 1.810
                        H0: no serial correlation
                                                                           
       3                9.227               3                   0.0264
       2                8.326               2                   0.0156
       1                8.128               1                   0.0044
                                                                           
    lags(p)             chi2               df                 Prob > chi2
                                                                           
Breusch-Godfrey LM test for autocorrelation
. estat bgodfrey, lags (1 2 3)
Durbin-Watson d-statistic( 11,    79) =  1.357885
. estat dwatson
 
 
Durbin-Watson statistic (transformed) 1.872192
Durbin-Watson statistic (original)    1.357885
                                                                              
         rho     .3549797
                                                                              
       _cons     540.1039   980.1962     0.55   0.583    -1416.376    2496.584
              
          1       52.4943   77.06109     0.68   0.498    -101.3203    206.3089
    L.adminq  
              
          1      100.9797   65.67377     1.54   0.129    -30.10573    232.0651
   L.rokldrq  
              
          1      16.76734   53.91637     0.31   0.757    -90.85019    124.3849
    L.usldrq  
              
          1      11.43339   20.29014     0.56   0.575    -29.06591    51.93269
 L.exerciseq  
              
         L1.    -2949.348   5301.901    -0.56   0.580    -13531.99    7633.291
     foodppq  
              
         L1.     2.756085   6.745713     0.41   0.684    -10.70841    16.22058
    infmortq  
              
         L1.     2868.563    1633.79     1.76   0.084    -392.4949    6129.621
   refugeesq  
              
         L1.    -828.2668   847.7516    -0.98   0.332    -2520.386    863.8524
totaltradepp  
              
         L1.     .0102596   .0714668     0.14   0.886    -.1323886    .1529079
       gdppp  
              
         L1.    -3189.311   37417.85    -0.09   0.932    -77875.65    71497.03
   dprkcincq  
                                                                              
       score        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                           Semirobust
                                                                              
                                                       Root MSE      =   105.2
                                                       R-squared     =  0.2235
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0621
                                                       F( 10,    67) =    1.89
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =      78
Cochrane-Orcutt AR(1) regression -- iterated estimates
Iteration 7:  rho = 0.3550
Iteration 6:  rho = 0.3550
Iteration 5:  rho = 0.3550
Iteration 4:  rho = 0.3549
Iteration 3:  rho = 0.3546
Iteration 2:  rho = 0.3512
Iteration 1:  rho = 0.3133
Iteration 0:  rho = 0.0000
> .adminq, corc vce(r)
. xi: prais score l.dprkcincq l.gdppp l.totaltradepp l.refugeesq l.infmortq l.foodppq  l.i.exerciseq l.i.usldrq l.i.rokldrq l.i
Co recting for Autocorrelation
AUTOCORRELATION NOW UNLIKELYModel 4
Cochrane-Orcutt
AR(1) with
Robust Standard 
Error
[vce(r)]
OLS 
Significant 
variables
(Robust SE)–
Refugees (.05)
AR(1)
Significant 
variables
(Robust SE)–
Refugees (.10 
level)
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Tests for 
Multicollinearity
Correlations
MULTICOLLINEARITY POSSIBLY PRESENT
Correlation is present
Model 4
    Mean VIF        9.21
                                    
         L1.        1.02    0.984389
   exerciseq  
         L1.        1.10    0.907397
      usldrq  
         L1.        1.31    0.763451
     rokldrq  
         L1.        5.39    0.185674
       gdppp  
         L1.        6.48    0.154407
      adminq  
         L1.        8.72    0.114734
     foodppq  
         L1.       13.11    0.076300
   dprkcincq  
         L1.       16.21    0.061682
    infmortq  
         L1.       18.47    0.054140
totaltradepp  
         L1.       20.35    0.049145
   refugeesq  
                                    
    Variable         VIF       1/VIF  
. vif
         L1.     0.1113   0.4878   0.6344   0.2577   0.0277  -0.0715   0.2922  -0.0142   0.0487   0.1126   1.0000
      adminq  
         L1.     0.2297   0.0532   0.0183  -0.0564  -0.0215  -0.0086  -0.0357  -0.0265   0.1771   1.0000
     rokldrq  
         L1.     0.0607   0.0624  -0.0083   0.0378  -0.0073  -0.0059  -0.0367   0.0225   1.0000
      usldrq  
         L1.    -0.0524  -0.0723   0.0024  -0.0066  -0.0289   0.0580  -0.0232   1.0000
   exerciseq  
         L1.    -0.3936  -0.1467   0.3733  -0.7356  -0.7861   0.5479   1.0000
     foodppq  
         L1.    -0.3440  -0.8249  -0.2228  -0.6455  -0.7514   1.0000
    infmortq  
         L1.     0.4770   0.5421  -0.2444   0.9217   1.0000
   refugeesq  
         L1.     0.4191   0.5390  -0.1133   1.0000
totaltradepp  
         L1.    -0.0697   0.4998   1.0000
       gdppp  
         L1.     0.2562   1.0000
   dprkcincq  
       score     1.0000
                                                                                                                 
                  score dprkci~q    gdppp totalt~p refuge~q infmortq  foodppq exerci~q   usldrq  rokldrq   adminq
                               L.       L.       L.       L.       L.       L.       L.       L.       L.       L.
(obs=79)
. corr score l.dprkcincq l.gdppp l.totaltradepp l.refugeesq l.infmortq l.foodppq  l.exerciseq l.usldrq l.rokldrq l.adminq
  
 
Tests for 
Multicollinearity: 
Joint f test
Correlations
Model 4
            Prob > F =    0.1199
       F(  4,    68) =    1.90
 ( 4)  L.infmortq = 0
 ( 3)  L.refugeesq = 0
 ( 2)  L.totaltradepp = 0
 ( 1)  L.dprkcincq = 0
. test l.dprkcincq l.totaltradepp l.refugeesq l.infmortq
This number should be  
<.05.  If not, then you 
cannot reject the null 
that the coefficients are 
equal to zero (thus 
multicollinearity is 
possibly present)
MULTICOLLINEARITY POSSIBLY PRESENT   
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Durbin-Watson statistic (transformed) 1.872192
Durbin-Watson statistic (original)    1.357885
                                                                              
         rho     .3549797
                                                                              
       _cons     540.1039   980.1962     0.55   0.583    -1416.376    2496.584
              
          1       52.4943   77.06109     0.68   0.498    -101.3203    206.3089
    L.adminq  
              
          1      100.9797   65.67377     1.54   0.129    -30.10573    232.0651
   L.rokldrq  
              
          1      16.76734   53.91637     0.31   0.757    -90.85019    124.3849
    L.usldrq  
              
          1      11.43339   20.29014     0.56   0.575    -29.06591    51.93269
 L.exerciseq  
              
         L1.    -2949.348   5301.901    -0.56   0.580    -13531.99    7633.291
     foodppq  
              
         L1.     2.756085   6.745713     0.41   0.684    -10.70841    16.22058
    infmortq  
              
         L1.     2868.563    1633.79     1.76   0.084    -392.4949    6129.621
   refugeesq  
              
         L1.    -828.2668   847.7516    -0.98   0.332    -2520.386    863.8524
totaltradepp  
              
         L1.     .0102596   .0714668     0.14   0.886    -.1323886    .1529079
       gdppp  
              
         L1.    -3189.311   37417.85    -0.09   0.932    -77875.65    71497.03
   dprkcincq  
                                                                              
       score        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                           Semirobust
                                                                              
                                                       Root MSE      =   105.2
                                                       R-squared     =  0.2235
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0621
                                                       F( 10,    67) =    1.89
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =      78
Cochrane-Orcutt AR(1) regression -- iterated estimates
Iteration 7:  rho = 0.3550
Iteration 6:  rho = 0.3550
Iteration 5:  rho = 0.3550
Iteration 4:  rho = 0.3549
Iteration 3:  rho = 0.3546
Iteration 2:  rho = 0.3512
Iteration 1:  rho = 0.3133
Iteration 0:  rho = 0.0000
> .adminq, corc vce(r)
. xi: prais score l.dprkcincq l.gdppp l.totaltradepp l.refugeesq l.infmortq l.foodppq  l.i.exerciseq l.i.usldrq l.i.rokldrq l.i
AR(1)
Significant 
variables
(Robust SE)–
Refugees (.10 
level)
Model 4
FINAL Model 4 – AR(1) Regression
Model is 
statistically 
significant
The Model 
explains 22% 
of the variation
Cochrane-Orcutt
AR(1) with
Robust Standard 
Error
[vce(r)]
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Appendix E - Substantive Effects  
Figure E.1  Substantive Effects (All Models)  
Model 1 (Base, 1960-2011)           
  
Standard 
Deviation (SD) 2* SD Coefficient  
2*SD x 
Coefficient Interpretation 
DPRK CINC(t-1)*** 0.008994 0.017988 -55154.67 -992.122204 A one unit increase in CINC equals 
a 992 unit decrease in hostility score 
WGI(t-1) -0.0803125 -0.160625 - n/a   
GDP(t-1) 1987.762 3975.524 -0.0917953 -364.9344182 A one unit increase in GDP equals a 
364 unit decrease in hostility score 
Trade(t-1) 0.1148044 0.2296088 -43.57502 -10.00520805 A one unit increase in Trade equals 
a 10 unit decrease in hostility score 
Refugees(t-1) 0.0449841 0.0899682 - n/a   
Infant Mortality(t-1) 38.65601 77.31202 -7.236242 -559.4484862 
A one unit increase in Infant 
Mortality equals a 559 unit decrease 
in hostility score 
Food(t-1)* 0.154359 0.308718 -3634.759 -1122.115529 A one unit increase in Food equals a 
1122 unit decrease in hostility score 
UN Resolutions(t-1) 0.1 0.2 - n/a   
Military Exercises(t-1) 0.091346 0.182692 -18.91945 -3.456432159 
A one unit increase in Military 
Exercises equals a 3 unit decrease in 
hostility score 
ROK Leadership Change(t-1)* 0.913462 1.826924 93.37184 170.5832554 
A one unit increase in ROK 
Leadership Change equals a 170 unit 
increase in hostility score 
US Leadership Change(t-1) 0.072115 0.14423 -29.74627 -4.290304522 
A one unit increase in US 
Leadership Change equals a 4 unit 
decrease in hostility score 
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ROK Admin(t-1)** 0.7788462 1.5576924 110.6997 172.4360814 
A one unit increase in ROK Admin 
equals a 172 unit increase in 
hostility score 
Cold War(t-1)*** 0.6153846 1.2307692 -179.9121 -221.4302714 
A one unit increase in Cold War 
equals a 221 unit decrease in 
hostility score 
        
Model 2 (Base + WGI, 1996-2011)  
  
Standard 
Deviation (SD) 
2* SD 
Coefficient (from 
above) 
2*SD x 
Coefficient Interpretation 
DPRK CINC(t-1) 0.008994 0.017988 77237.74 1389.352467 
A one unit increase in CINC equals 
a 1389 unit increase in hostility 
score 
WGI(t-1) -0.0803125 -0.160625 161.1741 -25.88858981 A one unit increase in WGI equals a 
25 unit decrease in hostility score 
GDP(t-1) 1987.762 3975.524 0.1348404 536.0612464 A one unit increase in GDP equals a 
536 unit increase in hostility score 
Trade(t-1) 0.1148044 0.2296088 -502.8026 -115.4479016 A one unit increase in Trade equals 
a 115 unit decrease in hostility score 
Refugees(t-1) 0.0449841 0.0899682 - n/a   
Infant Mortality(t-1) 38.65601 77.31202 7.708937 595.9934915 
A one unit increase in Infant 
Mortality equals a 559 unit increase 
in hostility score 
Food(t-1) 0.154359 0.308718 -11065.66 -3416.168424 A one unit increase in Food equals a 
3416 unit decrease in hostility score 
UN Resolutions(t-1) 0.1 0.2 - n/a   
Military Exercises(t-1) 0.091346 0.182692 23.24864 4.247340539 
A one unit increase in Military 
Exercises equals a 4 unit increase in 
hostility score 
ROK Leadership Change(t-1) 0.913462 1.826924 98.92562 180.7295894 
A one unit increase in ROK 
Leadership Change equals a 180 unit 
increase in hostility score 
US Leadership Change(t-1) 0.072115 0.14423 -5.589573 -0.806184114 
A one unit increase in US 
Leadership Change equals a 0.8 unit 
decrease in hostility score 
312 
 
ROK Admin(t-1) 0.7788462 1.5576924 -14.34915 -22.3515619 
A one unit increase in ROK Admin 
equals a 22 unit decrease in hostility 
score 
Cold War(t-1) 0.6153846 1.2307692 - n/a   
      
Model 3 (Base + UN Resolutions, 1992-2011)  
  
Standard 
Deviation (SD) 
2* SD 
Coefficient (from 
above) 
2*SD x 
Coefficient Interpretation 
DPRK CINC(t-1) 0.008994 0.017988 3736.401 67.21038119 A one unit increase in CINC equals 
a 67 unit increase in hostility score 
WGI(t-1) -0.0803125 -0.160625 - n/a   
GDP(t-1) 1987.762 3975.524 -0.0527 -209.5101148 A one unit increase in GDP equals a 
209 unit decrease in hostility score 
Trade(t-1) 0.1148044 0.2296088 116.7253 26.80115606 A one unit increase in Trade equals 
a 26 unit increase in hostility score 
Refugees(t-1) 0.0449841 0.0899682 - n/a   
Infant Mortality(t-1) 38.65601 77.31202 -2.374974 -183.6140374 
A one unit increase in Infant 
Mortality equals a 183 unit decrease 
in hostility score 
Food(t-1) 0.154359 0.308718 -3537.73 -1092.16093 A one unit increase in Food equals a 
1092 unit decrease in hostility score 
UN Resolutions(t-1) 0.1 0.2 -16.00958 n/a   
Military Exercises(t-1) 0.091346 0.182692 10.60475 1.937402987 
A one unit increase in Military 
Exercises equals a 1.9 unit increase 
in hostility score 
ROK Leadership Change  
(t-1)* 
0.913462 1.826924 107.4748 196.3482915 
A one unit increase in ROK 
Leadership Change equals a 196 unit 
increase in hostility score 
US Leadership Change(t-1) 0.072115 0.14423 3.086805 0.445209885 
A one unit increase in US 
Leadership Change equals a 0.4 unit 
increase in hostility score 
ROK Admin(t-1) 0.7788462 1.5576924 46.22309 72.001356 
A one unit increase in ROK Admin 
equals a 72 unit increase in hostility 
score 
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Cold War(t-1) 0.6153846 1.2307692 - n/a   
 
Model 4 (Base + Refugees, 1992-2011)  
  
Standard 
Deviation (SD) 
2* SD 
Coefficient (from 
above) 
2*SD x 
Coefficient Interpretation 
DPRK CINC(t-1) 0.008994 0.017988 -3189.311 -57.36932627 A one unit increase in CINC equals 
a 57 unit decrease in hostility score 
WGI(t-1) -0.0803125 -0.160625 - n/a   
GDP(t-1) 1987.762 3975.524 0.0102596 40.78728603 A one unit increase in GDP equals a 
40 unit increase in hostility score 
Trade(t-1) 0.1148044 0.2296088 -828.2668 -190.177346 A one unit increase in Trade equals 
a 190 unit decrease in hostility score 
Refugees(t-1) 0.0449841 0.0899682 2868.563 258.0794497 
A one unit increase in Refugees 
equals a 258 unit decrease in 
hostility score 
Infant Mortality(t-1) 38.65601 77.31202 2.756085 213.0784986 
A one unit increase in Infant 
Mortality equals a 213 unit increase 
in hostility score 
Food(t-1) 0.154359 0.308718 -2949.348 -910.5168159 A one unit increase in Food equals a 
910 unit decrease in hostility score 
UN Resolutions(t-1) 0.1 0.2 - n/a   
Military Exercises(t-1) 0.091346 0.182692 11.43339 2.088788886 
A one unit increase in Military 
Exercises equals a 2 unit increase in 
hostility score 
ROK Leadership Change(t-1) 0.913462 1.826924 100.9797 184.4822374 
A one unit increase in ROK 
Leadership Change equals a 184 unit 
increase in hostility score 
US Leadership Change(t-1) 0.072115 0.14423 16.76734 2.418353448 
A one unit increase in US 
Leadership Change equals a 2.4 unit 
increase in hostility score 
ROK Admin(t-1) 0.7788462 1.5576924 52.4943 81.76997215 
A one unit increase in ROK Admin 
equals a 81 unit increase in hostility 
score 
Cold War(t-1) 0.6153846 1.2307692  n/a   
Asterisks (*) indicate significance levels (* = p< 0.10;  ** = p < 0.05;  *** = p < 0.01) 
314 
 
Appendix F - Map of the Yellow Sea 
Figure F.1  Map of the Yellow Sea 
 
CIA 2005; ROK Ministry of Defense 2007  
 
